Chen v Chen
[2024] NZHC 186
•15 February 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2023-404-1984
[2024] NZHC 186
BETWEEN GUO JIAN CHEN and HAI YAN LIU
Applicants
AND
HUI CHEN and HONGYUN ZHU
Respondents
Hearing: 12 February 2024 Appearances:
D K Wilson Applicants
R O Parmenter for Respondents
Judgment:
15 February 2024
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESTER
This judgment was delivered by me on 15 February 2024 at 2:30 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
……
CHEN v CHEN [2024] NZHC 186 [15 February 2024]
[1] The applicants (the purchasers) apply to sustain a caveat over a property owned by the respondents (the vendors). I shall refer to the parties by their Christian names to avoid confusion.
[2] In December 2021, Guo and Hai agreed to purchase 144 Nixon Road, Taupaki, Auckland (the property) from Hui and Hongyun. The agreement was on the ADLS tenth edition form (the contract). Settlement was to occur on 18 November 2022. The purchase price was $5,500,000.00 with a 10 per cent deposit, which was paid. The property is 5.8241 ha on which there is a warehouse. Guo and Hai intended to subdivide the property and by agreement were permitted to store items in the warehouse. Guo and Hai did not have to pay rent for the use of the warehouse but it is common ground for the purposes of this application that they had possession of the warehouse by agreement.
[3] In November 2022, by an exchange of emails between the parties’ solicitors, the settlement date was extended to 30 June 2023. That the November 2022 variation required Guo and Hai to:
(a)pay a further deposit of $200,000.00 by 21 November 2022 (which was paid);
(b)pay a further deposit of $1,500,000.00 on 15 March 2023;
(c)interest at five per cent per annum on the balance of the purchase price from 18 November 2022 to 30 June 2023, with that interest payable on settlement date. The sum upon which interest was to be paid would be adjusted as the further deposits were paid;
(d)assuming the further deposits were paid, Guo and Hai could continue to use the warehouse rent free until 30 June 2023;
(e)if the further deposits were not paid then Guo and Hai were to vacate the warehouse immediately and Hui and Hongyun could issue a three
working day notice in respect of the unpaid deposit pursuant to the contract;
(f)the November 2012 exchange of emails recorded that if the further deposits were not paid then the contract would be cancelled and the deposits forfeited; and
(g)the November 2022 variation provided that Guo and Hai would have the right to extend settlement to 31 July 2023 and if that was the case, then they would pay interest on the purchase price from 30 June 2023 to 31 July 2023 at five per cent. If Guo and Hai did not settle on 31 July 2023, then they would have to vacate immediately. The parties agreed that: “Clause 11.4 (1) (b) (i) to be replaced by (i) forfeit and retain for the vendor’s own benefit all the deposit paid by the purchaser.”
[4] As noted at [3](f)] above, the parties agreed Hui and Hongyun would retain all deposits paid in the event either of the further deposits of $200,000.00 and
$1,500,000.00 were not paid.
[5] Clause 11.4(1)(b)(i) of the contract limits a vendor’s right to forfeit and retain the deposit: “… not exceeding in all 10% of the purchase price”.
15 March 2023 - further deposit of $1,500,000.00
[6]The next key event concerns the circumstances in which the further deposit of
$1,500,000.00 due under the November 2022 variation was not paid on 15 March 2023. The solicitors for Hui and Hongyun (the firm of James Donovan) issued a three working day notice calling for payment of the deposit. The
$1,500,000.00 additional deposit was not paid. On 22 March 2023, a further email was sent by James Donovan cancelling the contract in reliance on the three working day notice not being met.
[7] However, it appears the parties had communicated directly concerning the payment of the further $1,500,000.00. Loo & Koo, solicitors for Guo and Hai, wrote
to James Donovan on 23 March 2023 advising that the parties had agreed to cancel the obligation to pay the further $1,500,000.00 and asserted the cancellation notice was “wrongful and actionable”. At that point, Guo and Hai lodged their first caveat to protect their rights. The Loo & Koo email of 23 March 2023 concluded with: “We respectfully ask your clients to reconsider their position”.
[8]James Donovan replied on 29 March 2023 by email as follows:
As you have asked us to do, we have reconsidered the situation and have concluded you are correct in that it seems to be the case that the 3-day deposit notice was ineffectual. Our clients withdraw the purported cancellation, so that the contract remains on foot.
