Winn v Leigh
[2015] FCCA 2256
•20 August 2015
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| WINN v LEIGH | [2015] FCCA 2256 |
| Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Applicant fails to appear – application dismissed – reasons given – application in a case to set aside costs and dismissal orders. |
| Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966, ss.153B, 178 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, rr.13.03A, 13.03C, 16.02 & 16.05 |
| Clifford v Mountford [2006] FMCAFAM 450 NAKX v The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs – BC20038087 NALM v The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA FC 17 Winn v Leigh [2014] FCCA 573 Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v The Australian National University [2009] HCA 27 SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146 Pelechowski v The Registrar, Court of Appeal [1999] HCA 19 |
| Applicant: | JULENE WINN |
| Respondent: | DAVID LEIGH |
| File Number: | BRG 1127 of 2012 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Coates |
| Hearing date: | 29 October 2014 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 29 October 2014 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 20 August 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | In person |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms A Wheatley |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Rodger Barnes & Green Lawyers |
ORDERS
That the Application in a Case filed 12 May 2014 be dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRG 1127 of 2012
| JULENE WINN |
Applicant
And
| DAVID LEIGH |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 24 March 2014, I dismissed an application filed under the Bankruptcy Act 1966.
The application was made in a long-running dispute which had resulted in the applicant’s bankruptcy.
The case dismissed sought to have the bankruptcy annulled.
The orders made dismissing the application record that it was dismissed pursuant to r.13.03A (1)(a), r.13.03A(1)(b) and r.13.03A(1)(e) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001.
The particular rule provides the grounds to exercise dismissal powers if a party is in default because:
a)under subsection (1)(a), the party fails to comply with an order of the court in the proceeding;
b)under subsection (1)(b), the party fails to file and serve a document required under the rules, and
c)under subsection (1)(e), the party fails to prosecute the matter with due diligence.
The applicant did not appear in court on 24 March 2014.
She had sent a medical certificate to the court prior to 24 March 2014, relying on the information supplied as a reason for her non-attendance.
On the day I dismissed her application, I gave oral reasons. I took into account the applicant’s claimed condition, and did not dismiss the application on her simple failure to appear, otherwise the order would have stated that the application was dismissed pursuant to r.13.03C.
The respondent also sought a series of costs orders after I dismissed the application.
I made those costs orders against the applicant.
On 12 May 2014 this Application in a Case was filed seeking that I set all orders I made on 24 March 2014 aside, pursuant to r.16.05(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001. The object was to ensure that the substantive application be heard.
The rule states:
“r.16.05(1) The Court may vary or set aside its judgment or order before it has been entered.
(2) The Court may vary or set aside its judgment or order after it has been entered if:
(a) the order is made in the absence of a party; or
(b) the order is obtained by fraud; or
(c) the order is interlocutory; or
(d) the order is an injunction or for the appointment of a receiver; or
(e) the order does not reflect the intention of the Court; or
(f) the party in whose favour the order is made consents.
(3) This rule does not affect the power of the Court to vary or terminate the operation of an order by a further order.”
The rule itself gives no indication of what the court must consider in order to exercise the discretionary power it gives itself under its rules.
The case of Clifford v Mountford [2006] FMCAFAM 450 sets out useful principles applicable to determining an application pursuant to r.16.05.
In Clifford v Mountford Jarrett FM reviewed a number of cases and authorities examining the circumstances in which a litigant seeks to have orders dismissing a proceeding set aside.
Paragraph 34 of the judgment focuses on the decision-making process. It states:
“[34] From the abovementioned authorities, it seems to me that the following principles emerge in respect of applications under r.16.05(2)(a):
a. The discretion to be exercised is unfettered, but nonetheless to be exercised judicially and bearing in mind the public interest in there being an end to the litigation.
b. There are these criteria, each of which should usually be demonstrated before a judgment order is set aside under r.16.05(2)(a), namely:
i. a reasonable explanation for the applicant’s absence at the trial or hearing;
ii. material arguments available to the applicant that might reasonably lead to the making of an order different to that sought to be set aside;
iii. no prejudice to the party with the benefit of the orders sought to be set aside that is not able to be adequately addressed by the Court.
a. Matters relevant to the three criteria set out above will include, but will not necessarily be limited to:
i. whether a party with notice of proceedings disregarded the opportunity of appearing at and participating in the trial;
ii. delay, if any, in bringing the application to set aside and and whether, if during the period of delay the successful party has acted on the judgment, or third parties have acquired rights by reference to it;
iii. the conduct of the applicant since the judgment or order sought to be set aside was made.”
