Yu Sun v The Queen
[2021] VSCA 233
•24 August 2021
SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S EAPCR 2021 0015
| YU SUN | Applicant |
| v | |
| THE QUEEN | Respondent |
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| JUDGE: | BEACH JA |
| WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE |
| DATE OF HEARING: | On the papers |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 24 August 2021 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2021] VSCA 233 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | [2020] VCC 1400 (Judge Brookes) |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Application for extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal against sentence – Application for leave to appeal against sentence – Charges of stalking, aggravated burglary, and damaging property – TES of 3 years and 7 months, with NPP of 30 months – Whether sentence of 15 months (6 months to be served cumulatively) on stalking charge manifestly excessive – Not reasonably arguable that sentence or order for cumulation manifestly excessive – No reasonable prospect that total effective sentence would be reduced – Futile to grant extension of time sought – Application for extension of time refused.
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| REPRESENTATION: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Ms K Ballard | Emma Turnbull Lawyers |
| For the Respondent | Mr G Buchhorn | Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
BEACH JA:
The applicant pleaded guilty in the County Court to one charge of stalking,[1] one charge of aggravated burglary[2] and one charge of damaging property.[3] On 4 September 2020, following a plea hearing on 22 July 2020, the applicant was sentenced as follows:
[1]Contrary to s 21A of the Crimes Act 1958.
[2]Contrary to s 77 of the Crimes Act 1958.
[3]Contrary to s 197 of the Crimes Act 1958.
Charge
Charges on Indictment
Maximum Penalty
Sentence
Cumulation
1
Stalking
10 years
15 months
6 months
2
Aggravated burglary
25 years
3 years
Base
3
Damaging property
10 years
3 months
1 month
Total effective sentence
3 years 7 months
Non-parole period
30 months
Pre-sentence detention declared
298 days
Section 6AAA declaration
5 years with a non-parole period of 3 years 6 months
The applicant now seeks an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal against sentence and, if the extension of time is granted, leave to appeal against sentence. The applicant’s proposed ground of appeal is:
The sentence imposed on the applicant in respect of charge 1 is manifestly excessive.
PARTICULARS
The sentencing judge:
(a) failed to properly assess the objective gravity of the offending;
(b) failed to have proper regard for current sentencing practices; and
(c) failed to give sufficient weight to matters in mitigation.
The application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal against sentence requires consideration of the merits of the applicant’s proposed appeal and the applicant’s reasons for not filing his application for leave to appeal within the prescribed time.[4] The respondent submitted that the extension of time application should be refused, because the applicant’s proposed ground of appeal is not reasonably arguable. Additionally, it submitted that the explanation for the applicant’s delay is unsatisfactory. I will commence my analysis by considering the merits of the applicant’s proposed appeal.
[4]See Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601, 613–4 [29]–[33]; Derwish v The Queen [2016] VSCA 72, [55]–[57]; Madafferi v The Queen [2017] VSCA 302, [11]; Chen v The Queen [2017] VSCA 335, [22]–[23].
Circumstances of offending
The victim of the applicant’s offending was a Ms Zhang. There was a dispute on the plea about the existence and nature of the relationship between the applicant and Ms Zhang. The prosecution case was that the applicant and Ms Zhang met while working at a barbeque restaurant in Melbourne in March 2019. Ms Zhang worked at the restaurant for only a few days, before being let go. The applicant then helped Ms Zhang to get another job at another restaurant in Melbourne. He then moved to Sydney, before returning to Melbourne again in around August 2019.
In contrast, the applicant’s counsel on the plea told the sentencing judge that his instructions were that, prior to the commencement of his offending in September 2019, the applicant and Ms Zhang had been in a relationship for a year and a half. The relationship broke down, and the applicant ‘did not cope well with this’.
Whatever be the true position as to the existence or otherwise of any relationship between Ms Zhang and the applicant, the circumstances of and surrounding the stalking charge were conveniently summarised by the sentencing judge as follows:
[I]n approximately September 2019 you started calling and sending SMS messages to Zhang. This occurred generally after 11 pm when she had finished working. Owing to these calls and messages, Zhang believed that you wanted to be in a relationship and that you believed that because you had found Zhang a job she owed you.