[9] Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the cancellation, on 30 March 2023, Loo & Koo sent an email which concluded:
Given the contents of your emails of 22 and 24 March 2023 our clients no longer wish to proceed with the agreement. Our clients now give notice of cancellation of the agreement pursuant to s 36 Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017.
The letter called for a refund of the deposit.
[10] James Donovan wrote to Loo & Koo on 5 April 2023, disputing that the email of 23 March 2023, referred to at [7] above was sent on that date, asserting it was received on 27 March 2023 and recorded that Hui and Hongyun had reconsidered, as requested, their notice of cancellation which they withdrew.
[11] The affidavit evidence from Guo accepts that on 29 March 2023 Hui and Hongyun withdrew their cancellation. As noted, on 30 March 2023, Guo and Hai sent their own cancellation, but Guo says:
Without prejudice to the positions taken by us, in the ensuing months the vendors and we have been negotiating to try to get the transaction back on track.
Settlement Date – 30 June 2023
[12] It will be recalled that under the November 2022 variation, settlement was to occur on 30 June 2023.
[13] On 4 July 2023, James Donovan served by recorded delivery a settlement notice at the offices of Loo & Koo. The settlement notice was also issued pursuant to ss 28 and 29 of the Property Law Act 2007 (the PLA) given Guo and Hai occupied the warehouse on the property.
[14] Accordingly, the notices combined a settlement notice in terms of the contract and a notice addressing the requirements of ss 28 and 29 of the PLA.
[15]Guo, in his evidence, says the notices were not served on him or his wife.
[16] On 26 July 2023, with settlement not having occurred, a notice of cancellation was sent by James Donovan to Loo & Koo.
[17] On 11 August 2023, Loo & Koo advised they considered service of the PLA notice was invalid, meaning the subsequent cancellation was invalid and therefore a repudiation for which Guo and Hai cancelled the agreement. Repayment of the deposit was sought.
[18] A second caveat was lodged by Guo and Hai over the property to protect their deposit on the basis they have an equitable lien for their recovery of the deposit.1
Two caveats – the scope of the present application
[19] The focus of the submissions presented on behalf of Guo and Hai was on the second caveat registered on 29 August 2023. Counsel advises that the first caveat lodged by Guo and Hai is not being pursued and can be ignored. There is an order that Caveat 12706909.2 registered against CT NA 79B/686 lapse.
1 It is not in dispute that if there is an arguable equitable lien, that such is a caveatable interest.
[20] An adjournment of this application sought on 8 February 2024 was declined as both parties had prepared for the hearing on the basis it was the status of the second caveat that was in issue. Accordingly, the hearing proceeded on 12 February 2024 on the basis it was an application to sustain the second caveat which Hui and Hongyun have applied to lapse.
[21] While the application to sustain refers to the first caveat registered on 4 April 2023, counsel apparently agreed that the second caveat would be the focus of this application, albeit some residual issues about that agreement were reflected in the adjournment application.
[22] The grounds upon which the second caveat is sought to be sustained are firstly, the combined settlement notice/PLA notice (the combined notice) was not served in accordance with the provisions of the PLA and secondly, if that argument is incorrect, there remains a valid caveatable interest as while Hui and Hongyun were entitled to cancel the contract and forfeit the deposit they could only do so to the extent of 10 per cent of the purchase price.
What Guo and Hai have to establish to sustain the second caveat
Caveat principles
[23]The principles are settled and were described by Associate Judge Sussock in
Zhao v Zheng:2
The core principles covering applications to sustain caveats under s 143 of the LTA are those set out in this Court’s decision in Philpott v Noble Investments Ltd (drawing in turn on our earlier decision in Sims v Lowe):3
(a) The onus is on the applicants to demonstrate that they hold an interest in the land that is sufficient to support the caveat, but they need not establish that definitively;
(b) It is enough if the applicants put forward a reasonably arguable case to support the interest they claim.
2 Zhao v Zheng [2023] NZHC 983 at [11], citing Green and McCahill Holdings Ltd v Ara Weiti Development Ltd [2022] NZCA 218.
