Wright v Valladares

Case [2015] NTSC 59

Wright v Valladares [2015] NTSC 59

PARTIES:WRIGHT, Sammy Robert James

v

VALLADARES, Kylie

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY EXERCISING APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FILE NO:JA 40 of 2015 (21427125)

DELIVERED:  11 SEPTEMBER 2015

HEARING DATES:  7 SEPTEMBER 2015

JUDGMENT OF:  KELLY J

APPEAL FROM:  D WALLACE RSM

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – Sentencing – Mandatory sentencing – Exceptional circumstances exception – Sentence that may have been imposed in the absence of the mandatory sentencing regime may have been less than the sentence actually imposed – A difference between the mandatory minimum and the sentence that would otherwise be imposed does not ipso facto amount to exceptional circumstances – Such an approach would render mandatory sentencing provisions illusory – Appeal dismissed

CRIMINAL LAW – Sentencing – Mandatory sentencing – Exceptional circumstances – Relevant test – Magistrate’s finding that an aspect of the case was ‘unusual’ does not necessarily lead to a finding of exceptional circumstances – Magistrate considered all the circumstances of the case and clearly concluded there were no exceptional circumstances – Appeal dismissed

CRIMINAL LAW – Sentencing – Mandatory sentencing – Exceptional circumstances – Magistrate’s discretion – Magistrate may choose weight to be given to the circumstances – Sentence not so unreasonable that no reasonable magistrate could have arrived at it – Sentence not grossly disproportionate – Appeal dismissed

Sentencing Act ss 78CA(3); 78 DD; 78DI(1)

R v Duncan [2015] NTCCA 2, applied

Dhamarrandji v Curtis [2014] NTSC 39; Jambajimba v Dredge (1985) 33 NTR 19; Orsto v Grotherr [2015] NTSC 18; referred to

Ho v Professional Services Review Committee No 295 [2007] FCA 388; Yacoub v Pilkington (Aust) Ltd [2007] NSWCA 290; followed

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Appellant:F Bain

Respondent:  D Jones

Solicitors:

Appellant:North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency

Respondent:  Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment category classification:    B

Judgment ID Number:  KEL15014

Number of pages:  20

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

Wright v Valladares [2015] NTSC 59

No. JA 40 of 2015 (21427125)

BETWEEN:

SAMMY ROBERT JAMES WRIGHT

Appellant

AND:

KYLIE VALLADARES

Respondent

CORAM:     KELLY J

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered 11 September 2015)

  1. This is an appeal against the sentence imposed on the appellant in the Darwin Court of Summary Jurisdiction on 1 July 2015.

  2. The appellant pleaded guilty to unlawfully assaulting his estranged partner, aggravated by the fact that the victim suffered harm and that the victim was a female and the appellant is a male, the maximum penalty for which is five years imprisonment, or two years upon being found guilty summarily.

  3. In summary, the facts were these.  At the time of the assault, the appellant and the victim were living apart.  They had four children together aged 8, 7, 5 and 1.  On Wednesday 14 May 2014, the appellant spent the evening with friends at a number of places in Casuarina and Palmerston including Tracy Village.  Throughout the evening he sent text messages to the victim.  As a…

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Wright v Valladares [2015] NTSC 59
Case
[2015] NTSC 59
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Wright v Valladares was a case before the court where the appellant, Wright, challenged the sentence imposed by the magistrate. The central issue was whether the magistrate had correctly applied the law in determining that the circumstances of the case did not warrant an exception to the mandatory sentencing regime. Wright argued that the magistrate had not appropriately considered the exceptional circumstances exception under the relevant statutory provisions.

The court addressed whether the magistrate had applied the correct legal test in determining if the circumstances were exceptional. It was established that the magistrate had considered the appellant’s arguments, including the unusual nature of imposing a mandatory sentence based on an old prior conviction. However, the magistrate concluded that, while perhaps not common, the circumstances were not exceptional enough to warrant a departure from the mandatory sentencing regime. The court held that the magistrate’s conclusion was not unreasonable, as the term "unusual" did not necessarily equate to "exceptional" under the statutory criteria. The court further found that the magistrate had properly exercised their discretion in weighing the factors presented.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court affirming that the magistrate’s decision was within the bounds of reasonable sentencing discretion. The court underscored that the existence of exceptional circumstances must be assessed against the statutory criteria and not merely because certain aspects of the case were unusual. The sentence imposed was deemed appropriate and not grossly disproportionate, reflecting the magistrate’s careful consideration of all relevant factors.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

I do not consider that the sentencing magistrate applied the wrong test. A fair reading of his Honour’s reasons shows that although he considered it might not be common for people to be subject to the mandatory sentencing regime on the basis of only one prior conviction as old as this one, his Honour was not satisfied (in the words of s 78DI) that “the circumstances of the case are exceptional”. It cannot be the case that any finding that any aspect of the case is at all unusual must lead to a finding that it is an exceptional case. Moreover, the sentencing magistrate considered all of the circumstances of the case and his Honour’s conclusion was clearly expressed: …. none of these is, from my view, an unusual circumstance, far from it, nor in combination can I regard the combination of facts and antecedence as being particularly unusual. As for the use of the term “particularly unusual”, I do not construe that as applying any different principle than that set out in R v Duncan. His Honour was simply using a common English idiom, not applying a more stringent test for what amounts to “exceptional”. Was the sentencing magistrate’s determination that the circumstances were not exceptional unreasonable? The appellant contended that the factors relied on before the sentencing magistrate, in combination, established exceptional circumstances in this case, and in written submissions, the appellant contended that the sentencing magistrate was in error in failing to give “appropriate weight” to these factors (both individually and collectively) in determining whether exceptional circumstances existed. What weight should be given to various factors in determining whether the case is exceptional is a matter for the sentencing magistrate, provided the sentencing magistrate does not take into account irrelevant considerations, fail to take into account relevant considerations, or otherwise act on wrong principle. It has not been suggested that the sentencing magistrate took into account any irrelevant considerations; I have already determined that the sentencing magistrate did not fail to take into account the fact that on normal sentencing principles the appellant’s sentence would probably have been differently structured, and involve less actual prison time to be served; it has not been suggested that his Honour failed to take any other relevant matter into account; I have determined that his Honour did not apply the wrong test in determining whether the circumstances of the case were exceptional; and it has not been suggested that his Honour erred in principle in any other identifiable way. Therefore it is not open to me to interfere with the exercise of the learned magistrate’s decision unless it is shown to be so unreasonable that no reasonable magistrate could have arrived at it.[25] The trial judge’s exercise of the sentencing discretion is not to be disturbed on appeal unless error has been shown in the exercise of the discretion. The presumption is that there is no error. The appeal court will interfere only if it is shown that the sentencing judge acted on a wrong principle. The error may appear in what the sentencing judge has said in the proceedings or the result may be the sentence itself may be so excessive or inadequate as to manifest such error.[26]

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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