Bay Kiwifruit Contractors Ltd (in liq) v Ladher
[2015] NZHC 63
•3 February 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND TAURANGA REGISTRY
CIV-2014-470-121 [2015] NZHC 63
UNDER the Companies Act 1993 IN THE MATTER
of the liquidation of Bay Kiwifruit
Contractors Limited (in liquidation)BETWEEN
BAY KIWIFRUIT CONTRACTORS LIMITED (in liquidation)
First Plaintiff
VIVIEN JUDITH MASDEN-REIS and
HENRY DAVID LEVIN Second Plaintiffs
AND
RAM LAL LADHER First Defendant
REKHA RANI LADHER Second Defendant
SARABJIT KAUR Third Defendant
Hearing: 3 February 2015 Counsel:
KM Wakelin and JV Angelson for plaintiffs
No appearance for defendants
Judgment:
3 February 2015
(ORAL) JUDGMENT OF FAIRE J
Solicitors: Meredith Connell, Auckland
And to: R Ladher, R Ladher and S Kaur, Te Puke
Bay Kiwifruit Contractors Limited (in liquidation) v Ladher [2015] NZHC 63 [3 February 2015]
Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................[1]
Plaintiffs’ entitlement to hearing by formal proof ..................................................[3]
Background facts....................................................................................................[6] Insolvency of the company ....................................................................................[7]
Statement of Claim...............................................................................................[12]
First cause of action by first plaintiff against the defendants: debt owing
by the defendants to Bay Kiwifruit [13]
Second cause of action by the first plaintiff against the defendants:
recovery of salaries paid to directors [21]
Third cause of action by second plaintiffs against defendants:
transactions at an undervalue [24]
Fourth cause of action by second plaintiffs against defendants:
transactions for inadequate consideration [28]
Fifth cause of action against all defendants: breach of directors’ duty
to act in good faith (s 131) [31]
Sixth cause of action: reckless trading [40]
Seventh cause of action: incurring obligations without belief that
company could perform them [45] Relief for breaches of directors’ duties ................................................................[49] Result....................................................................................................................[53]
Introduction
[1] Bay Kiwifruit Contractors Limited (Bay Kiwifruit) was put into liquidation on 22 February 2013. The company and its liquidators now seek a judgment by formal proof against three defendant directors for recovery of debts and an award of compensation for the defendants’ breaches of directors’ duties.
[2] The seven alternative causes of action can be grouped into four broad claims:
(a) Claim to recover as a debt amounts owing to Bay Kiwifruit by the defendants as shareholders and defendants as directors;
(b)Claim under s 297 of the Companies Act 1993 for the recovery of the amount owing as transactions at an undervalue;
(c) Claim under s 298 of the Act for the recovery of the amount owing as transactions for inadequate consideration;
(d) Claim for breach of directors’ duties under ss 131, 135 and 136 of the
Act.
Plaintiffs’ entitlement to hearing by formal proof
[3] The plaintiffs filed this proceeding on 16 July 2014. The notice of proceeding was served on the defendants on 30 July 2014. The notice gave the defendants until 3 September 2014 to file a statement of defence. The defendants did not do so, nor did they take any formal action to oppose these proceedings. They did not appear today.
[4] The plaintiffs now seek judgment by default, pursuant to r 15.9 of the High Court Rules. On 17 September Associate Judge Bell directed the matter to be listed for a formal proof hearing. In accordance with the requirements of r 15.9(4) the plaintiffs have filed affidavit evidence of the liquidator, Mr Levin, to establish their seven causes of action to the Court’s satisfaction.
[5] The onus is on the plaintiffs to convince the Court that judgment should be entered against the three defendants.
Background facts
[6] Bay Kiwifruit was incorporated on 31 May 2004. Ms Kaur, the third defendant, has been the company’s director since its incorporation. Mr and Ms Ladher were appointed as directors on 1 January 2009. The three defendants are also the only shareholders of Bay Kiwifruit. The company traded as a kiwifruit
contractor until November 2012. That month the Commissioner of Inland Revenue, as a creditor, applied to the High Court to place Bay Kiwifruit into liquidation. The application was granted and the company was put into liquidation on 22 February
2013. Mr Levin and Ms Vivien Judith Madsen-Ries were appointed as liquidators by this court on that day.
Insolvency of the company
[7] It is the plaintiffs’ case that the defendants caused or allowed Bay Kiwifruit to continue trading and incur further obligations after it became, or should have become, clear to the defendants that the company was insolvent. That has resulted in loss of $244,013.81 to Inland Revenue, Bay Kiwifruit’s only creditor.
