Wright v Keon-Cohen & Anor; Currie v Neesham & Anor; Danci v Duggan

Case [1992] HCATrans 342


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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Melbourne No M59 of 1992

B e t w e e n -

MAXWELL AUSTIN JOHN WRIGHT

Applicant

and

JUDGE CHESTER STEWART
KEON-COHEN and THE DIRECTOR
OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS FOR THE

STATE OF VICTORIA

Respondent

Office of the Registry

Melbourne No M60 of 1992

B e t w e e n -

GRAHAM GEORGE CURRIE

Applicant

Wright 1 13/11/92

and

JUDGE THOMAS ANTHONY NEESHAM

and THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC

PROSECUTIONS FOR THE

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Respondents

Office of the Registry

Melbourne No M61 of 1992

B e t w e e n -

GHEORGHE DANCI

Applicant

and

JUDGE JAMES THOMAS DUGGAN and

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC

PROSECUTIONS FOR THE STATE OF

VICTORIA

Respondents

Applications for special leave

to appeal

MASON CJ
BRENNAN J

MCHUGH J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 13 NOVEMBER 1992, AT 3.02 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR D. GRACE: 

If the Court pleases, I appear on behalf of the applicants, Mr Wright and Mr Currie.

(instructed by Grace & Macgregor)

MR P.M. O'SHANNESSY: If the Court pleases, I appear on

behalf of the applicant, Danci. (instructed by

Grace & Macgregor)

Wright 2 13/11/92

MR B.D. BONGIORNO, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with

my learned friend, MS K.E. JUDD, on my own behalf

in the first and third matters. (instructed by the

Solicitor to the Director of Public Prosecutions for the State of Victoria)

MR M. ROZENES, QC: If it please the Court, I appear with my

learned friend, MR E.J. LORKIN, on my own behalf in

relation to the third matter of Currie.

(instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions

for the Commonwealth of Australia)

MASON CJ:  The Registrar has certified that he has received

a letter from the Victorian Government Solicitor

advising that the first-named respondent does not

wish to be represented in these matters. Yes,

Mr Grace.

MR GRACE:  Thank you, Your Honour. It is submitted that

these applications for special leave raise for

consideration a question of law that is of public

importance and that the interests of the

administration of the criminal justice system

require consideration of this question by this

Court.

Although the primary issue is one of the

statutory interpretation of section 78A of the

County Court Act 1958, an ancillary issue is the

processes including the award of costs.

existence of and the parameters of the County

The criminal jurisdiction of the County Court

was first conferred upon it by section 7 of the

County Court (Jurisdiction) Act 1968 which inserted

section 36A into the County Court Act.

Section 36A(2) provides as follows:

Subject to sub-section (1) and unless otherwise expressly provided the County Court

shall have jurisdiction and powers with
respect to indictable offences and the trial ·-
thereof as fully and amply to all intents and
purposes as the Supreme Court of Victoria in
like matters and the general principles of
practice and procedure observed for the…

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Wright v Keon-Cohen & Anor; Currie v Neesham & Anor; Danci v Duggan [1992] HCATrans 342
Case
[1992] HCATrans 342
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

These applications for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia concerned the jurisdiction of the County Court of Victoria to award costs in criminal proceedings. The applicants, Mr Wright, Mr Currie, and Mr Danci, sought to challenge decisions of the County Court and the Director of Public Prosecutions for the State of Victoria. The core of the dispute revolved around whether the County Court possessed the power to award costs in its criminal jurisdiction, either through statutory provisions or its inherent jurisdiction.

The central legal issue before the High Court was the interpretation of section 78A of the *County Court Act 1958* (Vic) and its application to the award of costs in criminal matters. Ancillary to this was the question of whether the County Court possessed an inherent jurisdiction to award costs, independent of statutory authority, and the parameters of such jurisdiction. The applicants contended that the County Court's power to award costs derived from section 78A and its inherent jurisdiction, while the respondents, and indeed the Full Court in prior judgments, argued that such power was restricted to civil proceedings.

The applicants' argument was that section 78A provided the necessary statutory power for the County Court to award costs in criminal proceedings. They further submitted that even if section 78A were to be interpreted as applying only to civil matters, the County Court retained an inherent jurisdiction to award costs in any matter before it, once the statutory power to award costs had been established. However, the Court, through Mason CJ and McHugh J, expressed skepticism regarding the existence of an inherent jurisdiction to award costs, emphasizing that costs are generally a creation of statute and not a matter of inherent judicial power at common law.

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