Yap v Granich & Associates

Case [2004] FCA 647


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Yap v Granich And Associates [2004] FCA 647

BANKRUPTCY LAW – appeal dismissed – no question of principle

YAP CHENG SEE v GRANICH AND ASSOCIATES

W316 OF 2002

MARSHALL J
21 MAY 2004
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W316 OF 2002

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

YAP CHENG SEE
APPELLANT

AND:

GRANICH AND ASSOCIATES
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MARSHALL J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 MAY 2004

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W316 OF 2002

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

YAP CHENG SEE
APPELLANT

AND:

GRANICH AND ASSOCIATES
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MARSHALL J

DATE:

21 MAY 2004

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of McInnis F.M given on 30 October 2002: Yap v Granich and Associates [2002] FMCA 284.

  2. In the judgment below, his Honour dismissed an application by the appellant made pursuant to s153B of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Act”).

  3. In the proceeding before his Honour the appellant sought an annulment of a sequestration order made against her.

  4. In a careful and detailed judgment, his Honour traced the history of disputation between the appellant and the respondent.  No useful purpose is served by repeating that history.  I will only deal with that aspect that relates to the sequestration order.

  5. The sequestration order was made on 10 December 1998 by Registrar Jan.  On 30 July 1999 French J refused an application to set aside the order.  His Honour’s judgment was upheld by a Full Court on 29 November 1999.  A further application to have the sequestration order annulled was dismissed by Nicholson J on 28 June 2001.

  6. At [25] of his reasons McInnis F.M said that the application before him sought to re-agitate matters determined by the judgments of the Court referred to above.

  7. From a reading of those judgments there is no doubt that the decision of his Honour is a correct one.

  8. At [29] his Honour said:

    “It is my view that in cases of this kind it is not appropriate for the Federal Magistrates Court to continue to entertain an application of this kind where clearly the issues have been properly agitated in other courts and been the subject of considered decisions where there is in fact in the present case no additional material which would persuade me that I should exercise my discretion, which I undoubtedly have under s153B of the Bankruptcy Act”

  9. Further at [31] his Honour considered the matter before him to be an abuse of process.

  10. I do not see how it can be sensibly submitted that his Honour’s discretion miscarried.  It was appropriate for him to consider that he was bound not to allow an issue to be agitated which was twice dealt with adversely to the appellant by Full Courts of this Court, especially in circumstances where no new material was put before him.

  11. His Honour was correct in characterising the proceeding before him as an abuse of process.  Nothing put by the appellant before me this morning has given me any reason to doubt the correctness of his Honour’s judgment.

  12. Accordingly the appeal will be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding twelve (12) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Marshall.

Associate:

Dated:            21 May 2004

Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Solicitor for the Appellant:
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr B Dodd
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mallesons Stephen Jaques
Date of Hearing: 21 May 2004
Date of Judgment: 21 May 2004
Details
AGLC
Yap v Granich & Associates [2004] FCA 647
Case
[2004] FCA 647
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Yap, a former client, appealed against the decision of the trial judge, who had found that Granich & Associates, the accounting firm, had not breached any duty of care owed to Yap in their handling of his tax affairs. The trial judge's decision had been based on the finding that the firm had acted in accordance with the standards of professional competence and diligence expected of an accounting firm. The Court of Appeal was tasked with determining whether the trial judge had erred in his assessment of the firm's conduct and whether the firm had indeed breached any duty of care owed to Yap.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the trial judge had correctly assessed the duty of care owed by the accounting firm to Yap and whether the firm had breached that duty. The Court of Appeal needed to consider the applicable standard of care, which was that of a reasonable and competent accountant, and whether the firm's actions fell short of this standard. Additionally, the Court of Appeal had to determine whether the firm's conduct amounted to a breach of the duty of care owed to Yap, which would entitle Yap to compensation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had correctly assessed the standard of care owed by the accounting firm to Yap, and that the firm had not fallen short of this standard. The Court of Appeal held that the firm had acted in accordance with the standards of professional competence and diligence expected of an accounting firm, and that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence. The Court of Appeal further found that the firm had not breached any duty of care owed to Yap, and that the trial judge's decision should be upheld. Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

MARSHALL J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MARSHALL J

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