Yalgan Investments Pty Ltd v Council of the Shire of Albert
[1997] QLAC 191
•11 December 1997
|
HELD AT BRISBANE
Re: Appeals against decision of the Land Court on costs -
(A94-94)
BETWEEN:
YALGAN INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
Appellant
AND
COUNCIL OF THE SHIRE OF ALBERT
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Delivered at Brisbane this Eleventh day of December 1997
Introduction
The claimant, Yalgan Investments Pty Ltd, appeals against a decision of a learned Member of the Land Court not to award costs in favour of the claimant and against the Member’s order that each party bear its own costs.
The Land Court had earlier ordered the respondent constructing authority to pay to the claimant the sum of $4,223,671.30 in compensation following the resumption for park purposes of part of the claimant’s land near Mudgeeraba on the Gold Coast. The award comprised $4,100,000.00 for the loss of land and $123,671.30 for disturbance.
The amount finally claimed by the claimant, following leave by the Court to amend the original claim, was $5,192,671.30 comprising $5,045,000.00 for the loss of land, $139,671.30 for expenditure thrown away and $8,000.00 for costs in formulating and lodging the claim. At the commencement of the hearing of the claim for compensation the constructing authority provided a valuation in the amount of $2,500,000.00. That amount was subsequently amended to $2,750,000.00. The constructing authority also conceded a claim for $8,000.00 for costs in formulating and lodging the claim.
The award was $969,000.00 less than the amount finally claimed. It was $1,723,671.30 more than the amount of the valuation provided by the constructing authority at the commencement of the hearing and $1,473,671.30 more than the subsequently amended amount of its valuation.
Clearly the amount of compensation as determined by the Member was nearer to that finally claimed by the claimant than the amount finally put in evidence by the respondent. The question is whether the decision not to make an order for costs was an appropriate exercise of the Court’s discretionary power.
Power of Land Court to make costs order
The power of the Land Court to order costs is found in s. 41(9) of the Land Act 1962 (preserved by s. 521 of the Land Act 1994). The subsection provides:
“Powers of Court
...
(9) The Court may make such order as it thinks fit as to the costs of or incidental to any matter that it has jurisdiction to hear and determine including, without limiting the generality of this subsection, the costs of an adjournment or application made in a pending matter, allowances to witnesses attending for the purpose of giving evidence at the hearing and the costs of any survey of boundaries.”
Section 27 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 provides:
“(1) Subject to this section, the costs of and incidental to the hearing and determination of the Land Court of a claim for compensation under this Acquisition of Land Act shall be in the discretion of that court.
(2) If the amount of compensation as determined is the amount finally claimed by the claimant in the proceedings or is nearer to that amount than to the amount of the valuation finally put in evidence by the constructing authority, costs (if any) shall be awarded to the claimant, otherwise costs (if any) shall be awarded to the constructing authority.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to any appeal in respect of the decision of the Land Court or to costs awarded pursuant to section 24(3) or section 25(3).”
Section 24(3) concerns amendments to claims and s. 25(3) concerns the grant of leave to a claimant to appear and be heard on a reference by a constructing authority when the claimant has failed to enter an appearance on the reference. Neither is relevant to these proceedings.
The leading decisions on the scope and exercise of the Land Court’s discretionary power include Moyses & Ors v. Townsville City Council (1979) 6 Q.L.C.R. 271 (“Moyses”), Minister for the Environment v. Florence (1980-81) 45 L.G.R.A. 127 (“Florence”), Banno and Another v. Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 81 L.G.E.R.A. 34 (“Banno”), Commissioner for Railways v.Buckler [1996] 1 Qd.R. 18 (“Buckler”) and, more recently, Kabale Holdings Pty Ltd v. Director General, Department of Transport (A94-34, unreported decision dated 15 October 1997) (“Kabale”) in which the Land Appeal Court quoted passages from decisions of the Full Court of Queensland in Wyatt v. Albert Shire Council [1987] 1 Qd.R. 486 (“Wyatt”) and Assignment Pty Ltd v. Kirby [1981] 1 Qd.R. 129 (“Assignment Pty Ltd”) relating to similarly worded discretionary power to award costs under other legislation.
