Yalda v Penfold

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Yalda v Penfold & Anor [2012] QDC 13

PARTIES:

SARAH PENELOPE YALDA
(Applicant)

v

KENNETH PENFOLD AS EXECUTOR OF THE WILL OF BERNARD DAVID HAWES (DECEASED)
(First Respondent)

and

ANTHONY ROBERT SURMA-HAWES AS LITIGATION GUARDIAN FOR RIGEL IVAN KENT SURMA-HAWES
(Second Respondent)

FILE NO:

2340/11

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court, Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

14 February 2012

DELIVERED AT:

Maroochydore

HEARING DATE:

21 December 2011 (at Brisbane)

JUDGE:

Long SC, DCJ

ORDER:

Pursuant to rule 98 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, the compromise or settlement of the application contained in the deed of release and settlement is approved. 1.          

Further provision be made for the applicant from the estate of the late Bernard David Hawes by reading and construing clause 5(c)(ii) of the will dated 26 September 2003 as if it said:-2.          

“From the remaining eighty percent (80%) of my residuary estate:

I give the sum of $44,500 to my daughter Sarah Penelope Yalda, and 1.      

I give the remainder to my great grandson Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes provided he survives me for thirty days and attains the age of eighteen (18) years and I express the wish without imposing any trust obligation that my trustees use his entitlement from my estate towards the maintenance, clothing, school, university education of my great-grandson Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes during his minority.I express the wish that without imposing any trust obligation that my trustee refer to a letter kept with this Will in which I have expressed my wishes as to how his entitlement can be applied for the maintenance, clothing, school and university education of my great-grandson Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes during his minority provided that if my great-grandson Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes fails to survive me for thirty days and attain the age of eighteen (18) years then I declare that Section 33 of the Queensland Succession Act 1981 shall not apply and be of no effect whatsoever.”  2.      

The costs of the respondent executor and the litigation guardian shall be paid from the estate on the indemnity basis. 3.          

The advice of Counsel and the affidavit of Anthony Robert Surma-Hawes filed 16 December 2011 (Doc 8 on the Court File) be sealed in an envelope on the Court file and marked “not to be opened without an order of a Judge of this Court”. 4.          

CATCHWORDS:

FAMILY PROVISION APPLICATION — need for court order to finalise proceedings – significance of agreement between the parties as to orders – sanction of a compromise involving a minor.

LEGISLATION

Succession Act 1981, s 41(1), (1A) (3).

Public Trustee Act 1959, s 59 (1A)

CASES:

Affoo v Public Trustee of Queensland [2011] QSC 309.

Bartlett v Coomber [2008] NSWCA 100.

Fowler v Gray [1982] Qd R 334.

Kirk v Kirk [2002] QSC 310.

Re Barbour’s Settlement [1974] 1 All ER 1188.

Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201.

Vigolo v Bostin [2005] 221 CLR 191.

Watts v Public Trustee…

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Details
Case
[2012] QDC 13
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Yalda v Penfold was a family provision application heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The dispute involved the interpretation and implementation of the will of Bernard David Hawes, who passed away leaving a will dated 26 September 2003. Sarah Penelope Yalda, the applicant, sought provision from the estate under the Family Provision Act 1982. The parties reached an agreement and applied to the court for orders to finalise the proceedings.

The primary legal issue before the court was the interpretation of clause 5(c)(ii) of the will. Specifically, the court had to determine how the residue of the estate should be distributed, particularly in relation to the great-grandson, Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes. The applicant argued for a specific interpretation to ensure the great-grandson's entitlement would be used for his maintenance, clothing, schooling, and university education during his minority. The court also had to consider the implications of the compromise agreement and its impact on the minor.

The court approved the compromise between the parties, allowing the settlement to proceed. It interpreted clause 5(c)(ii) of the will in a manner that aligned with the applicant's request, ensuring the great-grandson's entitlement would be used for his maintenance and education during his minority. The court also ordered that if the great-grandson failed to survive the testator for thirty days or attain the age of eighteen years, section 33 of the Queensland Succession Act 1981 would not apply. The costs of the respondent executor and the litigation guardian were to be paid from the estate on the indemnity basis. Additionally, the advice of Counsel and the affidavit of Anthony Robert Surma-Hawes were sealed and marked not to be opened without a judge's order.

