X Corporation Pty Ltd and Jess & Anor

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FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

X CORPORATION PTY LTD & JESS AND ANOR [2016] FamCAFC 43

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – Interlocutory orders – Where the appellant seeks leave to appeal – Where the trial judge found that legal professional privilege did not apply to certain documents – Where the trial judge made orders for the production of the documents – Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – Whether the trial judge erred in finding that, to the extent there was a joint privilege held by the husband and the appellant, the husband alone could waive it – Where the trial judge was invited to inspect the documents – Whether the trial judge erred by failing to give reasons for not inspecting the documents – Where the trial judge erred in drawing a Jones v Dunkel inference –Whether the appellant was materially distinguishable from the husband – Whether the errors asserted affected the outcome of the proceedings – Appeal dismissed.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 118, 124, 133

Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 15.26(2)

A v J (1995) FLC 92-619
Bailey and Anor v Director-General, Department of Land and Water Conservation and Ors (2009) 74 NSWLR 333
Bailey v Director General, Department of Natural Resources (formerly known as Department of Land and Water Conservation) [2014] NSWSC 1012
Barnes and Anor v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2007) 242 ALR 601
Bennett and Bennett (1991) FLC 92-191
Dupont & Chief Commissioner of Police and Anor (2015) FLC 93-648
Esso Australia Resources Limited v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 201 CLR 49
Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674
Hancock v Rinehart (Privilege) [2016] NSWSC 12
National Employers’ Mutual General Insurance Association Limited v Waind and Anor (1979) 141 CLR 648
Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd and Anor v Antico and Ors (1993) 36 NSWLR 87
Strahan & Strahan & Commissioner of Taxation (2013) FLC 93-570
Trade Practices Commission v Sterling (1979) 36 FLR 244
Whisprun Pty Ltd (formerly Northwest Exports Pty Ltd) v Dixon  (2003) 200 ALR 447

APPELLANT: X Corporation Pty Ltd
FIRST RESPONDENT: Ms Jess
SECOND RESPONDENT: Mr N Jess
FILE NUMBER: MLF 3444 of 2006
APPEAL NUMBER: SOA 60 of 2015
DATE DELIVERED: 24 March 2016
PLACE DELIVERED: Sydney
PLACE HEARD: Melbourne
JUDGMENT OF: Strickland, Aldridge & Cronin JJ
HEARING DATE: 14 October 2015
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Family Court of Australia
LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: 24 September 2015
LOWER COURT MNC: [2015] FamCA 822

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT: Mr Waller QC with Mr Mereine
SOLICITOR FOR THE APPELLANT: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
COUNSEL FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT: Mr Glick QC & Mr O’Shannessy

SOLICITOR FOR THE FIRST

RESPONDENT:

Kenna Teasdale Lawyers

SOLICITOR FOR THE SECOND

RESPONDENT:

Condello Lawyers

Orders

  1. The Application in an Appeal filed on 3 September 2015 be dismissed.

  2. The application for leave to appeal Order 1 of the orders made on


    24 August 2015 by the Honourable Justice Bennett be allowed.

  3. The Appeal be dismissed.

  4. The appellant X…

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Details
Case
[2016] FamCAFC 43
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of X Corporation Pty Ltd and Jess & Anor, the appellant, X Corporation Pty Ltd, sought leave to appeal against the orders of the trial judge that certain documents be produced. The dispute centered on the application of legal professional privilege to those documents. The trial judge had determined that the privilege did not apply and ordered their production. The appeal was heard in the Family Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the trial judge had erred in finding that, if a joint privilege existed between the husband and the appellant, only the husband could waive it. Additionally, the court examined whether the trial judge had erred by not inspecting the documents in question and whether she had correctly drawn a Jones v Dunkel inference. Furthermore, the court considered whether the appellant was materially distinguishable from the husband and whether these alleged errors impacted the outcome of the proceedings.