3 Philpott v Noble Investments Ltd [2015] NZCA 342 at [26]; and Sims v Lowe [1988] 1 NZLR 656 (CA) at 659-660.
(c) The summary procedures involved in applications of this nature are not suited to the determination of disputed questions of fact. An order for the removal of a caveat will only be made if it is patently clear that the caveat cannot be maintained – either because there is no valid ground for lodging it in the first place, or because such a ground no longer exists; and
(d) Where an applicant has discharged the burden upon it, the Court retains discretion to remove the caveat which it exercises on a cautious basis. Before it does so the Court must be satisfied that the caveator’s legitimate interest would not be prejudiced by removal.
First Issue: Was the PLA notice properly served?
Contractual provisions as to service
[24]Clause 1.4 of the contract is headed “Notices” and provides:
The following apply to all notices between the parties relevant to this agreement, whether authorised by this agreement or by the general law:
(1)All notices must be served in writing.
(2)Any notice under section 28 of the Property Law Act 2007, where the purchaser is in possession of the property, must be served in accordance with section 353 of that Act.
(3)All other notices, unless otherwise required by the Property Law Act 2007, must be served be one of the following means:
(a)on the party as authorised by sections 354 to 361 of the Property Law Act 2007, or
(b)on the party or on the party’s lawyer:
(i)by personal delivery; or
(ii)by posting by ordinary mail; or
(iii)by email; or
(iv)in the case of the party’s lawyer only, by sending by document exchange or, if both parties’ lawyers have agreed to subscribe to the same secure web document exchange for this agreement, by secure web document exchange.
… (emphasis added)
[25] It is common ground that s 28 of the PLA had to be complied with, therefore s 353 of the PLA had to be satisfied. Section 353 provides:
353 How documents in section 352 to be given or served
(1)A document to which this section applies (see section 352) is not adequately given or served unless it is given to, or served on,—
(a)an individual person in a manner provided for in section 359:
(b)a company under the Companies Act 1993 in a manner provided for in section 387(1) (other than paragraph (e)) or section 388 of that Act:
(c)an overseas company in a manner provided for in section 389(1) (other than paragraph (e)) or section 390 of the Companies Act 1993:
(d)any other body corporate in a manner in which it could be given or served if the body corporate were a company:
(e)the Crown, by delivery to, or receipt by, the chief executive of the relevant government department or office, or an agent of that chief executive, at the head office of the department or office, in a manner provided for in section 359.
(2)This section is subject to sections 355 to 357, but applies despite anything to the contrary in—
(a)any other enactment; or
(b)any instrument or agreement.
[26]Section 359 of the PLA provides:
359Manner of giving or serving notices
(1)A notice, cross-notice, or other document is given to, or served on, an individual person (including an individual person referred to in section 355) when it is, either in New Zealand or elsewhere,—
(a)delivered by registered post to that person or that person’s agent; or
(b)received by that person in accordance with section 360.
(2)In this section,—
agent, in relation to a person to whom an envelope or package is to be delivered (person A), means a person who has actual or ostensible authority to take delivery, on person A’s behalf, of an envelope or package—
(a)directed to person A by name; and
(b)purporting to contain a document
registered post includes any service that—
(a)provides a system of recorded delivery; and
(b)is similar in nature to a registered post service provided by a person registered as a postal operator under the Postal Services Act 1998.
[27]Section 360 of the PLA provides:
360Receipt for purposes of section 359
A notice, cross-notice, or other document is received by a person for the purposes of section 359 when—
(a)it is handed to, and accepted by, that person; or
(b)if that person does not accept it when it is handed to him or her, it is put down in that person’s presence and brought to his or her attention; or
(c)it is otherwise received in writing by that person.
[28] The combined notice was served by recorded delivery at the offices of Loo & Koo, solicitors addressed to the solicitor acting on the purchase. There is no doubt that Loo & Koo received the combined notice, such being sent by recorded delivery, New Zealand Post records confirming the notice was delivered to Loo & Koo and the covering letter having been stamped “Loo & Koo received 6 July 2023”.
