Adams v South Taranaki District Council

[2021] NZHC 3254

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND NEW PLYMOUTH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA NGĀMOTU ROHE

CRI-2021-443-35

[2021] NZHC 3254

BETWEEN

MICHAEL ADAMS

Appellant

AND

SOUTH TARANAKI DISTRICT COUNCIL

Respondent

Hearing:

21 October and 29 November 2021

[Further submissions received 18 November 2021

Appearances:

Appellant in Person

J E Bourke for Respondent

Judgment:

30 November 2021

JUDGMENT OF ISAC J

[Appeal against sentence]

Introduction

[1]    Mr Adams is 77 years old. His very dear canine companion, Rastus, attacked two people. As a result, Mr Adams was convicted by Judge Hikaka of two charges laid under s 57 of the Dog Control Act 1996 (the Act) and fined $250 on both charges. An order for Rastus’ destruction was also made.

[2]    Mr Adams appeals against sentence. The entire focus of his challenge is to save his dog from destruction.

ADAMS v SOUTH TARANAKI DISTRICT COUNCIL [2021] NZHC 3254 [30 November 2021]

Background

[3]    The relevant circumstances of the offending are helpfully set out in the Judge’s conviction and sentencing decisions.1

[4]    During the first COVID-19 Level 4  lockdown,  a  courier  driver  attended Mr Adams’ property. He was purporting to deliver a parcel. Rastus attacked the courier driver. This led the Council to issue a notice of classification of Rastus as a menacing dog under s 33A of the Act. The effect of that notice, if not subject to challenge, was to require Rastus to be muzzled at all times and to require Mr Adams to have Rastus neutered within one month.

[5]    Mr Adams wished to object to Rastus’ classification as a menacing dog. According to s 33B(a) of the Act, Mr Adams was required to give notice in writing of his objection within 14 days of receipt of the Council’s notice. Instead of doing so, Mr Adams arranged a meeting with Council officers, at which he made it clear he objected to Rastus’ classification as a menacing dog.

[6]    Then, on 25 September 2020, while Rastus was moving around Mr Adams’ property freely, a local man was walking back to his house from the shop. He was, as the Judge put it, “minding his own business along the footpath”.2 He saw Rastus on Mr Adams’ property but did not take much notice. As he continued along the footpath, he felt a pain in his ankle, fell to the ground, and turned to see Rastus biting his ankle.3 After shouting at Rastus, the dog let go of the victim’s ankle. But Rastus then lunged at the victim once more. The victim used his arm to repel the renewed attack and ended up with more tooth marks on his arm.4 Photographs confirmed injuries consistent with the victim’s account.

1      South Taranaki District Council v Adams [2021] NZDC 10777 [Conviction decision]; South Taranaki District Council v Adams [2021] NZDC 15381 [Sentencing decision].

2      Conviction decision, above n 1, at [9].

3 At [9].

4 At [9].

[7]    The victim initially did not wish to make a complaint about the attack but eventually did so after he discussed it with his partner. It appears he was concerned about the risk Rastus might present to a child walking past the property.5

[8]    As a result of the incident a Council officer attended Mr Adams’ property later the same day. Mr Adams was not present, but Rastus and a woman who had control of the dog were. After an initial disagreement about whether the Council officer was entitled to seize Rastus,6 the officer went back to his vehicle to call the Police. While he was leaning on the bonnet of the vehicle, the woman, who had been holding Rastus by the collar appears to have let go of the animal. Rastus then went towards the officer, apparently in order to bite him. The dog was not deterred when the officer pulled out his “bite stick” and held it in front of him. The officer had to strike the dog (apparently in self-defence) five or six times before it returned to the property.7 His trouser leg was torn and he had a slight scratch on his leg.

[9]    The officer left the property but returned again with police support. Once again there was a degree of resistance from the woman present at the property.8 By then  Mr Adams was also home and was concerned about what was happening. Initially he refused to allow the dog to be taken, offering to take the dog to the pound himself. After all of this, Rastus was taken to the pound by the officer.

