The Queen v Duncan [2015] NTCCA 2
PARTIES: THE QUEEN
v
DUNCAN, Sharay
TITLE OF COURT: COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION
FILE NO:CA 14 of 2014 (21419073)
DELIVERED: 9 February 2015
HEARING DATES: 9 February 2015
JUDGMENT OF: RILEY CJ, SOUTHWOOD & HILEY JJ
APPEALED FROM: BLOKLAND J
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – sentencing – Crown appeals against sentence – manifest inadequacy – whether sentence reflects objective seriousness of offending.
CRIMINAL LAW – sentencing – exceptional circumstances – exercise of discretion – s 78DI Sentencing Act 1995 (NT)
Sentencing Act 1995 (NT), ss 78CA; 78DI.
Whitehurst v The Queen [2011] NTCCA 11; R v Cavenagh-Novelli [2014] NTCCA 21; R v Kelly [2000]1 QB 198; Griffiths v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 372; Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, applied.
Northern Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 November 2012; Owens v Stevens [1991] VSC 91 (3 May 1991); R v Tootell [2012] QCA 273, referred to.
Yacoub v Pilkington (Aust) Ltd [2007] NSWCA 290, followed.
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant:MN Nathan
Respondent: GA Georgiou SC and J Hunyor
Solicitors:
Appellant:Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Respondent: North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency
Judgment category classification: B
Number of pages: 12
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWINThe Queen v Duncan [2015] NTCCA 2
No. CA 14 of 2014 (21419073)
BETWEEN:
THE QUEEN
Appellant
AND:
SHARAY DUNCAN
Respondent
CORAM: RILEY CJ; SOUTHWOOD AND HILEY JJ
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Ex Tempore
(Delivered 9 February 2015)THE COURT:
Introduction
This was a Crown appeal against sentence. On 9 February 2015 the Court allowed the appeal and resentenced the respondent. These are the reasons for so doing.
On 17 September 2014 the sentencing Judge sentenced the respondent to 18 months imprisonment for the offence of unlawfully causing serious harm. The sentence was back dated to 15 September 2014 and suspended forthwith.
The offence committed by the respondent was a level 5 offence under s 78CA(1) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (NT). It carried a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment and, unless there were exceptional circumstances, the Court was required to impose a minimum sentence of three months actual imprisonment.
The Crown appealed against the sentence on the following grounds:
1. the sentencing Judge erred in finding that the circumstances of the case were ‘exceptional’ pursuant to s 78DI of the Sentencing Act so as to displace the minimum mandatory term of imprisonment;
2. the sentencing Judge erred by imposing a sentence which was manifestly inadequate in all the circumstances of the case.
The main issue – manifest inadequacy
The main issue was whether the sentence imposed on the respondent was manifestly inadequate. In our opinion, it was. The appeal was allowed and the respondent was resentenced.
In all Crown appeals, the primary consideration for the Crown should be whether the sentence is manifestly inadequate. If…
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- AGLC
- R v Duncan [2015] NTCCA 2
- Case
- [2015] NTCCA 2
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court were whether the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate and, in light of the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the *Sentencing Act 1995* (NT), whether there were exceptional circumstances justifying a departure from such a minimum. The Court was required to determine if the original sentence was so disproportionate to the gravity of the offence that it shocked the public conscience.
The Court reasoned that while the respondent's subjective circumstances, including her youth, remorse, early guilty plea, and responsibility for her child, warranted considerable leniency, the objective seriousness of the stabbing offence was undeniable. The respondent had stabbed the victim with a knife, causing a life-threatening injury that required emergency surgery. The Court found that the original sentence was so disproportionate to the objective seriousness of the offending that it was manifestly inadequate and shocked the public conscience. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the original sentence was set aside, and the respondent was resentenced. The Court noted that the mandatory minimum sentencing regime only applied if the otherwise appropriate sentence fell below the prescribed minimum, and in this instance, the need to consider exceptional circumstances did not arise as the appropriate sentence involved actual imprisonment.
Orders
Orders of the court
Resentence:
In determining an appropriate sentence this Court took into account the youth of the respondent, her responsibility for her child and the other mitigatory factors referred to in the court below.
The respondent was convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three years backdated to 7 February 2015 to take account of time spent in custody. It was directed that the sentence be suspended after six months. An operational period of two years and six months from the date of her release from prison was set.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The sentencing Judge made the following important findings. The respondent was immediately remorseful following the incident. She waited with the victim until the police and ambulance arrived. Her remorse was genuine and sincere. The respondent made spontaneous admissions to police when they arrived at the drinking spot and she subsequently made full formal admissions of her offending. The respondent’s plea of guilty was an early plea of guilty. The respondent performed a useful role by looking after her young child who was still being breast fed at the time of sentencing. The respondent had not consumed alcohol since she committed the offence. The respondent and the victim were still together and the victim had forgiven her. The respondent had reasonable to good prospects of rehabilitation.Consideration The offending is objectively very serious. Knives are very dangerous weapons. The respondent threatened to stab the victim with a pen and then stabbed him with the knife with such force that the whole blade went into the victim’s body, and remained embedded in his back. It is fortunate that the victim did not die. Such crimes are a great drain on the medical resources of the Northern Territory and are an enormous cost to the community. The victim had to be medically evacuated to the Royal Darwin Hospital, where he remained for 14 days. The blade of the knife had to be surgically removed and the victim required a blood transfusion. While the objective seriousness of the offending is qualified by the fact that it was spontaneous and unplanned, the respondent’s reaction was utterly disproportionate to the victim’s conduct which gave rise to the domestic argument. Further, it was the respondent’s conduct which escalated the argument from a verbal argument to a physical altercation. There is no apparent reason why she could not have gone home by herself. In our opinion, the sentence imposed on the respondent was manifestly disproportionate to the objective seriousness of her offending. While the subjective circumstances do entitle the respondent to considerable leniency, such factors cannot result in a sentence which is not justly proportionate to the respondent’s offending. The sentence imposed on the respondent was so manifestly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offending that it shocks the public conscience.[1] In those circumstances the appeal was allowed, the sentence was set aside and the respondent was resentenced. The mandatory minimum sentencing scheme Because we have upheld ground 2, and imposed a sentence that involves actual imprisonment for a period exceeding three months, we do not need to consider ground 1. However, as there was extensive argument concerning the expression “exceptional circumstances” in s 78DI of the Sentencing Act we add the following observations. In 2013, the Sentencing Act was amended to provide a regime of mandatory minimum terms of actual imprisonment for violent offences. It is important to appreciate that the regime has application only where the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed is less than the legislatively prescribed mandatory minimum. If, having regard to all of the surrounding circumstances, including: the circumstances of the offending; the circumstances of the offender; the maximum penalty and the terms of any other statutory requirement, the appropriate sentence exceeds the mandatory minimum sentence, then the need to consider exceptional circumstances does not arise.