Yperion Technology SAS v Luminex Pty Ltd

Case [2013] FCAFC 38


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Yperion Technology SAS v Luminex Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 38

Citation: Yperion Technology SAS v Luminex Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 38
Appeal from: Yperion Technology SAS v Luminex Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 554
Parties: YPERION TECHNOLOGY SAS v LUMINEX PTY LTD (ACN 104 913 046), DAVID ERIC HAMMER, EVA KARPATI, HAMMER FAMILY TRUST T/AS LUMINEX (ABN 85 939 288 044), KARPATI FAMILY TRUST T/AS LUMINEX (ABN 85 939 288 044) and KARPTI CORPORATION PTY LTD (ACN 093 564 035)
File number: NSD 784 of 2012
Judges: NORTH, BARKER AND NICHOLAS JJ
Date of judgment: 5 April 2013
Cases cited: One.Tel Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 101 FCR 548
Date of hearing: 13 February 2013
Date of last submissions: 1 March 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 13
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr C A Moore SC with Mr A D B Fox
Solicitor for the Appellant: McCabes Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr P W Flynn
Solicitor for the Respondents: McLachlan Thorpe Partners

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 784 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

YPERION TECHNOLOGY SAS
Appellant

AND:

LUMINEX PTY LTD (ACN 104 913 046)
First Respondent

DAVID ERIC HAMMER
Second Respondent

EVA KARPATI
Third Respondent

HAMMER FAMILY TRUST T/AS LUMINEX (ABN 85 939 288 044)
Fourth Respondent

KARPATI FAMILY TRUST T/AS LUMINEX (ABN 85 939 288 044)
Fifth Respondent

KARPTI CORPORATION PTY LTD (ACN 093 564 035)
Sixth Respondent

JUDGES:

NORTH, BARKER AND NICHOLAS JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

5 APRIL 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The costs of the application for leave to appeal, of the appeal and of the application for a stay of proceedings made before Emmett J be costs in the cause.  

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 784 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

YPERION TECHNOLOGY SAS
Appellant

AND:

LUMINEX PTY LTD (ACN 104 913 046)
First Respondent

DAVID ERIC HAMMER
Second Respondent

EVA KARPATI
Third Respondent

HAMMER FAMILY TRUST T/AS LUMINEX (ABN 85 939 288 044)
Fourth Respondent

KARPATI FAMILY TRUST T/AS LUMINEX (ABN 85 939 288 044)
Fifth Respondent

KARPTI CORPORATION PTY LTD (ACN 093 564 035)
Sixth Respondent

JUDGES:

NORTH, BARKER AND NICHOLAS JJ

DATE:

5 APRIL 2013

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The appellant commenced proceedings in Paris to recover monies owing for goods sold to the first respondent.  The appellant also commenced proceedings against the respondents in Australia for infringement of trademark, breach of copyright, misleading and deceptive conduct and breach of agreement.  These claims arose from an allegation that the respondents sold counterfeit smart cards used to operate the laser hair removal machines supplied by the appellant to the first respondent. 

  2. In cl 24.2 of the distribution agreement made between the appellant and the first respondent the parties agreed “to submit to the Commercial Court of Paris, all disputes arising out of or in connection with the validity, interpretation or performance of this agreement and its exhibits.” 

  3. The primary judge ordered a stay of the Australian proceedings in reliance on this clause.

  4. Following the hearing of an application for leave to appeal from those orders the parties settled the matter save as to costs.  The Court made orders by consent as follows:

    In this order:

    Australian Proceedings means proceedings NSD2352 of 2011 in the Federal Court of Australia.

    French Proceedings means the pending proceedings in the Tribunal de Commerce de Paris (the Commercial Court of Paris or the Business Court of Paris) between the Applicant, the First and Sixth Respondents and Karpati Licencing Pty Limited filed on or around 20 September 2011.