[8] The plaintiffs’ submission is that Bay Kiwifruit was insolvent from at least
31 March 2009. They say that from that date, the company’s current and total liabilities exceeded its current and total assets, and that this is evidenced by the company’s default on its tax obligations from 30 September 2009.
[9] The plaintiffs submit that the financial statements for Bay Kiwifruit incorrectly record the financial position of the company. The plaintiffs contend that incorrectly recorded amounts should be excluded as assets from the financial statements and instead are recoverable as a debt. The classification of the following amounts as assets is contested:
(a) Loan of $8,000 to Rainbow Dairy Ltd, recorded on Bay Kiwifruit’s
financial statement for the year ending 2012.
(b) Amounts labelled “Taxation” on Bay Kiwifruit’s financial statements
for the years ending 31 March 2008 through to 31 March 2012. (c) Shareholders’ current account.
[10] The plaintiffs’ submissions in relation to each of the recorded assets is as follows:
(a) Ms Kaur is the sole director of the company and all shares are held by the three defendants. The liquidators have found no loan documentation, or other evidence to suggest that Bay Kiwifruit required Rainbow Dairy to provide security, pay interest, or that any repayments have been demanded. There were no director or shareholder resolutions authorising the loan. The loan is not realisable, and therefore cannot be an asset.
(b)Taxation is owed to Inland Revenue. For this reason it is not a realisable asset.
(c) The shareholders’ current account is not an asset because it has zero
value as it is unrecoverable.
[11] Once these assets are removed from Bay Kiwifruit’s financial statements and the appropriate re-adjustments are made, Mr Levin’s evidence is that Bay Kiwifruit was insolvent, for the purposes of s 4 of the Companies Act, from at least 31 March
2009. From that date the current liabilities of the company exceeded its current assets. From September 2009 Bay Kiwifruit could not meet PAYE obligations on time, by 30 September 2010 it could no longer pass on GST it collected on Inland Revenue’s behalf. By 31 December 2010 it could not meet its PAYE obligations at all.
Statement of Claim
[12] The plaintiffs bring seven alternative causes of action. They must establish each cause on the evidence of Mr Levin to obtain judgment against the defendants. The causes can be grouped into four claims:
(a) The first and second causes of action constitute a claim to recover from the defendants as shareholders and as directors amounts owing to Bay Kiwifruit;
(b) The third cause of action is a claim under s 297 of the Companies Act
1993 for the recovery of the amount owing as transactions at an undervalue;
(c) The fourth cause of action is a claim under s 298 of the Act for the recovery of the amount owing as transactions for inadequate consideration.
(d) The fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action comprise a claim for
breach of directors’ duties under the Act.
First cause of action by first plaintiff against the defendants: debt owing by the defendants to Bay Kiwifruit
[13] Bay Kiwifruit, as plaintiff, alleges that the defendants (jointly and severally) owe it $115,978, the amount by which the shareholders’ current account was overdrawn at the date of liquidation. The submission is that the amount by which the shareholders’ current account was overdrawn is recoverable as a debt.
[14] The liquidators, relying on Bay Kiwifruit’s accounting records, initially believed that the current account debt owed was $56,850. On 20 March 2013 the liquidators issued letters of demand for the sum to each defendant. On 8 April 2013
Mr Ladher, through his solicitors, accepted liability for the sum. Ms Ladher and Ms Kaur did not respond to the letters. The liquidators’ investigation of Bay Kiwifruit’s bank account and general ledger at a later date revealed that the shareholders’ current account was in fact overdrawn by $109, 978 at the end of the
2012 financial year. By the date of liquidation that amount increased to $115,978. Letters of demand for the new amount were issued to the defendants together with the statement of claim.
[15] Mr Levin explains the reason for this investigation and what it revealed. The statement for the financial year ended 31 March 2009 shows a closing balance of
$77,826. However, the opening balance for the financial year ended 31 March 2010 is only $25,515. The difference between the amounts is $52,311. Neither the
accountant for Bay Kiwifruit, nor any of the defendants offer any explanation for this discrepancy.