Zhang stopped answering your calls; however, at times she would answer out of fear. During these calls Zhang invariably would not speak, but you would swear and be abusive towards her. You began to call Zhang multiple times every night, causing her to frequently put her phone on silent.
On one occasion in September 2019, not long after the commencement of the calls from you, Zhang caught her usual tram home from work. Around halfway home you also boarded the same tram, approximately halfway towards Zhang’s home address. Zhang asked you why you were on the tram and you replied you would catch whatever tram you wanted, before getting off a short time later.
Regularly thereafter, when Zhang alighted from her tram at her stop, she would see you waiting and watching her from nearby. This caused Zhang to begin to alight from the tram one stop earlier; however, she soon found that you would be waiting there for her as well. On these occasions Zhang would run from you.
During October 2019 every day that Zhang alighted from her tram she would see you waiting for her, so much so that she sometimes waited for work colleagues to finish work so that they could go home together.
At approximately 11:38 pm on 20 October 2019 you began to call and text Zhang. Between then and 4:30 pm on 21 October 2019 you called Zhang 18 times and sent her six text messages.
Following work on 21 October 2019, Zhang took a tram home and alighted one stop before her normal stop. As she got off the tram she turned around and saw you. Zhang ran from you; however, you chased her. Zhang managed to climb over a large wall or fence to escape from you.
On 26 October 2019 you called Zhang a further four times between 10:56 pm and 11:30 pm. You also sent an SMS message to Zhang on 27 October 2019 once with Zhang messaging you back five minutes later and calling twice that day.
Between 12:58 am on 5 November 2019 to 7:48 pm on 6 November 2019 you attempted to contact Zhang 28 times. You also tried once each on 7, 9 and 10 November 2019; however, Zhang changed her phone number and did not speak with you.[5]
[5]DPP v Sun [2020] VCC 1400, [3]–[11] (‘Reasons’).
The circumstances of the aggravated burglary and damaging property charges were also conveniently summarised by the judge:
At approximately 11:40 pm on 10 November 2019, Zhang arrived home at an address in Baker Street, Richmond. Some of her housemates arrived home at approximately 12:50 am on 11 November 2019 and Zhang began speaking with them.
Zhang and her housemates heard a smashing sound at the front door and could hear someone trying to break in. Zhang heard the person yelling and saying, ‘Fuck you, I find a new job for you and you didn’t give me back anything. You are such a bad person. You don’t know how to give back to people who help you’. Zhang could tell from the voice that it was you.
Zhang and another housemate Ben Chen leant against the front door to stop you from pushing it in. Zhang saw another housemate open his bedroom door, so she ran inside that room to hide, closing the door behind her. Zhang locked the door and pushed her body against it.
You went around to the back of the house and entered through the back door, carrying a meat cleaver and gardening scissors. You went to Zhang’s bedroom and damaged the door; however, when seeing that Zhang was not there, you ran through the house to the bedroom where Zhang was hiding. You started to hack at the door with the meat cleaver, trying to get in. One of Zhang’s housemates, Jonathan Raj, saw this occurring and ran outside to call the police.
Zhang heard your voice whilst in the bedroom and believed you were inside the house and she looked through the gap in the door and saw you standing there. She could hear smashing and banging coming from outside the room and you also smashed on the door and you were cursing.
You left the house and started to smash the windows to the room in which Zhang had locked herself.
Police arrived at the address and saw you at the front of the house, still holding the meat cleaver in your left hand and garden scissors in your right. Police noted that both items had blood on them and that you were bleeding from your left palm. Police members yelled to you to not move and get down on the ground; however, you instead raised your hands and walked towards the officers. The police had parked cars between themselves and you and again requested that you stop and drop the weapons.
You did not drop the weapons but stopped short of the officers. Police then deployed OC spray in your eyes; however, you did not drop the weapons, causing police to physically take you to the ground and take the weapons from your hands. It is not alleged by the prosecution that you were refusing to be arrested and that your language difficulties accounted for a large amount of this behaviour.
Police provided you with after care for the OC spray and you were then transported to St Vincent's Hospital for assessment and medical treatment for the OC spray. Once completed, you were taken to Richmond police station for interview.[6]
[6]Ibid [12]–[20].