[29] Mr Wilson, counsel for Guo and Hai, submitted that a representation by Guo and Hai as to their solicitors’ ability, that is authority to accept a s 28 notice cannot arise from cl 1.4(3) of the contract because the parties had specifically excluded a s 28 notice from the notices a solicitor was authorised to accept. While Mr Wilson submitted there was always some element of agency when a solicitor is instructed to act on a transaction, he submitted nothing Guo and Hai did could be seen as conferring authority on Loo & Koo to accept service of PLA notices. As authority had to come from Guo and Hai as principals and as there was no evidence they gave Loo & Koo actual authority or held the firm out as having authority, it was arguable Loo & Koo did not have authority to receive the PLA notice. Mr Wilson submitted this conclusion was consistent with cl 1.4 of the contract which provided solicitors have certain functions when acting for a purchaser but that service of PLA notices was effectively carved out from their authority to be served as agents of their client. As I will explain, I do not accept that submission.
The role of Loo & Koo as the purchasers’ solicitors
[30] The first matter I note is there is no denial by Loo & Koo, acting for Guo and Hai, that they did not send the combined notice to Guo and Hai. While Guo says that neither he nor his wife were served with the combined notice, in my view, that evidence was carefully framed. Guo and Hai do not say they did not in fact receive the combined notice.
[31] If Gao and Hai actually received the combined notice then s 360(c) of the PLA applies which recognises actual receipt is, not surprisingly, good service.4
[32] There is no doubt that as the solicitors for the purchasers, Loo & Koo had an obligation to refer the combined notice to their clients.5
[33] I find Loo & Koo had an obligation to pass on the combined notice to their clients. There is no evidence they did not do so. Evidence that they did not do so could only come from Loo & Koo or from Guo and Hai but, while there was undoubtedly an obligation on Loo & Koo to pass the combined notice on to their clients, Mr Parmenter submitted it would have been a “bridge too far” to dismiss the application to sustain the caveat on an inference drawn from the absence of this evidence. Given that acknowledgment by Mr Parmenter, I do not take this issue further.
[34] Service on an agent with actual or ostensible authority is also good service for the purposes of s 359 of the PLA.
[35] There is no suggestion Loo & Koo ceased to act for Guo and Hai in respect of the purchase notwithstanding Guo and Hai’s purported cancellation of the contract on 30 March 2023 noted at [11] above. As noted, that cancellation was not accepted by Hai and Hongyun and Guo confirms that the parties continued to negotiate. At no point did Loo & Koo say to James Donovan they were not authorised to accept service on behalf of Guo and Hai or advise that they had ceased to act in respect of the
4 Kwon v BNZ No. 2 (2010) 14 NZCPR 20 at [43].
5 McKaskell v Benseman [1989] 3 NZLR 75 at 87 line 9. See also the authorities discussed in
Tuscany Ltd v Costello HC Christchurch CP56/99, 30 July 1999 Master Venning at [33]-[38].
purchase. That no objection to being served is raised and a failure by an agent to assert that they do not have authority can be relevant to concluding the agent has authority.6
[36] Accordingly, Loo & Koo were the solicitors instructed for Guo and Hai in respect of their purchase of the property. On 11 August 2023, Loo & Koo wrote to James Donovan on behalf of Guo and Hai asserting ineffective service confirming that Loo & Koo continued to act in respect of the purchase at all relevant times.
[37] It is artificial to try and draw a brightline between the settlement notice that was required under the terms of the contract and the notice required under the PLA. The settlement notice and the PLA notice related to the rights of Guo and Hai under the contract as both were directly relevant to whether the contract would continue to exist. Loo & Koo were instructed without limitation to act on the purchase and accordingly had ostensible, if not actual authority, to receive notices relating to the existence of the contract. That is what Loo & Ko were engaged to do; deal with legal issues arising in connection with the purchase. It is not suggested any limitation on Loo & Koo’s authority existed or was communicated to James Donovan who were told Loo & Koo were acting on the purchase.
[38] I do not accept Mr Wilson’s argument that the structure of cl 1.4 of the contract necessarily leads to a conclusion that solicitors are not agents with ostensible authority to receive PLA notices. Clause 1.4 of the contract is concerned with means of service as well as authority to accept service. There is an overlap between the means of service permitted by s 353 of the PLA and cl 1.4(3) of the contract, albeit s 353 is narrower than the contractual provisions. The role of cl 1.4(3) is to permit service of notices by means such as email. As it is not possible to contract out of s 359 of the PLA, cl 1.4(2) is what might be called an avoidance of doubt provision reminding the reader of the need to comply with the narrower service requirements of the PLA. Separating out the means of service depending on the type of notice does not determine an agent’s authority to receive such notices. Irrespective of the means of service, whether service is effective depends on what the agent has been engaged to do.