[16] However, Mr Levin put forward in his affidavit what he believes to be the reason for the disappearance of the money. During the investigation it was discovered that retained earnings from the financial years ended 2008 and 2009 of
$52,309 and $2 respectively were transferred by way of journal entry to the opening balance of the shareholders’ account for the financial year ending 2010. The total amount of retained earnings transferred is equal to $52,311. Mr Levin deposes that in his experience of investigating insolvent companies, the most likely explanation is that Bay Kiwifruit’s accountant has allocated to the shareholders’ current account an amount identical to the brought forward retained earnings. The effect, as Mr Levin explains, is the same as if Bay Kiwifruit had declared a dividend of its entire retained earnings at a time when it was insolvent, and the dividend had been used by the shareholders to repay part of their current account debt to Bay Kiwifruit.
[17] I am satisfied with the explanation offered by Mr Levin in his affidavit that the shareholders’ account was indeed overdrawn by $115,978 and that the defendants most likely used Bay Kiwifruit’s retained earnings for lowering their liability to the company as shareholders.
[18] A plaintiff party, including a liquidator, is entitled to rely on the company records as they are at the date of liquidation.1 Under s 194 of the Companies Act directors are responsible for the maintenance and accuracy of the company’s accounting records. The burden is on the directors to show that the accounting records are not correct.2 In the present case the defendants have not shown why the plaintiffs cannot rely on the accounting records for Bay Kiwifruit as they were at the
date of liquidation.
1 Thom Contractors Ltd (in liq) v Thom HC Auckland CIV-2008-404-6829, 28 April 2009; Chesterton Holdings v Durney HC Napier CIV-2011-441-007, 19 May 2011; New Zealand Meat Export Ltd (in liq) v Yat Fan Lau HC Whangarei CP34/98, 19 March 1999.
2 New Zealand Meat Export Ltd v Yat Fan Lau.
[19] Generally, advances made by the company to its shareholders are debts owed by the shareholder to the company, and are repayable on demand.3 When the company’s accounting records provide no explanation for the drawings from the shareholders’ current account, they must be treated as advances from the company to the shareholders.4 The High Court in Re Samarang Developments Ltd (in liq) held that shareholders are jointly and severally liable for overdrawn current accounts.5
[20] In the absence of any explanation for the drawings from the shareholders’ current account, I am satisfied that the amount by which the shareholders’ current account was overdrawn at the date of liquidation is recoverable by Bay Kiwifruit as a debt on demand. Demand was made on 30 July 2013. The defendants are jointly and severally liable for the repayment of the debt.
Second cause of action by the first plaintiff against the defendants: recovery of salaries paid to directors
[21] Bay Kiwifruit seeks to recover salaries paid to the defendants as directors in the 2011 and 2012 financial years, totalling $142,493. The submission is that the salaries were paid in breach of s 161(5) of the Companies Act, at a time when the company was insolvent and the directors could not have believed that the payment was fair to the company.
[22] Mr Levin deposes that the liquidators have found no evidence that the board of Bay Kiwifruit authorised the payment of remuneration to the defendants (in breach of s 161(1)); and no evidence that the defendants signed a certificate stating that in their opinion the payment of salaries was fair to the company (in breach of s 161(4)). Pursuant to s 161(5), where subs (1) and (4) are not complied with, the directors to whom the benefit was provided are personally liable to the company for the amount of the payment.
[23] I accept the submission that Bay Kiwifruit was not able to pay its debts as they became due in the normal course of business after 30 September 2010 and that
3 Thom Contractors Ltd (in liq) v Thom, above n 1, at [16].
4 Re Samarang Developments Ltd (in liq) HC Christchurch CIV-2003-409-2094, 30 September
2004 at [55].
5 At [67].
the payment of directors’ salaries after that date was not fair to the company. The defendants knew or ought to have known that payment of salaries to themselves when Bay Kiwifruit was trading insolvent would detriment Inland Revenue, the company’s only creditor. I also accept Mr Levin’s evidence that the salaries were paid in breach of the statutory requirements in s 161. Accordingly, each defendant is personally liable for the amount of salary he or she received in the 2011 and 2012 financial years. These amounts are as follows:
(a) Mr Ladher: $63,510 (b) Ms Ladher: $44,874 (c) Ms Kaur: $34,109
Third cause of action by second plaintiffs against defendants: transactions at an undervalue
[24] This cause of action is alternative to the first cause of action, in the event that the latter is not successful. As I have found that the drawings from the shareholders’ current account are a recoverable debt, payable on demand to Bay Kiwifruit, it is unnecessary to analyse at great length the third cause of action. A brief summary of the plaintiffs’ arguments will suffice.
