XBBS and Australian Capital Territory (Compensation) [2019] AATA 1057 (29 May 2019)
ReviewNumber: 2015/6808, 2015/6809, 2015/6810, 2017/4725
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2015/6808, 2015/6809, 2015/6810, 2017/4725
Re:XBBS
APPLICANT
AndAustralian Capital Territory
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal: Mark Hyman, Member
Date: 29 May 2019
Place:Canberra
The decision in matter 2015/6810 is set aside and in substitution the tribunal decides that the Australian Capital Territory is liable to pay compensation to the applicant, in respect of his physical injury, under sections 16 and 19 of the SRC Act from 1 July 2015 to the date of this decision.
The decision in matter 2015/6809 is set aside and in substitution the tribunal decides that the Australian Capital Territory is liable to pay compensation to the applicant under section 14 of the SRC Act in respect of his psychological injury.
The decisions in matters 2015/6808 and 2017/4725 are remitted to the Australian Capital Territory for consideration in light of the above decisions.
........................................................................
Mark Hyman, Member
Catchwords
COMPENSATION – where applicant has an accepted physical injury and a secondary psychiatric condition for which liability has been denied – whether employment contributed in a material degree to the physical condition – equivocal medical evidence – whether employment continues to contribute to applicant’s physical condition – whether physical condition contributed in a material degree to psychiatric condition – whether compensation payable for permanent impairment and non-economic loss – two decisions set aside and substituted – two decisions remitted to the respondent
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1988, ss 35, 37, 38AA
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988, ss 4, 5A, 5B, 14, 16, 19, 24, 27, 71
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2007Guide to the Assessment of the Degree of Permanent Impairment Edition 2.1
Cases
Asioty v Canberra Abattoir Pty Ltd [1989] HCA 36; (1989) 167 CLR 533
Australian Postal Corporation v Bessey [2001] FCA 266
Bailey v Broadsword Marine Contractors [2017] FCAFC 219
Beezley v Repatriation Commission [2015] FCAFC 165
Comcare v Martin (2016) 258 CLR 467
Comcare v Mooi [2006] FCA 1587
Comcare v Reardon [2015] FCA 1166
Commonwealth v Beattie (1981) 35 ALR 369
Commonwealth v Borg [1991] FCA 710
Commonwealth Banking Corporation v Percival (1988) 20 FCR 176
Federal Broom Co Pty Ltd v Semlitch [1964] HCA 34
Fletcher and Comcare [2015] AATA 430
Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Petkoska (2000) 200 CLR 286
Mellor and Australian Postal Corporation [2010] AATA 502
Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May [2016] HCA 19; (2016) 257 CLR 468
Portors v Comcare [2018] FCA 914
Prain v Comcare [2017] FCAFC 143
Rutledge and Comcare [2011] AATA 865
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hannaford [2006] FCAFC 87
Tippett and Australian Postal Corporation [1998] FCA 335
XBBS and Comcare [2018] AATA 4041Zickar v MGH Plastic Industries Pty Ltd (1996) 187 CLR 310
Secondary Materials
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth edition, American Psychiatric Association
REASONS FOR DECISION
Mark Hyman, Member
29 May 2019
This decision…
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- Case
- [2019] AATA 1057
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine several legal issues. These included whether the applicant's employment contributed in a material degree to his physical condition, whether his physical condition continued to contribute to his current physical state, and whether his physical condition materially contributed to his psychiatric condition. The court also had to consider whether compensation was payable for permanent impairment and non-economic loss.
The court's reasoning focused heavily on the medical evidence, acknowledging the intertwined nature of the applicant's physical and psychiatric conditions and the jurisdictional limitations on considering the direct psychological impact of employment. The court noted that while the applicant's evidence detailed his employment and its stresses, the respondent's case rested on the assertion that employment did not contribute to the applicant's condition. The court considered the onus of proof in tribunal matters, referencing precedent that such proceedings involve a merits review rather than a strict adversarial onus, and that an applicant must satisfy the statutory tests.
Ultimately, the court set aside two previous decisions and remitted the matter to the respondent for further consideration.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the alternative, the respondent suggested that the psychiatric condition would not meet the relevant test to be compensable: it was not the case that but for the pain the condition would have been outside the bounds of normal functioning.CONSIDERATION This matter comes forward on a similar basis to that in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hannaford [2006] FCAFC 87. The respondent’s decisions and argument are based on the thesis that the original condition sustained by the applicant was not a workplace injury; it would then follow that if the respondent’s decision in matter 6810 is affirmed, the respondent’s liability under section 14 of the SRC Act would remain undisturbed, but the applicant would have no present entitlement to compensation under sections 16 and 19 of the SRC Act for medical expenses and incapacity. There was some discussion in the hearing relating to what form of onus lay upon which party. It is accepted that there is no formal onus in tribunal matters, the role of the tribunal in merits review being rather different to the role of a court in an adversarial system, but such concepts as a “practical onus” or “evidential onus” are urged from time to time. Mr Snell for the respondent pointed to Beezley v Repatriation Commission [2015] FCAFC 165, where the full Federal Court noted the absence of a formal onus in tribunal proceedings and interpreted the statement that an applicant “must satisfy” a particular provision not as a comment on onus in a hearing but merely a description of the test that the relevant statute imposed. But I am also conscious of the remarks by Jenkison J in Commonwealth v Borg [1991] FCA 710 that a decision that liability has ceased requires a decision-maker to be satisfied that at least one entitling circumstance no longer applies. A great deal of evidence was advanced in the course of the hearing that appears to me to have at best a peripheral bearing on the matter. Mr Ryan went to some trouble to establish a picture of the applicant’s employment: that he was a man committed to his work at the hospital, into which he threw all his energy; that when he became injured it was a severe blow to him, not only because of his pain, but also because he could no longer fulfil the expectations of his position at the hospital; and that when the hospital became impatient with his inability to fulfil an essential role it managed him out of his position; the hospital then managed him out of his employment, in a similarly callous, indeed almost brutal way; and that this had a devastating effect on the applicant. But the detail of the applicant’s employment, including how he came to leave employment, can only be relevant for my purposes so far as it can be shown to have an impact on his accepted physical condition; its direct psychological impact, which might be considerable, is ruled out for the jurisdictional reasons discussed above. The heart of the matter, indeed, is the medical evidence and what that evidence reveals about causation.