Arnold v Fairfax New Zealand Ltd

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CIV-2015-485-484 [2016] NZHC 1078

UNDER the Defamation Act 1992

BETWEEN

KAREN FRANCES ARNOLD Plaintiff

AND

FAIRFAX NEW ZEALAND LIMITED First Defendant

TIMOTHY RICHARD SHADBOLT Second Defendant

On the papers

Counsel:

P A McKnight and A J Romanos for Plaintiff
R K P Stewart and R G Cahn for First Defendant
F E Geiringer for Second Defendant

Judgment:

23 May 2016

JUDGMENT OF CLIFFORD J (COSTS)

Introduction

[1]      The  plaintiff,  Ms  Karen  Arnold,  is  suing  Fairfax  and  Mr  Shadbolt  in defamation.   Mr Shadbolt has recently filed a notice of discontinuance of the counterclaim in defamation he brought as defendant against Ms Arnold.  Ms Arnold now applies for costs on that discontinuance.

Background

[2]      In  order  to  put  this  application  for  costs  in  context,  it  is  necessary  to summarise the procedural history of this matter to date:

(a)       Ms Arnold filed her statement of claim on 23 June 2015.

ARNOLD v FAIRFAX NEW ZEALAND LIMITED [2016] NZHC 1078 [23 May 2016]

(b)      Mr  Shadbolt  filed  his  statement  of  defence  and  counterclaim  on

31 July 2015.   In his defence Mr Shadbolt pleaded, amongst other things, honest opinion and qualified privilege.

(c)      Ms Arnold filed her reply to Mr Shadbolt’s statement of defence and counterclaim   on   14   August   2015.      She   did   not   respond   to Mr Shadbolt’s counterclaim.  That same day, Ms Arnold gave notice to Mr Shadbolt pursuant to ss 39 and 41 of the Defamation Act 1992 asking Mr Shadbolt which of the pleaded imputations were alleged to be honest opinion, and to provide particulars of ill will and improper advantage.

(d)On 9 October 2015 Ms Arnold applied to strike out Mr Shadbolt’s honest opinion defence, or alternatively to require him to identify the imputations said to constitute honest opinion.   She also applied to strike out all but one of the defamatory imputations pleaded in his counterclaim.

[3]      I heard those applications on 2 February 2016.  In a judgment of 23 February

2016  I  declined  each  of  those  applications,  save  that  I  ruled  that  one  of  the defamatory meanings pleaded by Mr Shadbolt was not, as a matter of law, a meaning capable of being borne by the words in question.1

[4]      In  the  final  paragraph  of  my  substantive  judgment  on  Ms  Arnold’s

applications I made the following comments:

[32]     I make some final comments.  These are proceedings between local body politicians.   By my assessment, much of the material complained of reflects the regular rough and tumble of local body politics.  In that context, freedom of speech issues arise.  The one complained of comment that may go further than that is Mr Shadbolt’s reference to “outright lies that are being hurled in Councillor Pottinger and the Council’s direction”, impliedly by “the combined forces of the blatantly ambitious Councillor Pottinger, the award-winning former Southland Times journalist Councillor Arnold, the Southland Times and the remnants of the Invercargill Ratepayers Association”.  But again, in context, I think it is fair to ask “Where is the harm?”.  I…

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Details
Case
[2016] NZHC 1078
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Karen Arnold sued Fairfax New Zealand Limited and Timothy Shadbolt in defamation. Shadbolt filed a counterclaim against Arnold in defamation, which he has now discontinued. Arnold seeks costs for Shadbolt's discontinuance of his counterclaim. The court considered whether the discontinuance of a counterclaim by a defendant should result in the plaintiff paying costs to the defendant. Arnold argued that the general principle in rule 15.23 of the High Court Rules applies, which provides that a plaintiff who discontinues a proceeding against a defendant must pay costs to the defendant up to and including the discontinuance. Shadbolt opposed the award of costs, arguing that the presumption of unreasonableness arising from discontinuance did not provide a basis for an award of full costs, as sought by Arnold.

The court held that the fact that no identifiable schedule 3 step could be identified did not preclude an order for costs being made nor indicate that one was not appropriate. The court also held that the fact that no recognised step had been taken, making calculation difficult, and the presumption of unreasonableness arising from discontinuance, did not of themselves provide a basis for an award of full costs. The court considered that Shadbolt should pay Arnold costs of $3,345, being one and a half days at the category 2 rate of $2,230 per day. The court did not consider that increased or indemnity costs were called for.

The court held that the final two relevant considerations were the implications of the fact that Shadbolt discontinued shortly after opposing Arnold's interlocutory application to strike out a large part of his counterclaim and the inference that Shadbolt asked the court to draw that, at least in part, he discontinued his counterclaim in response to the remarks the court made. The court held that those considerations did not affect its conclusion. The court ordered that Shadbolt pay Arnold $3,345 in costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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