Boyd v R

Case [2015] NZHC 822


IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND DUNEDIN REGISTRY

CRI-2015-412-000006 [2015] NZHC 822

BETWEEN

JOHN NATHAN BOYD

Appellant

AND

THE QUEEN Respondent

Hearing: 31 March 2015

Appearances:

S A Saunderson-Warner for Appellant
M J Grills for the Crown

Judgment:

24 April 2015

JUDGMENT OF GENDALL J

Introduction

[1]      This is an appeal against sentence.

[2]      On 25 February 2015, Judge M A Crosbie in the District Court at Dunedin sentenced the appellant to two years three months’ imprisonment on one charge of being an accessory after the fact to an assault with intent to rob.1 His Honour in his decision also recommended the appellant continue with one-on-one psychological counselling which he had commenced while on parole.2

[3]      The  appellant  now  appeals  on  the  basis  that  the  sentence  imposed  is manifestly  excessive.  Counsel  for  the  appellant  submits  that  the  starting  point adopted by Judge Crosbie of two years four months was too high, and, further, that

the uplifts imposed were excessive and should be reduced to be:

1      R v Boyd [2015] NZDC 2798.

2 At [18].

BOYD v THE QUEEN [2015] NZHC 822 [24 April 2015]

(a)       proportionate to the starting point; and

(b)offset to take account of time spent subject to recall (for breach of parole).

Jurisdiction

[4]      Mr Boyd is able to appeal this sentence imposed as of right.3   As first appeal Court, this Court will only disturb the sentence appealed from if the appellant can establish that there was an error in the sentence imposed and that a different sentence should be imposed.4    In a recent judgment the Court of Appeal has confirmed that the sentence appeal regime in the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 was not intended to signify departure from the position under the predecessor regimes in the Crimes Act

1961, s 385(3) and the Summary Proceedings Act 1957, s 121(3).5

Submissions

Appellant

[5]      Counsel  for  the  appellant  accepts  that  there  is  no  tariff  for  offending involving being an accessory after the fact, but cites numerous precedents in support of the submission that Judge Crosbie’s starting point was excessive.

[6]      Ms Saunderson-Warner for the appellant relies first upon R v Duff. 6   There, the Court noted a continuum for accessory situations ranging from cases involving the destruction of evidence (so as to thwart a successful prosecution) to cases where an isolated one-off incident (in which some form of assistance is given to a fugitive) occurred.   Ms Saunderson-Warner submits that the offending in R v Duff is more serious than the appellant’s offending here and yet in that case, Lang J adopted a

starting point of 18 months.

3      Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 244.

4      Sections 247 and 250.

5      Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482.

6      R v Duff HC Rotorua CRI-2009-063-6473, 9 December 2010 at [11] per Lang J.

[7]      In this Court in R v Boskell, I adopted a starting point of ten months for the defendant  who  was  charged  with  being  an  accessory  after  the…

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Boyd v R [2015] NZHC 822
Case
[2015] NZHC 822
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

John Nathan Boyd appeals his sentence of two years three months’ imprisonment, imposed by Judge Crosbie in the District Court at Dunedin. Boyd was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to an assault with intent to rob. Boyd’s counsel contends that the starting point and uplifts adopted by Judge Crosbie were excessive. The Crown submits that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive. The High Court found that the starting point adopted by Judge Crosbie was too high and the uplifts were disproportionate. The end sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment was substituted for the original sentence of two years three months’ imprisonment.

The High Court noted that there is no tariff for being an accessory after the fact to an offence. Boyd’s counsel submitted that the starting point adopted by Judge Crosbie was too high, and the uplifts were disproportionate. The Court found that a starting point of 14 months was appropriate. The uplifts were reduced to ensure proportionality with the starting point. The uplift for offending while on parole was retained, as the appellant had not objected to it at sentencing. The Court found that the uplift for offending while on parole did not subject the appellant to double punishment. A discount of 25 percent was applied, reflecting the appellant’s guilty plea and willingness to participate in restorative justice. The end sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment was substituted for the original sentence of two years three months’ imprisonment.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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