[25] The submission is that if the drawings from the shareholders’ current account are not amounts owed to Bay Kiwifruit by the defendants, then the transactions in the period 14 November 2010 to 22 February 2013 (the date of liquidation) were transactions at undervalue, pursuant to s 297. Subsections (1) and (2) relevantly provide:
297 Transactions at undervalue
(1) Under subsection (2) the liquidator may recover from a person (X)
the amount C in the formula A − B = C, where—
(a) A is the value that X received from a company under a transaction to which the company was or is a party; and
(b) B is the value (if any) that the company received from X
under the transaction.
(2) The liquidator may recover the difference in value (that is, C in the formula in subsection (1)) from X if—
(a) the company entered into the transaction within the specified period; and
(b) either—
(i) the company was unable to pay its due debts when it entered into the transaction; or
(ii) the company became unable to pay its due debts as a result of entering into the transaction.
[26] The plaintiffs submit that amount “A” for the above formula is $35,742, and amount “B” is $3,336 for the period specified above. Accordingly, amount “C” is
$32,407.
[27] The plaintiffs say the transactions were at undervalue because Bay Kiwifruit had no liability for the advances, it paid from its own funds, and did so at a time when it was insolvent. They rely on Rowmata Holdings (in liq) v Hildred for the proposition that liquidators are able to recover funds under s 297 for which the
company received no value in exchange.6
Fourth cause of action by second plaintiffs against defendants: transactions for inadequate consideration
[28] This cause is also pleaded as an alternative to the first and third causes of action, if both were unsuccessful. The plaintiffs’ submission is based on s 298 of the Companies Act, which holds that where a company has acquired business or property of its director, the liquidator may recover from that director any amount by which the value of the consideration given by the company exceeded the value of the business or property received from the director at the time of acquisition.7
[29] The plaintiffs allege that in the period 14 November 2009 to 22 February
2013 Bay Kiwifruit received a value of $16,943 from the defendants. However, in the same period Bay Kiwifruit disposed of property to the defendants to the value of
6 Rowmata Holdings (in liq) v Hildred [2013] NZHC 2435.
7 Companies Act 1993, s 298(1).
$81,680. As liquidators, the plaintiffs say they may recover the difference, being
$64,737.
[30] However, as the first cause of action is successful, it is unnecessary to consider the claim under s 298 further at this stage.
Fifth cause of action against all defendants: breach of directors’ duty to act in good
faith (s 131)
[31] The plaintiffs plead that Mr and Ms Ladher breached their directors’ duty
contained in s 131, which relevantly provides:
131Duty of directors to act in good faith and in best interests of company
(1) Subject to this section, a director of a company, when exercising powers or performing duties, must act in good faith and in what the director believes to be the best interests of the company.
…
[32] The duty is a subjective one. The plaintiffs must prove the following elements to establish a breach of the s 131 duty:
(a) The defendants were directors of Bay Kiwifruit; and
(b)When exercising powers or performing duties, the defendants failed to act in good faith and what they believed to be the best interests of Bay Kiwifruit.
[33] The first element has already been established. In respect of the second element, the plaintiffs submit that the s 131 duty to act in (what the directors believe to be) the best interests of the company is owed also to the company’s creditors. The Court of Appeal in Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd recognised that the duty extends
to creditors when the company is insolvent, or marginally solvent.8 The Court
elaborated that as a matter of business ethics it is appropriate for the directors to
8 Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd [1985] 1 NZLR 242 (CA) at 249 per Cooke J.
consider also whether their actions will prejudice the company’s ability to discharge
debts owed to current creditors.9
[34] The same position was also considered by the High Court in Sojourner v Robb.10 There Fogarty J observed that s 131 combines the subjective standard of whether the director has done what he or she believed to have been right with the objective standard of how people of business may be expected to act.11 His Honour also made the following observation:
If a director believes that the duty to act in the best interests of the company is a duty always to act in the best interests of the shareholders, and never in the interests of the creditors, in a situation of doubt as to the solvency of the company, the director cannot be said to be acting in good faith. Creditors are persons to whom the company has ongoing obligations. The best interests of the company include the obligation to discharge those obligations before rewarding shareholders.