As urged by the respondent, and as is apparent in any case, adoption of this procedure ensures that there is proper consideration of such an application to ensure justice is done. The applicant made little reference to the process outlined in Clifford v Mountford.
Before examining the propositions stated in Clifford v Mountford, some background will put the matters into context.
The substantive application dismissed was filed 20 December 2012, amended 25 March 2013 by leave. The subsequent amendments sought an annulment of the bankruptcy pursuant to s.153B of the Bankruptcy Act1966 and an enquiry into the conduct of the trustees of the applicant’s bankruptcy, allegedly for breaches of both the Bankruptcy Act 1966 and regulations. The applicant was alleging that the trustees gave misleading and prejudicial information pertaining to the bankruptcy. She also sought various directions under s.178.
The applicant’s bankruptcy had its genesis in a dispute between the applicant, who was the editor of a publication called Inscape, and Rodrick James Goodwin and a firm Blueprint Instant Printing Pty Ltd. The applicant bought claims against Mr Goodwin and Blueprint and they bought cross-claims in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, each seeking damages for disputes over a printing contract. There is no need to go into further detail of the disputes, but since a judgement was given by the Supreme Court of Victoria on 2 August 2002 (against the applicant here), there have been 19 further court actions emanating from the dispute in various venues, including the Victorian Court of Appeal, the Federal Court of Australia, the High Court and this court.
The applicant here was the applicant in 16 of those court matters and the respondent in three of those matters.
But it was a costs order made against the applicant by the Supreme Court of Victoria on 2 August 2002, and taxed on 9 November 2005, which founded the Bankruptcy Notice VN358/2009, dated 20 February 2009.
It appears that the applicant has been represented at times and not represented at other times.
It is relevant that I identify that the applicant has been self-represented on occasion previously, due to some statements that she did not fully understand these proceedings.
Self-represented litigants create complexities when a court is determining a case because there is always the possibility that such a litigant may not understand important aspects which are relevant to the manner in which a case is run. Because the applicant was not represented, I needed to ensure she had the capacity to understand and conduct the matter, and I mean capacity in the sense of understanding the basic legal concepts and how cases run, as well as assessing how the hearing was to be conducted in absolute fairness. However she is not a new comer to these numerous proceedings surrounding and involving her bankruptcy, as I have outlined above, and it could not be said that she has no understanding of court proceedings generally.
I should also state that the applicant, before me on a previous occasion, claimed she was a barrister, so there was no reason to rely on her statements that she did not understand aspects of the case generally and aspects of procedure. A barrister is presumed to know, or to understand, how proceedings are conducted, or how to find out how proceedings are conducted. I was satisfied she had sufficient understanding to run her case, the requirements of a proceedings and compliance with directions.
The first requirement of Clifford v Mountford is a requirement that there be an explanation for absence at trial. I note the wording used in that judgement is a requirement for a reasonable explanation, which requires more than a mere explanation.
To have such explanation of course requires that there was notice given of the hearing. That notice was given on 14 February 2014 when the matter was set for final hearing, but on the applicant’s application then, it was adjourned, with costs. Obviously she was present to make an adjournment application. I will return to the costs orders made on 14 February later in this judgment because they have become an issue in this application. I should state that the 14 February date was the second date I had given this matter for a final hearing.
The applicant relies on claims of her medical conditions as the reason she was not present. She particularly states she had a pathology test on 24 March 2014, however, particulars of such a test are not given. There is no sworn evidence independent of the applicant and a pathology test could mean anything, from a short procedure to intensive and longer intervention.
The evidence relied on by the applicant as to her condition preventing her from attending court on 24 March 2014 are a series of medical documents, which are not in admissible form.
