Bright v Wolfbrook Residential Limited
[2025] NZHC 437
•7 March 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CIV-2023-485-795
[2025] NZHC 437
UNDER the Fair Trading Act 1986 and the Companies Act 1993 BETWEEN
PAMELA ALISON BRIGHT
Plaintiff
AND
WOLFBROOK RESIDENTIAL LIMITED
First Defendant
STEVEN CAVELL BROOKS
Second DefendantJAMES OWEN COONEY
Third Defendant
Hearing: 25 February 2025 Appearances:
M Freeman for Plaintiff
T P Westaway and N R Harvey for Defendants
Judgment:
7 March 2025
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAULSEN
This judgment was delivered by me on 7 March 2025 at 4.15 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:
BRIGHT v WOLFBROOK RESIDENTIAL LIMITED [2025] NZHC 437 [7 March 2025]
[1] The plaintiff (Ms Bright) owns a property at 58 Martin Street, Upper Hutt. She was approached to sell the property for development purposes and entered into an agreement dated 16 December 2021 (the agreement) to sell the property to Fix My Property Ltd. Fix My Property Ltd failed to settle. Ms Bright ultimately cancelled the agreement but suffered substantial losses. Fix My Property Ltd is now in liquidation and is not a party to this proceeding. Ms Bright seeks to recover her losses from the first defendant (Wolfbrook) and the second and third defendants (Mr Brooks and Mr Cooney respectively).
[2] As far as Wolfbrook is concerned, Ms Bright alleges that Fix My Property Ltd was its agent in respect to the purchase of her property and that Wolfbrook must compensate her for her loss consequent upon its repudiation of the agreement.
[3] Mr Brooks and Mr Cooney are 50 per cent shareholders in Fix My Property Ltd and both were directors of the company at relevant times. Ms Bright makes claims against them for breaches of the Fair Trading Act 1986 and the Companies Act 1993.
[4] Wolfbrook has made an application for strike out/summary judgment. Relevantly, it asserts:
(a)it is only a promoting entity for the wider Wolfbrook group of companies;
(b)it never intended to purchase 58 Martin Street;
(c)Fix My Property Ltd was not its agent in respect to the purchase of the property;
(d)developments were undertaken by special purpose vehicles within the Wolfbrook group, of which Fix My Property Ltd is an example; and
(e)there are no documents to be obtained on discovery to support Ms Bright’s case.
[5] Wolfbrook’s application is supported by affidavits of Mr Brooks and Mr Cooney. In opposition to the application, Ms Bright has filed an affidavit referring to and annexing an affidavit previously made by Mr Brooks in a proceeding between Wolfbrook and a purchaser of a property in another development (the Churton affidavit). The Churton affidavit is said to:
(a)contradict evidence that Wolfbrook is (or was at the material times) simply a promotional entity;
(b)raise a serious issue as to whether Fix My Property Ltd was the agent of Wolfbrook in respect to the purchase; and
(c)cast doubt on the assertion that there are no further documents that could be obtained on discovery to support Ms Bright’s case.
[6] This judgment deals with an application by Wolfbrook to strike out what are said to be impermissible parts of Ms Bright’s affidavit as follows:
(a)paragraphs referring to the Churton affidavit; and
(b)the Churton affidavit itself (annexed as an exhibit to the affidavit).
[7] Wolfbrook’s application relies upon r 7.32 of the High Court Rules 2016 (the Rules) which it says, “bars the use of previous affidavits in interlocutory applications unless those affidavits were made in the same proceeding or in separate proceedings between the same parties”.
[8] Wolfbrook also says the Churton affidavit is not relevant to any matter in issue, is unfairly prejudicial and will needlessly prolong the proceeding.1
[9] Ms Bright responds that r 7.32 does not apply so as to exclude the Churton affidavit, and the content of the Churton affidavit is both relevant and admissible.
1 Evidence Act 2006, ss 7 and 8.
[10]The issues are:
(a)Does r 7.32 prevent Ms Bright from relying on the Churton affidavit in opposition to Wolfbrook’s application?
(b)Is the content of the Churton affidavit relevant to matters in issue?
(c)Should the Court exclude the Churton affidavit because it is unfairly prejudicial or will needlessly prolong the proceeding?
