Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd v Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd [No 24]

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   WRIGHT PROSPECTING PTY LTD -v- HANCOCK PROSPECTING PTY LTD [No 24] [2023] WASC 393

CORAM:   WHITBY J

HEARD:   31 AUGUST & 13 SEPTEMBER 2023

DELIVERED          :   11 OCTOBER 2023

FILE NO/S:   CIV 3041 of 2010

(Consolidated with CIV 2617 of 2012 by Orders dated 9 September 2014)

BETWEEN:   WRIGHT PROSPECTING PTY LTD

Plaintiff

AND

HANCOCK PROSPECTING PTY LTD

First Defendant

HOPE DOWNS IRON ORE PTY LTD

Second Defendant

BIANCA HOPE RINEHART

Third Defendant

JOHN LANGLEY HANCOCK

Fourth Defendant

HOPE RINEHART WELKER

Fifth Defendant

GINIA HOPE FRANCIS RINEHART

Sixth Defendant

HAMERSLEY WA PTY LTD

Third Party

(BY ORIGINAL ACTION)

BIANCA HOPE RINEHART

First Plaintiff by Counterclaim

JOHN LANGLEY HANCOCK

Second Plaintiff by Counterclaim

AND

GEORGINA HOPE RINEHART

First Defendant by Counterclaim

HANCOCK PROSPECTING PTY LTD

Second Defendant by Counterclaim

HANCOCK MINERALS PTY LTD

Third Defendant by Counterclaim

THE HANCOCK FAMILY MEMORIAL FOUNDATION LTD

Fourth Defendant by Counterclaim

TADEUSZ JOZEF WATROBA

Fifth Defendant by Counterclaim

WESTRAINT RESOURCES PTY LTD

Sixth Defendant by Counterclaim

HMHT INVESTMENTS PTY LTD

Seventh Defendant by Counterclaim

150 INVESTMENTS PTY LTD

Eighth Defendant by Counterclaim

HOPE RINEHART WELKER

Ninth Defendant by Counterclaim

GINIA HOPE FRANCIS RINEHART

Tenth Defendant by Counterclaim

MAX CHRISTOPHER DONNELLY as trustee in bankruptcy of LANGLEY GEORGE HANCOCK 

Eleventh Defendant by Counterclaim

HOPE DOWNS IRON ORE PTY LTD

Twelfth Defendant by Counterclaim

ROY HILL IRON ORE PTY LTD

Thirteenth Defendant by Counterclaim

MULGA DOWNS INVESTMENTS PTY LTD

Fourteenth Defendant by Counterclaim

MULGA DOWNS IRON ORE PTY LTD

Fifteenth Defendant by Counterclaim

WRIGHT PROSPECTING PTY LTD

Sixteenth Defendant by Counterclaim

DFD RHODES PTY LTD

Seventeenth Defendant by Counterclaim

MATTHEW JOHN KEADY AND DOROTHEA MARGARET CAMPBELL as executors of DONOVAN FRANCES DUNCAN RHODES

Eighteenth Defendants by Counterclaim

(BY COUNTERCLAIM)

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2617 of 2012

BETWEEN:   WRIGHT PROSPECTING PTY LTD

Plaintiff

AND

HANCOCK PROSPECTING PTY LTD

First Defendant

HOPE DOWNS IRON ORE PTY LTD

Second Defendant

BIANCA HOPE RINEHART

Third Defendant

JOHN LANGLEY HANCOCK

Fourth Defendant

HOPE RINEHART WELKER

Fifth Defendant

GINIA HOPE FRANCIS RINEHART

Sixth Defendant

HAMERSLEY WA PTY LTD

Third Party

(BY ORIGINAL ACTION)

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2737 of 2013

BETWEEN:   DFD RHODES PTY LTD

First Plaintiff

MATTHEW JOHN KEADY AND DOROTHEA MARGARET CAMPBELL as executor of the estate of DONOVAN FRANCES DUNCAN RHODES

Second Plaintiffs

AND

HANCOCK PROSPECTING PTY LTD

First Defendant

WRIGHT PROSPECTING PTY LTD

Second Defendant

HOPE DOWNS IRON ORE PTY LTD

Third Defendant

BIANCA HOPE RINEHART

Fourth Defendant

JOHN LANGLEY HANCOCK

Fifth Defendant

HOPE RINEHART WELKER

Sixth Defendant

GINIA HOPE FRANCIS RINEHART

Seventh Defendant

HAMERSLEY WA PTY LTD

Third Party

(BY ORIGINAL ACTION)

