Young v Minister for Home Affairs and Anor (No.2)

Link copied
Case Copied 18 min read

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

YOUNG v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR (No.2) [2020] FCCA 3077
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – special category (temporary) (Class TY) subclass 444 visa – whether notification of the primary decision by facsimile was unreasonable – whether notification of the primary decision complied with section 127(2) of the Migration Act 1958 by failing to specify under which Part of the Act a review was available – notification of the primary decision did not comply with section 127(2) – application allowed – matter remitted with declaration – costs awarded to the applicant.
Legislation:
Migration Act 1958, ss.66, 116, 127(2)
Migration Regulations 1994, r 2.55
Cases cited:
BMY 18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 189
DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64
EFX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 230
Parata v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCCA 1582
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 31
Yu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 912
Applicant: ANDREW WAYNE YOUNG
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: MLG 464 of 2019
Judgment of: Judge Blake
Hearing date: 24 August 2020
Date of last submission: 24 August 2020
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 13 November 2020

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Guo
Solicitors for the Applicant: Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Goodwin
Solicitors for the respondents: Mills Oakley Lawyers

ORDERS

THE COURT DECLARES THAT

  1. The Applicant has not been notified under section 127 of the Migration Act 1958 of the decision of a delegate of the Minister made on 17 March 2016.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT

  1. A writ of certiorari issue directed to the Second Respondent, quashing the decision of the Second Respondent dated 30 January 2019.

  2. A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Second Respondent, requiring the Second Respondent to determine the application for review according to law.

THE COURT ORDERS BY CONSENT THAT

  1. The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the proceeding fixed in the sum of $11,211.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 464 of 2019

ANDRE WAYNE YOUNG

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This is an application for review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) on 30 January 2019. In that decision, the Tribunal found that it did not have jurisdiction in the matter.

  2. The review application to the Tribunal arose out of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister (‘delegate’) to cancel the Applicant’s Special Category (Temporary) (Class TY) subclass 444 visa (‘visa’).

  3. For the reasons that follow, I have decided to allow the application for review.

Background

  1. The Applicant is a New Zealand national. The Applicant had been the holder of the visa since 2004. On 11 December 2015, the Applicant was…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Young v Minister for Home Affairs and Anor (No.2) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2020] FCCA 3077
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Young v Minister for Home Affairs and Anor (No.2)*, heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, the applicant challenged the validity of a visa cancellation notice. The applicant contended that the notice was defective because it failed to specify whether the cancellation decision was reviewable under Part 5 or Part 7 of the relevant Act, as required by section 127(2)(b). The Minister argued that the notice was valid and relied on a previous decision of Emmett J in *Yu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs*, while the applicant relied on the more recent decision of Riethmuller J in *Parata v Minister for Home Affairs*.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the visa cancellation notice complied with the mandatory requirements of section 127(2)(b) of the Act, specifically the obligation to "state whether the decision is reviewable under Part 5 or 7". The Court was required to determine if the notice, which stated that the decision could be reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, satisfied this requirement, or if the failure to explicitly mention Parts 5 or 7 rendered the notification invalid.

Judge Blake reasoned that the language of section 127(2)(b) was clear and mandatory, requiring the notice to "state" the specified information. The Court noted that the notice provided to the applicant did not explicitly state whether the decision was reviewable under Part 5 or Part 7, but rather generally indicated that a review was possible with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The Court found the reasoning in *Parata* persuasive, where Riethmuller J concluded that a precise approach to the provision was necessary due to the strict time limits involved in the review process. The Court adopted the view that section 127(2)(b) had not been complied with, and therefore the applicant had not been notified in accordance with the section.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 127(2) relevantly provides as follows: ‘127 Notification of decision(1) When the Minister decides to cancel a visa, he or she is to notify the visa holder of the decision in the prescribed way.(2) Notification of a decision to cancel a visa must:(a) specify the ground for the cancellation; and(b) state whether the decision is reviewable under Part 5 or 7;and(c) if the former visa holder has a right to have the decision reviewed under Part 5 or 7 state:(i) that the decision can be reviewed; and(ii) the time in which the application for review may be made; and(iii) who can apply for the review; and(iv) where the application for review can be made.(3) Failure to give notification of a decision does not affect the validity of the decision.’ It is common ground that the notice given to the Applicant contained at Court Book 28 does not state whether ‘the decision is reviewable under Part 5 or 7’. Rather, the notification simply provides that ‘The decision to cancel your visa can be reviewed. You may make an application for merits review of this cancellation decision with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT)’. The Applicant contends, among other things, that the notification is not valid because of the defect identified above. Among other things, the Applicant relies on the recent decision of Riethmuller J of this Court in Parata v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCCA 1582 (‘Parata’) in support of that proposition. The Minister contends, among other things, that Parata is plainly wrongly decided, and the Court is required to follow the decision of Emmett J in Yu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 912 (‘Yu’). It is important prior to turning to the authorities referred to above to have regard to the words of the Act. First, the language used by the legislature in section 127(2)(b) is clear and mandatory: a notice ‘must’ contain the matters set out in subparagraphs (a) to (c) of section 127(2). Second, the notice must ‘state’ whether the decision is reviewable under Part 5 or Part 7. Parata was a case in which a visa holder received notice of the cancellation of his visa. The applicant in Parata contended that section 127(2)(b) had not been complied with because, as in the present matter, the notice failed to specify whether the relevant decision was reviewable under either Part 5 or Part 7 of the Act. As a result, the applicant in Parata contended that he had not been notified in accordance with section 127 of the Act. Riethmuller J examined the statutory provision and concluded that section 127(2)(b) had not been complied with, and therefore that the applicant had not been notified in accordance with the section. In reaching that conclusion, Riethmuller J examined the history of the section, the amendments to it, the grammatical differences arising from the amendments and the Explanatory Memoranda. Riethmuller J also stated, at [17] that in his view, a ‘precise approach to the provision is required, as it is part of a scheme that provides very strict time limits’.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established