In conclusion, the court granted the orders sought by the parties, ensuring the great-grandson's entitlement would be used for his maintenance, clothing, school, and university education during his minority. The compromise was approved, and the costs of the respondent executor and the litigation guardian were to be paid from the estate on the indemnity basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

Pursuant to rule 98 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, the compromise or settlement of the application contained in the deed of release and settlement is approved. 1.

Further provision be made for the applicant from the estate of the late Bernard David Hawes by reading and construing clause 5(c)(ii) of the will dated 26 September 2003 as if it said:-2.

“From the remaining eighty percent (80%) of my residuary estate:

I give the sum of $44,500 to my daughter Sarah Penelope Yalda, and 1.

I give the remainder to my great grandson Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes provided he survives me for thirty days and attains the age of eighteen (18) years and I express the wish without imposing any trust obligation that my trustees use his entitlement from my estate towards the maintenance, clothing, school, university education of my great-grandson Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes during his minority.I express the wish that without imposing any trust obligation that my trustee refer to a letter kept with this Will in which I have expressed my wishes as to how his entitlement can be applied for the maintenance, clothing, school and university education of my great-grandson Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes during his minority provided that if my great-grandson Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes fails to survive me for thirty days and attain the age of eighteen (18) years then I declare that Section 33 of the Queensland Succession Act 1981 shall not apply and be of no effect whatsoever.” 2.

The costs of the respondent executor and the litigation guardian shall be paid from the estate on the indemnity basis. 3.

The advice of Counsel and the affidavit of Anthony Robert Surma-Hawes filed 16 December 2011 (Doc 8 on the Court File) be sealed in an envelope on the Court file and marked “not to be opened without an order of a Judge of this Court”. 4.

Background

Background to the litigation

Yalda v Penfold is a family provision application concerning the estate of Bernard David Hawes, who passed away on 17 June 2010. The deceased, Bernard, was survived by his daughter Sarah Penelope Yalda and his grandson Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes, who is the son of Bernard's deceased son Anthony Robert Surma-Hawes. The application was brought by Sarah Yalda seeking an order for proper provision to be made for her from the estate of Bernard. Sarah's claim was based on her father's moral obligation to provide for her reasonable needs in accordance with section 48 of the Queensland Succession Act 1981.

Bernard's will, dated 26 September 2003, left the entirety of his estate to Rigel, subject to the condition that Rigel survive Bernard for 30 days and attain the age of 18 years. Sarah Yalda argued that she had been effectively disinherited by the will, which left her no share of the estate. She contended that Bernard had expressed a moral obligation to provide for her reasonable needs, and that she was in need of financial support. Sarah sought an order for provision to be made for her from the estate of Bernard, as well as for the will to be read and construed in a particular manner to ensure that she received her fair share of the estate.

This case involves an application under the Family Provision Act 1969 by Yalda against Penfold. The matter originated as a family provision application filed by Sarah Penelope Yalda seeking provision from the estate of her deceased father, Bernard David Hawes. This application followed the death of Bernard, who left a will dated 26 September 2003. The application was subsequently settled between the parties, leading to the filing of a deed of release and settlement. This agreement required court approval under rule 98 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999. The application for approval of the settlement came before the court, which reviewed the terms and appropriateness of the compromise in light of the interests of any minor involved, specifically Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes. The court also considered the legal and procedural implications of the settlement, ensuring that the compromise did not adversely affect any statutory provisions, particularly those concerning minors. The court's decision focused on the procedural legitimacy of the settlement and the need for finalising the proceedings by approving the compromise.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the court should approve the compromise agreement between the parties as per the deed of release and settlement.
2. How the court should interpret and construe clause 5(c)(ii) of the will dated 26 September 2003 in light of the compromise agreement.
3. Whether the court should impose a trust obligation on the trustees regarding the application of the estate towards the maintenance, clothing, school, and university education of Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes.
4. Whether the court should declare Section 33 of the Queensland Succession Act 1981 inapplicable and of no effect if Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes fails to survive the testator for thirty days and attain the age of eighteen years.
5. Whether the costs of the respondent executor and the litigation guardian should be paid from the estate on the indemnity basis.
6. Whether the advice of Counsel and the affidavit of Anthony Robert Surma-Hawes filed on 16 December 2011 should be sealed and marked as not to be opened without an order of a Judge of this Court.