Context
[11] Wolfbrook’s application for strike out/summary judgment responds to Ms Bright’s claim that Fix My Property Ltd was the agent of Wolfbrook in respect to the purchase of her property as follows:
(i) The plaintiff has failed to provide any evidential basis for the allegation that Fix My Property was Wolfbrook’ [sic] Residential’s agent.
...
(iii) Wolfbrook Residential was a promoting entity for the wider Wolfbrook group. It was never intended to purchase 58 Martin Street.
...
(vi)Fix My Property is an independent entity, and not a related company to Wolfbrook Residential.
[12]Mr Brooks’ affidavit in support of Wolfbrook’s application says:
9The Wolfbrook Property Group (as a group of companies) is involved in the purchasing, development, and sale of property in New Zealand. As a group, Wolfbrook has many subsidiary, related and special purpose companies that perform specific functions in that group. I consider Wolfbrook Residential is a “promoting entity”, as I describe below.
...
11 Ms Bright appears to have selected Wolfbrook Residential at random, and then decided Wolfbrook Residential is responsible for any action of any entity within the Wolfbrook Property Group. As a result, many allegations in Ms Bright’s claim are factually inaccurate, these include:
(a)The inference Wolfbrook Residential was intended to purchase 59 Martin Street. Wolfbrook Residential is a promoting entity and we never had any intention it would be the ultimate purchaser of 58 Martin Street.
…
13There was never an agency relationship between Fix My Property and Wolfbrook Residential. In this respect:
(a)I have never appointed Fix My Property as the agent of Wolfbrook Residential. As one of two directors, this should be the start and end of any agency arrangement.
(b)As a director of Fix My Property I knew that Fix My Property was not the agent of Wolfbrook Residential.
(c)I have searched the records of the Wolfbrook Group. I have found no documents evidencing an agency relationship. There is no document that might be available in discovery that will change the lack of agency.
(d)Wolfbrook Residential never suggested or implied to the public or anyone it dealt with that Fix My Property had the authority to enter contracts on behalf of Wolfbrook Residential.
(e)Fix My Property had zero authority to bind Wolfbrook Residential. Everyone knew this.
14Whilst I am both a director of Fix My Property and Wolfbrook Residential, Fix My Property is an independent entity. This is an intentional corporate structure. Like many property developers, we utilise special purpose vehicles for certain transactions.
15I can say unequivocally that Wolfbrook Residential was not the principal of Fix My Property under the agreement for sale and purchase.
[13]Mr Cooney’s affidavit confirms the contents of Mr Brooks’ affidavit and says:
3 ... (d)
The Wolfbrook group and the Wolfbrook branding is different
from individual companies. We are careful to ensure that contracting on particular developments is done through special purpose vehicles. It was always made very clear that the agreement with Ms Bright was in the name of Fix My Property and no other entity.
4I confirm that there will be no other documents that are relevant to this case that would fall within an order for discovery. There is no agency agreement, no other documents even suggesting an agency
relationship, and no documents beyond those in the affidavits as to the representations said to be made by Wolfbrook Residential.
[14] Ms Bright’s affidavit in opposition to the application annexes the Churton affidavit (without exhibits). The Churton proceeding was a claim by Wolfbrook for damages following failure of the defendant to complete the purchase of a property in a residential development undertaken by Wolfbrook.
[15]Ms Bright refers to the Churton affidavit and says:
74. I have seen an affidavit filed by Mr Brooks, on behalf of Wolfbrook Residential Limited, in different proceedings. I have seen this because the defendant in those proceedings provided them to my lawyer with permission to use them in this proceeding if helpful.
...
76.In that affidavit Mr Brooks describes Wolfbrook Residential Limited very differently. He says:
“Wolfbrook Residential is a property Development Company. Wolfbrook Residential’s core business activities involve the acquisition of land, subdivision, construction and sale of residential properties. Wolfbrook Residential Limited is involved in developments throughout New Zealand.”
77.In that affidavit he also describes an associated Company called Wolfbrook Residential no [sic] 4 Ltd which he refers to as the agent/nominee for Wolfbrook Residential Limited and which owns the land as a bare trustee for Wolfbrook Residential Limited.
78.It seems likely that Wolfbrook No 13 Limited (which purchased 60 Martin Street and presumably would have purchased my property as well) would also be an agent of Wolfbrook Residential Limited, as would Fix My Property Limited. It is not clear what Fix My Property Limited did if it does not buy property for Wolfbrook.