I was referred to the cases NAKX v The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs – BC20038087, a decision of a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia, and to NALM v The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA FC 17, a full bench appeal decision, both of which refer to the status of medical certificates.
In NAKX Lindgren J stated at paragraph 6:
“The medical certificates are quite unsatisfactory. They do not address the critical question whether, and if so why, the medical condition would prevent the appellant from travelling to the court and participating effectively in a court hearing”. He then goes on to state from paragraph 7: “I do not accept that either of the medical conditions referred to would make the sufferer unable to attend court – apparently each was able to attend upon the medical practitioner. 8. If the certificates were meant to say that the medical condition would prevent the sufferer from participating effectively in a court hearing, they do not in fact say that and do not explain why the medical condition would have that effect.”
The case of NALM v The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs expresses the same requirement of a medical certificate, that it address the critical question as to why a litigant cannot attend court.
I sought that the applicant address the two cases cited, so that I could understand her case. Despite that approach, the applicant continued with her submissions that the medical certificates were enough and in fact she objected to the respondent referring to her medical conditions claiming that such reference was degrading and insulting.
The applicant continually submitted that all of the medical material she produced to the court indicated that she could not attend court and could not deal with the matters in the court. In my view the material did not address the critical question, however, the applicant submitted that the medical certificates had to be read fairly, as well as stating that the court could not take note of the respondent’s counsel’s submissions because she was not medically qualified.
She did not put that those cases were wrongly decided.
I accept the position as stated in the authorities I referred to, that there needed to be an unequivocal medical statement that the applicant could not take part in the proceeding. I accept the applicant can say she did not feel well to the court, but that is different from a doctor stating she cannot participate, giving reasons as to why.
This may seem to be a very narrow view of claims in relation to a medical issue or claims in assessment of a medical issue, but it is the applicant who relies on her alleged medical conditions as the reason for her nonappearance and the onus is on her to show, unequivocally, that it is a medical issue or a number of medical issues which prevent her from adequately participating in the court processes which she instigated.
Further, in ruling that the respondent quite properly was able to refer to the alleged medical assertions, I also ruled that such was done so in the proper discharge of counsel’s duties and without any form of harassment, all belittlement, as claimed.
The applicant also claimed that she did not know what occurred on 24 March until late in April 2014, and then she knew only that orders were made.
There seems to be a claim that she did not know reasons were given, however, that she has claimed she was a barrister would lead me to conclude that she knew, or ought to have known, that decisions may be given orally or at a hearing of a matter.
Further, she knew that, at least when appearing previously before me, I had given a decision orally on the second date set for hearing, being 14 February 2014, and that later, because she appealed that decision, the oral reasons needed to be published in writing.
Despite knowing this occurred in relation to the decision of 14 February 2014, the applicant at paragraph 35 of her written outline states about the court date set for 24 March 2014: “In the absence of reasons given by the Court the Applicant does not know the factors the Court took into consideration in exercising discretion to make the decision.”
That appears to be a disingenuous statement.
There is no plausible explanation as to why the applicant, having knowledge that on 14 February 2014 I delivered oral reasons, could not have anticipated an oral judgment being given on 24 March 2014, especially once the orders were made and sent to her.
Very surprisingly, the applicant has failed and refused to enquire whether reasons were given on 24 March 2014 or that any reasons given be settled. Nor did she request a transcript of the proceedings. Possession of both a judgment and transcript must be almost decisive to determining how to address an application pursuant to r.16.05.
Since she also states that at least two of the costs orders are incorrect, reasons for the decision would be imperative to show why they are incorrect and should be set aside under r.16.02.
I will go as far as stating that it appears that she has wilfully not sought the judgment and the transcript, because if she had done so, her argument that the matter was dismissed because of her non-attendance could not be run.
There was no application by the applicant to my chambers to have the reasons published. I raised the issue with the parties when hearing this application, but still no oral application was made by the applicant. The respondent did not seek the reasons and of course had no need to seek them, being present on 24 March 2014. The applicant appears with no idea of what I considered when I dismissed her case, simply because she did not seek the reasons, essential information she would need to properly manage this application.