[10]As a result of these facts, Mr Adams faced a judge alone trial on four charges:

(a)Two charges under s 57(1)(a) of the Act, being the owner of a dog that attacked a person (reflecting the attacks on both the first victim and the Council officer);9

(b)A  failure  to  comply   with  a  menacing   dog   classification  under  s 33E(1)(a) and s 33EC(1) of the Act;10

5      At [10]

6 At [11].

7 At [12].

8 At [13].

9      Carrying a maximum penalty of a fine not exceeding $3,000.

10     Carrying a maximum penalty of a fine not exceeding $3,000.

(c)A charge of failing to  produce  a  neutering  certificate,  contrary  to ss 33E(1)(b) and 33EC(1) of the Act.11

Decision under appeal

[11]   While not subject to direct challenge, an understanding of the District Court’s conviction decision is helpful.

[12]   The Judge found there was no dispute that Mr Adams’ dog had attacked two people as alleged by the prosecution. He noted:12

[5]        Mr Adams questioned the prosecution witnesses. He provided evidence of his own. He has accepted that his dog is Rastus. He has accepted that his dog did attack and bite [the victim] and also lunged at [the Council officer].  In  essence,   he  accepted  the  first  two  of   the  charges  from    25 September 2020; namely, that Rastus attacked those two individuals.

[6]        Nothing in his defence negated the fact of the attacks, and it is attack in the wider sense of the word. It is not a vicious dog being restrained, let loose, in order to deliberately be set upon an individual. It is a dog that lunges at a person, using the most effective tools at its disposal – namely teeth, and in [the victim’s] case, latched onto his ankle, caused some lacerations, puncture holes and grazes; and in [the Council officer’s] case he went for his leg, tore his trousers, and there was a slight graze on his leg.

[13]   Having heard evidence that the attacks were conceded, the Judge was satisfied the two charges laid under s 57 of the Act were proven beyond reasonable doubt.

[14]   Turning to the charges relating to Rastus’ classification as a menacing dog, the Judge took a merciful view. He found that despite Mr Adams’ failure to meet the statutory requirements of s 33B of the Act (requiring written notice of objection within 14 days), the Council was aware of Mr Adams’ position and found it would be “a triumph of form over substance” to enter a conviction.13 The Judge dismissed the remaining charges accordingly.

11     Carrying a maximum penalty of a fine not exceeding $3,000.

12     Conviction decision, above n 1, at [5]–[6].

13     At [21]–[22].

Sentence decision

[15]   In a careful decision, the Judge acknowledged the more distressing aspect of the sentencing process was the requirement for the Court to make a destruction order under s 57(3) “unless it is satisfied that the circumstances of the offence were exceptional and do not warrant destruction of the dog.”

[16]   After noting the guidance of the Court of Appeal on the correct approach to this enquiry,14 he concluded:15

Rastus was not confined at the time he bit [the victim] and tried to bite [the Council officer]. He was able to move freely to and from the property. The attacks were unprovoked. I have tried to extrapolate as to what might have been going on in the dog’s head in the circumstances as they were at the time. But taking a step back, dealing with the evidence that was heard, the overall view is that the dog was unprovoked and there is a tendency that is discernible with Rastus, particularly with Mr Adams and his flatmate, that he may in fact act aggressively particularly when Mr Adams and his flatmate may feel vulnerable in certain circumstances…

… [W]hen I look at the two factors that need to be taken into account, first the relevant circumstances, in other words, what happened at the time of the incident; and second, were those circumstances unusual or one-off and most unlikely to be repeated, in other words “exceptional”, I am not satisfied that high threshold has been met in this case.

All this leads to the inevitable conclusion that an order must be made for Rastus’ destruction. I make that order accordingly.

Grounds of appeal

[17]   Mr Adams acted for himself both in the District Court and on appeal. He is not a lawyer, and I have taken a generous view of the written and oral submissions he made.

[18]   Mr Adams, amongst other things, argues that: Rastus is not vicious; the wounds caused to the victim were minor; the Council officer’s own behaviour brought about the attack; the attack on the victim was only just off Mr Adam’s property and Rastus may have thought the victim was about to enter Mr Adam’s property; and Rastus’ behaviour was likely the result of confusion caused by the lockdown and his protective

14     At [27]–[32], citing Auckland Council v Hill [2020] NZCA 52, [2020] 3 NZLR 603.

15     At [39], [42]–[43].

instincts. Mr Adams stresses that he loves his dog, and it is a matter of great distress for him to think of his companion being put to death. As an elderly man in a rural town he needs his dog to keep him safe, and for companionship.

