Young v The Commissioner of Fire Service

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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF QUEENSLAND

Brisbane  No 2005 of 1991

Before the Hon. Justice Williams

[Young v. The Commissioner of Fire Service]

BETWEEN:

QUINTON NIVEN YOUNG
  Plaintiff

AND:

THE COMMISSIONER OF FIRE SERVICE
  Defendant

JUDGMENT - WILLIAMS J

Judgment delivered 24/03/1997

CATCHWORDS: LIMITATIONS - action for damages for post traumatic stress disorder induced by work experiences - writ issued approximately 4 months after expiration of 3 year period from precipitating incident - s.31 Limitation Act 1974 considered - Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v. Taylor (1996) 78 ALJR 866 considered - limitation period extended.

Counsel:Williams QC and O'Grady for applicant

Griffin QC, Stenson and Mrs Thomson for respondent

Solicitors:Taylors for applicant

Dillons for respondent

Hearing Date:   17 March 1997

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF QUEENSLAND

No 2005 of 1991

Brisbane

[Young v. The Commissioner of Fire Service]

BETWEEN:

QUINTON NIVEN YOUNG
  Plaintiff

AND:

THE COMMISSIONER OF FIRE SERVICE
  Defendant

JUDGMENT - WILLIAMS J

Judgment delivered 24/03/1997

The present action was commenced by writ issued 22 November 1991. The endorsement thereon indicates the claim is one "for damages for breach of contract of employment and/or breach of duty and/or negligence." Mention was made in the course of argument of the fact that a statement of claim has been delivered, but a copy is not to be found amongst the material on the file. The plaintiff's claim is that in the course of his employment he was exposed to psychological and emotional trauma on 4 August 1988 and that the defendant, his employer, was negligent in not providing him with counselling and other treatment reasonably necessary in order to prevent the subsequent onset of post-traumatic stress syndrome or other psychiatric illness. That failure occurred over a period of time after 4 August 1988. At this stage the plaintiff cannot be precise as to a date on which the cause of action arose, and it may be that even after a trial no precise date could be established. The difficulty which gives rise to the present application is that if the cause of action accrued prior to 22 November 1988 the claim would be statute barred - the writ being issued more than three years after the cause of action arose. In consequence the plaintiff has brought this application pursuant to s.31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 for an extension of the limitation period so that it expired on 22 November 1991, the date on which the writ was issued. In order to succeed the applicant must establish that he did not know of a material fact of a decisive character relating to his right of action until after 22 November 1990 and that such fact was not within his knowledge or means of knowledge until on or after that date.
           The plaintiff was born on 3 September 1949.  He joined the fire brigade (the service operated by the respondent-defendant) on or about 14 January 1974.  From then until about the end of the year 1989…

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Details
Case
[1997] QSC 43
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of Queensland was presented with a case where Quinton Niven Young sought damages for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) allegedly induced by his experiences during his employment with the defendant, the Commissioner of Fire Service. The crux of the matter was whether the statutory limitation period for the claim could be extended under Section 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974, as the writ was issued approximately four months after the expiration of the standard three-year limitation period. The court needed to decide if the plaintiff's claim could benefit from an extension based on the circumstances that he did not become aware of the severity of his condition until after the limitation period had expired.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiff could successfully argue that he was unaware of a material fact of decisive character relating to his right of action until after the limitation period had expired, thereby justifying an extension under Section 31. The court also needed to consider whether granting such an extension would cause significant prejudice to the defendant, as required by the statutory discretion.

In its reasoning, the court noted that the plaintiff did not become aware of the seriousness of his psychiatric condition until around November 1991, which was shortly before the writ was issued. The court found that the plaintiff's psychiatric condition, which was a direct result of the incident on 4 August 1988, prevented him from appreciating the nature and significance of his injury and its likely consequences. The court held that the plaintiff's lack of knowledge about the seriousness of his condition until November 1991 was a material fact of decisive character. Moreover, the court determined that extending the limitation period would not result in significant prejudice to the defendant, as the defendant had already been served with a comprehensive statement from the plaintiff's solicitor detailing all relevant issues. Consequently, the court decided to exercise its discretion in favour of extending the limitation period, thus allowing the plaintiff's action to proceed.