6 Kwon v BNZ No. 2 at [42].
[39] McMorland in Sale of Land 4th edition at para 12.27, referring to a s 28 PLA notice, states:
The notice must be served in the manner prescribed by ss 352 to 361 of the PLA 2007; the parties cannot contract out of this requirement. It may not be served as otherwise permitted by cl 1.4 of REI-ADLS form.
This notice may be given at the same time as a notice making time of the essence as to an instalment payment, or as a notice calling up the unpaid balance of the purchase price together with a settlement notice. These notices may be given in the same instrument so long as it meets the requirements of each form of notice. Any composite notice must also be served as required by ss 352 to 361 of the PLA 2007.
[40] So, while a combined notice is permitted, it must still meet the service requirements of the PLA. Accordingly, we return to whether Loo & Koo had actual or ostensible authority to receive the combined notice.
[41] Mr Wilson also relies (albeit as a secondary point) on that part of s 359 of the PLA that refers to the envelope being “directed to person A by name” and purporting to contain a document. He notes that the package was addressed to the solicitor at Loo & Koo acting for Guo and Hai and not addressed to Guo and Hai personally. However, as I have already noted, the package was opened as confirmed by the covering letter being stamped received by Loo & Koo with the covering letter being headed: “Re Chen and Zhu to Chen and Liu – 144 Nixon Road, Taupaki”. The letter began: “Please find enclosed our settlement notice re the above matter which was due to settle on 30 June 2023.” There can have been no doubt as to the nature of the document and the client of the firm for whom it was intended. Addressing the letter to the solicitor actually dealing with the matter is sensible. In any event, any concern as to whether the covering envelope or package had Guo and Hai’s name on either the outside of the envelope or the outside of the package is overtaken by the fact that the package was actually opened and the clients to whom it was directed named.
[42] It is artificial for solicitors acting on a purchase to say they did not have ostensible authority to receive the combined notices when, because they were aware their clients were in possession, a settlement notice would have to address the PLA either in a combined notice or by a separate notice.
[43] This is not a situation where Loo & Koo advised they had ceased to act or where, having received the composite notice, advised James Donovan they did not have authority to receive the notice.
[44] I find Loo & Koo had actual or ostensible authority to receive the combined notice. In short, Loo & Koo, in acting for Guo and Hai on the purchase, had actual or ostensible authority to receive communications concerning the status of the purchase. The combined notice was such a communication. As the combined notice was actually received by Loo & Koo as agent for Guo and Hai, I am satisfied the service requirements of the PLA were met.
[45] It follows from that conclusion the notice of cancellation sent by Hui and Hongyun’s solicitor was not a repudiation for which Guo and Hai were entitled to cancel. Rather, the opposite is true: Hui and Hongyun were entitled to cancel and therefore were entitled to retain the deposit subject to the subsidiary argument as to the deposit being more than 10 per cent.
The deposit
[46] Clause 11.4(1)(b) of the contract provides that if the vendor has cancelled a contract for failure by the purchaser to comply with a settlement notice then the vendor can:
Cancel this agreement by notice and pursue either or both of the following remedies:
(i)forfeit and retain for the vendor’s own benefit the deposit paid by the purchaser, but not exceeding in all 10 per cent of the purchase price; and/or
(ii)sue the purchaser for damages.
[47] Mr Wilson submits that if the contract was validly cancelled, the above clause limits the amount of deposit that can be retained by Hui and Hongyun to 10 per cent. The deposit, while originally 10 per cent, was increased by $200,000.00 pursuant to the November 2022 variation. A deposit of $750,000.00 is 12.72 per cent of the purchase price.
[48]Clauses 5 and 6 of the November 2022 variation noted earlier:
5.If the further deposit in items 1 & 2 is not paid in full on the due date for payment, then
a.The purchaser must vacate the storage building immediately; and
b.The vendor may at any time serve on the purchaser a three working days’ notice requiring payment. If the purchaser fails to pay the deposit on or before the third working day after service of the notice, time being of the essence, the vendor has the right to cancel this agreement by serving notice of cancellation on the purchaser and forfeit all the deposit paid by the purchaser.
