FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Woodroffe v National Crime Authority [1999] FCA 1689
APPEALS - application for leave to appeal - test to be applied when determining whether leave to appeal be allowed when appeal on interlocutory point - whether s 130 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) or common law principle governs pre-trial inspection of documents the subject of a claim to public interest immunity - whether deponent of affidavit in support of claim to public interest immunity from production of documents for inspection should be examined on his affidavit - proper approach of Court to making orders for discovery.
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1996 (Cth) ss 118, 119 and 130
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 166
Federal Court Rules O 35 r 7(2), O 35 r7(3)Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 applied
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Nestle Australia Ltd (1986) 69 ALR 445 cited
Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 83 FCR 511 applied
Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 applied
Young v Quin (1984) 4 FCR 483 cited
Hartogen Energy Ltd v Australian Gaslights Co (1992) 109 ALR 177 cited
Compagnie Financiere et Commerciale Du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Co (1882) 11 QBD 55 cited
Mulley v Manifold (1959) 103 CLR 341 cited
Temsign Pty Ltd v Biscen Pty Ltd (Full Federal Court, 15 July 1996, unreported) citedJENNIFER JEAN WOODROFFE AND JAJ HOTELS PTY LTD v NATIONAL CRIME AUTHORITY, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION AND MARK WILLIAMS
S 24 OF 1999DRUMMOND, SUNDBERG AND MARSHALL JJ
3 DECEMBER 1999
ADELAIDE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
S 24 OF 1999
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
JENNIFER JEAN WOODROFFE and
JAJ HOTELS PTY LTD
ApplicantsAND:
NATIONAL CRIME AUTHORITY
First RespondentDEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Second RespondentMARK WILLIAMS
Third Respondent
JUDGES:
DRUMMOND, SUNDBERG AND MARSHALL JJ
DATE:
3 DECEMBER 1999
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
The applicants seek to have set aside three orders (numbered 3, 4 and 5) made by Mansfield J in the proceedings they have brought against the National Crime Authority (“NCA”), the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (“DCT”) and a South Australian police officer seconded to the NCA. By their amended application, they seek injunctions to prevent the respondents making any use of documents seized when a search warrant was executed at various premises in South Australia in May 1998, any use of certain documents obtained from the Police Credit Union and any use of information contained in or derived from those documents. Orders for delivery up of the documents and any copies made by the respondents and numerous declarations are also sought.
Orders 3 and 4 relate to discovery in the action. By Order 5, the learned primary judge refused to strike out certain paragraphs of the DCT’s points of defence. The orders are interlocutory. Leave to…
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- Case
- [1999] FCA 1689
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The applicants argued that the primary judge did not accurately reflect his intended order, which limited the respondents' claim to immunity from production of certain documents. The Court found no merit in this argument, stating that the primary judge's order was consistent with his conclusion that the applicants had made out a prima facie case of illegality concerning the third respondent's application for the warrant. The Court considered it an accidental omission and suggested the applicants seek relief under the Federal Court Rules.
The applicants also contended that the primary judge erred in applying common law principles rather than statutory provisions when determining the respondents' claims to immunity. The Court found no sufficient doubt in the primary judge's decision, stating that the statutory provisions only regulated the production of documents in court, not the non-production of discovered documents for inspection outside court. Even if the primary judge's refusal to apply the statutory provisions was wrong, the applicants failed to show any prejudice resulting from this decision.
Lastly, the applicants argued that the primary judge should have permitted cross-examination of a deponent in support of a claim to public interest immunity. The Court upheld the primary judge's decision, stating that he correctly applied the principles governing the permission of cross-examination and that there was no good reason for doubting his Honour's approach.
The Court refused leave to appeal, citing the principle of restraint reflected in the leave requirement for appeals from interlocutory decisions in s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The Court concluded that the applicants had not made out a case for leave to appeal and that the primary judge's orders were correct.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: DRUMMOND, SUNDBERG AND MARSHALL JJ
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