BIANCA HOPE RINEHART

First Plaintiff by Counterclaim

JOHN LANGLEY HANCOCK

Second Plaintiff by Counterclaim

AND

GEORGINA HOPE RINEHART

First Defendant by Counterclaim

HANCOCK PROSPECTING PTY LTD

Second Defendant by Counterclaim

HANCOCK MINERALS PTY LTD

Third Defendant by Counterclaim

THE HANCOCK FAMILY MEMORIAL FOUNDATION LTD

Fourth Defendant by Counterclaim

TADEUSZ JOZEF WATROBA

Fifth Defendant by Counterclaim

WESTRAINT RESOURCES PTY LTD

Sixth Defendant by Counterclaim

HMHT INVESTMENTS PTY LTD

Seventh…

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Details
Case
[2023] WASC 393
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd v Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd [No 24], the parties were engaged in a dispute concerning the interpretation of a commercial arbitration agreement. The primary legal issues before the court were whether the proceedings constituted a 'matter' under section 8(1) of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2012 (WA), and if so, whether this 'matter' was the subject of an arbitration agreement. Additionally, the court had to determine if the arbitration clause in the Hope Downs Deed was inoperative or incapable of being performed, and whether the Privilege Challenge constituted an abuse of process. The court also had to consider whether there was a change in circumstances that would render hearing the Privilege Challenge a waste of judicial resources.

The court began by examining the definition of a'matter' under section 8(1) of the Act, which includes both the subject matter in dispute and the substantive questions for determination in the proceedings. The court emphasised the importance of identifying the controversy in dispute to determine if there is an overlap with the arbitration agreement. The court found that while the language of section 8(1) of the Act did not explicitly require the matter to be 'capable of settlement by arbitration', it was an inherent requirement that the matter or matters must be capable of settlement by arbitration. The court also considered the role of issue estoppel and whether the rulings of the Martin Arbitration constituted a final determination of the issue. The court concluded that the Privilege Challenge did not constitute an abuse of process and that there was no material change in circumstances that would render hearing the Privilege Challenge a waste of judicial resources.

The court held that the proceedings did constitute a'matter' under section 8(1) of the Act and that this 'matter' was the subject of an arbitration agreement. The arbitration clause in the Hope Downs Deed was not found to be inoperative or incapable of being performed. The doctrine of issue estoppel was not applicable in relation to interlocutory orders, and the Privilege Challenge did not constitute an abuse of process. The court maintained control over its own processes and denied the application for a stay of proceedings and referral to arbitration. The court found that the Privilege Claims of the HPPL Parties and Mrs Rinehart were privileged in the Martin Arbitration and that the doctrine of issue estoppel did not apply to interlocutory orders. The court also held that the Privilege Challenge did not constitute an abuse of process and that there was no material change in circumstances that would render hearing the Privilege Challenge a waste of judicial resources.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

