Williamson v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Williamson v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited [2021] FCCA 296

File number(s): SYG 857 of 2019
Judgment of: JUDGE DRIVER
Date of judgment: 18 February 2021
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Application to set aside a bankruptcy notice – proceeding by applicant to set aside the judgment debt unsuccessful and other proceedings asserting a set-off or cross demand also unsuccessful - application dismissed.  
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)

Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] FCAFC 51

Ebert v The Union Trustee Co of Australia Ltd (1960) 104 CLR 346

Glew v Harrowell, in the matter of Glew (2003) 198 ALR 331

In re Foster, Ex parte Basan (1885) 2 Morr 29

Re Capsanis; Capsanis v Owners -- Strata Plan 11727 [2000] FCA 1262

Re Roy Edward Brink; Ex Parte the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney Limited (1980) 44 FLR 135

Re Verma; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1985) 4 FCR 181

Williamson v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd [2020] NSWSC 933

Williamson v Elders Rural Services & Ors [2020] NSWSC 934

Williamson v Elders Rural Services Australia Ltd (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1986

Williamson v Rural Bank Limited [2019] NSWSC 1735

Number of paragraphs: 39
Date of hearing: 18 February 2021
Place: Sydney
: The Applicant appeared in person
Solicitor for the Respondent: Ms F Reynolds of TurksLegal

ORDERS

SYG 857 of 2019
BETWEEN:

HUGH WILLIAMSON

Applicant

AND:

BENDIGO AND ADELAIDE BANK LIMITED

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE DRIVER

DATE OF ORDER:

18 FEBRUARY 0221

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application as amended by leave filed on 15 February 2021 is dismissed.

2.The Court notes that the time for compliance with the Bankruptcy Notice for the purposes of s.41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) expires on the dismissal of the application.

3.The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application as agreed or, in the absence of agreement, as quantified or, if necessary, taxed under the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE DRIVER

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

  1. On 18 February 2021 I dismissed with costs an amended application seeking to set aside Bankruptcy Notice 232347 (bankruptcy notice) issued on 21 December 2018.  The following are my reasons for those orders. 

  2. The procedural background is conveniently set out in the respondent’s (the Bank) outline of submissions filed on 17 February 2021.

  3. Mr Williamson applies to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued against him by the Bank. The basis for the bankruptcy notice is a final judgment obtained by the Bank against Mr Williamson in proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. 

  4. The bankruptcy notice was issued on 21 December 2018.  The Court made orders on 4 March 2019 to facilitate substituted service.  The bankruptcy notice, and an amended bankruptcy notice (the amendment related solely to the time for compliance), were served by substituted service on 19 March 2019.

  5. On 5 March 2019, the Court made orders extending the…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCCA 296
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter came before Driver J of the Federal Court of Australia concerning an application by Mr Williamson to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued by Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited. Mr Williamson sought to rely on an alleged counterclaim, set-off, or cross-demand arising from his 2007 purchase of a property known as "Reevesdale".

The central legal issue was whether Mr Williamson had established a sufficient counterclaim, set-off, or cross-demand for the purposes of section 40(1)(g) of the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth) to justify setting aside the bankruptcy notice. This required the court to determine if Mr Williamson had demonstrated a prima facie case, a fair chance of success, or was fairly entitled to litigate his claim, and that the claim was genuine or bona fide.

Driver J found that Mr Williamson's alleged counterclaim, which stemmed from claims of misleading conduct by a selling agent and non-disclosure of a proposed quarry development during the purchase of Reevesdale, and the Bank's alleged receipt of proceeds of fraud due to its shareholding in the vendor's mortgagee, faced grave difficulties. His Honour noted that the underlying issues had been litigated three times previously, unsuccessfully for Mr Williamson, and that the current application was being resisted by the Bank. The court agreed with the Bank's submissions that Mr Williamson had not satisfied the necessary criteria to establish a valid counterclaim for the purposes of the *Bankruptcy Act*.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Counsel for the Bank supplemented her written submissions orally at the trial.CONSIDERATION Having heard the parties, it was obvious that Mr Williamson’s application faced grave difficulties. His challenge to the judgment supporting the bankruptcy notice has failed in the NSW Supreme Court. His asserted counterclaim, set-off or cross demand has already been litigated three times adversely to him. The only outstanding proceeding is an application to have him declared a vexatious litigant, which Mr Williamson is resisting on the basis of allegations of fraud. Those allegations are not new. I agree with the Bank’s submissions concerning the asserted counterclaim, set-off or cross demand. Mr Williamson seeks to set aside the bankruptcy notice on the ground that he has a counterclaim for the purpose of s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act. The counterclaim is said to have arisen from Mr Williamson’s purchase of a property, in 2007, known as “Reevesdale”. Mr Williamson says that in respect of his purchase of Reevesdale, which is located in Bungonia, New South Wales, the selling agent (Mr Hannan) misled Mr Williamson about the vendor’s reasons for the sale, and failed to tell Mr Williamson about a proposed quarry development. Mr Hannan was employed by Elders Rural Services Australia Ltd. On Mr Williamson’s purchase of Reevesdale, the outgoing mortgagee (that is, the vendor’s mortgagee) was Rural Bank Ltd. At the time of the sale of Reevesdale in 2007, the Bank held 50% of the shares in Rural Bank Ltd. Mr Williamson’s alleged counterclaim is that the Bank received the proceeds of fraud upon the sale of Reevesdale, by reason of its holding shares in Rural Bank Ltd.[2][2] Affidavit of Mr Williamson sworn 15 February 2021 (Williamson Affidavit) at [33] and Annexure B to the Byrne Affidavit at page 11 (see [11], [13], [18], [58]-[61] for the background; and against the Bank see [98]-[110]) Separately, Mr Williamson claims that the Bank has otherwise “assisted” Elders to conceal fraud, by taking steps to enforce its judgment, including serving the bankruptcy notice.[3][3] Williamson Affidavit at [30] and [36] and Annexure B to the Byrne Affidavit at page 11 at [111]-[127] These matters are said to give rise to a claim for damages. In Glew v Harrowell, in the matter of Glew[4] Lindgren J observed at [9] that in order to be satisfied of a counterclaim, set off or cross-demand, a debtor must satisfy the Court of interrelated and sometimes overlapping matters as follows. Mr Williamson must satisfy the Court that he has a prima facie case;[5] and that he has a “fair chance of success” or is “fairly entitled to litigate” the claim.[6] Mr Williamson must also satisfy the Court that he is advancing a genuine or bona fide claim.[7][4] (2003) 198 ALR 331[5] Ebert v Union Trustee Co of Australia Ltd (1960) 104 CLR 346 at 350[6] Re Roy Edward Brink; Ex Parte the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney Limited (1980) 44 FLR 135 at 141[7] Re Capsanis; Capsanis v Owners - Strata Plan 11727 [2000] FCA 1262 at [1]