Rather than quote passages from those judgments we will state in summary form the propositions for which the judgments and section 27 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 stand.
(a)The power to award costs of proceedings is entirely the creation of statute (Wyatt at p. 488 quoted in Kabale at p. 29).
(b)The power of the Land Court to make an order for costs in relation to a claim for compensation is conferred by s 41(9) of the Land Act 1962 and s 27 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967.
(c)Subject to s 27 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967, the discretionary power of the Land Court is full or complete (cf. Wyatt at pp. 488-9 and Assignment Pty Ltd at p. 134, quoted in Kabale at p. 29).
(d)The only statutory constraints on the exercise of the discretion are that:
(i)if the amount of compensation as determined is the amount finally claimed by the claimant in the proceedings or is nearer to that amount than to the amount of the valuation finally put in evidence by the constructing authority, costs (if any) shall be awarded to the claimant; and
(ii)otherwise, costs (if any) shall be awarded to the constructing authority (see Buckler at pp. 23-4 for history of and policy reasons for those constraints).
(e)Compulsory acquisition cases differ from ordinary claims in the significant respect that the claimant, unlike the ordinary plaintiff, had no choice whether to make a claim or not. The mere acquisition by compulsory process gave the claimant a claim to compensation which he or she could hardly be expected to renounce (Florence at p. 149, Banno at p. 53).
(f)The discretion whether to award costs may not be exercised in an arbitrary manner but must be exercised on principled grounds (Banno at p. 53) or judicially, that is, for reasons that can be considered and justified (Wyatt at p. 489) by reference to relevant considerations (Moyses at p. 273).
(g)In some cases the matter may be so obvious as not to require explanation in the form of stated reasons (Wyatt at p. 489).
(h)In general, a party who is wholly successful in litigation can expect an order for costs in his favour. Where compensation is awarded to one who had already been given, by statute, the right to receive it, it is just to say that the claimant ought, in the absence of special circumstances, to receive his reasonable costs of obtaining the compensation that is, ex hypothesi, his due. But costs are discretionary and no hard and fast rules will ever be allowed to occupy part of an area controlled by a discretion, however predictable the result of its exercise may be in certain sorts of cases. In some cases, the Land Court may consider that there are sufficient reasons for departing from the general rule (Moyses at p. 278, Florence at pp. 149-50).
Although the exercise of the power does not exclude resort to the “settled practice” of a court where such a practice has evolved, a purported exercise of discretion which fails because the mind is closed to relevant considerations through a rigid adherence to preconceptions involves an error of law that is open to correction on appeal (Wyatt at p. 489).
(j)Section 27(2) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 should not be regarded as a legislative suggestion that, where the claim is substantially more than the amount awarded, and the amount put in evidence by the constructing authority is not substantially less than the amount awarded, the Court should not merely refrain from awarding any costs to the claimant but should award costs to the authority (Moyses at p. 274).
(k)Where the Land Court is considering whether it should award costs to a constructing authority, it could be wrong to have regard merely to the amounts of the claim and of the award and of the value put in evidence by the authority. Usually it would be more relevant to enquire whether the conduct of the claimant (such as, for example, making an exorbitant claim) has been such as to force the authority, unreasonably and unnecessarily, into litigation (Moyses at p. 274) or whether the claimant has pursued a vexatious, dishonest or grossly exaggerated claim or presented his case in such a way as to impose unnecessary burdens on the constructing authority or the Court (Banno at p. 53).
Submissions to the Land Court
The decision on costs was made after the learned Member had received written submissions on behalf of the claimant and had heard oral submissions from the representatives of each party.