A 'matter' within the meaning of s 8(1) of the Act consists of 'the subject matter in dispute and the substantive questions for determination in the proceedings'.[34] [34] Full Federal Court decision citing ComandateMarine Corporation v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd (2006) 157 FCR 45 (Comandate) at [238] with approval. The identification of the controversy between the parties is critical because it informs whether that is a 'matter' or 'matters' in which the action is brought and in turn, whether there is overlap between the 'matter[s]' in which the action is brought and the matter which is the subject of the arbitration agreement. If there is such overlap, that enlivens the court's obligation to refer the 'matter' to arbitration as required by s 8(1) of the Act.[35] [35] 2020 Stay Appeal at [119]; North West Pilots Pty Ltd as trustee for the Port Hedland Pilots Unit Trust trading as Port Hedland Pilots v Daniel [2023] WASCA 122 [42]. This critical step of identifying the controversy in dispute was described by Deane and Gaudron JJ in Tanning Research Laboratories Inc v O'Brien[36] as follows:To ascertain whether s 7(2) [of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (Cth Act)][37] operates in respect of proceedings pending in a court it is necessary to first identify the subject matter of the controversary which falls for determination in those proceedings. Only when that has been done is it possible to identify whether the proceedings 'involve the determination of a matter … capable of settlement by arbitration: s 7(2)(b). [36] Tanning Research Laboratories Inc v O'Brien (1990) 169 CLR 332 [350] (Tanning).[37] Section 7(2) of the Cth Act, although not in identical terms, is the equivalent to s 8(1) of the Act. In Australian Maritime Systems Ltd v McConnell Dowell Constructors(Aust) Pty Ltd, Mitchell J (as his Honour then was) noted that, while the language of s 7(2) of the Cth Act differed from the language of s 8(1) of the Act, in that the former refers to a matter capable of settlement in pursuance of an arbitration agreement and the latter refers to a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement, 'the context in which the term matter is used in s 8 of the Act is even more likely to invoke the concept of a controversy for determination in legal proceedings as opposed to the legal proceedings themselves'.[38] Accordingly, although there is no specific reference in s 8(1) of the Act to a requirement that a matter must be 'capable of settlement by arbitration', I am satisfied that it is an inherent requirement of s 8 of the Act that the matter or matters must be capable of settlement by arbitration.[38] Australian Maritime Systems Ltd v McConnell Dowell Constructors(Aust) Pty Ltd [2016] WASC 52 [50]. Further as Quinlan CJ observed, in the 2020 Stay Appeal, Mitchell J's reference to the term 'matter' in Australian Maritime Systems reveals that an important aspect of s 8 of Act is the requirement to identify the parties to the relevant controversy for determination.[39][39] 2020 Stay Appeal [134].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Clause 20 provides:20.CONFIDENTIAL MEDIATION/ARBITRATIONIn the event that there is any dispute under this deed then any party to this deed who has a dispute with any other party to this deed shall forthwith notify the other party or parties with whom there is the dispute and all other parties to this deed ('Notification') and the parties to this deed shall attempt to resolve such difference in the following manner…20.2.Confidential Arbitration(a)Where the disputing parties are unable to agree to an appointment of a mediator for the purposes of this this clause within fourteen (14) days of the date of the Notification or in any event any mediation is abandoned then the dispute shall on that date automatically referred to arbitration for resolution ('Referral Date') and the following provisions of this clause shall apply:…(b)the dispute shall be resolved by confidential arbitration by the arbitrator agreed to by each of the disputing parties or appointed pursuant to paragraph (2)(a)(i) above ( or if more than one is appointed pursuant to paragraph (2)(a)(ii) then as decided by not less than a majority of them) who shall resolve the matter pursuant to the Commercial Arbitration Act of Western Australia and whose decision shall be final and binding on the parties.… The definition of Claim, at subclause (e) of cl 1.1, includes any claim made in the unsigned draft affidavit of [John]. The unsigned draft affidavit of John was sent to Gina's solicitors in October 2004.[50] The draft affidavit alleges that:[50] Wilks Second Affidavit, Confidential Annexure MAW 2.(1)Mr Lang Hancock established the Zamoever Trust for his four grandchildren (Gina's children) over shares in Zamoever. (The Zamoever Trust is later rebranded as the HFMF Trust);(2)Gina became the trustee of the Zamoever Trust on the death of Lang Hancock;(3)Lang Hancock, as the trustee of the Zamoever Trust, controlled HFMF via Zamoever;(4)on 27 March 1990, HPPL transferred its shares in HRL to HFMF(5)HFMF was the sole shareholder of all issued shares in HML and HRL;(6)prior to his death on 27 March 1992, Lang Hancock controlled all of these companies;(7)Gina has long disagreed with the way Lang Hancock had conducted the affairs of his companies. In particular, Gina argued that valuable assets of HPPL were being transferred to the other entities, particularly HFMF. These included the issued shares in HML and HRL (which companies held various mining tenements), and further mining tenements subsequently transferred to HML and HRL by HPPL;[51](8)after Lang Hancock's death, Gina embarked upon a sustained campaign to return assets to HPPL which she considered were the rightful property of the family, HPPL being the family company;[52](9)Gina breached her duties as trustee of the Zamoever Trust, by divesting a company ultimately controlled by the Zamoever Trust of most of its valuable assets;[53](10)at all times in the 10 years prior to October 2004, Gina acted in conflict with her various positions as director and trustee of the Zamoever Trust, to her sole benefit. It was John's strong belief that Gina must be removed as trustee and that there should be some form of redress from the calculating and astounded breaches of fiduciary Gina displayed in divesting HFMF, which was always intended to solely for the benefit of Gina's children, of all of its valuable assets, particularly its shareholding in HPPL;[54] and(11)Gina also divested HFMF of the Hope Downs Tenements, which would have provided a huge source of income to HFMF.[55][51] Wilks Second Affidavit, Confidential Annexure MAW 2 [130].[52] Wilks Second Affidavit, Confidential Annexure MAW 2 [132].[53] Wilks Second Affidavit, Confidential Annexure MAW 2 [142].[54] Wilks Second Affidavit, Confidential Annexure MAW 2 [258].[55] Wilks Second Affidavit, Confidential Annexure MAW 2 [259].