    UPON the undertaking to the Respondents and the Court, of the Applicant by its counsel to:

    (a)       discontinue or dismiss forthwith the French Proceedings;

    (b)not bring any claims presently made in the French Proceedings (“French Claims”) in any court, otherwise than as part of the Australian Proceedings; and

    (c)treat the costs of the French Proceedings as abiding the outcome of costs in the Australian Proceedings (whether by order, settlement or otherwise), and if there is any dispute as to their quantum that they be assessed in accordance with Australian principles of costs assessment / taxation;

    AND UPON the undertaking to the Applicant and the Court, of the Respondents by their counsel that they will:

    (a)consent to the French Claims, and the claims currently made in the Australian Proceedings, being brought as part of the Australian Proceedings;

    (b)not seek to invoke clause 24.2 of the Exclusive Distribution Agreement dated 8 July 2003 between the Applicant and the First Respondent in answer to or as a barrier to the French Claims, or the claims currently made in the Australian Proceedings, being brought as part of the Australian Proceedings; and

    (c)treat the costs of the French Proceedings as abiding the outcome of costs in the Australian Proceedings (whether by order, settlement or otherwise), and if there is any dispute as to their quantum that they be assessed in accordance with Australian principles of costs assessment / taxation;

    THE COURT, BY CONSENT, ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:

    1.        Leave to appeal be granted.

    2.        The appeal be allowed.

    3.        Orders 1 and 2 of the orders of Emmett J made on 22 May 2012 be set aside.

    4.If no consent order as to costs is filed in the meantime, within 7 days of the date of this order, the Applicant file any written submissions in chief as to the costs before Emmett J, and the costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal (collectively, “Costs”).

    5.Within 14 days of the date of this order, the Respondents file any written submissions in answer as to Costs.

    6.Within 21 days of the date of this order, the Applicant file any written submission in reply as to Costs.  

  5. In accordance with those orders on 20 February 2013 the appellant filed a written submission on the question of costs.  On 27 February 2013 the respondents filed a written submission in response, and on 1 March 2013 the appellant filed a written submission in reply.

    THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS

  6. The appellant contended that the respondents should pay its costs of the application before the primary judge and before the Full Court.

  7. The respondents contended that each side bear their own costs of the application to the primary judge and the appellant should pay 50 per cent of the respondents’ costs of the appeal to the Full Court.  Alternatively, the respondent contended that each side should bear their own costs of the application before the primary judge and before the Full Court.  The respondents contended that where there has been no determination on the merits and both parties have acted reasonably, the starting point is that there be no order as to costs.  Then, the respondents contended that there were two considerations which militated in favour of the appellant paying 50 per cent of the respondents’ costs of the appeal. 

  8. First, the respondents contended that the outcome reflected an advantageous result to them.  They achieved a position that they would only be sued in one jurisdiction.  This result had not been offered to them by the appellant before.  Second, in the course of argument before the Full Court, the appellant, following some observations from the Court, submitted that the appellant may have wrongly conceded before the primary judge, and the primary judge wrongly found, that there was no evidence that the Court in Paris would not deal with the causes of action dependent on Australian law.  If this submission would have been determinative of the application, then the respondents had wasted effort in addressing complex conflict of laws questions raised in the submissions of the appellant.  Had the appellant properly identified the central issues in the application, the costs of addressing these complex issues would not have been incurred.

  9. In reply, the appellant contended that it was bound by the exclusive jurisdiction clause to bring the contract claims in France, and further, that the respondents had not sought to have the French proceedings heard in Australia prior to the settlement of this application.  In relation to the Australian proceedings the appellant completely succeeded.  The appellant argued that the respondents effectively conceded the application and, in that circumstance, it was appropriate to order costs in favour of the appellant: One.Tel Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 101 FCR 548. The appellant then submitted that unless the application was determined on the merits it was speculative as to whether some part of the argument was wasted.

    CONSIDERATION

  10. There are two factors which guide the determination of the issue of costs in the circumstances of this appeal. 

  11. The first factor is that the Court has not determined the merits of the appeal but has acceded to consent orders proposed by the parties.  In the absence of a determination on the merits the Court should not ordinarily make an order for costs by reference to a prediction of what the likely outcome of the appeal would have been had the matter been resolved on the merits.  There may be some cases in which the outcome is so obvious that it would not be wrong in principle to make an order for costs by reference to the likely outcome of the appeal after a determination on the merits.  However, that is not the case in this appeal. 

