“X” v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

“X” v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 702

MIGRATION – whether applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution – whether “differential risk” required in ethnic conflict – whether Tribunal erred in not making findings in relation to material relied upon as a reason for the applicant’s fear of persecution – duty of Tribunal to have regard to all the material and evidence before it and to make finding on all material questions of fact raised by evidence.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 430, 476 (1)(a) and (1)(g)

Abdi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1335, considered
Adan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1998] 2 WLR 702, cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Abdi (1999) 162 ALR 105, applied
Logenthiran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 56 ALD 639, applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [1999] FCA 1681, followed
Xu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1741, not followed
Labed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 35, considered
Montes-Granados v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 60, considered
Ahmed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 55 ALD 618, considered
Addo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 940, not followed
Paramananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 94 FCR 28, applied
Thevendram v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 182, applied
Sivaram v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1740, considered
Applicant A & Another v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 142 ALR 331, considered
Murugasu v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 28 July 1987), cited
Paramananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 94 FCR 1, cited

“X” v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

VG 366 OF 1998

NORTH J
29 MAY 2000
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VG 366 OF 1998

BETWEEN:

"X"
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

NORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 MAY 2000

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal is set aside.

2.The application is referred to the Refugee Review Tribunal for further consideration.

3.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VG 366 OF 1998

BETWEEN:

"X"
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

NORTH J

DATE:

29 MAY 2000

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application by "X" for a review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 17 July 1998.  The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate of the respondent, the Minister for…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 702
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of "X" v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a Kenyan citizen, sought a review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal which dismissed his application for a protection visa. The applicant claimed that he had a well-founded fear of persecution if he were to return to Kenya based on his membership in a religious group, his family's history of persecution, and his tribal affiliation. The Tribunal found that while there had been significant civil unrest in the area of Likoni in August 1997, the applicant's fear of persecution was not sufficient to meet the requirements of the Refugees' Convention. The Federal Court was asked to determine whether the Tribunal's decision was legally sound and whether the applicant met the definition of a refugee under the Refugees' Convention.

The court considered whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the law in determining whether the applicant met the definition of a refugee. The court noted that the Tribunal had correctly identified the distinction between persecution and communal violence. However, the court found that the Tribunal had not adequately considered whether the applicant's fear of persecution was based on a Convention reason. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was legally flawed and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal for further consideration.

The Federal Court set aside the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal for further consideration. The court also ordered that the respondent pay the applicant's costs of and incidental to the application. The court found that the Tribunal had not adequately considered whether the applicant's fear of persecution was based on a Convention reason and that further consideration was required. The case highlights the importance of correctly applying the law in refugee cases and the need for the Tribunal to adequately consider all relevant evidence in making its decisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal is set aside.

2. The application is referred to the Refugee Review Tribunal for further consideration.

3. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant is a Kenyan citizen. He arrived in Australia on 17 April 1998. He arrived with his friend "Y" with whom he had stowed away on a ship which sailed from Kenya. Although there is controversy about the ages of the boys it is sufficient for present purposes to record that both boys were at the time of arrival under eighteen years of age and either over or nearly over sixteen years.BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS The Tribunal set out the claims of the applicant and the evidence relied upon. The following is a summary of the relevant and important aspects taken from the Tribunal's decision. The applicant is a Muslim and lived in Likoni, which is a suburb of Mombassa. In August 1997 there was fighting between Christians and Muslims in the Likoni area. The applicant claimed that there were riots which were caused by the resentment of Muslims towards Christians. Many Christians had come from the highlands and settled on the coast. The Muslims believed that the Christians were taking their jobs. The Muslims lived in the area first and wanted the Christians to go back to the highlands. In August 1997 riots erupted when some Muslims raided a police station and stole weapons. Police from Nairobi came to quell the riots. The police were a mixture of Muslims and Christians. Shortly afterwards, the police raided the house of the applicant's neighbours and then came to his house. When the police arrived he was in the toilet. He heard noises and shouting and became frightened. He then escaped through the back door which was not guarded by police. When he returned after an hour, the house had been ransacked and his mother's face was swollen. The applicant went with his friend to live on the beach after the police raid. The police did not return to his house to search for him. The police came to the beach at the time of the raid on the applicant's home and one week later, but did not visit the beach again. The applicant believed that his father and brothers were taken to prison because they were Muslim and were suspected of being involved in the violence. The applicant did not know why they were suspected of such involvement. The applicant's father was a member of the KANU (Kenyan African National Union) Party. The applicant was frightened of being harmed by Christian gangs. He and his friend were beaten up by one such gang because they had a boat which the gang wanted. The gang threatened to kill them if they did not hand over the boat. The applicant said he feared returning to Kenya because he thought he would be arrested like his father and brothers. The guns stolen from the police station had still not been recovered, and the applicant feared that, having fled Kenya, he would be suspected of having stolen the guns. He also feared that he would be imprisoned on return for having left illegally without documents. In summary the applicant feared that he would be arrested because he is Muslim, because he is a member of a family that had already been the subject of persecution and suspicion, and because he is a member of the Digo tribe. He feared that he would be arrested, jailed and subjected to torture and possibly execution.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

NORTH J
The applicant rejected the delegate's finding that it would be safe for him to return to Kenya because the tensions that existed during August 1997 were no longer a problem.THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL Under the heading "Civil Disturbance" the Tribunal dealt with conditions in Likoni in August 1997. It accepted that there was large scale civil unrest in the area. The Tribunal referred to reports of the eruption of violence on 13 August 1997 when a gang of marauders attacked the main police station at Likoni and stole thirty automatic guns and 5,000 rounds of ammunition. Six policemen were killed and the Tribunal referred to a news service report which indicated unconfirmed reports of up to 100,000 persons having been displaced by the violence. Reference was also made to an article in the Economist on 23 August 1997 which reported that the violence had spread by 20 August and the death toll then stood at 39. The Economist also referred to the government view that the violence had been stirred up by the opposition, and the opposition view that the violence was a protest against government opposition to reform. Indeed, some political leaders had been arrested by the police for involvement in the violence. The Tribunal then said:"However, no matter how serious, the hardship and dangers to people caught up in civil disturbances do not, without more, amount to persecution. Nevertheless, if a group is being harassed for a Convention reason, there is no reason why a member of that group might not fall within the Convention definition of a refugee. It is in this context that the question of fact and degree is particularly important." The Tribunal then sought to distinguish between patterns of persecution and patterns of communal violence by reference to the decision of Wilcox J in Murugasu v MIEA (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 28 July 1987) and quoted a passage at par 8 which included the following: "It is not enough that there be fear of being involved in incidental violence as a result of civil or communal disturbances. … it is not essential to the notion of persecution that the persecution be directed against the applicant as an individual. In a case where a community is being systematically harassed to such a degree that the word persecution is apt, then I see no reason why an individual member of that community may not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted." The Tribunal then referred to an observation of Davies J in Paramananthan v MIMA (1998) 94 FCR 1, which included the following at 3:"However, the Refugees' Convention does not apply to persons merely because they flee from war." The Tribunal then said:"The Federal Court also observed in Mohamed Dahir Mohamed v MIMA (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Hill J, 11 May 1998) that where a country is engaged in a civil war, acts committed against its nationals as a result of that war do not as such constitute persecution for a Convention reason. The House of Lords concluded in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Adan ([1998] 2 WLR 702) [that] it is not enough for an asylum-seeker to show that he or she would be at risk in times of civil war. A differential impact, or fear of persecution for Convention reasons over and above the ordinary risks of ethnic warfare, must be shown."

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: NORTH J

Full text does not contain this section.