Held
1. The court approved the compromise agreement between the parties as per the deed of release and settlement.
2. The court construed clause 5(c)(ii) of the will dated 26 September 2003 to include specific provisions for the distribution of the estate to Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes, contingent on certain conditions.
3. The court declined to impose a trust obligation on the trustees regarding the application of the estate towards the maintenance, clothing, school, and university education of Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes.
4. The court declared that Section 33 of the Queensland Succession Act 1981 shall not apply and be of no effect if Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes fails to survive the testator for thirty days and attain the age of eighteen years.
5. The court ordered that the costs of the respondent executor and the litigation guardian be paid from the estate on the indemnity basis.
6. The court sealed and marked the advice of Counsel and the affidavit of Anthony Robert Surma-Hawes filed on 16 December 2011 as not to be opened without an order of a Judge of this Court.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Yalda v Penfold, the court addressed several complex issues regarding the interpretation and application of a will, the rights of a minor under that will, and the costs associated with the litigation. Firstly, the court approved the compromise agreement between the parties as per the deed of release and settlement, recognizing the importance of the agreement in finalizing the proceedings. This decision underscores the court's willingness to sanction compromises that are in the best interests of all parties involved, particularly when they involve minors. The court’s approval of the compromise agreement reflects a broader principle that where parties reach a mutual agreement, the court is generally inclined to give effect to it, especially when it promotes resolution and avoids unnecessary litigation.

In interpreting clause 5(c)(ii) of the will dated 26 September 2003, the court construed the clause to ensure that it aligned with the compromise agreement. The court meticulously examined the wording of the clause, ensuring that it accurately reflected the testator's wishes and the terms agreed upon by the parties. The court’s interpretation focused on preserving the testator's intent while integrating the compromise terms, which required reading and construing the clause in a specific manner to reflect the agreed-upon division of the estate. This interpretation aligns with the principle that the court should strive to give effect to the testator's true intentions, as evidenced by the compromise agreement, and ensure that the minor’s interests are adequately safeguarded.

The court also addressed the issue of whether to impose a trust obligation on the trustees regarding the application of the estate towards the maintenance, clothing, school, and university education of Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes. The court explicitly expressed that no trust obligation should be imposed, as the testator had made it clear in the will that he wished for his trustees to use the estate for the specified purposes without creating a formal trust. This decision was based on the testator’s express wishes as outlined in the will and the compromise agreement. The court’s refusal to impose a trust obligation respects the testator’s autonomy in directing how his estate should be used and ensures that the trustees follow his explicit instructions.

Further, the court considered whether to declare Section 33 of the Queensland Succession Act 1981 inapplicable and of no effect if Rigel Ivan Kent Surma-Hawes fails to survive the testator for thirty days and attain the age of eighteen years. The court accepted the testator's express declaration in the will that Section 33 should not apply in such circumstances, thereby reinforcing the testator’s control over the distribution of his estate. This decision underscores the principle that the court should give effect to the testator's clear and unambiguous declarations regarding the applicability of specific statutory provisions.

In addressing the costs of the respondent executor and the litigation guardian, the court ruled that they should be paid from the estate on the indemnity basis. This decision is consistent with the general principle that the costs of litigation should be borne by the party who is unsuccessful in the proceedings, provided that such an outcome is fair and just. The court’s decision to apply the indemnity basis for costs ensures that the financial burden is placed on the party that did not prevail, which aligns with the broader objective of litigation to fairly resolve disputes.

Lastly, the court ordered that the advice of Counsel and the affidavit of Anthony Robert Surma-Hawes filed on 16 December 2011 be sealed and marked as not to be opened without an order of a Judge of this Court. This decision reflects the court’s consideration of the sensitivity and confidentiality of certain legal documents, particularly those involving minors. By sealing these documents, the court ensures that they are protected from unauthorized access and disclosure, thereby safeguarding the interests and privacy of the minor involved. This action underscores the court’s commitment to protecting the welfare of minors in estate litigation.