Younan v Director of Public Prosecutions

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District Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Younan v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] NSWDC 264
Hearing dates:5 October 2012
Decision date: 05 October 2012
Before: Nicholson SC DCJ
Decision:

The appellant's application is rejected

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW - Interlocutory judgment - District Court appeal - Evidence - Admission of documents - Computer printouts of sales transactions - Information stored in data base - document copies made by witness - Witness capable of authenticating documents tendered.
Legislation Cited: Evidence Act 1995
Cases Cited: Campbell v Hitchcock [2003] NSWIR Comm 148 (3 June 2003) at [153-154]
NSW Crime Commission v Rinh [2003] NSWSC 14
NAB v Rusu [1999] NSWSC 539
ASIC v Rich [2005] NSWSC 149
DPP v Koopelian [2012] NSWSC 309
Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Raymond Younan v Director of Public Prosecutions
Representation: Director of Public Prosecutions
File Number(s):2010/131655

Judgment

  1. The concept of what constitutes a document, and its capacity to play a relevant part in litigation by and large is governed by the Evidence Act 1995. Documents these days, to use an inexact cliché, "come in all shapes and sizes". A document can contain visual images and aural content, such as a video recorded interview; it may constitute a printout from a computer data base; diagrams and plans, or simply hand writing such as found in a last will and testament. Significantly, the source of a document and its content may well determine how its potential for relevant contribution to the evidence is to be assessed, thereby determining the ultimate question - "Does the document have any capacity to play a relevant part in the litigation?"

  1. In the Local Court conviction appeal before me, the appellant, Raymond Younan objects to the Director of Public Prosecutions (respondent), through his solicitor, calling fresh evidence, much of it relating to documents sourced from Caltex service stations. Resolving that objection requires the Court to determine with some precision the nature of the documents sought to be tendered, and whether, bearing in mind the nature of the documents, they have any capacity to play a relevant part in the litigation of this appeal.

  1. The appellant, Raymond Younan was found guilty by Magistrate Maloney on the 2nd February 2011 of 24 counts of obtaining a benefit by deception. The deception in each case was identified by the learned Magistrate as the appellant's use of a Caltex card for his own purposes at the same Caltex service station on 24 discreet occasions, all the time knowing that he was not entitled to use the card for such a purpose. The benefit arising from the 24 transactions proved against the appellant amounted to $31,154. As best I can tell from reading His Honour's remarks leading to verdict, the then focus of the appellant's case centred upon claimed problems arising from identification of images on CCTV camera footage.

  1. Mr Provera, counsel appearing on the appeal, was also counsel appearing before the learned Magistrate in the Court below. The appeal, to the extent in has been…

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Details
Case
[2012] NSWDC 264
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Younan v Director of Public Prosecutions involved an interlocutory appeal against a decision by the District Court in relation to the admission of certain documents in a criminal proceeding. The appellant challenged the admissibility of computer printouts of sales transactions and information stored in a database, arguing that they constituted hearsay and could not be authenticated by the witness. The court was required to determine whether the documents were admissible as evidence and whether the witness was capable of authenticating them.

The court considered the arguments presented by both parties, focusing on the definition of a document under the Evidence Act 1995 and the requirements for authenticating business records. The appellant contended that the documents were hearsay and that only a person with responsibility for making or keeping the document could authenticate them. The respondent argued that the documents were not business records and should be regarded as real evidence, thereby not subject to the hearsay rule. The court ultimately rejected the appellant's application and held that the witness, Mr Freeman, was capable of authenticating the documents as he had personal knowledge of their creation.

In its decision, the court noted that the documents were indeed business records but were created by Mr Freeman or at his direction. As such, he was in a position to authenticate them. The court further found that Ms Blizard's argument that the documents should be regarded as real evidence was not persuasive, as it did not alter the fact that they were still business records subject to the hearsay rule. The court concluded that the appellant's application to exclude the documents was rejected, and they were deemed admissible as evidence in the criminal proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appellant's application is rejected

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As I noted at the outset both the Postec system printouts and the CCTV material sought to be tendered by the Respondent are being tendered as documents as understood within the context of the Evidence Act 1995 (the Act). The Dictionary to the Act defines document to mean any record of information and includes: While the printout documents in question have not been tendered but have been marked MFI 1, it is safe to make a number of assumptions about them. If any of the assumptions are incorrect, and upon that basis likely to result in a flawed reasoning process the parties are at liberty to tender the documents for the purpose of exposing the error in assumption and its impact upon the reasoning process. The evidence, as I already noted discloses Mr Freeman personally retrieved documents that contained point of sale information. From the evidence and conduct of the voir dire proceedings I have assumed: Let me stress again, these are assumptions I have made; they do not constitute findings. The DDP Solicitor representing the Respondent, Ms Blizard, sought to describe the documents to me. I declined to take evidence from the bar table, anticipating, incorrectly as it turns out, the documents ultimately would be tendered on the voir dire. I turn now to Mr Provera's submissions on behalf of the Appellant. Firstly, he seeks, in the light of the evidence before me, to revisit the decision of the Chief Judge to permit the prosecution to call Mr Freeman, in circumstances where it did not do so at the trial before the Local Court. I will return to that issue shortly. Mr Provera submits the documents are hearsay documents, by virtue of their being business records. He argues the Respondent is forced to rely upon s. 69 of the Act. That in turn, he argues brings into play ss.170 -173 of the Act. The argument is that only persons who fit the requirements imposed by s.171 can authenticate business documents. That is to say, in the circumstances of this case, only persons who at the relevant time or afterwards, had a position of responsibility in relation to making or keeping the document. Accepting, only for the purpose of dealing with this argument the documents sought to be tendered against the Appellant are in fact business records, those documents were made in Mr Freeman's office by him or at his direction. They were, in effect, made by his command to a computer to print out a designated selection of encoded material from the encoded database, into documentary form, with the intention of capturing information sought during the course of a police investigation or a requisition from the Respondent. Mr Freeman is capable of authenticating the documents. Ms Blizard submitted each document did not constitute a business record, but rather should be regarded as "real" evidence. If this were so, then s.69 of the Act would not apply, because the document would not be hearsay in content. She relies upon the reasoning of Walton J, Vice President of the Industrial Relations Commission in Cambell v Hitchcock [2003] NSWIR Comm 148 (3 June 2003) at [153 -154].

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established