Wojewodzka & Ibrahimov

Case •

[2025] FedCFamC1A 173

•

19 September 2025

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Wojewodzka & Ibrahimov [2025] FedCFamC1A 173

Appeal from: Wojewodzka & Ibrahimov [2025] FCWA 119
Appeal number: NAA 297 of 2025
File number: 1292 of 2018
Judgment of: AUSTIN J
Date of judgment: 19 September 2025
Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – APPLICATION IN AN APPEAL – Where the appellant made an oral application for an adjournment of the appeal hearing listed before the Full Court – Where the respondent and the ICL consented to the application – Where the parties have complied with procedural directions and the matter is ready for hearing – Where it is unclear how the appellant’s reasons for the adjournment could preclude the hearing from proceeding as scheduled – Where the grant of the adjournment would not be an efficient use of judicial resources or an effective disposal of the Court’s caseload – Where the consent of the respondent and the ICL to the adjournment is not reflective of their statutory duty to help the Court fulfil its overarching purpose – Oral application dismissed.
Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt VII

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 67, 68

Cases cited: Aon Risk Services Aust Ltd v ANU (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27
Number of paragraphs: 15
Date of hearing: 19 September 2025
Place: Newcastle (via Microsoft Teams)
The Appellant: Litigant in person
Solicitor Advocate for the Respondent: Ms Korzeniecka
Solicitor for the Respondent: Platinum Legal
Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Ms Needham
Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: RM Law Pty Ltd

ORDERS

NAA 297 of 2025
1292 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTION
BETWEEN:

MR WOJEWODZKA

Appellant
AND:

MS IBRAHIMOV

Respondent

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER

ORDER MADE BY:

AUSTIN J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 SEPTEMBER 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant’s oral application for an adjournment of the appeal hearing is dismissed.

Note:   The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Wojewodzka & Ibrahimov has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

EX TEMPORE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

AUSTIN J:

  1. These reasons explain the dismissal of an oral application made by the appellant to vacate the current hearing date of the appeal, despite the respondent and the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“the ICL”) consenting to the application.

    Background

  2. On 29 May 2025, a judge of the Family Court of Western Australia made orders to determine the parties’ dispute over their child under Pt VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

  3. The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 26 June 2025, which he later amended on 5 August 2025.

  4. On 5 August 2025, the appeal registrar listed the appeal for hearing on 1 October 2025 and made procedural directions about the filing of documents to ensure the readiness of the appeal for hearing on that date.

  5. Those directions have been the subject of compliance and so the appeal is ostensibly ready to be heard. The Appeal Book was filed. The transcript was filed. The appellant filed his Summary of Argument on time. The respondent filed her Summary of Argument on time. The ICL is due to file her Summary of Argument early next week.

  6. Two days ago, on 17 September 2025, the parties and the ICL wrote to the appeal registrar saying this:

    The Appellant has proposed an adjourned of the appeal hearing on 1 October 2025, and the First Respondent and the Second Respondent have agreed to the same.

    …

    …respectfully request that the Minute of Procedural Orders be referred to…the Administrative head of Appeals for consideration.

    (As per the original)

  7. The appeal was consequently listed on 19 September 2025 for the parties and the ICL to be heard regarding the proposed adjournment.

  8. Given the appellant had not filed an Application in an Appeal with supporting affidavit seeking and explaining the need for any adjournment of the appeal hearing, the appellant was invited to make the application orally and to make submissions in support of it. He duly did.

    Disposition

  9. When asked to explain the need for an adjournment, in summary, the appellant said this:

    (a)he had been “going through a lot” in recent times;

    (b)he was “facing other proceedings”, the nature of which he did not clearly identify;

    (c)he had been out of work since February 2025 and was without income;

    (d)the primary judge and the decision-makers involved in the “other proceedings” which he did not identify had all engaged in his “judicial bullying”; and

    (e)the primary judge and the Chief Judge of the Family Court of Western Australia were engaged in “judicial corruption” and had conspired against him with the WA Police and the WA government.

  10. One might have reasonably thought those reasons could justify the appeal being heard and determined promptly, but apparently not.

  11. It was quite unclear how any of those considerations could possibly preclude the appeal hearing from proceeding as scheduled on 1 October 2025 – particularly given the parties’ compliance with the directions of the appeal registrar. The appeal is ready for hearing.

  12. The consent which was quite remarkably given by both the respondent and the ICL to the adjournment application did not advance the appellant’s cause. Courts do not acquit their business according to the whims of the litigants.

  13. More specifically, this Court is bound by a statutory duty to hear and determine the appellate causes before it as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible (s 67(1) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth)). Moreover, the parties to the appeal are duty-bound to help the Court fulfil that overarching purpose (s 68(1)). Neither the appellant’s application nor the consent given to it by the respondent and the ICL were reflective of their respective statutory duty. The pointless grant of the adjournment without any properly articulated reason would not be an efficient use of judicial resources or an efficient disposal of the Court’s caseload (s 67(2)).

  14. Such statutory duties cannot be ignored since litigation is justly resolved in the context of minimum delay and expense. The avoidance of undue delay and the efficient use of public resources are considerations which may transcend the interests of the parties. The times are long gone when the parties are left to control the course of litigation. The resolution of litigation serves the public, not just the parties to the proceedings (Aon Risk Services Aust Ltd v ANU (2009) 239 CLR 175 at 189–190, 211–215 and 217).

  15. The adjournment application is refused. The appeal hearing should proceed as presently fixed on 1 October 2025.

I certify that the preceding fifteen (15) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Austin.

Associate:

Dated:       19 September 2025

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