Brian Green Properties (1971) Limited v Bindon Holdings Limited

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA484/2016
[2017] NZCA 284

BETWEEN

BRIAN GREEN PROPERTIES (1971) LIMITED
Appellant

AND

BINDON HOLDINGS LIMITED
Respondent

Hearing:

9 May 2017

Court:

French, Miller and Clifford JJ

Counsel:

J W Maassen, M W G Riordan and R E Riddle for Appellant
P B Churchman QC and J M Moran for Respondent

Judgment:

6 July 2017 at 10 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        The application for leave to adduce further evidence is declined.
B        The appeal is allowed. 

CThe matter is remitted to the High Court for further consideration on the basis set out in the judgment.

DThe respondent must pay the appellant costs for a standard appeal on a band A basis and usual disbursements.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Clifford J)

Introduction

  1. Brian Green Properties (1971) Ltd leases land from Bindon Holdings Ltd in Dunedin, adjacent to that city’s new stadium (the Land).  Bindon and Brian Green entered into that lease (the Lease) on 27 April 2009.  In 2015 Bindon gave Brian Green notice of breach of a covenant in the Lease for maintenance and repair.  Brian Green subsequently applied to the High Court for relief against forfeiture. 

  2. The High Court granted Brian Green such relief, on condition that Brian Green undertake, by reference to what the Court saw as Brian Green’s obligations under the Lease, certain repairs to a building on the Land (the Building).[1]

  3. Brian Green says those repairs are not required of it under the Lease and therefore appeals that condition.  At issue is the significance in these circumstances of s 223 of the Property Law Act 2007 (the 2007 Act).

Facts

  1. The Lease is a Glasgow lease.  The Building is a warehouse.  In the High Court, Dunningham J summarised the history of the Lease in the following helpful terms:

    [5]       The property is subject to a Glasgow lease.  A description of such leases was given in Mandic v Cornwall Park Trustboard Inc as follows:

    [25]     Long-term ground leases (usually of 14 or 21 years) renewable in perpetuity with rent calculated either by an assessment of fair or market rent (or some similar concept) or, as in this case, as a percentage of a sum established pursuant to stipulated valuation exercises, are referred to as Glasgow leases.  They were mainly put in place in the 19th and early 20th centuries.  A Glasgow lease is, in economic substance, a bond which is revalorised every 14 or 21 years and secured against the demised land…

    [26]     Glasgow leases proceed on the basis that:

    (a)increases in the value of the land due to extrinsic factors are for the lessor’s benefit; but

    (b)the rent should not be fixed in relation to value due to improvements made by the lessee.

    [6]       The original lessor of this property was the Otago Harbour Board, and the Court was provided with the copies of…

