Xue v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

XUE & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2018] FCCA 151
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Cancellation of partner visa – review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the Tribunal’s decision was affected by a reasonable apprehension of bias – whether the Tribunal’s decision was based upon errors of law – whether the Tribunal erred by acting on a premise which did not exist – whether the Tribunal failed to comply with s.359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.101, 103, 107, 109(1), 140, 198, 200, 338, 348, 352, 359A, 474,pt.5 of div.2

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), cl.100.321 of sch.2, criteria 4004 of sch.4

Cases cited:

ALA15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30

Bezer v Bassan [2017] NSWCA 333
Bilgin v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 149 ALR 281; [1997] FCA 1022
Graham v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2017) 91 ALJR 890; [2017] HCA 33
Gul v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2642
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6
Rani v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 80 FCR 379; [1997] FCA 1493
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2007) 81 ALJR 1190; [2007] HCA 26
Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568; [1989] HCA 44
Zaburoni v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 205

First Applicant: XIONG ZHONG XUE
Second Applicant: JUN KAI XUE
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 393 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Smith
Hearing date: 5 December 2017
Date of Last Submission: 14 December 2017
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 9 February 2018

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicants: Mr R Turner, Turner Coulson Immigration Lawyers
Solicitors for the Respondents: Ms M Donald, Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

  1. The application be dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 393 of 2017

XIONG ZHONG XUE

First Applicant

JUN KAI XUE

Second Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The first applicant (applicant) applied for a Partner visa on 1 March 2011. The second applicant was included in the application as a dependent of the applicant. The application failed to disclose a number of matters including the fact that the applicant had previously been to Australia under an assumed name and had unsuccessfully applied for a visa under that name.

  2. The visa application was initially rejected, but after successfully seeking review by the Migration Review Tribunal[1] (MRT), the applicant and his son were granted visas on 29 January 2014.

    [1] As it was then known. On 1 July 2015 it became the Administrative Appeals Tribunal: Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth).

  3. On 16 September 2016, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration issued the…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 151
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The applicant, Mr. Xue, sought to challenge the Tribunal's decision to affirm the cancellation of his visa. The primary dispute revolved around whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to review the cancellation of the second applicant's visa and whether the Tribunal had made errors of law in its assessment of Mr. Xue's case.

The court was required to determine two principal legal issues. Firstly, whether the cancellation of the second applicant's visa constituted a "decision" for the purposes of Part 5 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which would grant the Tribunal jurisdiction to review it. Secondly, the court had to consider whether the Tribunal's repeated references to the applicant having been "deported" from Australia, rather than "removed" under section 198(1) of the Act, constituted a legal error.

The court reasoned that a "decision" for the purposes of reviewable decisions under Part 5 of the Act requires some form of positive action or inaction, and does not encompass consequences arising solely from the operation of law. Applying this principle, the court held that the cancellation of the second applicant's visa was not a "decision" and therefore the Tribunal correctly concluded it lacked jurisdiction. Regarding the alleged error of deportation, the court found that while the Tribunal used the term "deported," its detailed reasons clearly indicated an understanding of the applicant's removal from Australia as an unlawful non-citizen. The court rejected the applicant's argument as relying on a narrow and pedantic interpretation of the Tribunal's reasons, which was inconsistent with established legal principles. The court also noted, in passing, that the Tribunal's finding that the applicant's visa would not have been granted even with correct information was a relevant consideration.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal has the power to review pt.5–reviewable decisions: s.348 of the Act. Part 5–reviewable decisions are defined in s.338 of the Act. Section 338(1) relevantly provides that a “decision is a Part 5–reviewable decision if this section so provides…”[6]. This means, quite obviously, that a pt.5–reviewable decision must be a “decision”.[6] Emphasis in original. There is no definition of “decision” that applies throughout the Act; however, even if it is taken at its broadest (such as the definition in s.474(3)), it does not include a consequence of the operation of the law without the intervention of any separate action or inaction: see Rani v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 80 FCR 379, 399-400; [1997] FCA 1493; Gul v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2642 at [33]. For that reason, the cancellation of the second applicant’s visa was not a “decision” and the Tribunal was correct to conclude that it had no jurisdiction in respect of it. In light of that conclusion it is unnecessary to consider whether the second applicant’s entitlement to a bridging visa was affected or whether the decision of Graham has any application in these proceedings. The assertion of the second legal error is based on the fact that, in its reasons, the Tribunal referred on seven occasions to the applicant as having been deported. For example, the Tribunal said:51.As the applicant did not disclose the name by which he had been deported from Australia ……56.… When he was previously deported from Australia, …(Emphasis added) The applicant says that this was an error because, in fact, the applicant was “removed” from Australia under s.198(1) of the Act whereas deportation only occurs under s.200 of the Act. Apart from the use of the words “deport” and “deported” there is nothing to suggest that the Tribunal misunderstood the basis on which the applicant had last left Australia; namely, because he was an unlawful non-citizen and so was required to be removed from Australia. At [5] of its reasons the Tribunal set out a summary of the process by which the applicant came to be removed. This included his unsuccessful visa applications, the expiry of his last bridging visa, detention, and the fact that he was “removed to China … with escorts after he had tried to escape detention”. In light of that, it is apparent that the applicant’s argument relies on a narrow and pedantic approach to the Tribunal’s reasons. Such an approach is inconsistent with well-established principle and must be rejected: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6, in particular at 271-272. The first ground is rejected. For the reasons set out above, there were no errors of law made by the Tribunal and this ground is rejected. One of the matters considered by the Tribunal in determining whether to affirm the decision to cancel the applicant’s visa was whether his visa would have been granted had the correct information been known. It found, at [54] of its reasons, that the visa would not have been granted. The applicant argued that this conclusion was based on the applicant’s debts to the Commonwealth and that that was not necessarily sufficient to deny the applicant a visa.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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