Wondal v Inspector-General in Bankruptcy

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wondal v Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2018] FCA 1278

File number: NSD 1216 of 2017
Judge: BROMWICH J
Date of judgment: 24 August 2018
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal on questions of law – where Tribunal had affirmed a decision of the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy to refuse to extend the time in which the applicant could file an application for review of the remuneration of her trustees – whether Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness – whether there was no evidence to support findings made by the Tribunal – whether Tribunal failed to consider applicant’s submissions – whether Tribunal’s reasons were inadequate
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 33, 44

Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth), reg 8.12C(5), 8.12E, 8.12F

Cases cited:

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321

Casey v Repatriation Commission (1995) 60 FCR 510

Fisse v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2008] FCAFC 188; 172 FCR 513

Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550

Leighton International v Hodges [2012] NSWSC 458

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; 214 CLR 1

Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v Nguyen [2001] NSWCA 264; 52 NSWLR 213

Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54

Date of hearing: 15 March 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 57
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Docker (Pro Bono)
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D Rayment
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 1216 of 2017
BETWEEN:

SUSIANI WONDAL

Applicant

AND:

INSPECTOR-GENERAL IN BANKRUPTCY

Respondent

JUDGE:

BROMWICH J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 AUGUST 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs as assessed or agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BROMWICH J:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal by application in the original jurisdiction of this Court under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act) from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on questions of law.

  2. The applicant, Ms Susiani Wondal, applied to the respondent, the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy, for a review of the amount of remuneration claimed by her trustees in bankruptcy.  The application was required to be made within 28 days of receiving notification of the trustees’ claim.  The application was made 24 days late.  The Inspector-General had a confined discretion to extend the period in which an application for review may be made.  A delegate of the Inspector-General declined to exercise that discretion.

  3. The applicant applied to the Tribunal for merits review of the delegate’s refusal to extend the period for making the application for review.  The Tribunal conducted a hearing and affirmed the delegate’s decision, giving ex tempore reasons.  The applicant has since applied to this Court seeking to appeal from the Tribunal’s…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1278
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the Federal Court of Australia was asked to review a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) concerning an application for an extension of time to file a review of trustee remuneration in a bankruptcy matter. The applicant, a bankrupt individual, sought to challenge the decision of the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy to refuse an extension of time in which to file an application for review of the remuneration of her trustees. The AAT had affirmed the decision of the Inspector-General. The court considered several grounds of appeal, including whether the AAT had denied the applicant procedural fairness, whether there was evidence to support the findings made by the Tribunal, and whether the Tribunal had failed to consider the applicant’s submissions.

The court found that the AAT had not denied the applicant procedural fairness, as the applicant had access to the review papers and the context of the original decision. The court also held that there was evidence to support the Tribunal’s findings, despite the applicant's contention that the findings were based on submissions rather than evidence. Furthermore, the court found that the Tribunal had considered the applicant’s submissions, albeit with limited weight due to the lack of a compelling explanation for the delay in filing the review application. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the Inspector-General.