[19]   During the course of discussion at the hearing I noted Mr Adams is 77 years old and, at that time, appeared to have no previous convictions.16 Following a discussion with the Bench, Mr Adams sought and was granted leave to include as part of his appeal an application for a discharge without conviction.

[20]   I then raised with Mr Bourke for the Council whether the destruction order was part of the sentence imposed by the District Court and, if it was, whether I could have regard to the destruction order in determining whether the consequences of the convictions were out of all proportion to the gravity of the offences. I then granted leave for both parties to file further submissions on the following issues:

(a)the status of a destruction order as part of a sentence (or not);

(b)the relationship between ss 57(3) and 58 of the Act, given the former appears to focus on an “attack” as the precondition of a destruction order, while the latter appears to require a conviction before such an order can be made.

[21]   I then received further submissions from the parties on those matters, and from Mr Adams on issues relevant to whether I ought to grant him a discharge without conviction should I uphold the sentence appeal.

Approach on appeal and s 106 of the Sentencing Act 2002

[22]   Appeals against sentence must be determined in accordance with s 250 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. An appeal against sentence may be allowed by this Court only if it is satisfied that there has been an error in the imposition of the sentence and that a different sentence should have been imposed.17

16     Subsequently, a largely historical criminal history was provided by the respondent.

17     Criminal Procedure Act, ss 250(2) and 250(3).

[23]   The only aspect of sentence subject to appeal is the destruction order. The order was made under s 57(3) of the Act, which provides:

If, in any proceedings under subsection (2), the court is satisfied that the dog has committed an attack described in subsection (1) and that the dog has not been destroyed, the court must make an order for the destruction of the dog unless it is satisfied that the circumstances of the offence were exceptional and do not warrant destruction of the dog.

[24]   I have previously queried the reference to “destruction” in the Act, noting that it evokes notions of property rather than something that can occur to a sentient being.18 Regardless, the question for the District Court was whether the circumstances of the offence were exceptional and did not warrant destruction of the dog.

[25]   In Auckland Council v Hill,19 the Court of Appeal considered the underlying rationale for the presumptive requirement for destruction of a dog that has engaged in an attack in these terms:

… The reason for a default rule that the dog should be destroyed is that the Act proceeds on the basis that where a dog has attacked once, there is a risk that the dog will behave in the same way again in similar circumstances. That risk must be removed by destruction of the dog, unless the risk is immaterial because the circumstances of the attack were exceptional and a repeat of those circumstances is most unlikely. …

[26]   Although the assumption underlying the legislation’s response to a dog attack is open to question — it perhaps being a better approach to focus less on criminalising dog attacks and more on ensuring that dog owners are equipped to ensure their dogs do not attack others — a destruction order is nonetheless what it calls for unless there are exceptional circumstances.20

[27]   Unfortunately for Mr Adams, there was no error in the approach or conclusion of the Judge, and there were certainly no circumstances of the offence that render it exceptional. The Judge directed himself to the correct legal test, and there is no error in his application of the law to the facts. Indeed, I agree with his analysis.

18 See Haenga v Porirua City Council [2021] NZHC 1549 at [35].

19 Auckland Council v Hill, above n 14, at [65].

20 For a critical analysis of New Zealand’s dog control legislation, see David Tong and Vernon Tava “Moral Panics and Flawed Laws: Dog Control in New Zealand” in Peter Sankoff, Steven White and Celeste Black (eds) Animal Law in Australasia (2nd ed, The Federation Press, Sydney, 2013) 104–128.

[28]   The evidence indicates that Rastus was unrestrained and unmuzzled. He also had free access to the footpath outside Mr Adams’ property. Whether Mr Adams’ dog perceived the victim was a threat or not is immaterial. This appears to have been an unprovoked attack of a person innocently going about their business on a footpath. I share the victim’s concern that an attack on a child or elderly person may have had much more serious consequences. That is because, on the victim’s evidence, having been bitten once on the ankle, Rastus made a second attack on the victim, who received defensive wounds to his wrist as a result. Rastus then attacked a Council officer the same day. It seems the Officer was obliged to hit the dog repeatedly to deter it from continuing its attack. And all this occurred against a backdrop of an admitted attack on a courier driver some months earlier. So Rastus’ behaviour was not a one-off. It formed a pattern. Added to that is the problem that — at least until very recently — Mr Adams has resisted any suggestion that his dog presents a danger to the public, and was not prepared to take obvious steps to remove that risk, such as muzzling the dog or ensuring he was kept away from the footpath by a lead or gate.