On arrival at the police station, police determined that the applicant was alcohol-affected and not fit for interview. As a result, he was not interviewed for some hours. When interviewed, he said he had been drinking and could not remember anything.[7] He said he had been in a relationship with Ms Zhang for some months, but it had ended. When asked if it was a definitive relationship, or whether he believed he was in a relationship and Ms Zhang did not believe they were in a relationship, he said that it was ‘only from [his] side’. When shown the meat cleaver and garden scissors, the applicant said he did not recognise them — although he confirmed that keys found at the scene were his.
[7]For completeness I should note that, during the course of the plea, the applicant’s counsel specifically eschewed any suggestion that the applicant’s consumption of alcohol was a mitigating factor. She submitted, however, that it provided ‘context to how the offending escalated … from … following [Ms Zhang] and calls and text messages to actually violently trying to enter the home’.
Sentencing reasons
After describing the circumstances of the applicant’s offending,[8] the judge noted the applicant’s counsel’s submission that the applicant’s offending ‘constituted serious offending’.[9] The judge also noted the applicant’s counsel’s submission that the dispute about the nature of the relationship between the applicant and Ms Zhang ‘did not matter’ because Ms Zhang was already in fear of the applicant ‘based on the months of stalking preceding the aggravated burglary’.[10]
[8]Reasons [22].
[9]Ibid [23].
[10]Ibid [24].
In dealing with the gravity of the applicant’s offending, the judge noted that the aggravated burglary involved planning, as the applicant had ‘attended armed with multiple items’.[11] The judge also noted that, on the applicant’s account, the offending occurred in the context of a relationship breakdown, and this was a further aggravating feature.[12] The judge also recorded the prosecutor’s submission that the applicant’s culpability for his offending was high, and nothing had been submitted on behalf of the applicant to the contrary.[13]
[11]Ibid [25].
[12]Ibid [26].
[13]Ibid [28].
Under the heading ‘Criminal Record and Victim Impact Statement’, the judge noted that the applicant did not have a criminal record, and Ms Zhang had not provided a Victim Impact Statement.[14] The judge, however, recorded a concession by the applicant’s counsel that the applicant’s offending ‘would have had a significant impact on [Ms Zhang].[15]
[14]Ibid [29].
[15]Ibid.
Under the heading ‘Matters in Mitigation and Personal to You’, the judge:
·noted that the applicant had been born and raised in China and was 45 years of age;[16]
·described the applicant’s personal circumstances, including the facts that the applicant had been educated to a Year 9 level, had previously been married, had had a stint in the Chinese army and engaged in various occupations;[17]
·referred to, and discussed, a psychological report tendered from Ms Kerrin Danswan, a clinical psychologist who had assessed the applicant on 28 April 2020;[18] and
·referred to Ms Danswan’s assessment of the applicant’s ‘general risk of reoffending as low’.[19]
[16]Ibid [30].
[17]Ibid [31]–[32].
[18]Ibid [33]–[41].
[19]Ibid [41].
Under the heading ‘Sentencing Principles’, the judge said that he had to give effect to the principles of general deterrence and specific deterrence. He said that he was also required to express the community’s denunciation of the applicant’s conduct, and to promote his rehabilitation. Additionally, the judge said that he also had to have regard to current sentencing practices, as well as balancing the applicant’s personal circumstances.[20]
[20]Ibid [42].
Under the heading ‘Current Sentencing Practices’, the judge acknowledged that the applicant’s counsel had referred him to the sentencing remarks in two County Court cases[21] — saying that these cases served as ‘some reference’. The judge, however, noted that current sentencing practice was only one of the factors that fell to be considered.[22]
[21]The judge referred to these cases as DPP v Rogers and DPP v Stewart. The transcript of the plea hearing reveals that two unnamed cases (presumably these two cases) were provided to the judge the day before the plea. The judge said he had read them. However, no actual submission was made about them during the course of the plea hearing.
[22]Reasons [43].
Next, the judge referred to the applicant’s plea of guilty having been made at the earliest possible opportunity. The judge accepted that the plea should be regarded as having significant utilitarian value, ‘more so even due to the current health crisis of COVID-19 and the cessation of jury trials it has caused’.[23] Additionally, the judge accepted that the applicant had demonstrated ‘genuine remorse’ for his conduct and its impact on Ms Zhang.[24]
[23]Ibid [44].