In support of an award of costs, the claimant submitted that:
(a)The decision of the Land Court to award compensation in the sum of $4,223,671.30 was “comprehensively in accordance with the claim lodged by the claimant and bears no resemblance to, or, at the very least, is starkly in contrast with” the final valuation by the constructing authority;
(b)The valuation prepared by the constructing authority was “so low as to make the litigation unavoidable and inevitable”;
(c)The amount awarded was closer to the amount finally claimed by the claimant than to the valuation finally put in evidence by the constructing authority;
(d)The increase in compensation from the amount of the constructing authority’s valuation at the commencement of the hearing to the amount awarded by the Land Court - an increase of more than $1.72 million - “is substantial and it was necessary for the claimant to have litigated the matter to obtain compensation for the compulsory acquisition of its property”;
(e)The increase in the constructing authority’s valuation from $2,000,000.00 as it appears by the advance on 25 November 1994 to $2,500,000.00 as appears by the advance on 5 January 1996 to $2,758,000.00 as appears by the advance on 14 November 1996 indicates that the constructing authority’s approach to the valuation was reviewed on two occasions but “was erroneous and not in accordance with the market value for the subject property”;
(f)This is not a case of a small increase above the threshold level indicated by s. 27(2) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 but is “a substantial increase which was occasioned by strenuously contested and lengthy process of litigation”;
(g)There is no suggestion nor is there any evidence that there was any behaviour on the part of the claimant which would have any bearing upon its claim for costs, in particular, that would deny it being awarded costs; and
(h)The nature of the claimant’s case was such that it required the claimant to call a substantial number of witnesses at considerable expense. The costs incurred by the claimant were not inconsiderable and were required to be incurred in order to see the compensation awarded to it.
In broad terms it was submitted that to make an award of costs would be consistent with the framework of the relevant legislation and with the principles laid down under relevant authorities. Given the proximity of the amount of compensation awarded to the amount contended for by the claimant, this would be an appropriate case to award costs in accordance with the general principle that costs should follow the event.
On behalf of the constructing authority it was submitted, correctly, that the Land Court has a broad discretion which must be exercised judicially and that the exercise of the discretion is limited only by s. 27 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967. There is no general rule that costs follow the event. It was further submitted that:
(a) The claimant had not been wholly successful in its claim;(b)The methodology of the claimant had not been accepted by the Court, most of the conclusions reached by the Court favoured the position adopted by the constructing authority, and the Court had adopted what was in a sense an amalgam of the methodologies adopted by both parties;
(c)It was a very complex case and appropriately qualified experts in varying disciplines disagreed and so was “the sort of case that needed an adjudication”;
(d)No “really pejorative comments” could be made about the conduct of either party; and
(e)Although the Court was empowered to award costs, this was not a case where it necessarily followed that costs should be awarded and, having regard to relevant facts, it is not an appropriate case that an adverse costs order be made against the constructing authority.
Decision of the Land Court
In his written decision on the application for an award of costs the learned Member gave reasons for his decision which are summarised as follows:
(a) The claim for compensation was not exorbitant.
(b)Although the question of the highest and best use of the subject land was made difficult by:
(i)the “quite bizarre circumstances” of the subject land having been rezoned to a Special Facilities zone without the imposition of conditions or the inclusion in the zoning description of a reference to a plan of development; and
(ii)evidence indicating a shift in trend in the market with regard to townhouses,
neither of those matters impacted on his final decision in a way that took the matter outside one capable of resolution between parties negotiating in a bona fide way.
(c)Of “greater importance” was that he found that each of the valuation methods presented by the parties was “either deficient or flawed”. The method finally adopted by the Member was “a composite one including the check method put forward by one of the claimant’s valuers and part of the hypothetical subdivision exercise relied on by the respondent”.
(d)Had either party addressed the deficiency in valuation method (in particular the hypothetical subdivision method proposed by the respondent) prior to the hearing, the matter would have been capable of settlement.
Power of Land Appeal Court to deal with costs order of Land Court
The power of this Court to deal with costs in the Land Court is governed by s. 44(16) of the Land Act 1962 which provides:
“(16) The Land Appeal Court ... may rescind, confirm or modify any order as to costs made by the Land Court.”
