XBBS and Australian Capital Territory (Compensation)

Link copied
Case Copied 82 min read

XBBS and Australian Capital Territory (Compensation) [2019] AATA 1057 (29 May 2019)

ReviewNumber:          2015/6808, 2015/6809, 2015/6810, 2017/4725

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2015/6808, 2015/6809, 2015/6810, 2017/4725

Re:XBBS

APPLICANT

AndAustralian Capital Territory

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:                  Mark Hyman, Member

Date:  29 May 2019

Place:Canberra

The decision in matter 2015/6810 is set aside and in substitution the tribunal decides that the Australian Capital Territory is liable to pay compensation to the applicant, in respect of his physical injury, under sections 16 and 19 of the SRC Act from 1 July 2015 to the date of this decision.

The decision in matter 2015/6809 is set aside and in substitution the tribunal decides that the Australian Capital Territory is liable to pay compensation to the applicant under section 14 of the SRC Act in respect of his psychological injury.

The decisions in matters 2015/6808 and 2017/4725 are remitted to the Australian Capital Territory for consideration in light of the above decisions.

........................................................................

Mark Hyman, Member

Catchwords

COMPENSATION – where applicant has an accepted physical injury and a secondary psychiatric condition for which liability has been denied – whether employment contributed in a material degree to the physical condition – equivocal medical evidence – whether employment continues to contribute to applicant’s physical condition – whether physical condition contributed in a material degree to psychiatric condition – whether compensation payable for permanent impairment and non-economic loss – two decisions set aside and substituted – two decisions remitted to the respondent

Legislation

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1988, ss 35, 37, 38AA
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988, ss 4, 5A, 5B, 14, 16, 19, 24, 27, 71
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2007

Guide to the Assessment of the Degree of Permanent Impairment Edition 2.1

Cases

Asioty v Canberra Abattoir Pty Ltd [1989] HCA 36; (1989) 167 CLR 533
Australian Postal Corporation v Bessey [2001] FCA 266
Bailey v Broadsword Marine Contractors [2017] FCAFC 219
Beezley v Repatriation Commission [2015] FCAFC 165
Comcare v Martin (2016) 258 CLR 467
Comcare v Mooi [2006] FCA 1587
Comcare v Reardon [2015] FCA 1166
Commonwealth v Beattie (1981) 35 ALR 369
Commonwealth v Borg [1991] FCA 710
Commonwealth Banking Corporation v Percival (1988) 20 FCR 176
Federal Broom Co Pty Ltd v Semlitch [1964] HCA 34
Fletcher and Comcare [2015] AATA 430
Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Petkoska (2000) 200 CLR 286
Mellor and Australian Postal Corporation [2010] AATA 502
Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May [2016] HCA 19; (2016) 257 CLR 468
Portors v Comcare [2018] FCA 914
Prain v Comcare [2017] FCAFC 143
Rutledge and Comcare [2011] AATA 865
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hannaford [2006] FCAFC 87
Tippett and Australian Postal Corporation [1998] FCA 335
XBBS and Comcare [2018] AATA 4041

Zickar v MGH Plastic Industries Pty Ltd (1996) 187 CLR 310

Secondary Materials

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth edition, American Psychiatric Association

REASONS FOR DECISION

Mark Hyman, Member

29 May 2019

  1. This decision…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read XBBS and Australian Capital Territory (Compensation) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] AATA 1057
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by XBBS against the Australian Capital Territory regarding compensation for an accepted physical injury and a secondary psychiatric condition. The applicant contended that his employment contributed materially to his physical condition, and that this physical condition, in turn, materially contributed to his psychiatric condition. The respondent denied liability for the psychiatric condition.

The court was required to determine several legal issues. These included whether the applicant's employment contributed in a material degree to his physical condition, whether his physical condition continued to contribute to his current physical state, and whether his physical condition materially contributed to his psychiatric condition. The court also had to consider whether compensation was payable for permanent impairment and non-economic loss.

The court's reasoning focused heavily on the medical evidence, acknowledging the intertwined nature of the applicant's physical and psychiatric conditions and the jurisdictional limitations on considering the direct psychological impact of employment. The court noted that while the applicant's evidence detailed his employment and its stresses, the respondent's case rested on the assertion that employment did not contribute to the applicant's condition. The court considered the onus of proof in tribunal matters, referencing precedent that such proceedings involve a merits review rather than a strict adversarial onus, and that an applicant must satisfy the statutory tests.