[29]   Given the combination of Rastus’ pattern of behaviour, and Mr Adams’ reluctance to take steps mitigating the risk his dog presents, the Judge was correct to conclude that the risk of further attack was material.

[30]   For these reasons, I am satisfied that the destruction order was inevitable, and reflects Parliament’s intention when enacting s 57(3).

[31]I dismiss Mr Adams’ sentence appeal on this ground accordingly.

Is a destruction order a consequence of a conviction in terms of s 107 of the Sentencing Act?

[32]   As I have noted, during the hearing I raised a question concerning the status of the destruction order and whether it forms part of a sentence. The answer to that question could be relevant in two ways:

(a)The destruction of Mr Adams’ dog might, with its profoundly upsetting implications for him, be a direct consequence of his conviction and thus

relevant to a consideration  of a discharge without  conviction  under ss 106 and 107 of the Sentencing Act.

(b)If the destruction order is part of a sentence, and Mr Adam’s conviction quashed following a discharge under s 106 is granted, the destruction order would also be set aside.

[33]   In response to these issues, Mr Bourke helpfully drew my attention to  Gordon J’s decision in Ingle v Auckland Council.21 In that case, her Honour noted there were divergent authorities in this Court on the question of whether a destruction order was part of a sentence contingent on a conviction.

[34]   Having considered the legislative history of s 57(3), and in particular an amendment in 2003, Gordon J concluded that a conviction was not a necessary requirement of a destruction order under s 57.22 Accordingly, she held a destruction order was not a direct or indirect consequence of a conviction under s 57, as described in s 107 of the Sentencing Act. Destruction followed whether a conviction was entered or not.

[35]   As Gordon J acknowledged, there is an odd distinction in the drafting between ss 57(3) and 58. She found that while s 57(3) does not require a conviction as a precondition of a destruction order, s 58, which deals with dog attacks causing serious injury, clearly does. The relevant wording of the two provisions is set out below for the sake of comparison:

21 Ingle v Auckland Council [2020] NZHC 1164.

22 At [60], where the Court noted that “…A conviction is not a precondition to the jurisdiction to  order destruction of a dog under s 57(3). If there is an attack, and the dog has not already been destroyed, then an order must be made in the course of enforcement proceedings under s 57(2) unless the circumstances of the offence (or attack) are exceptional. I respectfully decline to follow Fountain. The express requirement for a conviction was removed from s 57(3) in the 2003 amendment and I do not consider it consistent with the public safety purpose of the provision to imply one. I agree with Miller J that there will be circumstances where the owner can establish a total absence of fault (and therefore will not have committed an offence) but the dog still presents a risk to public safety which requires it be destroyed. I will consider the consequences of this conclusion below in relation to the specific issues in dispute in the appeal.” (footnotes omitted).

57(3) Dog attacking persons or animals

If, in any proceedings under subsection (2), the Court is satisfied that the dog has committed an attack described in subsection (1) and that the dog has not been destroyed, the Court must make an order for the destruction of the dog unless it is satisfied that the circumstances of the offence were exceptional and do not warrant destruction of the dog.

58     Dogs causing serious injury

The owner of any dog that attacks any person … and causes—

(a)     Serious injury to any person;
…

(c) … commits an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding $20,000, or both, and the Court shall, on convicting the owner, make an order for the destruction of the dog unless satisfied that the circumstances of the attack were exceptional and do not justify

destruction.

[36]   As the Court of Appeal acknowledged in Auckland Council v Hill, the expressions “circumstances of the offence (used in s 57(3)), and “circumstances of the attack” (used in s 58) are equivalents and appear to have been used interchangeably.23 But unlike Gordon J, I do not find the removal of the words “on conviction of the owner” from s 57(3) clearly indicates Parliament intended the two sections were intended to operate differently when it came to destruction orders.