The second requirement of Clifford v Mountford is that there be some material submission to show that a different order could have been made. Again, giving litigants the benefit of the doubt, the wording is such that an argument may reasonably lead to the making of a different order. I suspect the threshold test is not difficult, but I accept the submission that there was no material submission on this requirement from the applicant.
The third requirement, addressing enough factors to show that the respondent would not be prejudiced if the orders were set aside, has been addressed by referring back to the alleged medical conditions, with reference to the acceptance by the Federal Court for the appeal of the applicant’s medical evidence. If the Federal Court relied on the medical evidence produced by the applicant in her application for leave to appeal, such a decision may well have been an exercise of discretion and as such, is not a decision which binds a court below. Each case has its own necessities for a court to reach a determination, and the matter before this court was determination at a final hearing on the third date given for a final hearing. Case management has occurred at every stage of this matter, to ensure the final hearing proceeded. This court has hundreds of matters annually in each judge’s docket, and case management is crucial to ensure each matter has the appropriate opportunity to be heard, but such depends on compliance with directions. The rules of this court place a duty on litigants to co-operate. Rule 1.03 states: “To assist the Court, the parties must: avoid undue delay, expense and technicality”. On 14 February the respondent was ready for final hearing and the applicant was not – discretion being exercised in the applicant’s favour to adjourn to another date for final hearing. That was the third date given for final hearing. While the applicant did not bother to have the court settle the reasons for the decision of 24 March 2014, from my recollection I referred to issues going to the consideration of the use of court resources. Further, in the judgement previously given on 14 February 2014, I referred to medical evidence produced for that date indicating that its form was not very helpful. I would have thought that the applicant would take note of that and ensure updated medical information was cogent, and admissible, for her purposes later.
The issue of the timing of the filing of this application to set my decision aside and conduct is relevant under r.16.05 according to the respondent.
The respondent points to a seven week delay after judgment was given on 24 March 2014, as delay which is material to the decision he seeks in dismissing the application in a case.
At least four of those weeks appear to be because of the claim that the applicant received the orders in late April, which on my calculation is at least four weeks after they were made.
I do not know when my chambers sent the orders out, however, even if there was delay there, the crucial point is that the respondent was present in court when I set the final hearing date, contacted the court to say she was not attending and did not contact the court to determine what occurred. She knew that some decision was made. She does not give evidence of why she did not contact the court to determine what decision was made, when such must have been a priority for her.
Her conduct then is to make claims that no reasons were given, when in fact, reasons were given and she made no attempt to secure the reasons or transcript at either the earliest opportunity or at any opportunity.
Added to this is a history of this case never being in a position to be finalised by hearing. It has required amendment to the originating application, submissions on materials not been filed in accordance with directions, given to case-manage the matter, subsequent adjournment applications and, lately, non-appearance.
I had expressed at one stage my lack of confidence that the matter would ever be ready, and the event of the applicant not appearing confirms what appeared to be the case.
There is another issue which has been introduced by the applicant as being relevant.
On 14 February 2014, I made a costs order against the applicant – at the time I granted her application to adjourn the final hearing.
The costs orders made on 14 February 2014 were supported by reasons, see Winn v Leigh [2014] FCCA 573.
That judgment begins by stating the matter was set for trial on that day.
I addressed considerations for adjournment, especially in light of the High Court’s judgment in Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v The Australian National University [2009] HCA 27.
I addressed the fact that the applicant had not complied with directions made in order to case manage the matter to get it to a trial date and have it heard.
I addressed the fact that the respondent was prepared to proceed with trial on that day.
I addressed the state of the medical certificates she relied on at that time, a different set from the medical certificates she relied on for her absence on 24 March 2014, the new day set for final hearing. I expressed doubt about those medical certificates as at 14 February 2014.
I addressed the need to ensure that self-represented litigants have a fair trial, referring to the Federal Court’s judgement in SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146.
I addressed the nature of the adjournment application and was prepared to grant an adjournment, on the basis that costs thrown away be paid within 28 days.