[16]In the Churton affidavit, Mr Brooks deposed:
5.Wolfbrook Residential is a property development company. Wolfbrook Residential’s core business activities involve the acquisition of land, subdivision, construction and sale of residential properties. Wolfbrook Residential is involved in developments throughout New Zealand.
6.Lot 1, 43 Churton Crescent (Property) is part of a development undertaken by Wolfbrook Residential in Lower Hutt. Wolfbrook Residential acquired the land for development. Subdivision plans were commissioned, and consent was obtained. Residences were constructed.
...
10.As the development progressed, Wolfbrook Residential handed off the funding and construction phase of the development to an associated company, Wolfbrook Residential No 4 Ltd (No 4). The shares in No 4 are held by Wolfbrook Residential, and the directors of both companies are the same.
11.The development land was transferred from Wolfbrook Residential to No 4 on 7 October 2022 and held by No 4 as a bare trustee for Wolfbrook Residential. There was no consideration for the transfer to No 4, since No 4 only held the land as bare trustee and acted at the direction of and as agent/nominee for Wolfbrook Residential Ltd. These arrangements were recorded in a Deed dated 7 October 2022.
...
12.This is a common practice in development projects, and the purchasers are fully aware of the arrangements and consent to those arrangements. Once the development is complete, the completed titles are transferred back to Wolfbrook Residential at the time of settlement, and Wolfbrook Residential completes settlement.
[17] Mr Brooks has also sworn an affidavit in reply to Ms Bright’s affidavit. He says the Churton affidavit is taken out of context and “relates to a time earlier in the development cycle of the Wolfbrook Group”. He also says:
9The business practices of Wolfbrook Residential have necessarily changed overtime [sic]. A significant change occurred in late 2021 with respect to the role of Wolfbrook Residential; in part caused by problems that arose with the Churton Purchase.
10Those problems explain why Wolfbrook Residential now operates only as a promoting entity. In the facts of the Churton Proceeding, Wolfbrook Residential did own the land in question and was selling it. However, the changing requirements of project funders made this arrangement untenable.
11Project funders often require, as was the case with the Churton Crescent development, a General Security Agreement (GSA) before they would advance funds. The funder for Churton Crescent would not accept a GSA from Wolfbrook Residential given it already possessed significant other obligations in relation to other developments.
12The solution in the Churton Purchase was to transfer Churton Crescent to Wolfbrook Residential No 4 Limited (Wolfbrook No 4), who would then hold Churton Crescent as a bare trustee for Wolfbrook Residential. This transfer enabled Wolfbrook No 4 to provide the required GSA. In this respect, Wolfbrook Residential was not the developer in this situation – it was the beneficiary of a trustee development entity.
13This solution worked for the Churton Purchase but was not practical as a continuing practice. It was decided that, moving forward, new entities would be incorporated for each development; with that new entity providing security to project funders.
14This is how Wolfbrook currently operates – Wolfbrook Residential has not purchased any properties for more than two years. This change in operation started in late 2021.
15The context of the two proceedings was entirely different, not least because Wolfbrook Residential Limited was a contracting party who owned the land in the Churton Proceedings. Even then, it was subject to a bare trust arrangement, formally recorded in a deed. ...
16Naturally that has not happened in the current proceeding. Wolfbrook Residential Limited did not contract with Ms Bright. It was not intended to purchase 58 Martin Street. It issued no directives to Fix My Property Limited and did not operate in an agency relationship with Fix My Property Limited. There are no trust deeds or arrangements between Fix My Property and Wolfbrook Residential in this case.
General comments
17Having briefly explained the context, I consider it clear that my comments in the Churton Affidavit are not inconsistent with the statements I have made in the current proceedings. The Churton Affidavit described the business practices of Wolfbrook Residential at the time of the Churton Purchase; by December 2021, those business practices had changed.
...
The submissions
Wolfbrook
[18] Wolfbrook argues that r 7.32 regulates the use of affidavits in the disposal of interlocutory applications, and unless its requirements are satisfied the Court may not have regard to an affidavit. Those requirements are said to be that the affidavit must be filed in the same proceeding or, if not filed in the same proceeding, can only be relied upon if:
(a)the Court has granted leave for its use; and
(b)the affidavit was filed in a proceeding between the same parties; and
(c)prior notice of the intention to use the affidavit has been given.