This case underscores the importance of providing a clear and compelling explanation when seeking an extension of time in administrative law proceedings. It also highlights the need for administrative tribunals to carefully consider the evidence and submissions before making their decisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs as assessed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before turning to the background of this proceeding, it should be recorded that the Court is grateful for the able assistance of Mr Sean Docker of counsel, who accepted a referral to act on behalf of the applicant under the Court’s pro bono scheme. Background The applicant was born in Indonesia in 1951 and came to Australia in 1974. She has been living here for over 40 years. She speaks Indonesian at home. Although she can read English, she is not proficient in the language. The applicant was made bankrupt on 27 October 2014. She filed a statement of affairs late, on 2 June 2015, which revealed that she owned units in Bankstown and Ashfield, which she estimated to be worth $625,000 and $550,000 respectively. She had no secured creditors, but significant amounts of unsecured debt owed to various banks. The trustees’ second report to creditors was prepared in June 2016. The report relevantly stated that the Ashfield unit had been sold in August 2015 for $570,000, and that the Bankstown unit had been sold in April 2016 for $490,000. By the time of that report, dividends totalling $0.86 in the dollar had been paid to creditors’ claims of $654,084. On 8 June 2016, the trustees issued a remuneration claim notice for $175,247.55 (including GST) for the period 27 October 2014 to 6 June 2016. It was this remuneration claim that the applicant sought to have reviewed. On the same day, 8 June 2016, the trustees issued a remuneration approval notice for further fees of $74,718.60 (including GST), including fees already incurred between 27 August 2015 and 6 June 2016 of $63,828.60 (including GST). In part at least, the quantum of the trustees’ fees relative to the size of the bankrupt estate appears to be attributable to a somewhat obstructive approach taken by the applicant to the administration of her bankruptcy. A further contributing factor of significance was the level of fees charged by the trustees, with the delegate appearing in person at the Tribunal hearing describing the rates charged as being the highest in Australia. As outlined in greater detail below, the delegate did, however, carry out a three-hour inspection of the trustees’ file and, as he told the Tribunal, only located one billing error.The trustee remuneration regime under the Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth) The relevant portions of the Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth) were repealed on 1 September 2017, but remain applicable in this proceeding by reason of transitional provisions. Apparently, there is no case law on the meaning of the key provisions, and it is unlikely that there will be at any time after this decision given their repeal. It is convenient to reproduce those provisions in full, emphasising the key passages, so as to provide the necessary context:8.12E Application for review—remuneration(1)A bankrupt or a creditor of the bankrupt (the applicant) may apply to the Inspector‑General for a review of the amount of remuneration claimed by the trustee.(2)The application must be in writing and must, subject to subregulation (3), be made within 28 days after the day the applicant receives notification under regulation 8.12C.(3)The Inspector‑General may, before or after the end of the 28 days mentioned in subregulation (2), extend the period in which an application for review may be made if the Inspector‑General is satisfied that:(a)the applicant and the trustee have been engaged in an alternative dispute resolution process to try to resolve the matter; or(b)it is appropriate, in all the circumstances, to extend the period.(4)The Inspector‑General may extend the period for any period the Inspector‑General considers appropriate in all the circumstances.(5)The applicant may apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for the review of a decision by the Inspector‑General under subregulation (3) to refuse to extend the period in which an application for review may be made.(6)The trustee may apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for the review of a decision by the Inspector‑General under subregulation (3) to extend the period in which an application for review may be made.8.12F Application threshold(1) The Inspector‑General must refuse to accept an application:(a)unless the Inspector‑General is satisfied on reasonable grounds that 1 or more of the following apply:(i)the trustee’s remuneration may have been fixed in a manner that is inconsistent with the requirements of the Act or these Regulations;(ii)the trustee may have acted improperly, or without due care and diligence, in the administration of the estate; or(b) if the Inspector‑General is satisfied on reasonable grounds that:(i)the applicant does not have an interest in the outcome of the review; or(ii)the applicant has not adequately particularised the issue giving rise to the review; or(iii)the application is frivolous or vexatious.(2)However, the Inspector‑General may accept an application if the Inspector‑General is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify the review.(3)The Inspector‑General may refuse to accept an application if the Inspector‑General is satisfied on reasonable grounds that:(a)it was appropriate in all the circumstances for the applicant to attempt to resolve the matter without seeking a review under this Subdivision; and(b)the applicant did not do so; and(c)the applicant did not provide a reasonable explanation for not doing so.The trustees’ remuneration claim notice

