FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ZX v Commonwealth of Australia [2018] FCA 1617
File number: SAD 376 of 2015 Judge: WHITE J Date of judgment: 29 October 2018 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Australian Crime Commission (ACC) – application for judicial review – whether the ACC Board had the power by an instrument in 2016 to amend a determination made in 2013 – s 33(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) authorises amendment of a determination made pursuant to s 7C of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) (ACC Act) – where s 7C amended after the making of the 2013 Determination but before the 2016 Instrument – whether the ACC Board had to comply with the amended s 7C when making the 2016 Instrument – whether the change to the special operation to make it one of indefinite duration was a change to the “reason, scope or purpose” of the operation – whether the Board complied with s 7C of the ACC Act in making the 2016 Instrument – whether the 2016 Instrument was a “new” determination – whether the 2016 Instrument should have been served on the Applicant pursuant to s 28(2) of the ACC Act when the 2016 Instrument did not exist at the time of the service of the summons – whether the 2016 Instrument is invalid as it provides for an operation of indefinite duration – application for judicial review dismissed. Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 33
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) ss 4, 4A, 7A, 7C, 12, 20, 21, 21A, 22, 23, 24, 24A, 28, 30, 34A‑34E, 46B
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment (Powers) Act 2015 (Cth)
Cases cited: B v Australian Crime Commission [2011] FCA 1046
Egglishaw v Australian Crime Commission (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 82; (2010) 186 FCR 393
LX v The Commonwealth [2016] FCA 441
P v Board of Australian Crime Commission [2006] FCAFC 54; (2006) 151 FCR 114
X v Australian Crime Commission [2004] FCA 1475; (2004) 139 FCR 413
X7 v Australian Crime Commission [2013] HCA 29; (2013) 248 CLR 92
XCIV v Australian Crime Commission [2015] FCA 586; (2015) 234 FCR 274
XX v Australian Crime Commission (No 3) [2016] FCA 437; (2016) 335 ALR 180
Date of hearing: 15 December 2016 Date of last submissions: 3 May 2018 (Judgment delivery deferred pending the finalisation of other litigation) Registry: South Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Federal Crime and Related Proceedings Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 100 Counsel for the Applicant: Dr R Gray Solicitor for the Applicant: Patsouris & Associates Counsel for the Respondents: Ms S Maharaj QC with Mr DF O’Leary Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
SAD 376 of 2015 BETWEEN: ZX
Applicant
AND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent
AUSTRALIAN CRIME COMMISSION
Second…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1617
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the amendment to the 2013 determination by the ACC Board in 2016 constituted a change to the "reason, scope or purpose" of the operation, as required by section 33(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act. The court found that the change to indefinite duration was indeed a significant alteration in the scope of the investigation, as it expanded the operation from one with a defined period to one with no temporal limitation at all. This conclusion was reinforced by the Full Court's decision in XXVII v Commonwealth, which held that a material change in the duration of a special investigation could constitute a change in its scope. The court further noted that the amendment in the present case was more substantial than the one considered in X v ACC, which had merely extended the period of the investigation by 12 months. The court held that the ACC Board was required to comply with section 7C(2) in its amended form when making the 2016 instrument, regardless of whether the amendment changed the reason, scope or purpose of the 2013 determination.
In light of the above findings, the court dismissed the application for judicial review. The court held that the ACC Board's amendment to the 2013 determination was valid, and the 2016 instrument did not constitute a "new" determination that should have been served on the applicant under section 28(2) of the ACC Act. The court also found that the 2016 instrument was not invalid merely because it provided for an operation of indefinite duration. Therefore, the application for judicial review was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for judicial review is dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The consequence in my view is that when the Board made the 2016 Instrument amending the 2013 Determination, it was required to comply with s 7C(2) in its amended form, irrespective of whether the amendment changed the reason, scope or purpose of the 2013 Determination. A change to “the reason, scope or purpose” of the operation If the conclusion just expressed be wrong, it is necessary to address the applicant’s submission that the 2016 Instrument did alter the “reason, scope or purpose” of the 2013 Determination so that, on the reasoning of Finn J in X v ACC, the amending power had, nevertheless, to be exercised “in the like manner and subject to the like conditions” as the way in which a new decision may be made. This question was also addressed in the analogous circumstances under consideration in XXVII v Commonwealth. As already noted, in that case, the Full Court was considering, amongst other things, the validity of an amendment to an authorised investigation of matters relating to federally relevant criminal activity. Section 7C(3) required the Board, before determining that an investigation be a special investigation, to consider whether “ordinary police methods of investigation into the matters are likely to be effective at understanding, disrupting or preventing the federally relevant criminal activity”. The authorisation of the investigation had been made by the Board on 4 September 2013 and expressed to apply to 30 June 2016. As in the present case, the Board had, on 8 June 2016, amended the 2013 determination by removing the termination date of 30 June 2016 with an express statement that the investigation was to continue to a special investigation. The Full Court (Wigney and Bromwich JJ, Dowsett J dissenting on this point) found that the removal of the temporal limitation with the consequence that the special investigation became one of indefinite duration, amounted to a change in “the reason, scope or purpose” of the special investigation. Wigney J reasoned as follows:[97]The effect of the 2016 Instrument was to extend or expand the range or operation of the special investigation. It changed the special investigation from one with a defined and confined period, to one which had no temporal limitation at all. Even if the amendment did not alter the general nature of the circumstances or allegations, or the purpose of the investigation, it plainly expanded its scope. It is immaterial that the Board may not have been required to impose a time limit in the first place. The fact is that it did. The amendment was far removed from the amendment considered in X v ACC, which simply extended the period of the investigation by 12 months. Bromwich J said:[187]Put simply, it is one matter for the Board to determine that a given authorised investigation of 3 years’ duration is to be a special investigation. It may be a very different matter for the Board to determine that the same investigation in content, but without any stipulated end date, is to be a special investigation. It must therefore be accepted that a significant change to the duration of a special investigation is capable of constituting a change in its scope, thereby engaging the requirement in s 33(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act to observe the conditions attaching to the exercise of the determination power when considering an amendment or variation. Of course, the materiality of any change in duration, including the removal or absence of any stipulated duration, will also depend on the ambit of the reasons for, scope (apart from duration) and stated purpose of the investigation.[188]In the present case, the removal of the end date specified for an investigation that was already very wide-ranging was a material change in its scope because of that very breadth. …