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Case
[2017] NZCA 284
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was by Brian Green Properties (1971) Limited (the appellant) against the decision of the High Court that it be required to undertake certain repairs to a building on land it leased from Bindon Holdings Limited (the respondent) as a condition of relief against forfeiture. The appellant submitted that the repairs were not required of it under the lease and appealed that condition. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the High Court for further consideration on the basis set out in the judgment. The respondent must pay the appellant costs for a standard appeal on a band A basis and usual disbursements. The appellant leased land from the respondent adjacent to that city’s new stadium. In 2015 the respondent gave the appellant notice of breach of a covenant in the lease for maintenance and repair. The appellant applied to the High Court for relief against forfeiture. The High Court granted the appellant such relief on condition that it undertake certain repairs to a building on the land. The appellant submitted that those repairs were not required of it under the lease and appealed that condition. The Court of Appeal found that the Judge’s conclusion that, to similar effect, s 223 was excluded by cl 11 of the Lease depends in the first instance on the implicit conclusion that the effect of s 223 is to imply a covenant into the Lease. That must be the case, given the wording of cl 11. As a matter of general law, and of interpretation of the words of s 223, that is where they differed from the Judge. In their view, s 223 is not a provision which implies a covenant. Rather, it is one which limits the effect of covenants like cl 4 of the Lease. Moreover, it does so here in the manner the appellant asserts. The conclusion flowed from the express terms of s 223, the broader context provided by the 2007 Act and its purposes and principles, and the relevant legislative history. The overall effect of these provisions in the 2007 Act was that: (a) section 219 implied the sch 3 repair covenant into the Lease. (b) section 217 provided for such an implied term to be negatived “where a contrary intention is expressed in accordance with s 279(2)”. Section 279(2) provided for implied covenants to be negatived, varied or extended by, as relevant, the express terms of the instrument. (c) Clause 4 was such an express term. (d) Section 223 limited the effect of cl 4, subject to the proviso “unless the context otherwise requires”. That analysis was supported by the 2007 Act’s legislative history. The Law Commission’s intent could not be clearer. The legislative process The Property Law Bill 2006 was introduced on 30 October 2006. Clause 222, which became s 223, read: 222 Effect of covenant to keep premises in good condition In a lease, unless the context otherwise requires, a covenant to keep leased premises in good condition (or words to that effect) does not require the lessee to put the premises into good condition if they are not in good condition when the term of the lease begins. The explanatory note stated: Clause 222 provides that, unless otherwise agreed, a covenant to keep leased premises in good condition does not require the lessee to put the premises into good condition if they are not in good condition when the term of the lease begins. Thereafter, the wording of cl 222 was not changed throughout the legislative process, nor was there any further comment on that clause specifically. As so enacted, s 223 remains the same today. It would appear that the Law Commission’s overall intention was adopted, because: (a) subject to the addition of the phrase “unless the context otherwise requires”, the Bill as introduced used wording identical to that used by the Law Commission in its draft bill; and (b) that phrase reflects the Law Commission’s intention that the parties to the lease should be able to otherwise agree. That is, cl 222 negates the rule in Payne v Haine, unless — to use the Law Commission’s phrase — “the parties agreed otherwise”, or — as provided in the statute — “the context otherwise requires”. The Court of Appeal concluded that the Judge was wrong to find that s 223 was excluded by cl 4 of the Lease. They allowed the appellant’s appeal to that extent. Implicit in that conclusion was their view that, by itself, cl 4 was not a provision which represented an “agreement otherwise” or which created a “context that otherwise requires” in the terms of the proviso to s 223. To hold otherwise would be to rob the section of virtually any effect. They turned then to the significance of the phrase “unless the context otherwise requires” in s 223. As a matter of first impression, two interpretations of these words would appear to be available. The words “unless the context otherwise requires” appeared in the interpretation section of almost every statute. There they typically qualified the introductory words “in this Act”. Thus the reference to “the context” was manifestly a reference to the use of a defined term within the statute, but in such a way, in such a context, that it was clear the specific definition did not apply. An immediate limit on the relevance of that interpretation was that s 223 did not prescribe a specific meaning to words. Rather, and as regards specific words and like words, it negated a common law rule regarding the construction of a lessee’s obligations. Having said that, the use of the common statutory phrase “unless the context otherwise requires”, here qualifying the introductory words “In a lease”, did suggest that the relevant context was provided by the words of the lease itself, rather than any broader, factual context relating to the parties and their dealings with each other. However, and to quite opposite effect, the phrase “unless the context otherwise requires” might be interpreted as a statutory mandate to look beyond the lease and, in the standard way of interpreting contracts, to have regard to the context provided by the factual matrix. The meaning to be attributed to this statutory phrase was also to be determined on the basis of the well-established principles of statutory interpretation. Applying those principles, the words “unless the context otherwise requires” were, in their view, best interpreted as requiring there to be an express written agreement to the contrary recorded in the manner provided for in s 279. The words “unless the context otherwise requires” were, in their view, best interpreted as requiring there to be an express written agreement to the contrary recorded in the manner provided for in s 279. As already noted, s 217 provided for the limited range of implied covenants now provided by statute to be negatived, varied or extended by a contrary intention expressed in accordance with s 279(2). Section 279 required such an agreement to be recorded in the express terms of the lease itself or in a written memorandum executed in

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