[35] It follows that the defendants, when exercising powers or performing duties, had a duty act in good faith toward the company’s creditors, in the present case only Inland Revenue.
[36] The plaintiffs argue that the defendants breached the s 131 duty by continuing to trade while Bay Kiwifruit was insolvent and in doing so disregarding the interests of the company’s creditor, Inland Revenue. The breach of the duty is underlined by the fact that the defendants continued to pay themselves salaries throughout the period that Bay Kiwifruit was insolvent.
[37] I have already accepted that the company began to show signs of insolvency on or around 31 March 2009 and became insolvent on or around 30 September 2010. Between this date and the time Bay Kiwifruit ceased trading in November 2012, it had incurred a very substantial debt to Inland Revenue. Given that all persons and companies are subject to tax liabilities, and the company’s inability to comply with its PAYE and GST obligations since 30 September 2010, the defendants can be taken as having been fully aware of this increasing debt.
[38] The defendants can also be taken as having been aware of Bay Kiwifruit’s financial decline from 31 March 2009 and insolvency from 30 September 2010. The company’s inability to comply with GST and PAYE obligations would have, or ought to have been, well known to the defendants.
[39] It follows that the defendants were in breach of their s 131 duty. By ignoring their growing debt to Inland Revenue, continuing to trade while insolvent and paying themselves salaries throughout this time, the defendants did not act in good faith toward Bay Kiwifruit or Inland Revenue when exercising their powers or performing their duties.
Sixth cause of action: reckless trading
[40] The plaintiffs argue that the defendants also breached the duty not to trade recklessly. Section 135 provides:
135 Reckless trading
A director of a company must not—
(a) Agree to the business of the company being carried on in a manner likely to create a substantial risk of serious loss to the company's creditors; or
(b) Cause or allow the business of the company to be carried on in a manner likely to create a substantial risk of serious loss to the company's creditors.
[41] The plaintiffs must prove either subs (a) or (b). The duty in s 135 is owed by directors to the company, not to any particular creditor.12 The test is an objective one and focuses on the manner in which a company’s business is carried on and whether that manner creates the substantial risk of serious loss.13 A director must make a “sober assessment” of the company’s likely future once the company appears to be in financial trouble.14
[42] The plaintiffs’ argument did not distinguish between subs (a) and (b). The
contention is that the defendants were aware of Bay Kiwifruit’s failure to meet its
obligations to Inland Revenue and should have undertaken a “sober assessment” of Bay Kiwifruit’s future between March 2009 and 30 September 2009, after which date it began to accrue penalties and interest on its PAYE obligations. Mr Levin’s evidence on this point is that failure to pay PAYE and GST is a sure sign that the company is in trouble. This is because companies with cash flow problems may be tempted to defer their obligations to Inland Revenue due to the absence of a trading relationship.
[43] For an objective assessment it is important to bear in mind that Bay Kiwifruit ceased trading only in November 2012. This means that it continued to trade while insolvent for at least three years and two months. In that time the defendants failed to make a “sober assessment” of the company’s future and so caused or allowed the business to be carried on in a manner that created a serious loss for Inland Revenue.
[44] It follows that the defendants traded recklessly in breach of their duty under s
135.
Seventh cause of action: incurring obligations without belief that company could perform them
[45] In the final cause of action the plaintiffs plead that the defendants breached their duty under s 136, which provides:
136 Duty in relation to obligations
A director of a company must not agree to the company incurring an obligation unless the director believes at that time on reasonable grounds that the company will be able to perform the obligation when it is required to do so.
Given that the defendants were the directors at all material times, the plaintiffs only have to establish the following two elements:15
(a) That an obligation was incurred by the company; and
(b)That at the time the obligation was incurred, the defendants did not honestly believe on reasonable grounds that the company would be able to perform the obligation when it was required to do so.
[46] The difference between ss 135 and 136 appears to be that s 135 focuses on directors engaging in a course of action, and s 136 focuses on incurring specific obligations.16 Both however involve illegitimate risks.
[47] In the present case the obligation in question is the debt owed to Inland Revenue that was incurred by failure to pay GST and PAYE on time, and subsequent penalties and interest that accrued. Given Bay Kiwifruit’s insolvency and inability to meet its tax obligations after 30 September 2009, after that date the defendants could not have believed on reasonable grounds that the company would be able to pay the entire amount to Inland Revenue when required to.
