Zahra 15 Pty Ltd v Saffron SA Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Zahra 15 Pty Ltd v Saffron SA Pty Ltd [2023] FedCFamC2G 387

File number(s): ADG 32 of 2022
Judgment of: JUDGE MANOUSARIDIS
Date of judgment: 12 May 2023
Catchwords: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – Practice and procedure – application by the respondent for summary dismissal of a proceeding for trade mark infringement on the ground that the claims made in the proceeding are barred by the terms of a deed made between the applicant and another company – whether the respondent was the company’s successor within the meaning of the deed and therefore a party to the deed – whether the respondent is entitled to a covenant given by the applicant to the company to release claims and causes of action the applicant had against the company – whether the release provided in the deed covered the claims the applicant made against the respondent in the proceeding – order for summary dismissal made.
Legislation:

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)

Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) reg 3.1

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 13.13

Cases cited:

Accordent Pty Ltd v Bresimark Nominees Pty Ltd [2008] SASC 196

Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 337

Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Murry [1998] HCA 42; (1998) 193 CLR 605

Cong v Shen (No 3) [2021] NSWSC 947

Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd [2009] NSWCA 407

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125

Geraghty v Minter (1979) 142 CLR 177

Inland Revenue Commissioners v Muller & Co’s Margarine Ltd [1901] AC 217

Moody v Condor Insurance Ltd [2006] EWHC 100 (Ch)

Mount Bruce Mining Pty Limited v Wright Prospecting Pty Limited [2015] HCA 37

Needlegrove Investments Pty Limited v Thakral Brighton Hotel Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 89

Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9

O'Grady v Northern Queensland Co Ltd [1990] HCA 16

Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 40

Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381

Re A. & K. Holdings Pty Ltd [1964] VR 257

Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council [2002] HCA 5

Sayabath v Willowdale Nominees Pty Ltd, Williams, Cooper, Notley [2023] FedCFamC2G 104

Wollongong Coal Ltd v Gujarat NRE India Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 135

Division: General
Number of paragraphs: 69
Date of hearing: Decided on the papers
Place: Sydney
Solicitor for the Applicant: Y Intellectual Property
Solicitor for the Respondent: Beena Rezaee Legal & Migration

ORDERS

ADG 32 of 2022

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

ZAHRA 15 PTY LTD (ACN 615 433 442)

Applicant

AND:

SAFFRON SA PTY LTD (ACN 644 375 931)

Respondent

order made by:

JUDGE MANOUSARIDIS

DATE OF ORDER:

12 may 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to r 13.13 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia…

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Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC2G 387
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Zahra 15 Pty Ltd v Saffron SA Pty Ltd, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia was asked to determine whether the applicant, Saffron SA Pty Ltd, had reasonable prospects of success on its claims against the respondent, Zahra 15 Pty Ltd, in relation to alleged trade mark infringement and misleading and deceptive conduct. The dispute arose out of the operation of a deed of settlement between the parties, which had been executed in the Federal Court of Australia to resolve prior litigation. The Federal Circuit and Family Court was tasked with interpreting the effect of the deed on the current proceeding.

The central legal issue was whether the terms of the deed barred the respondent from pursuing its claims against the applicant for trade mark infringement and misleading and deceptive conduct. The court had to determine the extent to which the deed operated to release the applicant from any claims it might have had against the respondent. Specifically, the court needed to ascertain whether the deed's release clause was broad enough to encompass the applicant's claims in the current proceeding.

The court concluded that the deed's release clause did apply to the claims in the current proceeding, thereby barring the respondent from pursuing those claims against the applicant. The court found that the applicant, as the successor of the original party to the deed, was entitled to the benefits of the settlement agreement. Consequently, the respondent's claims for trade mark infringement were dismissed as they were released by operation of the deed. The court held that the respondent did not have reasonable prospects of success on its claims due to the effect of the deed.

The court ordered the proceeding to be dismissed and proposed to order the respondent to pay the applicant's costs. The court reserved the right to vary or discharge the order for costs if either party applied within 28 days of the order being made. This decision underscores the importance of the terms of settlement agreements and their binding effect on the parties involved.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