In J.T. and L.J. Barns v. Director-General, Department of Transport (A93-55, A93-56, unreported decision dated 2 September 1997) the Land Appeal Court considered the scope of this Court’s power and the relevance of s. 27 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 to the exercise of that power in a case such as this. The Court held that there is nothing in s. 44(16) of the Land Act 1962 or s. 27 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 which, either expressly or by necessary implication, might limit the power of this Court to rescind, confirm or modify any order as to costs made by the Land Court. The Land Appeal Court continued:
“On the other hand, there is in our view great force in [the] submission that the discretion should be exercised so as to make such an order as to costs as would properly have been made by the Land Court had the decision on appeal been given at first instance. In our judgment, s. 27(3) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 is intended to ensure that s. 27(2) is not applied in respect of costs of an appeal (whether to this Court or to the Court of Appeal). It is not intended to signal that s. 27(2) is irrelevant when this Court is replacing the order for costs below. Opinions may differ as to the justice of the policy embodied in s. 27(2); but it is the function of the courts to give proper effect to it. That cannot be done if, by the simple process of appealing against an order made (or not made) in the Land Court, the whole question of costs in that Court becomes at large.”
We note that that observation was made following a decision of the Land Appeal Court allowing an appeal against an award of compensation by the Land Court. This is not such a case. There was no appeal against the Member’s decision on compensation. The only appeal is against his decision on costs.
We further observe that appeal courts are reluctant to interfere with a discretionary decision such as an award of costs unless the decision can be shown to be clearly wrong.
The appellant conceded that difficulty and quoted the following passage from the judgment of Kitto J. in the Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v. The Commonwealth (1953) 94 C.L.R. 621:
“.. the true principle limiting the manner in which appellate jurisdiction is exercised in respect of decisions involving discretionary judgment is that there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the decision appealed from, and that that decision should therefore be affirmed unless the court of appeal is satisfied that it is clearly wrong. A degree of satisfaction sufficient to overcome the strength of the presumption may exist where there has been an error which consists in acting upon a wrong principle, or giving weight to extraneous or irrelevant matters, or failing to give weight or sufficient weight to relevant considerations, or making a mistake as to the facts. Again, the nature of the error may not be discoverable, but even so it is sufficient that the result is so unreasonable or plainly unjust that the appellate court may infer that there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance: House v. The King [(1936) 55 C.L.R. 499, at pp. 504, 505].” (p. 627)
That and other passages were relied on by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland in Wyatt (p. 487) and were referred to by that Court in Poole v. Enlor Pty Ltd [1987] 1 Qd.R. 80 (“Poole”) at p. 85. Other decisions are authority for the following propositions:
(a)The Land Appeal Court should interfere with the exercise of the discretion only if there has been some disregard of principle or misapprehension of fact (Moyses at p. 273 citing Estate of Shaw v The Crown (1974) 1 Q.L.C.R. 147).
(b)Where what has been done by the Land Court appears to lack rational justification, either in the findings or in the reasons expressed for it, a question may arise whether the decision has been arrived at judicially. It may then be open to review the decision on costs as involving error or mistake of law (Wyatt at p. 489).
(c)The Land Appeal Court cannot by its decision impose conditions upon the free exercise of that discretion by the Land Court (Moyses at p. 274 citing Middleton v Freier and Others (1958) Qd.R. 351 at p. 357) and it would be wrong for the Land Appeal Court to attempt to lay down rules governing the exercise of the discretion of the Land Court in the matter of awarding or withholding costs under s 27 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (cf. Wyatt at p. 493, Poole at p. 87).
Submissions on appeal
First, although Mr Ure, counsel for the constructing authority, alluded to a query which the constructing authority may have about one aspect of the calculation of the sum of compensation, there was no question that whatever method is used to calculate the median sum, the amount of compensation as determined by the Land Court is nearer to the amount finally claimed by the claimant in the proceedings than to the amount of the valuation finally put in evidence by the constructing authority.
Second, it is clear from the Member’s decision on costs that he placed great importance on his finding in the decision on compensation that each of the valuation methods presented to him were either deficient or flawed. The method which he finally adopted was “a composite one including the check method put forward by one of the claimant’s valuers and part of the hypothetical subdivision exercise relied on by the respondent”. The parties took no issue with the Member on that point.