[37]   While the opening words of the subsection refer to an “attack”, the proviso which follows requires focus on “the circumstances of the offence”. This in turn suggests there must be a conviction before the proviso comes into play. Notably, Parliament did not use the expression “alleged offence”, or repeat the term “attack”, as part of the proviso. So, while the Court must be satisfied that the dog has committed “an attack”, its focus in relation to the proviso is the circumstances of an offence. If no offence has been committed, the proviso would not apply.

[38]   Having considered the issue in the context of Mr Adams’ appeal, I have respectfully reached a different view, and prefer that of Wylie J in Fountain v Auckland Council.24 That is, s 57(3) requires the commission of an offence under s 57(2) before an order can be made for the destruction of the dog who has committed the attack.25

23     Auckland Council v Hill, above n 14, at [5].

24     Fountain v Auckland Council [2018] NZHC 591, [2018] 3 NZLR 216.

25 At [33].

[39]   Parliament when enacting the Dog Control Act was primarily concerned with public safety. The mechanism it adopted to achieve that aim was to impose criminal responsibility on dog owners for certain actions. So, it is no accident that a destruction order is contained in a section of the Act imposing criminal penalties on dog owners in specified circumstances. I consider the purpose of the Act, ascertained from its text and in the light of its purpose and context, is to treat the destruction of a dangerous dog as an integral element of a sentencing process following conviction. The Act does not confer any jurisdiction to order the destruction of a dog — akin to a civil order — unless its owner is convicted of an offence. I consider that a conviction is therefore a precondition of a destruction order in terms of both ss 57 and 58 of the Act.

[40]   I am reinforced in the view that Parliament did not intend the 2003 amendment to alter the requirement for a conviction by the clear drafting of s 58, which on its current terms plainly requires a conviction before a destruction order can be made. Given dog attacks established as offences under s 58 are more serious than those under s 57, it would seem an unusual result if Parliament intended a more stringent approach to destruction for more serious offending, involving greater danger to the public. Indeed, s 58 would serve no purpose if destruction orders could simply be made under s 57 without convicting the owner.

[41]   Having reviewed the Parliamentary materials, I have been unable to identify anything in them suggesting Parliament intended to uncouple destruction orders from a conviction when amending s 57. Doing so may create more problems than it fixes in any case: if a destruction order is not part of a sentence, how does the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 respond to it, if at all? If it is not part of a sentence, is there a right of appeal, and if so, what is its source? These procedural difficulties were resolved by the Court of Appeal in Hill. The Court concluded that a destruction order is part of a sentence amenable to appeal under s 253(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act. As Gordon J noted,26 the Court of Appeal went on to conclude:27

The opening words of s 57(3), “[i]n any proceedings brought under subsection (2)”, make it clear that a dog destruction order can only be made in the context of those criminal proceedings. It follows that an order made under s 57(3) is criminal in nature. In addition, a dog destruction order falls within the

26     Ingle v Auckland Council, above n 21, at [61].

27     Auckland Council v Hill, above n 14, at [10].

definition of a sentence in s 212 of the CPA, being a “method of disposing of a case following conviction.

[42]   Mr Bourke also drew attention to s 33ED, inserted into the Act by amendments in 2006, as supporting the conclusion that the Act appears to envisage ss 57, 57A and 58 as having a uniform application. While I agree with that submission, having considered the provision, I consider it supports the view that the uniform approach it reveals is that a conviction is a precondition of a destruction order. Section 33ED is in the following terms:

33ED Territorial authority to classify certain dogs as dangerous or menacing

(1)A territorial authority must classify a dog as a dangerous dog under section 31 or a menacing dog under section 33A if—

(a)the owner of the dog has been convicted of an offence against section 57(2) or 57A(2)(a); and

(b)no destruction order for the dog has been made by the court concerned.

(2)Subsection (1) applies unless the territorial authority is satisfied that the circumstances of the attack, rush, or startle by the dog (being the circumstances relating to the offence for which the owner was convicted)—

(a)were exceptional; and

(b)do not, in the territorial authority's opinion, justify classifying the dog as dangerous or menacing.

(my emphasis)

[43]   Once again, this provision links a power (in this case classification of a dog as menacing), to a conviction. And in doing so, Parliament has expressly defined the “circumstances of the attack” as “the circumstances relating to the offence for which the owner has been convicted.” In my view, it is a further strong indication of Parliament’s intention to use the expression “circumstances of the attack” interchangeably with “circumstances of the offence”. So, whichever expression is used, both require a conviction.

