Bright v Wolfbrook Residential Limited - [2025] NZHC 2389

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV-2023-485-795

[2025] NZHC 2389

UNDER the Fair Trading Act 1986 and the Companies Act 1993

BETWEEN

PAMELA ALISON BRIGHT

Plaintiff

AND

WOLFBROOK RESIDENTIAL LIMITED

First Defendant

STEVEN CAVELL BROOKS
Second Defendant

JAMES OWEN COONEY

Third Defendant

Hearing: 4 August 2025

Counsel:

M Freeman for Plaintiff

S D Campbell for Defendants

Judgment:

21 August 2025

JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAULSEN

This judgment was delivered by me on 21 August 2025 at 4.30 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

BRIGHT v WOLFBROOK RESIDENTIAL LIMITED [2025] NZHC 2389 [21 August 2025]

[1] The plaintiff (Ms Bright) sues the first defendant (Wolfbrook) to recover losses she suffered upon cancellation of an agreement with Fix My Property Ltd for the sale of her Upper Hutt property.1 Ms Bright contends Fix My Property Ltd entered into the agreement as Wolfbrook’s agent. She also pursues an alternative claim against Wolfbrook for breaches of the Fair Trading Act 1986, and separate claims against the second and third defendants (respectively Messrs Brooks and Cooney), directors of Wolfbrook, under s 301 of the Companies Act 1993.

[2] Wolfbrook has applied to strike out Ms Bright’s statement of claim or for summary judgment. Wolfbrook contends it has never had an agency arrangement with Fix My Property Ltd and that Wolfbrook is a promotional entity only. Its application is supported by affidavits of Messrs Brooks and Cooney.

[3] Ms Bright opposes the summary judgment/strike out application and has filed an affidavit annexing as an exhibit an affidavit sworn by Mr Brooks in other proceedings (the Churton affidavit).

[4] In the Churton affidavit Mr Brooks deposes that Wolfbrook’s core business involves buying, developing and selling residential properties and references other matters which Ms Bright will argue support her contention that Wolfbrook has an agency relationship with special purpose corporate entities and, by extension, arguably with Fix My Property Ltd.2

[5] The Churton affidavit may also cast doubt upon Wolfbrook’s assertion that there are no further documents that could be obtained on discovery to support Ms Bright’s claim, such that the case is suitable to be determined by summary judgment.

[6] Wolfbrook applied to strike out those parts of Ms Bright’s affidavit that refer to the Churton affidavit. While Mr Brooks does not resile from any of his evidence in the Churton affidavit, he says Wolfbrook’s business practises have changed, and his

1 Fix My Property Ltd is now in liquidation.
2 To compare the evidence of Messrs Brooks and Cooney in support of Wolfbrook’s application for strike out/summary judgment and the Churton affidavit see Bright v Wolfbrook Residential Ltd [2025] NZHC 437 at [11]–[17].

earlier evidence has to be considered in its proper context and was specifically directed at the issues that arose in that other proceeding.

[7] The application to strike out parts of Ms Bright’s affidavit was made in reliance on r 7.32 of the High…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2025] NZHC 2389
Decision Date: 21 August 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Bright v Wolfbrook Residential Limited, the plaintiff, Pamela Alison Bright, sued Wolfbrook Residential Limited, a property development company, for losses she suffered upon the cancellation of an agreement for the sale of her property. She claimed that Wolfbrook acted as the agent for Fix My Property Ltd, which was involved in the sale. Additionally, she alleged breaches of the Fair Trading Act 1986 by Wolfbrook and sought damages against the company's directors, Steven Cavell Brooks and James Owen Cooney, under the Companies Act 1993. Wolfbrook applied to strike out Ms Bright’s statement of claim or for summary judgment, arguing it had no agency arrangement with Fix My Property Ltd. The application was supported by affidavits from Messrs Brooks and Cooney. Ms Bright opposed the application and referenced an affidavit sworn by Mr Brooks in other proceedings, which suggested Wolfbrook had agency relationships with special purpose corporate entities.

The court dismissed Wolfbrook’s application, ruling that Rule 7.32 of the High Court Rules 2016, which regulates the use of affidavits in interlocutory applications, did not apply to affidavits filed in other proceedings between other parties. Wolfbrook sought leave to appeal the decision, arguing that the use of the Churton affidavit required leave and was an abuse of process. The court found that Wolfbrook had not raised an arguable error of law, as none of the legal principles cited required Ms Bright to obtain leave to use the affidavit. The court also held that the alleged errors were not of public importance and that granting leave would cause unnecessary delay. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

Ms Bright was awarded costs on a 2B basis plus reasonable disbursements, and the case was referred for case management review.

Orders