6.The purchaser shall have the right to extend the settlement to 31 July 2023 if required by the purchaser with interest payable on the balance purchase price at 5% per annum from 30 June 2023 to 31 July 2023. If the purchaser fails to settle on 31 July 2023, then
a.The purchaser must vacate the storage building immediately;
b.The interest rate for late settlement 12% shall apply from 31 July 2023; and
c.Clause 11.4 (1) (b) (i) to be replaced by (i) forfeit and retain for the vendor’s own benefit all the deposit paid by the purchaser.
[49] Guo and Hai did not take up the option created by cl 6 of the contract to defer settlement by a month. In my view, I doubt whether or not the further deposit of
$200,000.00 could be retained by Hui and Hongyun would depend on whether Guo and Hai opted to defer settlement.
[50] Clause 5 of the contract entitled Hui and Hongyun to forfeit the $200,000.00 if the further $1,500,000.00 was not paid. Both the $200,000.00 and the $1,500,000.00 would be part of the purchase price. Of course the purchase price was never paid. The parties varied the obligation to pay the further $1,500,000.00 but, when the November 2022 variation was made, the parties agreed that the $200,000.00 deposit would be lost if the $1,500,000.00 was not paid or the contract did not settle by 31 July 2023 in the event Guo and Hai elected to defer settlement by a month.
[51] The payment of the further $200,000.00 deposit was for the benefit of Hui and Hongyun. Was it intended that a failure to settle by Guo and Hai could deprive Hui
and Hongyun of the benefit of the further deposit? A failure to settle by Guo and Hai is the very event at which the payment of the deposit was aimed.
[52] In the context of a major purchase where the deposit was part of Guo and Hai obtaining an extension of the settlement date from 18 November 2022 to 30 June 2023 and permitting Guo and Hai to have continued rent free use of the warehouse, I doubt it could have been intended that part of what Guo and Hai agreed to provide for obtaining the extension and the use of the warehouse would automatically revert to them if they failed to extend settlement by a month.
[53] However, Mr Parmenter, in his oral submissions, conceded that for the purposes of this application, it was arguable that the cl 6 alteration of cl 11.4(1)(b) of the contract was dependent on the settlement date being deferred to 31 July 2023 – which did not occur. The presence of cl 11.4(1)(b) means it is not possible to imply an ability to retain a deposit greater than 10 per cent. It follows it is arguable that Hui and Hongyun are bound by the 10 per cent limit on their ability to forfeit the deposit. Therefore, there is a reasonably arguable basis to sustain the second caveat to the extent that it protects an equitable lien to recover $200,000.00 of the $750,000.00 deposit.
[54] Accordingly, there is an order that caveat number 12817748.1 registered on 29 August 2023 is sustained. The value of the equitable lien is not recorded in the caveat but I confirm that the extent of the equitable lien protected by that caveat is
$200,000.00.
Costs
[55] The parties have had mixed success. The primary argument advanced by Mr Wilson on behalf of Guo and Hai was a right to sustain the caveat to protect their claim to recover $750,000.00. The primary basis for that submission was dismissed.
[56] Mr Parmenter, when briefly addressing costs, suggested it could be said that, broadly speaking, Hui and Hongyun have had two-thirds success in terms of the quantum in that the arguable lien now only applies to the further deposit of
$200,000.00.
[57] The agency point was the primary focus of both counsels submissions. The issue around the separate treatment of the $200,000.00 occupied no more than a paragraph of Mr Wilson’s submissions. I am satisfied that the respondents, Hui and Hongyun, are the primarily successful parties in respect of this application. There is an order that the applicants are to pay the respondents costs on a 2B basis reduced by 33 per cent to represent the mixed success. The respondents are also entitled to disbursements as fixed by the Registrar.
Associate Judge Lester
Solicitors:
Loo & Koo, Auckland (for Applicants)
James Donovan, Auckland (for Respondents)
Copy to counsel:
D K Wilson, Barrister, Auckland (for Applicants)
R O Parmenter, Barrister, Auckland (for Respondents)
0
3
1