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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M59 of 1992 B e t w e e n -
MAXWELL AUSTIN JOHN WRIGHT
Applicant
and
JUDGE CHESTER STEWART
KEON-COHEN and THE DIRECTOR
OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS FOR THESTATE OF VICTORIA
Respondent
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M60 of 1992 B e t w e e n -
GRAHAM GEORGE CURRIE
Applicant
| Wright | 1 | 13/11/92 |
and
JUDGE THOMAS ANTHONY NEESHAM
and THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS FOR THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondents
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M61 of 1992 B e t w e e n -
GHEORGHE DANCI
Applicant
and
JUDGE JAMES THOMAS DUGGAN and
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS FOR THE STATE OF
VICTORIA
Respondents
Applications for special leave
to appeal
MASON CJ
BRENNAN J
MCHUGH J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 13 NOVEMBER 1992, AT 3.02 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR D. GRACE: | If the Court pleases, I appear on behalf of the applicants, Mr Wright and Mr Currie. |
| (instructed by Grace & Macgregor) |
MR P.M. O'SHANNESSY: If the Court pleases, I appear on
behalf of the applicant, Danci. (instructed by
Grace & Macgregor)
| Wright | 2 | 13/11/92 |
MR B.D. BONGIORNO, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with
my learned friend, MS K.E. JUDD, on my own behalf
in the first and third matters. (instructed by the Solicitor to the Director of Public Prosecutions for the State of Victoria)
MR M. ROZENES, QC: If it please the Court, I appear with my
learned friend, MR E.J. LORKIN, on my own behalf in
relation to the third matter of Currie.
(instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions
for the Commonwealth of Australia)
| MASON CJ: | The Registrar has certified that he has received |
a letter from the Victorian Government Solicitor
advising that the first-named respondent does not
wish to be represented in these matters. Yes,
Mr Grace.
| MR GRACE: | Thank you, Your Honour. | It is submitted that |
these applications for special leave raise for
consideration a question of law that is of public
importance and that the interests of the
administration of the criminal justice system
require consideration of this question by this
Court.
Although the primary issue is one of the
statutory interpretation of section 78A of the
County Court Act 1958, an ancillary issue is the
processes including the award of costs.
existence of and the parameters of the County
The criminal jurisdiction of the County Court
was first conferred upon it by section 7 of the
County Court (Jurisdiction) Act 1968 which inserted
section 36A into the County Court Act.
Section 36A(2) provides as follows:
Subject to sub-section (1) and unless otherwise expressly provided the County Court
shall have jurisdiction and powers with
respect to indictable offences and the trial ·- thereof as fully and amply to all intents and purposes as the Supreme Court of Victoria in like matters and the general principles of practice and procedure observed for the…
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- AGLC
- Wright v Keon-Cohen & Anor; Currie v Neesham & Anor; Danci v Duggan [1992] HCATrans 342
- Case
- [1992] HCATrans 342
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was the interpretation of section 78A of the *County Court Act 1958* (Vic) and its application to the award of costs in criminal matters. Ancillary to this was the question of whether the County Court possessed an inherent jurisdiction to award costs, independent of statutory authority, and the parameters of such jurisdiction. The applicants contended that the County Court's power to award costs derived from section 78A and its inherent jurisdiction, while the respondents, and indeed the Full Court in prior judgments, argued that such power was restricted to civil proceedings.
The applicants' argument was that section 78A provided the necessary statutory power for the County Court to award costs in criminal proceedings. They further submitted that even if section 78A were to be interpreted as applying only to civil matters, the County Court retained an inherent jurisdiction to award costs in any matter before it, once the statutory power to award costs had been established. However, the Court, through Mason CJ and McHugh J, expressed skepticism regarding the existence of an inherent jurisdiction to award costs, emphasizing that costs are generally a creation of statute and not a matter of inherent judicial power at common law.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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