[19] Wolfbrook says those requirements are not met in respect to the Churton affidavit, which is an insuperable barrier to Ms Bright relying on it and it must be excluded. It says the requirements are not met because the affidavit was not filed in this proceeding, and the Churton proceeding was not between these parties but between Wolfbrook and a third party.
[20] Wolfbrook contends its interpretation of the rule is supported by the authorities on r 7.32 and its predecessor rule,2 and by the policy objectives of r 7.32 which it says are threefold, namely:
(a)that a litigant should not be “hamstrung” when preparing evidence with considerations of how their evidence in one proceeding might be construed in an unrelated matter with a different factual matrix;3
(b)the avoidance of prejudice where the context within which an affidavit was made may be unknown or misunderstood so that it is necessary to “relitigate” prior proceedings to obtain or examine that context;4 and
(c)the avoidance of duplication of affidavit evidence where the same parties are involved in multiple proceedings by allowing the use of affidavits in different proceedings where the parties remain the same, but not otherwise.
[21] Wolfbrook contends Ms Bright’s use of the Churton affidavit is not consistent with those objectives and that it will be prejudiced if the affidavit is not excluded. It says the Churton proceeding will effectively need to be re-argued to give appropriate context to the affidavit and require the production by Wolfbrook of extraneous and otherwise irrelevant evidence to counter Ms Bright’s assertions.
2 High Court Rules 1986, r 251.
3 Referring to Westpac Banking Corporation v Wayland HC Auckland CP 1151/91, 25 September 1992 at 3.
4 Relying on Bank of New Zealand Ltd v Scott HC Wanganui CP 36/90, 12 March 1991 at 14; and High Court Rules 2016, r 1.2.
[22] Wolfbrook’s counsel accepts that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to admit the Churton affidavit into evidence where the requirements of r 7.32 are not met but says it would be improper for it to do so in this case.5
[23] Wolfbrook’s counsel also addressed the relationship between the Evidence Act 2006 and the Rules.6 Relying on the commentary in Cross on Evidence, Mr Harvey submits that insofar as the Rules regulate the admission of otherwise admissible evidence they are to be regarded as complementary to, not inconsistent with, the Evidence Act and a twofold approach must be taken to the production of documents before the Court, namely:7
(a)the document must be admissible in terms of the Act; and
(b)the production of an admissible document must be in accordance with the Rules.
[24] Wolfbrook also contends the Churton affidavit is not relevant to any issue arising on the summary judgment application as the Churton proceeding concerned different facts, and that in his reply affidavit Mr Brooks has satisfactorily explained that there has been a change in Wolfbrook’s business operations from late December 2021.
Ms Bright
[25] Mr Freeman submits the Churton affidavit is admissible as an admission under s 34 of the Evidence Act and is reliable and probative. He also argues that r 7.32 is not concerned with the exclusion of relevant and admissible evidence, rather it is a procedural provision that ensures an affidavit in the same or related proceedings can be read and provides ample notice of a party’s intention to rely upon it thereby avoiding unnecessary duplication of evidence already before the Court.
5 See Osborne v Wells HC New Plymouth CP6/00, 11 July 2000 at [12]–[13] where Master Kennedy-Grant purported to exercise the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to admit affidavits and notes of evidence in other proceedings between different parties.
6 Section 5(2) of the Evidence Act 2006 provides “Despite subsection (1), if there is any inconsistency between rules of court made under any enactment with the concurrence of 2 or more members of the Rules Committee and this Act, the provisions of this Act prevail.”
7 Mathew Downs (ed) Cross on Evidence (online ed, LexisNexis) at [EVA5.3].
[26] He also submits Wolfbrook’s approach to r 7.32 is arbitrary and may produce injustice. He says the approach is also inconsistent with longstanding authority that an affidavit from one proceeding may be put into evidence in another proceeding if it has a tendency to establish some fact to be determined in the proceeding.
[27] I was referred to Sandman v McKay, where the Supreme Court held that third party affidavits made in Family Court proceedings were wrongly excluded upon the hearing of a summary judgment application in the High Court as being inadmissible hearsay.8 There was no mention of r 7.32, rather the Supreme Court held the affidavits should have been admitted as they were relevant and therefore had wrongly been ruled inadmissible.