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Considering all of the circumstances as a whole, the Inspector-General’s submissions should be accepted. While it is true that, although present, the applicant was not a direct party to the discussions that took place at the Tribunal hearing, this must be considered in context. The relevant context was that the question of exceptional circumstances was front and centre in the review, in circumstances where the delegate of the Inspector-General had found that, due to there being no possibility of a surplus, the applicant lacked an interest in the outcome of any review, which was a finding that would ordinarily preclude extending time. Viewed in that context, the requirements of procedural fairness were amply met. It would be artificial in the extreme to require the Tribunal to laboriously restate the contents of the review papers, which the applicant had a copy of in advance, and the entire context in which the original decision had been made, these being an essential part of the subject matter of the applicant’s merits review application. This ground of appeal must therefore fail.Ground 3: no evidence The applicant asserts that there was no evidence to support the Tribunal’s findings that: (1)there was little prospect of the remuneration of the applicant’s trustees changing on review; and (2)there seemed to be little prospect of success in the review application. It is not in doubt that the question of whether there is any evidence of a particular fact is a question of law for the purpose of appeals under s 44 of the AAT Act: see Fisse v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2008] FCAFC 188; 172 FCR 513 at [46] and the cases there cited and quoted. The applicant submits that this ground requires consideration to be given to what evidence was before the Tribunal, which was not necessarily an easy task, given that a clear distinction was not drawn between evidence and submissions at the Tribunal hearing. The applicant submits that, although the Tribunal was not bound by the rules of evidence, submissions made from the Bar table should not be treated as evidence, especially as the Tribunal made no ruling or statement that it would treat submissions before it in that manner. The applicant characterised the following as findings made by the Tribunal:(1)the applicant had no clear idea about what she thought would be a correct amount for remuneration;(2)it seemed that there was little prospect of the charges in the remuneration notice changing in any substantial way;(3)it was unlikely that there would be any real benefit to the applicant if a review was undertaken;(4)the applicant had no interest in the outcome; and(5)there seemed to be little prospect of success for the review application. The applicant submits that there was no evidence to support the third and fifth findings that it seemed that there was little prospect of the charges in the remuneration notice changing in any substantial way and that there seemed to be little prospect of success for the review application. The applicant submits that these findings appear to be based on submissions by the Inspector-General’s representative, rather than evidence. That representative had made the submission that “… even if I was to perform a review, I don’t think the outcome would be any different to the current situation and in any case”, together with other similar submissions. It is emphasised that those submissions were based on the representative’s review of the trustees’ file on 12 January 2017, in circumstances where that file was not before the Tribunal and there was no detail of what had been looked at. The applicant therefore submits that it would be procedurally unfair to the applicant to treat those submissions as evidence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

A careful and beneficial reading of the transcript reveals that the Tribunal did not go so far as to say that it did not have to take account of the applicant’s explanation, as opposed to regarding the explanation as having little weight because, in effect, it made little sense. Nor should the Tribunal’s reasons be read as setting a legal standard requiring the applicant to show a very strong reason for the delay. Rather, the Tribunal should be understood as treating the applicant as having advanced no real reason for the delay such that her explanation did not advance her case on the review. There was no error in this approach. This ground of appeal must therefore fail.Conclusion As all of the grounds of appeal must fail, the appeal must be dismissed. There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. Accordingly, the applicant must pay the Inspector-General’s costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The relevant portions of the Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth) were repealed on 1 September 2017, but remain applicable in this proceeding by reason of transitional provisions. Apparently, there is no case law on the meaning of the key provisions, and it is unlikely that there will be at any time after this decision given their repeal. It is convenient to reproduce those provisions in full, emphasising the key passages, so as to provide the necessary context:8.12E Application for review—remuneration(1)A bankrupt or a creditor of the bankrupt (the applicant) may apply to the Inspector‑General for a review of the amount of remuneration claimed by the trustee.(2)The application must be in writing and must, subject to subregulation (3), be made within 28 days after the day the applicant receives notification under regulation 8.12C.(3)The Inspector‑General may, before or after the end of the 28 days mentioned in subregulation (2), extend the period in which an application for review may be made if the Inspector‑General is satisfied that:(a)the applicant and the trustee have been engaged in an alternative dispute resolution process to try to resolve the matter; or(b)it is appropriate, in all the circumstances, to extend the period.(4)The Inspector‑General may extend the period for any period the Inspector‑General considers appropriate in all the circumstances.(5)The applicant may apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for the review of a decision by the Inspector‑General under subregulation (3) to refuse to extend the period in which an application for review may be made.(6)The trustee may apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for the review of a decision by the Inspector‑General under subregulation (3) to extend the period in which an application for review may be made.8.12F Application threshold(1) The Inspector‑General must refuse to accept an application:(a)unless the Inspector‑General is satisfied on reasonable grounds that 1 or more of the following apply:(i)the trustee’s remuneration may have been fixed in a manner that is inconsistent with the requirements of the Act or these Regulations;(ii)the trustee may have acted improperly, or without due care and diligence, in the administration of the estate; or(b) if the Inspector‑General is satisfied on reasonable grounds that:(i)the applicant does not have an interest in the outcome of the review; or(ii)the applicant has not adequately particularised the issue giving rise to the review; or(iii)the application is frivolous or vexatious.(2)However, the Inspector‑General may accept an application if the Inspector‑General is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify the review.(3)The Inspector‑General may refuse to accept an application if the Inspector‑General is satisfied on reasonable grounds that:(a)it was appropriate in all the circumstances for the applicant to attempt to resolve the matter without seeking a review under this Subdivision; and(b)the applicant did not do so; and(c)the applicant did not provide a reasonable explanation for not doing so.The trustees’ remuneration claim notice