Ultimately, the court set aside two previous decisions and remitted the matter to the respondent for further consideration.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Medical evidence comes from the applicant himself, in respect of the onset of symptoms, the nature and course of those symptoms and their treatment; from his wife and colleague (Mr Wigan); from the extensive documentary record detailing the examinations he has undergone and the various diagnoses of his conditions; and from the expert witnesses. Evidence of the applicant The applicant’s evidence was given over an extended period, and went into great detail about the nature of his employment, the stress placed upon him by that employment, and the various events that characterised the period of his employment until his departure from it in 2006. Most of that evidence, however, is not contested; the respondent’s case is not about the events associated with the applicant’s employment, but rather that the applicant’s employment made no contribution to his condition. The case rests, therefore, largely on the medical evidence. For that reason I have provided an abbreviated summary of much of the material that came forward, focusing on those aspects of the evidence which in my view throw light on the matters that may influence the decision. In adducing the applicant’s evidence, Mr Ryan was understandably at pains to illustrate the events in his employment that in his submission contributed to the applicant’s conditions, both physical and psychiatric. Because of the jurisdictional ruling that I had made and later confirmed in the written interlocutory decision, certain evidence with regard to the applicant’s psychological state could be regarded as relevant and certain evidence would lie outside the boundaries of my jurisdiction. Thus evidence of the applicant’s psychological state arising from his employment is relevant so far as it goes to the effect on his physical condition; and the effect of his physical condition on his psychological state, especially as it relates to the development of psychiatric symptoms or a psychiatric disorder, is relevant; but evidence that shows that his employment directly caused psychiatric symptoms or a psychiatric condition is not. It is plain that these things are significantly intertwined; considerable attention has been given in this decision to determining which evidence bears on the matters at hand and which does not, but the interplay between employment and the psychiatric condition of the applicant does not always allow the factors to be easily teased apart. I return to this issue below. Some time was spent by counsel for each party in attempting to establish whether or not the applicant experienced symptoms associated with his condition before beginning his period of employment at Calvary Hospital. The applicant distinguished his symptoms at any earlier time from those he encountered after his work at the hospital began, saying that the earlier pain was in the lower part of his shoulder, near or under the scapula, not in his neck. He did not recall ever reporting to Dr Ho that he suffered four weeks of neck pain, and thought he had only spoken to him of lower back pain. He also suggested that the previous pain he reported to Mr Brazenor at his first consultation related to pain under the scapula, not in the neck. He said that his wife had corrected Dr Brazenor at the time.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the alternative, the respondent suggested that the psychiatric condition would not meet the relevant test to be compensable: it was not the case that but for the pain the condition would have been outside the bounds of normal functioning.CONSIDERATION This matter comes forward on a similar basis to that in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hannaford [2006] FCAFC 87. The respondent’s decisions and argument are based on the thesis that the original condition sustained by the applicant was not a workplace injury; it would then follow that if the respondent’s decision in matter 6810 is affirmed, the respondent’s liability under section 14 of the SRC Act would remain undisturbed, but the applicant would have no present entitlement to compensation under sections 16 and 19 of the SRC Act for medical expenses and incapacity. There was some discussion in the hearing relating to what form of onus lay upon which party. It is accepted that there is no formal onus in tribunal matters, the role of the tribunal in merits review being rather different to the role of a court in an adversarial system, but such concepts as a “practical onus” or “evidential onus” are urged from time to time. Mr Snell for the respondent pointed to Beezley v Repatriation Commission [2015] FCAFC 165, where the full Federal Court noted the absence of a formal onus in tribunal proceedings and interpreted the statement that an applicant “must satisfy” a particular provision not as a comment on onus in a hearing but merely a description of the test that the relevant statute imposed. But I am also conscious of the remarks by Jenkison J in Commonwealth v Borg [1991] FCA 710 that a decision that liability has ceased requires a decision-maker to be satisfied that at least one entitling circumstance no longer applies. A great deal of evidence was advanced in the course of the hearing that appears to me to have at best a peripheral bearing on the matter. Mr Ryan went to some trouble to establish a picture of the applicant’s employment: that he was a man committed to his work at the hospital, into which he threw all his energy; that when he became injured it was a severe blow to him, not only because of his pain, but also because he could no longer fulfil the expectations of his position at the hospital; and that when the hospital became impatient with his inability to fulfil an essential role it managed him out of his position; the hospital then managed him out of his employment, in a similarly callous, indeed almost brutal way; and that this had a devastating effect on the applicant. But the detail of the applicant’s employment, including how he came to leave employment, can only be relevant for my purposes so far as it can be shown to have an impact on his accepted physical condition; its direct psychological impact, which might be considerable, is ruled out for the jurisdictional reasons discussed above. The heart of the matter, indeed, is the medical evidence and what that evidence reveals about causation.