Third, the Member concluded that if either party had addressed the “deficiency in valuation method”, in particular the hypothetical subdivision method proposed by the respondent prior to the hearing, the matter would have been capable of settlement. Mr Needham, counsel for the claimant, submitted to the contrary. In his submission the Member’s finding that the parties could have settled the matter if either party had addressed the deficiency in valuation method prior to the hearing was “pure speculation”. In his submission, if both sides had assessed the matter in accordance with the Land Court’s decision then the matter would have been resolved without resort to litigation. If, however, the claimant had assessed its compensation in accordance with the decision, but the constructing authority had not, then the constructing authority would have been contending for $1,600,000.00 less than the claimant for the land component only. If the constructing authority had contended for the award as assessed, but the claimant had not, then the claimant would have been contending for $945,000.00 more than the constructing authority. In either case it is speculation to say that the matter could have been settled. The prospects of settlement may also have been reduced because part of the difficulty in making a proper valuation (in particular, the determination of the highest and best use of the subject land) could be traced to the constructing authority’s error. Mr Ure was content to adopt the Member’s conclusion on this point. He submitted that it was drawing speculation too far to assume that the parties would not have been in a position to negotiate a settlement if, for example, they had settled on the correct highest and best use of the subject land.
Although any case may be said to be susceptible to settlement before the date on which a hearing is scheduled, we are persuaded by Mr Needham to conclude that this case was one where settlement was less likely because of the different approaches taken by each party. Even if either party had foreseen and adopted the approach ultimately taken by the Court, the parties would have remained a substantial distance apart.
Fourth, although the conduct of the parties is relevant to a discretionary decision about costs, it is clear from Mr Ure’s submissions on costs to the Land Court and the submissions of the parties to this Court that there can be “no really pejorative comments made about the conduct of either party”.
Fifth, the matter was undoubtedly complex and was the subject of a hearing taking six days. In his submission on costs to the Land Court Mr Ure stated that it was “a very complex case and appropriately qualified experts in varying disciplines disagreed. In a sense it was really the sort of case that needed an adjudication”. Mr Needham adopted that approach in his submissions to this Court.
The appellant’s submissions on appeal to this Court referred to the leading decisions on the award of costs and highlighted the unusual nature of this type of litigation. It argued that, in cases such as this where it can be said that the claimant has “won”, costs should follow the event in the absence of special circumstances. Further, the circumstances in this case did not constitute special circumstances which would deprive a claimant of its costs of obtaining fair compensation. Indeed, the Member had found that the claim was not exorbitant. An order for costs would be consistent with the approach traditionally (if not always) taken by the Land Court.
Even if that submission were to be accepted, there remains the question of whether the Land Appeal Court should rescind or modify the decision of the Land Court.
Conclusion and order
We are satisfied that the Land Court should have made an award of costs in this case. But that is not enough for the appeal to succeed. We need to be satisfied that the decision of the Member was clearly wrong because, for example, the Member acted upon a wrong principle, or gave weight to extraneous or irrelevant matters, or failed to give weight or sufficient weight to relevant considerations, or made a mistake as to the facts. We could also allow the appeal if we consider the decision to have been so unreasonable or plainly unjust that there appears to have been a failure properly to exercise the discretion reposed in the Land Court.
In essence, the relevant considerations in relation to the award of costs in this case are as follows:
(a)The claimant had a claim for compensation which it had to have determined by the Land Court.
(b)The claim for compensation was not exorbitant.
(c)The claimant was not “wholly successful” in the litigation.
(d)Whatever method is used to calculate the median sum, the amount of compensation as determined was nearer to the amount finally claimed by the claimant in the proceedings than to the amount of the valuation finally put in evidence by the constructing authority.
(e)Although the Land Court did not accept the valuation or the method for calculating the amount of compensation advanced by the claimant, the Court did not accept the totality of the evidence of the constructing authority on those matters.
(f)In the absence of special circumstances, the claimant ought to have received its reasonable costs of obtaining the compensation that is its due.
(g)Neither party criticizes the conduct of the other in the presentation of its case before the Land Court. In particular, there was no suggestion that the claimant had pursued a vexatious, dishonest or grossly exaggerated claim or had presented its case in such a way as to impose unnecessary burdens on the constructing authority or the Land Court.
(h) Given that:
(i)Neither party put its case on the same basis as that on which the judgment was made; and
(ii)Even if before the hearing one party had adopted the approach taken by the Court, the parties would have been apart by a significant amount,
it should not be assumed that the matter would have been settled.
The matter was complex and was an appropriate matter to be heard and determined by the Land Court.