[28] I was also taken to authorities under r 7.32, which it is submitted generally support Ms Bright’s position and to the extent they do not they are distinguishable on their facts.
[29] Ms Bright also contends there is no prejudice to Wolfbrook if the Churton affidavit is read, and that while there is authority that the Court could admit the affidavit in its inherent jurisdiction there is no requirement to do so as r 7.32 is simply not engaged.
Analysis
[30]Rule 7.32 provides:
7.32 Previous affidavits and agreed statements of fact
(1)Affidavits already filed in the court and agreed statements of fact, if made in the same proceeding or, with the leave of a Judge, in any other proceeding between the same parties, may be used on the disposal of any application if—
(a)prior notice of the intention to use them has been given to the opposite party (whether in the notice of application or in the notice of opposition or otherwise); or
(b)in the case of an application without notice, they are referred to in the notice of application.
8 Sandman v McKay [2019] NZSC 41, [2019] 1 NZLR 519 at [60], [70], [109] and [143].
(2)Subclause (1) does not apply to an affidavit or to an agreed statement to the extent that the affidavit or statement contains any admission of the kind described in rule 7.31.
[31] As noted above, Wolfbrook’s application is founded on an assertion that r 7.32 operates as a bar to the use of previous affidavits in interlocutory applications, except in the limited circumstances identified. I consider that is incorrect.
[32] The meaning of a statutory provision, including secondary legislation such as the Rules, must be ascertained from its text and in light of its purpose and context.9
[33] Also relevant is r 1.2, which provides that the objective of the Rules is to “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any proceeding or interlocutory application”. The commentary in McGechan on Procedure notes that r 1.2 does not give the Court power to override the plain meaning of a rule, and the Court has the power to use analogies in appropriate cases by utilising r 1.6 so that it is rare for a Court to find itself so constrained by a rule that an injustice has to be done.10
[34] Rule 7.32 appears in pt 7 concerned with case management. It is not concerned with the admissibility of evidence. The text of r 7.32 does not say anything about affidavits (or agreed statements of fact) filed in other proceedings between different parties. Its subject matter is limited to affidavits filed in the same proceeding or in a different proceeding between the same parties. I can see no justification for extending its application beyond its terms.
[35]I do not accept Wolfbrook’s submission that the policy objectives underlying r
7.32 include that litigants could be hamstrung by concern that their affidavits may be taken out of context or that to admit affidavits from another proceeding will require that proceeding to be relitigated. If they were the applicable policy objectives one would not expect the rule to be limited to interlocutory applications. I also consider the concerns identified are exaggerated.
9 Legislation Act 2019, s 10.
10 Jessica Gorman and others McGechan on Procedure (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR 1.2.03].
[36] In my view the rule is intended to avoid the unnecessary duplication of evidence upon the hearing of interlocutory applications while ensuring that parties have fair notice of the evidence they must respond to. Ms Bright’s reliance upon the Churton affidavit does not offend those objectives.
[37] The authorities on r 7.32 are relatively few in number, some are oral decisions containing little analysis and often they do not support Wolfbrook’s position. For instance, in Westpac v Wayland a defendant to a summary judgment application wished to rely on his affidavits filed in a related proceeding with another party.11 Master Gambrill referred to r 251 of the 1986 Rules, which were applicable at the time, and held that the defendant could not rely on the affidavits under that rule. That was a correct application of the rule but, as the Master then noted, the defendant was entitled to file another affidavit deposing to the very matters contained in the affidavits in the other proceedings.