[44]   Given the underlying public protection focus of the Act, and its focus on criminalising certain conduct by dog owners as the mechanism to achieve public

safety, it seems inescapable to me that a conviction is precondition of a destruction order, and, of equal importance in Mr Adams’ case, it also forms part of the direct or indirect consequences of a conviction which the Court ought to take into account under s 106. And, as  Wylie  J  found  in  Fountain,  the  Court  retains  a  discretion  under s 106(3)(c) of the Sentencing Act whether, on granting a discharge without conviction, to make an order for destruction.

[45]   For Mr Adams, the fundamental difficulty with this conclusion is not legal, but factual.

[46]   The evidence reveals Rastus has made three attacks on people, one at least resulting in injury. Rastus has “form”. And the evidence before me also clearly indicates a tendency to blame others — including the victims of the attacks — for  Mr Adams’ dog’s behaviour. Mr Adams has also resisted efforts by the Council before the most recent attacks to ensure greater protection of the public. Had Rastus been muzzled or confined to Mr Adams’ property following the attack on the courier driver, the two attacks which occurred in September 2020 would not have occurred, and Rastus would not now be facing destruction. And after two attacks on the same day, Mr Adams continued to resist efforts by the Council to remove his dog to the pound.

[47]   All of this unfortunately leaves me with significant doubt that the appellant will ensure his dog does not attack others in the future. A future attack on a vulnerable victim may have far more serious outcomes.

[48]   For these reasons, I have concluded that the entry of the convictions themselves, as well as the effects of the destruction order, are not out of all proportion to the seriousness of the offences. The aggravating features I have noted, particularly Mr Adams’ failure to ensure there were no further attacks following the Council’s concern over the April 2020 courier attack, leave no room for any other outcome.

[49]   I do however consider it appropriate to make two observations regarding New Zealand’s dog control legislation, and how Parliament may wish to consider aspects of it given it is now 25 years old.

[50]   First, in light of the divergent views as to the interpretation of ss 57 and 58 of the Act in this Court — specifically whether a conviction of the owner is a precondition for making a destruction order — Parliament may wish to consider clarifying these provisions to make its intention clear.

[51]   Second, the assumption that criminalising aspects of dog ownership is the most effective means of ensuring public safety may also be worthy of reconsideration, particularly given the relative lack of regulation on ownership in favour of presumptive destruction of an animal when things go wrong. As David Tong and Vernon Tava note:28

The ‘death penalty’ is unusually strict, which is highlighted by a comparison to comparable Australian regimes. Most Australian jurisdictions confer a discretion to destroy a dog where it has attacked, rather than a presumption that it be destroyed. For example, s 29(5) of the Domestic (Feral and Nuisance) Animals Act 1994 (Vic) provides:29

If the owner of a dog is convicted of an offence under this section, the court may order that the dog be destroyed by an authorised officer of the Council of the municipal district in which the offence occurred.

In New South Wales, the discretion to destroy a dog that has attacked may only be invoked where the court is satisfied that no other order, such as for the dog to be removed from its owner, will be sufficient to protect the public. In Tasmania, the discretion to destroy a dog that has attacked persons or animals only arises after the dog’s second or subsequent attack.30

(original footnotes omitted)

[52]   No doubt there was a difficult balance to be struck when enacting the Act. Licensing dog ownership might be unpopular with many dog owners. But a form of graduated regulation focussed on public safety which reduces absolute freedom of ownership while also reducing reliance on lethal outcomes for the animal might be a more humane, and modern, way of dealing with a persistent issue. Killing the dog in question does little to ensure the public will be protected in the future from the real problem, which is poor ownership.

28     David Tong and Vernon Tava “Moral Panics and Flawed Laws: Dog Control in New Zealand”, above n 20, at 123.

29 This section is now found in s 29(12) of the Domestic Animals Act 1994.

30     See also the discretion contained in the Dog Control Act 2000 (Tas), s 19(9).

Conclusion and result

[53]   I dismiss the appeal. I acknowledge the distress this will cause for Mr Adams. But dog ownership carries responsibilities, and one of them is acknowledging the requirement for destruction of a dog permitted to attack people which then goes on to do so.

Isac J

Solicitors:

C & M Legal, New Plymouth for Respondent