I took the costs from the court schedule, and at paragraph 8 of the judgement stated:
“8. The schedule of this Court’s rules are for party-and-party costs. Item 6 is for preparation for final hearing of a one-day matter in general federal proceedings, and that is in the amount of $5988. Item 13(c) is the daily hearing fee for a full day’s hearing, which is what this matter was set down for, of $1994. Those two amounts are ordered to be paid by the applicant within 28 days. I will set this matter down for hearing regardless on 24 March 2014. I have made the orders with regard to the filing of material. I will now hear from the applicant as to when she will comply out of time with the orders I made in October.”
What occurred then was that the order which issued termed the costs as being “of and incidental to the proceedings on an indemnity basis in the sum of $7982”. It can be seen that the sum of $5988 and $1994 add up to $7982, the amount stated in the order.
Her case is that the orders are null and void because they were not given in open court, the written reasons were given six weeks after the order was entered, the written reasons totally contradicted the costs orders entered, the court changed the reasons for costs so they became different reasons for costs and so no reason was given for ordering indemnity costs and costs of the proceeding, and no notice was given that such costs were going to be made and there was no application for indemnity costs.
The applicant refers to cases and states that the costs order was made “without power, is a nullity, and not being an order of a superior court of record is not required to be set aside to be of no legal effect: Pelechowski v The Registrar, Court of Appeal [1999] HCA 19”. She refers to other cases, however there is no explanation as to how the legal concepts stated in those cases is to be applied.
The orders made 14 February 2014 were subject, as I have said, to an application to the Federal Court for leave to appeal.
She then goes onto to submit that:
“9. The Federal Circuit made orders on 24 March 2014 in the absence of the Applicant and before the Federal Court hearing of the application for leave to appeal the order on 27 March 2014. The orders include the dismissal of the Applicant’s application.
10. As a consequence, the Federal Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal on 15 May 2014 as the Federal Circuit Court had already dismissed the proceeding. The Court’s reasons for not allowing the application for leave to appeal are contrary to the Court’s previously expressed vire (sic) of the status of the order and the established law of the invalidity of an order when the reasons for it have been impermissibly altered, in 7.”. I assume the word “vire” is merely a typographical error and the word “view” should be read into that part of the submission.”
She goes onto to say that the Federal Court had expressed a view that the order of 14 February was incorrect and could be reopened and corrected, that she believed the respondent would reopen the matter or the Federal Court, “consistent with its reasons for the course it had taken” would set aside the order.
She says that is the reason she did not pay the costs order made on 14 February 2014.
This is a curious submission, and obviously one of importance to the applicant, because it is her first submission in the Outline of Submissions document filed 20 August 2014, folio 42 on the court file.
I assume that the submission identifying the costs orders made on 14 February 2014, which is not part of this application and nor could it be because it was subject of appeal proceedings dealt with by the Federal Court, anticipates a possible argument that the applicant’s case should not be allowed to be re-opened until she has paid the costs of 14 February 2014.
The respondent submitted that addressing the costs order made 14 February 2014 was a collateral attack on the decision of the Federal Court in the appeal case.
Given the wording I have quoted from the applicant’s submissions, I would have to agree on that because the applicant clearly states that the reasons given for not allowing the application for leave to appeal were contrary to the court’s previously expressed view of the status of an order made when reasons were impermissibly altered.
The respondent also submitted there was no order by the Federal Court that the costs matter of 14 February be returned to this court because of an apparent mistake.
There is the world of difference between a mistake and altering of reasons.
The applicant was present when I gave judgment orally in February.
She does not say how the published reasons, published because the court was asked for the reasons in writing, were changed.
For completeness, I should say that the orders of 14 February 2014 could be subject of an application under the same provision as the orders made on 24 March 2014 are challenged, pursuant to r.16.05, and in particular sub-section (e), on the ground that the orders did not reflect the intention of the court.
As can be seen, this very wide ranging rule allows even a judgment to be set aside, as well as orders, if the impugned order does not reflect the intention of the court.
There is no application to set the orders aside by the applicant or respondent.
