IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S108 of 1998
B e t w e e n -
MANSOOR HAIDER ZAIDI
Applicant
and
HEALTH CARE COMPLAINTS COMMISSION
First Respondent
MEDICAL TRIBUNAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Second Respondent
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S109 of 1998
B e t w e e n -
MANSOOR HAIDER ZAIDI
Applicant
and
HEALTH CARE COMPLAINTS COMMISSION
Respondent
Applications for special leave to appeal
GLEESON CJ
McHUGH J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 16 APRIL 1999, AT 10.10 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR P.L.G. BRERETON, SC: May it please the Court, in each matter I appear with my learned friend, MS B.C. BOSS, for the applicant. (instructed by Morgan Ardino & Co)
MS A.J. KATZMANN, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by D.M. Swain, Health Care Complaints Commission).
GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Brereton.
MR BRERETON: May it please the Court, in New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom it is accepted in professional disciplinary proceedings that the juxtaposition of allegations which, because they are not sufficiently strikingly similar, do not qualify as similar fact evidence but are sufficiently similar to cause prejudice, requires at least the strict warning to the disciplinary tribunal and the identification of the similar fact principles.
In New Zealand that has been most authoritatively stated by the High Court in Duncan v Medical Disciplinary Committee which is behind tab A in the bundle, particularly at page 547 in the judgment ‑ ‑ ‑
GLEESON CJ: Who gives the warning in New Zealand?
MR BRERETON: The legal assessor.
GLEESON CJ: Is that because there is no lawyer on the disciplinary tribunal?
MR BRERETON: Yes, your Honour. At page 547 in the judgment of the President, Mr Justice Cooke, speaking for himself and three other judges of the Court of Appeal ‑ ‑ ‑
GLEESON CJ: What tab is that?
MR BRERETON: That is tab A, your Honour, at 547, particularly at line 28:
If the principle of separation of evidence and findings is not scrupulously observed, difficulties will arise of the type illustrated by a line of Canadian cases –
and at line 39, acknowledging an exception:
where by analogy with the criminal law similar fact evidence has probative force –
The Canadian authorities which support the same view are set out by his Honour at that page.
GLEESON CJ: Where do we find the view?
MR BRERETON: Commencing at line 14:
When there are a number of separate charges, it will normally be the responsibility of the Council to consider the evidence relating to each separately, entirely uninfluenced by the evidence on others, and to make separate findings…..It will be a responsibility of the Council’s legal assessor, appointed under s 60, to make very clear to the Council…..that this is how the charges must be approached…..in the consideration of the evidence and the findings, the separate charges must normally be kept…
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- Case
- [1999] HCATrans 103
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the HCCC had the statutory authority to investigate and make findings of professional misconduct against Dr. Zaidi, particularly in circumstances where the alleged misconduct occurred outside of New South Wales. This involved an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the *Health Care Complaints Act 1993* (NSW) and the extent of the HCCC's jurisdiction.
Gleeson CJ and McHugh J considered the legislative intent behind the *Health Care Complaints Act* and the scope of the HCCC's powers. They reasoned that the Act conferred a broad investigatory and disciplinary jurisdiction on the HCCC, designed to protect public health and safety. The Court concluded that the HCCC's jurisdiction was not confined to conduct occurring within New South Wales, but extended to conduct by practitioners registered in New South Wales, regardless of where the conduct took place, provided it had a sufficient connection to the practitioner's professional practice in New South Wales. The appeal was dismissed.
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Evidence Before The Court
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