Zefi v The Director of Public Prosecutions; Jakaj v The Director of Public Prosecutions; Stakaj v The Director of Public Prosecutions; NH v The Director of Public Prosecutions

These four appeals concerned the interpretation of s 110(1) of the *Criminal Procedure Act 2011* (Vic) (the Act), which provides that a person charged with an indictable offence may apply for a review of a decision by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) not to consent to the committal of the person for trial. The applicants, Zefi, Jakaj, Stakaj, and NH, had each been charged with indictable offences. In each case, the DPP had refused to consent to their committal for trial. The applicants sought judicial review of these decisions in the Supreme Court of Victoria, which dismissed their applications. The applicants then appealed to the Court of Appeal, which also dismissed their appeals. The matter proceeded to the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Supreme Court had erred in its interpretation of s 110(1) of the Act. Specifically, the applicants argued that the Supreme Court had incorrectly held that the DPP's decision not to consent to committal was not amenable to judicial review. They contended that the DPP's decision was a "decision of an administrative character" made under an enactment, and therefore subject to review under the *Administrative Law Act 1978* (Vic). The applicants further argued that the Supreme Court had failed to give adequate reasons for its decision.

Kiefel J, delivering the judgment of the High Court, held that the DPP's decision not to consent to committal under s 110(1) of the Act was not a decision of an administrative character made under an enactment for the purposes of the *Administrative Law Act 1978* (Vic). His Honour reasoned that the DPP's power to consent or refuse consent to committal was an integral part of the criminal prosecution process, a function that was inherently judicial or quasi-judicial in nature, rather than administrative. The exercise of this discretion was not subject to the general principles of administrative law. Consequently, the Supreme Court had not erred in dismissing the applications for judicial review. The appeals were dismissed.