  12. The second factor is that this appeal concerned an interlocutory, not a final, order.  There is more force in the argument that each side should bear their own costs where a matter is resolved by final orders.  Where there is no such finality it may be appropriate to reflect in the order for costs on the interlocutory matter the result ultimately to be achieved on a final hearing by making an order for costs in the cause.  Then the party which achieves success in the final outcome obtains its costs for the interlocutory application which, by its nature, was part of the process of achieving success at the final determination of the case.

  13. In the end, justice is served in the circumstances of this appeal if the parties’ costs of the application to the primary judge and to the Full Court are costs in the cause.

I certify that the preceding thirteen (13) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of their Honourable Justices North, Barker and Nicholas.

Associate:

Dated:       5 April 2013

Details
AGLC
Yperion Technology SAS v Luminex Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 38
Case
[2013] FCAFC 38
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Yperion Technology SAS v Luminex Pty Ltd involved the determination of costs related to an appeal and applications made before the Federal Court of Australia. The primary issue was whether the costs incurred during the interlocutory stages of the proceedings should be borne by the parties or if they should be considered costs in the cause. The appellant, Yperion Technology SAS, argued that the respondents had effectively conceded the application, and thus it was appropriate to order costs in its favour. The respondents, Luminex Pty Ltd, did not contest the application on the merits but rather on procedural grounds.

The legal issues before the court revolved around the appropriate allocation of costs when the court accedes to consent orders and does not determine the merits of the appeal. The court had to consider whether it was appropriate to order costs by reference to the likely outcome of the appeal, given that the appeal was resolved without a determination on the merits. Additionally, the court needed to decide whether the nature of the appeal as interlocutory, rather than final, should influence the allocation of costs.

In its reasoning, the court highlighted two key factors. Firstly, since the appeal was resolved by consent orders and the merits were not determined, the court should not ordinarily make an order for costs by reference to the likely outcome of the appeal. Secondly, the court noted that because the appeal concerned an interlocutory order rather than a final order, it might be more appropriate to consider the costs of the interlocutory application as costs in the cause. This approach ensures that the party that ultimately succeeds in the final outcome bears the costs of the interlocutory application, which is part of the process leading to that final determination.

The court ultimately decided that the costs of the application for leave to appeal, the appeal itself, and the application for a stay of proceedings made before Emmett J should be costs in the cause. This decision ensures that both parties bear their own costs for the interlocutory proceedings, which aligns with the principle that each party should bear their own costs when a matter is resolved by final orders. The orders were entered in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The costs of the application for leave to appeal, of the appeal and of the application for a stay of proceedings made before Emmett J be costs in the cause.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In reply, the appellant contended that it was bound by the exclusive jurisdiction clause to bring the contract claims in France, and further, that the respondents had not sought to have the French proceedings heard in Australia prior to the settlement of this application. In relation to the Australian proceedings the appellant completely succeeded. The appellant argued that the respondents effectively conceded the application and, in that circumstance, it was appropriate to order costs in favour of the appellant: One.Tel Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 101 FCR 548. The appellant then submitted that unless the application was determined on the merits it was speculative as to whether some part of the argument was wasted. CONSIDERATION There are two factors which guide the determination of the issue of costs in the circumstances of this appeal. The first factor is that the Court has not determined the merits of the appeal but has acceded to consent orders proposed by the parties. In the absence of a determination on the merits the Court should not ordinarily make an order for costs by reference to a prediction of what the likely outcome of the appeal would have been had the matter been resolved on the merits. There may be some cases in which the outcome is so obvious that it would not be wrong in principle to make an order for costs by reference to the likely outcome of the appeal after a determination on the merits. However, that is not the case in this appeal. The second factor is that this appeal concerned an interlocutory, not a final, order. There is more force in the argument that each side should bear their own costs where a matter is resolved by final orders. Where there is no such finality it may be appropriate to reflect in the order for costs on the interlocutory matter the result ultimately to be achieved on a final hearing by making an order for costs in the cause. Then the party which achieves success in the final outcome obtains its costs for the interlocutory application which, by its nature, was part of the process of achieving success at the final determination of the case. In the end, justice is served in the circumstances of this appeal if the parties’ costs of the application to the primary judge and to the Full Court are costs in the cause.