[24]Ibid [45].
The judge noted that no reliance was placed on the principles in Verdins,[25] but observed that the history given to Ms Danswan went some way to explaining ‘what was submitted to be an out of character type of attack for a man of [the applicant’s] age with no prior convictions’.[26]
[25]R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269.
[26]Reasons [46].
Under the heading ‘Impact of Imprisonment and COVID-19’, the judge referred to the applicant’s counsel’s submission that the applicant had been completely isolated while in custody (save for a few fellow prisoners who speak the same language as the applicant) and that this was likely to continue.[27] In addition to referring to the effects of COVID-19, the judge noted that the applicant’s life had been threatened by two other prisoners, requiring him to be moved to a different prison — which move had given rise to ‘greater feelings of disconnection and isolation’.[28]
[27]Ibid [48].
[28]Ibid [50].
After dealing with the issue of the likelihood of the applicant’s deportation at the conclusion of his sentence,[29] the judge turned to the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation — saying that because of Ms Danswan’s assessment of him being a low risk of reoffending, ‘they [the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation] should be categorised as excellent’.[30]
[29]Ibid [52]–[53].
[30]Ibid [54].
The judge then returned to the topics of specific deterrence, general deterrence and denunciation.[31] The judge accepted that it was appropriate to moderate specific deterrence, owing to the applicant’s prior good character, lack of criminal history, prospects of rehabilitation and low likelihood of reoffending. The judge also said that protection of the community ‘should not overwhelm other considerations’, having regard to the applicant’s prior good character, his lack of criminal history and the particular circumstances of the case.
[31]Ibid [56]–[60].
Finally, the judge recorded the applicant’s counsel’s concession that a term of imprisonment comprising a head sentence and a non-parole period was the only disposition open to the Court.[32] After referring to the principles of proportionality and totality, the judge said that there needed to be a level of cumulation between charges 1 and 2 because those offences contained different acts of criminality and were both ‘serious examples’ of those offences.[33]
[32]Ibid [51].
[33]Ibid [63].
Parties’ contentions
In contending that the sentence imposed on charge 1 was manifestly excessive, the applicant submitted that the judge failed to properly assess the objective gravity of the offending; failed to have proper regard for current sentencing practices; and failed to give sufficient weight to matters in mitigation.
In his submissions about the objective gravity of the offending on charge 1, the applicant ‘accepted that the offending was serious’. He also accepted that it was ‘somewhat protracted, and the fact that it occurred in a family violence context elevated the gravity’. He submitted, however, that there was an absence of some aggravating features associated with cases of this kind such as:
·threats of any nature, to the victim or others;
·sending material about the victim to others;
·any prior history of offending against Ms Zhang;
·violence;
·the use of monitoring or tracking devices; and
·offending in breach of an intervention order.
The applicant submitted that, in all the circumstances, the offending constituting charge 1 ‘was not an example of stalking of the highest order of gravity’.
As to current sentencing practices, the applicant relied upon this Court’s decisions in Director of Public Prosecutions v Lade[34] and Director of Public Prosecutions v Elfata.[35] In Lade, the applicant was originally sentenced to an aggregate term of 16 months in respect of six charges, including two charges of stalking. An appeal by the Director was allowed by this Court and, on the stalking charges, the applicant was sentenced to terms of imprisonment of 6 months and 9 months. The applicant submitted that the stalking in Lade was objectively more serious than that for which he fell to be sentenced. In Elfata, this Court dismissed a Director’s appeal against sentence in a case where the offender had been convicted, following a trial, of stalking and rape. The sentence imposed in Elfata on the stalking charge was 6 months. Again, the applicant submitted that Elfata supported his contention that the sentence imposed on charge 1 in the present case was manifestly excessive.
[34][2017] VSCA 264 (‘Lade’).
[35][2019] VSCA 63 (‘Elfata’).
