IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Darwin No D2 of 2022
B e t w e e n -
ENID YOUNG
First Applicant
PETRIA CAVANAGH IN HER CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT CONWAY (DECEASED)
Second Applicant
and
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (HOUSING)
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
KEANE J
EDELMAN J
STEWARD J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA AND BY VIDEO CONNECTION
ON FRIDAY, 16 SEPTEMBER 2022, AT 12.34 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
KEANE J: As the Court is sitting remotely, I will announce the appearances for the parties.
MR M.L.L. ALBERT appears for the applicant. (instructed by Australian Lawyers for Remote Aboriginal Rights)
MR N. CHRISTRUP, SC, Solicitor‑General for the Northern Territory, appears for with MR H.H. BADDELEY for the respondent. (instructed by MinterEllison)
KEANE J: Yes, Mr Albert.
MR ALBERT: If your Honours please, the core legal question which we say arises in respect of the two grounds of the application that are still in contention could be framed as follows: whether a statutory power to award compensation for breach of a residential tenancy agreement is qualified by general contract law principles of remoteness on its own terms or by reference to principles from Baltic Shopping Co. The Court of Appeal below concluded, as your Honours will be aware, that the statutory compensation power is limited by concepts of remoteness and foreseeability and, on that basis, concluded that there could be no compensation awarded for disappointment or distress arising from a breach of the tenancy agreement.
In our submission, their Honours, with respect, were wrong and the conclusion that they reached is inconsistent in material respects with what this Court concluded in the matter of Moore v Scenic Tours, and we say that on two primary bases referrable to the two grounds of the application. The first is that nothing in the words chosen by Parliament embraced or accommodated such a limitation being imported into section 122 of the Residential Tenancies Act. Parliament instead elected to adopt a causation touchstone, that is, if loss or damage is caused by the breach, then compensation can be awarded relevantly including for disappointment or distress. Even if ‑ ‑ ‑
EDELMAN J: Mr Albert, does that mean that there is no remoteness criterion at all? I mean, causation in the sense of a but for criterion can be extremely broad. It can extend to a chain of consequences that can reach back to the Norman Conquest.
MR ALBERT: Yes, your Honour. In our submission, the limitation provided by causation is sufficiently clear. Where questions of remoteness may have a role is when one were to get to the question of quantification. So, your Honours might be aware that there were two appeals that arose from the judgment of Justice Blokland. One of them dealt with whether there could be compensation for distress and disappointment; that is the one that was resolved and…
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- Case
- [2022] HCATrans 159
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court were twofold. Firstly, whether the statutory power to award compensation under section 122 of the Residential Tenancies Act was, on its own terms or by reference to principles from cases like *Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon*, qualified by general contract law principles of remoteness. The applicants argued that Parliament had intended a causation touchstone, allowing compensation for loss or damage caused by the breach, including for disappointment or distress, without the importation of remoteness limitations. Secondly, the applicants contended that even if general contract law principles applied, residential tenancy agreements should be considered contracts for peace of mind, freedom from molestation, or anxiety, thus falling within the second limb of principles established in *Baltic Shipping*, particularly given the vulnerable circumstances of the tenant.
The applicants' primary submission was that section 122 of the Residential Tenancies Act operated as a code, defining the limits of compensation without the need for additional limitations imposed by courts. They argued that Parliament's choice of words did not embrace remoteness principles and that the statutory power was sufficiently clear in its causation requirement. While acknowledging that remoteness might be relevant in the quantification of damages, they asserted that the facts of this case, involving a fundamental breach of a statutory obligation to provide reasonable security over a prolonged period to a vulnerable tenant, were not remote. Furthermore, they argued that residential tenancy agreements, being everyday contracts affecting a significant portion of the population, should be treated as contracts for enjoyment and freedom from anxiety, citing overseas authorities such as *Farley v Skinner* and *Chiodi* in support, and highlighting a divergence of opinion among Australian courts on this issue. The respondent, conversely, argued that section 122 incorporated common law principles, including remoteness, as it "piggybacked" on contract law concepts, and that the provision was not unique to the Northern Territory in a way that would warrant the High Court's intervention.
The Court ultimately granted special leave to appeal. The applicants' appeal was to proceed on the basis that the Court of Appeal erred in importing principles of remoteness and foreseeability into section 122 of the Residential Tenancies Act, and in failing to recognise a residential tenancy agreement as a contract for enjoyment or freedom from molestation, thereby precluding compensation for distress and disappointment. The Court also noted that certain procedural matters regarding consent orders had been resolved.
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