I have set out elsewhere the principles that govern the exercise of the power to dismiss a proceeding under r 13.13 of the GFL Rules.[2] The parties, however, do not in their submissions address the question that arises on SAPL’s application under r 13.13 of the GFL Rules, namely, whether, given the existence of the Deed, ZPL does not have reasonable prospects of succeeding on its claims. The question they address is whether the Deed bars ZPL’s claims. In other words, the parties have framed their submissions as if the Court has ordered that it decide as a separate question whether the Deed bars ZPL’s claims. For reasons I give at the end of these reasons, nothing turns on the parties having conducted their cases on this basis.BACKGROUND [2] Sayabath v Willowdale Nominees Pty Ltd, Williams, Cooper, Notley [2023] FedCFamC2G 104, at [29]-[31]The businesses of ZPL and SCPL Since about December 2017 ZPL has been conducting a business under the name “Agha Juice House” at Blair Athol, South Australia. “Agha Juice” is a common description of a style of drink popular in Pakistan. In about February 2018 SCPL commenced a business (Saffron Business) comprising a restaurant known as the “Saffron Club”, and a juice bar called “Agha Juice Point”, from Main North Road in Prospect, South Australia. On 8 February 2018 ZPL applied to register “Agha Juice House” as a trade mark (Trade Marks) under the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (TM Act) in respect of goods falling within two of the classes of goods prescribed by reg 3.1 of the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth), and in respect of services falling within one of the classes of services prescribed by reg 3.1.FC proceeding On 28 February 2018 ZPL commenced a proceeding (FC proceeding) against SCPL in the Federal Court of Australia (FCA). ZPL alleged that SCPL had engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct, contrary to the Australian Consumer Law, and had committed the tort of passing off, by using the words or mark “Agha Juice” in the conduct of the Saffron Business. ZPL and SCPL agreed to settle the FC proceeding on the terms of the Deed.The Deed The Deed is made between ZPL and SCPL, who are identified “Zahra 15” and “Saffron Club” respectively, and are collectively referred to as “the parties”. The recitals record that since December 2017 ZPL had been carrying on the business under the name of “Agha Juice House” at Prospect Road, Blair Athol in South Australia; that on 8 February 2018 ZPL applied to register a trade mark in respect of “Agha Juice House”, which application had been accepted but had not yet been registered; since about February 2018 SCPL had carried on business under the name “Agha Juice Point” at Main North Road in Prospect, South Australia; that ZPL had commenced the FC proceeding claiming that SCPL’s use of the words “Agha Juice” constituted misleading and deceptive conduct; SCPL denied ZPL’s claims; and that the parties agreed to settle the FC proceeding “on the terms and conditions contained in this Deed”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

I am satisfied that cl 4.1 of the Deed applies to the causes of action based on trade mark infringement ZPL propounds in the FCFC proceeding, and to the claims for relief for which it applies on the basis of those causes of action. The effect of cl 4.1 of the Deed is that ZPL released those causes of action and claims for relief in relation to, or that arise out of the facts ZPL alleges in the statement of claim ZPL filed in the FCFC proceeding.CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION I have concluded that SAPL is SCPL’s successor within the meaning of cl 1.1(h) of the Deed, and therefore is a party to the Deed. Being a party to the Deed, SAPL is entitled to the benefit of cl 4.1. That means that, by the operation of cl 4.1 of the Deed, ZPL has released SAPL from any cause of action, including one based on trade mark infringement, ZPL might otherwise have had against SAPL in relation to the conduct the statement of claim it filed in the FCFC proceeding alleges SAPL has engaged in; and, for that reason, ZPL is barred from maintaining against SAPL the causes of action for trade mark infringement it propounds in the FCFC proceeding. I have expressed my conclusion as if I were determining on a final basis the question to which my conclusions apply. That reflects the manner in which the parties addressed the question of whether the Deed barred the claims ZPL makes in the FCFC proceeding. Even if, however, the parties had addressed their submissions by reference to whether, because of the Deed, ZPL does not have reasonable prospects of succeeding on the claims it makes in the FCFC proceeding, I would have undertaken the same analysis of the parties’ contentions. The issues raised by the application are not straightforward; and as Barwick CJ, in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW), said in relation to a power to summarily dismiss:[34]. . . I do not think that the exercise of the jurisdiction should be reserved for those cases where argument is unnecessary to evoke the futility of the plaintiff's claim. Argument, perhaps even of an extensive kind, may be necessary to demonstrate that the case of the plaintiff is so clearly untenable that it cannot possibly succeed.[34] General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125, at page 130 The grounds on which SAPL applied for contending ZPL has no reasonable prospects of succeeding on its trade mark claims required the parties to make the extensive submissions they did; and these were necessary to enable me to determine whether ZPL did not have such reasonable prospects. Having considered the detailed submissions of the parties, I am satisfied that, because of the Deed, ZPL does not have reasonable prospects of succeeding on its claims for relief in the FCFC proceeding.DISPOSITION I propose to order that the proceeding be dismissed. I will also order that ZPL pay SAPL’s costs, but I will reserve to the parties liberty to apply within 28 days from the day after I make the order to vary or discharge the order for costs I propose to make.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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