We have concluded that, in deciding not to make an order for costs and to order that each party bear its own costs, the learned Member gave too much weight to his assumption that, had either party addressed the deficiency in its valuation method (in particular the hypothetical subdivision method proposed by the respondent) prior to the hearing, the matter would have been capable of settlement. We also consider that he gave too much weight to the fact that each of the valuation methods presented by the parties was either deficient or flawed. As neither method was accepted and the Court adopted a composite method, neither party’s prospects for an award of costs should have been affected. In particular, the claimant’s prospects of being awarded its costs should not have been denied. Finally, we consider that the Member did not give sufficient weight to the principle that, in circumstances where the discretion is exercisable only in favour of the claimant and in the absence of special circumstances, the claimant should obtain the costs of achieving fair compensation. Consequently, it is appropriate to rescind the order made by the Land Court.
We have also concluded that, given the complexity of the case and the fact that the claimant was not wholly successful either in gaining the amount claimed or in convincing the Court to adopt the claimant’s methodology for calculating compensation, it is appropriate to make a partial award of costs. Two decisions of the Federal Court set out the factors which a court ought to take into account when deciding whether to make such an award.
In Hughes v. Western Australian Cricket Association (Inc) (1986) 8 A.T.P.R. 40-748 Toohey J stated:
“1.Ordinarily, costs follow the event and a successful litigant receives his costs in the absence of special circumstances justifying some other order ...
2.Where a litigant has succeeded only upon a portion of his claim, the circumstances may make it reasonable that he bear the expense of litigating that portion upon which he has failed ...
3.A successful party who has failed on certain issues may not only be deprived of the costs of those issues but may be ordered as well to pay the other party’s costs of them. In this sense, ‘issue’ does not mean a precise issue in the technical pleading sense but any disputed question of fact or of law ...”. (p. 48, 136)
In Dodds Family Investments Pty Ltd v. Lane Industries Pty Ltd (1993) 26 I.P.R. 261 the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia observed that the propositions enunciated by Toohey J. in Hughes v. Western Australia Cricket Association (Inc) are:
“... subject to the further consideration that justice may not be served if parties are dissuaded by the risk of costs from canvassing all issues which might be material to the decision in the case ... In Trade Practices Commission v. Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No. 3) (1979) 42 F.L.R. 213; 28 ALR 201, Fisher J. regarded the discretion to apportion costs as one to be exercised only in the most exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless he accepted that where a considerable part of the trial is taken up in determining issues upon which a party fails, it is a proper exercise of the discretion to reduce the costs allowed to that party. Generally speaking, and notwithstanding the considerations referred to by Toohey J. and the other authorities mentioned above, the demands of the community for greater economy and efficiency in the conduct of litigation may properly be reflected in a qualification of the presumption that a successful party is entitled to all its costs.” (pp. 271-272)
The Land Appeal Court referred to those passages in Kabale (pp. 33-34).
The parties submitted and the Member’s reasons for decision on the award of compensation disclose that, although the award was nearer to the amount claimed by the claimant, the Member found in favour of the respondent on most factual issues. It was a complex case and there has been no challenge to the Member’s composite approach in determining the amount of compensation. No useful purpose can be served by dissecting the judgment and the transcript of the six days of the hearing in an attempt to determine precisely what proportion of costs should be awarded. At this stage it is preferable to take a broad view, influenced by the substantial success achieved by the claimant. An award of costs of a hearing for three days is appropriate.
We conclude that the claimant’s appeal should be allowed in part. The decision of the Land Court on the question of costs is rescinded. The constructing authority shall pay so much of the costs of the claimant of and incidental to the hearing before the Land Court of the claim for compensation as are the costs of and incidental to a hearing for three days. The amount of such costs shall be ascertained and fixed by the taxing officer of the Supreme Court at Brisbane according to the scale of costs prescribed by law for the time being in respect of proceedings in the Supreme Court and in accordance with the provisions of section 41(9) of the Land Act 1962.
We shall invite submissions on the costs of this appeal.
HELMAN J
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
JJ TRICKETT
PRESIDENT OF THE LAND COURT
GJ NEATE
MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT
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