The court found that the trial judge did not err in her conclusion that the appellant had not established the identity of the client at the meeting in question, nor that the communications were for the purpose of providing legal advice. The court rejected the argument that the trial judge should have inspected the documents in question, as it was not necessary for the resolution of the issues at hand. The court also found no error in the trial judge’s inference and concluded that the appellant was not materially distinguishable from the husband. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.

The final orders of the court were: the application for leave to appeal was allowed in part, the appeal itself was dismissed, and the appellant was to pay the costs of the appeal as agreed or assessed if an agreement could not be reached.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The Application in an Appeal filed on 3 September 2015 be dismissed.

2.

The application for leave to appeal Order 1 of the orders made on

24 August 2015 by the Honourable Justice Bennett be allowed.

3.

The Appeal be dismissed.

4.

The appellant X Corporation Pty Ltd pay the costs of the appeal of the first respondent, Ms Jess, as agreed, or in default of agreement, as assessed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Her Honour stated that the first step in determining the claim for privilege was to ascertain the identity of the client at the meeting on 20 June 2003. After referring to Mr HR’s evidence her Honour said: 32.There is force in the submissions of Senior Counsel for the wife, Mr Dickson QC, that in the context of asserting privilege, [XC] has first to establish the nature of the communications that took place at the meeting on Friday 20 June 2003. Furthermore, the mere fact that a file is opened in the name of a particular person or entity is not conclusive of anything. He referred to earlier evidence of Mr [HR], at paragraph 24 of the affidavit sworn 7 October 2014 to the effect that Clayton Utz had opened a file titled “[X] Group Pty Ltd”. In October 2014, Mr [HR] deposed:I have conducted a search of the online records of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and, based on the results of that search, it appears that there is no such legal entity. However, as this matter related to a corporate restructuring of the entities involved in the running of the [Y Pty Ltd] business, it appears to me that “[X] Group Pty Ltd” was used as a shorthand reference to those entities.33.Mr [HR] has no personal experience of Clayton Utz having acted for the husband. At paragraph 10 of his first affidavit, sworn 7 October 2014, he deposed:Neither I, nor any Clayton Utz lawyers involved in the review of documents for the purpose of compliance with the [husband’s] subpoena, had any involvement in the matters in which Clayton Utz acted for [Mr N Jess].34.Mr Dickson QC further submitted that, the fact that a document was created in the course of giving advice to a particular client(s) is an essential element for the establishment of client legal privilege. He submits that there is no evidence conclusively identifying the client nor any evidence about the nature of the communications during the meeting on 20 June 2003. 35.Mr Dickson QC submits, correctly in my view, that “W6”, the relevant part of which is extracted at paragraph 17 above, merely informs the court of the topics which were intended to be discussed by [Mr N Jess]. 36.On the basis of Mr [HR]’s evidence, I cannot be satisfied that the communications during the meeting were for the purpose of providing advice to [XC]. Absent a concession by the represented third parties that the husband’s list titled “Matters to be considered” is the “agenda” to which Mr [HR] refers and that the discussion followed the agenda, I cannot conclude what was discussed at the meeting. (Emphasis added) Thus her Honour, in those passages, did not determine the identity of the client at the June 2003 meeting. There was, however, a finding that the trial judge was not satisfied that the communications were for the purpose of giving advice to XC. Her Honour went on to consider and reject a submission from XC that her Honour could infer from the circumstances that the purpose of the meeting was to provide legal advice. Her Honour said: 40.Having already heard much evidence in the case, I can comfortably conclude that, as at mid-2003, [Mr N Jess] was not materially distinguishable from the corporate entity [XC] and that he, for all intents and purposes, had control of it and other parts of the business empire although his reliance on [Mr JJ] was increasing. In these circumstances, I have not been able to place significant weight on the title of the file from which the documents were extracted and produced to the court or the fact that [XC] paid an invoice for time billed to that file.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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