In respect of the matters in mitigation which the applicant asserted the judge failed to give sufficient weight to, the applicant relied on:
·his plea of guilty at the earliest opportunity, the judge’s findings as to the value of the plea, the fact that the plea spared Ms Zhang the ordeal of giving evidence, and the judge’s finding of ‘genuine remorse’;
·the applicant’s prior good character, and the fact that he had no prior convictions;
·the applicant’s excellent prospects for rehabilitation; and
·the increased burden of imprisonment on the applicant, having regard to his history and antecedents, his likely deportation on release from prison, his lack of English language skills, the fact that he had been moved around the prison system; and the increased burden caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Under the heading ‘Synthesis’, the applicant submitted that, ‘in the particular circumstances of this offending and the matters in mitigation, the sentence imposed on charge 1 and the order for cumulation is manifestly excessive’.
In response, the respondent noted that the ground of manifest excess ‘is a stringent one, difficult to make good, requiring the applicant to establish that the sentence imposed was “wholly outside the range of sentencing options available”’. In support of this submission, the respondent relied upon this Court’s often-cited decision in Clarkson v The Queen.[36]
[36](2011) 32 VR 361, 384 [89] (‘Clarkson’).
The respondent submitted that the conduct constituting charge 1 was ‘very serious’. It relied on the following factors to illustrate the gravity of the offending:
·
the offending was protracted and sustained. It occurred over
71 days, on a nearly daily basis, and sometimes more than once in a single day;
·the conduct escalated over time from regular phone calls and text messages of an abusive and offensive nature, to following the victim every second night and then every night, and eventually chasing her when she ran away from him;
·the offending involved planning, with the applicant timing his contacts to coincide with when his victim finished work (including altering his plans whenever the victim took steps to evade him);
·the offending occurred in the context ‘of a domestic or familial relationship with the applicant exhibiting a sense of entitlement over the victim’;
·the offending involved ‘psychological violence and intimidation’;
·the incidents when Ms Zhang alighted from her usual tram were particularly egregious as they occurred at night in a public place when she would be alone and vulnerable; and
·the applicant persisted with his actions despite being apparent that his victim was not interested in a relationship with him.
With respect to Lade and Elfata, the respondent submitted there was ‘limited comparative value to be derived from [these cases]’. The offending, and the offender’s individual circumstances, in each case was relevantly different from the applicant’s circumstances in offending. While each case concerned stalking and involved aspects which elevated the respective gravity of the offending, neither case involved a course of conduct which was anything like as frequent as the stalking engaged in by the applicant in the present case.
As to current sentencing practices, the respondent submitted that relevant sentencing statistics supported the contention that the sentence imposed by the judge on the stalking charge was not wholly outside the range of appropriate sentences. The statistics[37] showed that approximately 89 per cent of offenders received custodial dispositions for stalking offences, ranging from one month’s imprisonment to three years and six months’ imprisonment. Of this number, 27.6 per cent received a term of imprisonment of between one year and two years, with a further 20.7 per cent receiving longer terms of imprisonment.
[37]
Finally, the respondent submitted that there was no basis for contending that the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to matters in mitigation. Each of the matters relied upon by the applicant were specifically, and appropriately, dealt with by the judge in his reasons for sentence.
Consideration
A number of matters relied upon by the respondent as illustrating the gravity of the applicant’s stalking of Ms Zhang come from her police statement, and were not contained in the prosecution opening on the plea. To that extent, they must be disregarded. The applicant’s applications in this Court fall to be determined by reference to the facts upon which the applicant was sentenced.
That said, as the applicant’s counsel properly conceded on the plea, the applicant’s offending was undoubtedly serious. It occurred over a number of weeks. It was persistent; and there can be little doubt that it would have been frightening to Ms Zhang.
The applicant’s submission that the stalking was not ‘of the highest order of gravity’ is not of great utility. That the stalking was not of the ‘highest’ order of gravity can be accepted. Accepting that proposition, however, does not detract from the judge’s undoubtedly correct conclusion that the applicant’s stalking of Ms Zhang was a serious example of that offence (occurring, as it did, over weeks and involving numerous texts calls and attempts to contact Ms Zhang; and the applicant repeatedly following her, to a point where she ran from him and he gave chase, and Ms Zhang had to climb a large wall or fence to escape from the applicant).[38] The fact that the applicant’s offending did not contain further aggravating factors which would have made his offending even more serious is not to the point. To that effect, in Brown v The Queen,[39] Maxwell P and Sifris JA recently said:[40]
As this Court has often said, little benefit is to be gained from arguments which draw attention to the absence of aggravating features which might have been but were not in fact present in the offending before the court. Sentencing judges — and this Court on appeal — are required to assess the objective gravity of the offence, and the offender’s moral culpability, on the basis of what actually happened. That assessment must be based on the relevant features of the offence as committed.[41]
[38]Reasons [63].