The final orders of the court were to extend the limitation period as sought by the plaintiff, enabling the action to continue.

Background

Background to the litigation

Quinton Niven Young was employed by the respondent, the Commissioner of Fire Service, from around 14 January 1974 until his medical retirement on 3 December 1994. During his employment, he attended various traumatic incidents, including extricating deceased or injured persons from vehicles and discovering burnt bodies after a fire. In August 1985, he consulted a general practitioner for work-related stresses. The primary incident in question occurred on 4 August 1988, when Young participated in the recovery of individuals trapped under debris at a building collapse on Queen Street. He found this incident very traumatic and was not provided with any counseling or treatment by his employer. Over time, Young began experiencing difficulties performing his duties and eventually had an emotional breakdown in November 1989. In May 1991, he experienced another breakdown and took leave until February 1992. In November 1991, he acknowledged for the first time that he had a serious problem after reading articles on critical incident stress provided by his employer's Stress and Trauma Program manager. He was required to retire on medical grounds on 3 December 1994.

The action was commenced by writ issued on 22 November 1991. The plaintiff claims damages for breach of contract, breach of duty, and negligence, alleging that his employer was negligent in not providing him with necessary counseling to prevent the onset of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or other psychiatric illness. The plaintiff applied for an extension of the limitation period under s.31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974, as the writ was issued more than three years after the cause of action accrued. The application was heard on 17 March 1997, and judgment was delivered on 24 March 1997.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the limitation period should be extended under s.31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974.
2. Whether the plaintiff's psychiatric condition prevented him from appreciating the nature and significance of his injury and its likely consequences.
3. Whether extending the limitation period would result in significant prejudice to the defendant.

Held
1. The limitation period should be extended under s.31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974.
2. The plaintiff's psychiatric condition prevented him from appreciating the nature and significance of his injury and its likely consequences.
3. Extending the limitation period would not result in significant prejudice to the defendant.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the plaintiff's application for an extension of the limitation period under s.31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974. The plaintiff argued that he did not know of a material fact of a decisive character relating to his right of action until after 22 November 1990, which was that he had suffered from a serious psychiatric problem as a result of the incident on 4 August 1988, and that it was likely to have a significant impact on his earning capacity. The court found that the plaintiff's psychiatric condition prevented him from appreciating the nature and significance of his injury and its likely consequences. The court held that the fact that the injury was more serious than previously realised should be regarded in context with other facts and that the newly discovered fact went to the very existence of the injury and the causes thereof.

The court also considered whether extending the limitation period would result in significant prejudice to the defendant. The court noted that the writ was issued less than four months after the limitation period would have expired with respect to a cause of action commencing on 4 August 1988. The court found that extending the limitation period as sought by the applicant would not raise any new issue for the respondent's consideration which would not have been immediately obvious on receipt of the writ. The court held that justice was best served by extending the limitation period as sought.

The court applied the legal principles established in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v. Taylor (1996) 78 ALJR 866, which held that the section confers a discretion upon a court to extend time and that discretion should only be exercised in favour of an applicant where, in all the circumstances, justice is best served by so doing. The court also relied on the Full Court decision in Byers v. Capricorn Coal Management Pty Ltd (1990) 2 Qd. R. 306, which held that the limitation period could be extended where the plaintiff had been advised that his injury was only a muscle strain which would resolve itself, but was later informed that he would have to cease his highly paid employment and seek different and lighter employment as a result of the serious nature of his injury. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the court may extend the limitation period where the plaintiff did not know, and had no reason to believe, that he had a cause of action against the defendant until after the limitation period had expired.

The court distinguished the case from Taggart v. The Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland (1983) 2 Qd. R. 19, which held that the fact, discovered outside the limitation period, namely that the injury was more serious than previously realised, should not be considered separately from the facts already known; it should be regarded in context with such other facts. The court found that the newly discovered fact in this case did not merely go to the enlargement of the plaintiff's prospective damages; it went to the very existence of the injury and the causes thereof. The court held that the plaintiff had satisfied the conditions necessary for there to be an extension of time pursuant to s.31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974.