[48] For this reason, the defendants have breached their duties under s 136.
Relief for breaches of directors’ duties
[49] The plaintiffs seek relief for breaches of directors’ duties under s 301. Section 301 provides:
301 Power of Court to require persons to repay money or return property
(1) If, in the course of the liquidation of a company, it appears to the Court that a person who has taken part in the formation or promotion of the company, or a past or present director, manager, administrator, liquidator, or receiver of the company, has misapplied, or retained, or become liable or accountable for, money or property of the company, or been guilty of negligence, default, or breach of duty or trust in relation to the company, the Court may, on the application of the liquidator or a creditor or shareholder,—
(a) Inquire into the conduct of the promoter, director, manager, administrator, liquidator, or receiver; and
(b) Order that person—
(i) To repay or restore the money or property or any part of it with interest at a rate the Court thinks just; or
(ii) To contribute such sum to the assets of the company by way of compensation as the Court thinks just; or
(c) Where the application is made by a creditor, order that person to pay or transfer the money or property or any part of it with interest at a rate the Court thinks just to the creditor.
(2) This section has effect even though the conduct may constitute an offence.
(3) An order for payment of money under this section is deemed to be a final judgment within the meaning of section 17(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 2006.
(4) In making an order under subsection (1) against a past or present director, the Court must, where relevant, take into account any action that person took for the appointment of an administrator to the company under Part 15A.
[50] The plaintiffs seek the following relief:
(a) The total debt left unpaid to Inland Revenue. The plaintiffs argue this was a loss to Inland Revenue as it accrued after the company should have ceased trading on 30 September 2009. As Inland Revenue is not a party to this case, the plaintiffs submit that this amount should be awarded to Bay Kiwifruit, as it was a loss suffered by the company. They say that had the defendants not withdrawn the current account debt, those funds would have been available to meet the company’s liabilities and allow it to continue trading.
(b)The second plaintiffs seek an order that the defendants contribute compensation to the costs of liquidation. They argue that the creditor should not have to bear the costs of pursuing claims against the defendants when it was the defendants’ breaches of duty that caused the creditor to incur costs. An award is sought covering the cost of administration..
[51] The defendants failed to consider and act in the best interests of the company’s creditor, causing it to suffer a substantial loss. The amount of the loss could have been significantly mitigated had the defendants ceased trading as soon as the company had become insolvent in September 2009. The decision to continue to trade for a further three years despite accruing further obligations to Inland Revenue only underscores the disregard for the company’s creditor. As the obligations were attributed by the company, but incurred by the defendants’ irresponsible conduct, the loss can be attributed to Bay Kiwifruit.
[52] In respect of compensation for the liquidation, in Richard Geewiz Consultants Ltd (in liq) v Gee the Court granted to the liquidators compensation under s 301 for costs expended to a date pleaded in the statement of claim. The plaintiffs in this case seek compensation for costs expended until today.17
Result
[53] Accordingly I enter judgment as follows:
(a) On the first cause of action for the first plaintiff in the sum of
$115,978 jointly and severally against each defendant, plus interest from the date of liquidation to the date of judgment in accordance with s 87 of the Judicature Act 1908.
(b)On the second cause of action for the first plaintiff against each defendant for the following amounts:
(i) Mr Ladher: $63,510 (ii) Ms Ladher: $44,874 (iii) Ms Kaur: $34,109
plus interest from the date of liquidation to the date of judgment in
accordance with s 87 of the Judicature Act 1908.
17 Richard Geewiz Consultants Ltd (in liq) v Gee [2014] NZHC 1483 at [126].
(c) For the first plaintiff, the sum of $244,013.81 jointly and severally against each defendant plus interest from the date of liquidation to the date of judgment in accordance with s 87 of the Judicature Act 1908;
(d)For the first plaintiff, the sum of $4001.39 being recovery costs which the first plaintiff was ordered to pay to the Commissioner of Inland Revenue jointly and severally against each defendant plus interest from the date of liquidation to the date of judgment in accordance with s 87 of the Judicature Act 1908;
(e) For the second plaintiff, the sum of $69,120 being the costs of administration in the liquidation including the costs of this proceeding plus disbursements in relation to this proceeding only as fixed by the
Registrar jointly and severally against each defendant;
JA Faire J
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