[39][2021] VSCA 204.
[40]Ibid [28] (citations in original).
[41]Adamson v The Queen (2015) 47 VR 268, 299 [83]; [2015] VSCA 194 (Warren CJ, Redlich and Weinberg JJA); Stephens v The Queen (2016) 50 VR 740, 747 [26]; [2016] VSCA 121 (Redlich, Santamaria and Beach JJA); Dennis v The Queen [2017] VSCA 251, [66] (Kyrou and Hansen JJA); Crawford (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2018] VSCA 113, [77] (Maxwell P and Kyrou JA); Gurovski v The Queen [2018] VSCA 3, [72] (Whelan and Kyrou JJA); Sutic v The Queen [2018] VSCA 246, [55] (Kyrou and Kaye JJA); Clarkson v The Queen (2011) 32 VR 361, 382 [80]; [2011] VSCA 157 (Maxwell ACJ, Nettle, Neave, Redlich and Harper JJA).
As to the applicant’s reliance upon Lade and Elfata, four points should be made. First, the applicant’s plea counsel,[42] made no reference to Lade or Elfata in her submissions to the sentencing judge.
[42]Who did not represent the applicant in this Court.
Secondly, the nature of the offending, and the circumstances of each offender, in those cases is quite different from the circumstances of the applicant and the nature and extent of his offending. For example, in Elfata, the stalking involved the offender continuing to call and text the complainant, and to send gifts to her parents’ house.[43]
[43]Elfata [2019] VSCA 63, [8]–[9]. As to the offending in Lade, see [2017] VSCA 264, [12]–[17].
Thirdly, as has been said on many occasions, while s 5(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act 1991 requires current sentencing practices to be taken into account in sentencing an offender, this is only one of the factors that must be taken into account.[44]
[44]DPP v Dalgliesh (2017) 262 CLR 428, 434 [9], 450 [68] and 453 [82].
Fourthly, the mere existence of the sentences imposed in Lade and Elfata, in the circumstances of those cases, is a very thin basis for the assertion of some ‘current sentencing practice’ against which the sentence imposed on the applicant, for his offence of stalking, might be compared.
In relation to the applicant’s assertion that the judge failed to give sufficient weight to matters in mitigation, it should be observed that the judge dealt at some length with each of the matters relied upon by the applicant as being mitigatory. Nothing in, or absent from, the judge’s reasons suggests that his Honour did not have proper regard to relevant matters which the applicant was able to rely upon.
It is trite that in order to succeed on a ground of appeal alleging manifest excess, the applicant must show that the sentence imposed was wholly outside the permissible range of sentencing options open to the judge. When one examines the circumstances of the applicant’s stalking of the complainant, as described in the prosecution opening and summarised by the judge, and notwithstanding the matters in mitigation to which I have already referred, it is plain that the sentence imposed, far from being manifestly excessive, was quite moderate.
Moreover, only six months of that sentence was cumulated on an even more modest sentence for the serious aggravated burglary committed by the applicant (involving, as it did, the use of a meat cleaver — the applicant being armed with both a meat cleaver and garden scissors). The end result in respect of these serious offences is a total effective sentence which is, if anything, lenient. The applicant’s contention that the sentence imposed on charge 1 and the order for cumulation are manifestly excessive, is totally without merit.
Additionally, even if it could be thought that there was some error in one of the components of his Honour’s sentence, there is no reasonable prospect that this Court would reduce the applicant’s total effective sentence.[45]
[45]See s 280(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009.
The extension of time application
Having regard to the lack of merit in the applicant’s application for leave to appeal against sentence, it would be futile to grant the applicant the extension of time he seeks. The application for an extension of time must be refused. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to consider the applicant’s explanation for failing to file an application for leave to appeal within time.
Conclusion
The applicant’s application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of application for leave to appeal is refused.
- - -
Sentencing Advisory Council, SACStat: Stalking, Higher Courts, 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2019
(28 October 2020).
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