In my view the applicant is simply wrong in her view that the costs orders made 14 February 2014 are of no effect for the numerous reasons she relies upon.
But for grammar and perhaps comprehension of the spoken word, the reasons were not changed and the court intended to make a costs order, for the reasons as stated in paragraph 8 of the judgment quoted.
What has obviously occurred is that administrative error has been made in how the costs orders were expressed in the actual order.
As was pointed in the judgment of Rangiah J, when he dismissed the application for leave to appeal my orders, the wording of the orders that were sealed had no substantive prejudicial effect on the applicant because the reasons show that the costs were fixed according to this court’s schedule, and were confined to costs of that day. He found that no injustice could result on the basis of the discrepancies between the reasons and the orders.
I overlooked the wording when I signed the order, so the error is mine – however, that does not invalidate the orders. If such an application came to the court, I would change the wording of the orders to reflect the reasons, because the orders that were signed and sealed did not reflect the intention of the court expressed in the reasons of judgment given on 14 February 2014, and published later. The costs would still be payable.
The applicant then knew and must have known when she saw the orders that mere mistake had occurred and that the court could remedy the situation pursuant to r.16.05. She is aware of the effect of the rule because she makes this application asking for an application of the rule in relation to her substantive matter.
It follows that she knew she had to pay a costs order from the 14 February 2014, she said she could pay such order on the day and payment of such costs remains outstanding.
I do take this conduct, as well as all the other issues I have stated, into account when considering her application to set the orders of 24 March 2014 aside and allow her case to continue.
This decision is an exercise of discretion.
In exercising that discretion, I consider that the case of Clifford v Mountford adequately guides a party bringing an application to set orders aside, in relation to the type of case which has to be presented.
I am not satisfied with:
a) Explanations as to being absent from court based on medical requirements, such conditions not being particularised or supported by admissible evidence, as to how and why such conditions and procedures prevented the applicant’s attendance at court on 24 March 2014;
b) The lack of arguments as to why different orders could have been made on 24 March 2014;
c) The failure to pay the costs order of 14 February 2014;
d) The applicant’s refusal to request the reasons for judgment for the orders made 24 March 2014 and the transcript of that day, to assist the court in understanding her case now;
e) The applicant’s delays generally of her matter, keeping in mind the comments in AON Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27 where the High Court considered adjournments and made very specific remarks directed to the courts being public institutions and the need to maintain public confidence in the judicial system;
f) Real prejudice to the respondent in being kept before the court when the final hearing has now been given three dates. The prejudice is not that the respondent is in court because that is the legal right which an applicant has in bringing a matter before the court. However, the requirement to answer court proceedings becomes prejudicial when, as in this matter, a hearing has to be set for a final determination three times with no progress as to a final hearing on any of those occasions. The respondent has the benefit of orders and is prepared to have a trial. The applicant has never been ready for final hearing, so she is not prosecuting the matter with due diligence.
I have little confidence that future management of the applicant’s case (by her) will be different from the past management.
I also have grave concerns about the applicant’s reliability in ever being ready for final hearing. It is a sentiment I have expressed previously because her material has never been ready and it seems to change. The appeal judgment delivered by Rangiah J on 15 May 2014 raised an issue which goes to my concern as to the applicant’s reliability, but in this case it is to what she may put before the court. Justice Rangiah identified the facts in which she did seek an adjournment of the hearing on 14 February 2014, despite her submissions to the contrary. The judgment did not hold that the applicant misled the court, but it appears her statements, at the very least, were not reliable with regard to denial of seeking an adjournment.
When I examine the original application filed 20 December 2012, the first order the applicant sought was that the bankruptcy notice be deemed null and void, but the application amended by leave sought that her bankruptcy be annulled. This is not simply playing with words, it is being able to present a case and then to prosecute it – and the court requires confidence that an applicant can and will do that. Here there has been a constant inability to get the matter to trail, and the three occasions set for a hearing have now wasted court time.
There is a need to end litigation as a matter of public confidence and a need to end this matter which has been given three different dates for final hearing.
I dismiss her application.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and three (103) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Coates
Associate:
Date: 20 August 2015
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