[38] Similarly, in Osborne v Wells evidence contained in an affidavit sworn in other proceedings fell “outside the situation to which r 251 [of the then Rules] is directed” but Master Kennedy-Grant exercised the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to have it and other affidavits, as well as notes of evidence, in other proceedings read into evidence.12
[39] Perhaps the decision best supporting Wolfbrook’s position is Registered Securities Ltd v Fidow, an oral judgment in which there were four applications before the Court, including an oral application seeking leave to use an affidavit filed in another proceeding.13 The defendant’s husband had made an affidavit in support of the defendant’s opposition to an application for summary judgment and had annexed to his affidavit an affidavit he had made in other proceedings between him, the plaintiff and another party. Doogue J held that:14
Such an affidavit is not an affidavit “in any other proceeding between the same parties” which would come within the provisions of Rule 251 of the High Court Rules. It is not therefore an affidavit to which the Court can grant leave in the present proceedings for its use on the disposal of the application for summary judgment. Accordingly the Court does not have jurisdiction to give
11 Westpac Banking Corporation v Wayland HC Auckland CP 1151/91, 25 September 1992.
12 Osborne v Wells, above n 5.
13 Registered Securities Ltd v Fidow HC Auckland CP 2775/89, 8 March 1990.
14 At 6–7.
the Defendant leave to refer to that affidavit of the husband of the Defendant on the hearing of the Plaintiff’s application for summary judgment against her.
[40] Doogue J was correct that r 251 did not apply, but in my view having come to that conclusion he was wrong then to conclude that the affidavit could not be read without first considering whether it was otherwise admissible; an issue that would now be decided under the Evidence Act. I note also, as Ms Bright’s counsel correctly submits, there was nothing to prevent the husband from simply making a further affidavit containing the same material as in the affidavit that Doogue J considered could not be read.
[41] Wolfbrook argues that it is not consistent with the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of its summary judgment/strike out application to allow the Churton affidavit to be read, because this will mean that it will need to produce further “extraneous and otherwise irrelevant evidence to counter Ms Bright’s assertions”. I do not see how the position Wolfbrook is taking is consistent with ensuring a just result in the proceeding. As far as the other objectives of the Rules are concerned, Wolfbrook has already responded to the Churton affidavit and while there is a timetable direction allowing it to respond further that will not cause delay or significant expense to Wolfbrook. The interests of ensuring a just result outweigh considerations of speed and expense in a case like this.
[42] Wolfbrook says the Churton affidavit is not relevant to any matter in issue as Mr Brooks has explained in his reply affidavit that there was a change in Wolfbrook’s business operations after late December 2021 whereby special purpose companies were incorporated to undertake development projects. I do not accept that submission.
[43] Mr Brooks’ reply affidavit provides support for Ms Bright’s case because it appears that at the time of the sale of her property Wolfbrook was not merely a promoting entity but a company whose “core business activities involve the acquisition of land, subdivision, construction and sale of residential properties”. It also appears that special purpose companies “acted at the direction and as agent of [Wolfbrook]”.
[44] That the changes are said to have occurred in late December 2021 is also not inconsistent with Ms Bright’s case when she was first approached to sell her property in September 2021 and entered into the agreement for its sale on 16 December 2021. I also note that in his reply affidavit Mr Brooks says “Wolfbrook Residential has not purchased any properties for more than two years”, suggesting that it was doing so until late 2022.
[45] The final point is Wolfbrook’s submission that there are other means by which evidence contained in a third party affidavit can be put before the Court if excluded under r 7.32. It is correct that under r 9.75 if a person with relevant information refuses to make an affidavit an order may be sought that they be required to appear and be examined on oath. However, the making of such an order is generally inappropriate on summary judgment applications and would not assist Ms Bright.15
[46] Having regard to its text, context and purposes, r 7.32 does not prevent Ms Bright from putting the Churton affidavit into evidence.
Result
[47] The application to strike out or exclude Ms Bright’s evidence and the Churton affidavit is dismissed.
[48] Wolfbrook raised an objection that the Churton affidavit does not have exhibits attached. Mr Freeman advises that Ms Bright can file another affidavit attaching the complete affidavit with exhibits. I direct that she does so.
[49] Ms Bright has been successful and in the ordinary course would be entitled to costs. However, the defendant has asked to be heard on costs. If counsel cannot agree on costs, they may file memoranda no longer than six pages within 14 days and I will determine the matter on the papers.
[50] Associate Judge Skelton made directions on 18 November 2024 for Wolfbrook to file any further evidence consequent upon this judgment and setting the summary
15 Sampson Property Investments Ltd v DMST Internationals Ltd [2024] NZHC 555.
judgment/strike out application down for hearing. I understand there is no need for me to make further directions.
O G Paulsen Associate Judge
Solicitors:
Thomas Dewar Sziranyi Letts, Lower Hutt Wynn Williams, Christchurch
2