FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited v Williamson [2021] FCCA 1987
File number(s): SYG 377 of 2021 Judgment of: JUDGE MANOUSARIDIS Date of judgment: 27 August 2021 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – creditor’s petition – whether there is a question whether behind the judgment debt on the basis of which a bankruptcy notice was issued there lies a true debt – no question that behind the judgment debt there lies a true debt – sequestration order made Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 40(1)(g), 41(6A), 43, 47, 52, 156A
Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth), rr 4.02(1), 4.02(2), 4.04(1)(a), 4.04(1)(b), 4.05, 4.06(3), 4.06(4)
Cases cited: Burrell v Reavill Farm Pty Ltd & Ors [2014] FCCA 1449
Cheung v Burness (Trustee) [2016] FCA 1381
Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28
Williamson v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited [2021] FCCA 296
Number of paragraphs: 35 Date of hearing: 2 August 2021 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicant: Ms A Avery-Williams, by telephone Solicitor for the Applicant: Turks Legal The Respondent: Appeared in person, by telephone ORDERS
SYG 377 of 2021 IN THE MATTER OF HUGH WILLIAMSON
BETWEEN: BENDIGO AND ADELAIDE BANK LIMITED ACN 068 049 178
Applicant
AND: HUGH WILLIAMSON
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE MANOUSARIDIS
DATE OF ORDER:
27 AUGUST 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The estate of the respondent, Mr Hugh Williamson, is sequestrated under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
2.The applicant creditor’s costs (including any reserved costs) be paid from the estate of the respondent, Mr Hugh Williamson, in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
3.The applicant’s creditor’s costs are set in the amount of $10,623.53.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
4.The date of the act of bankruptcy is 18 February 2021.
5.A consent to act as trustee signed by Mr John Melluish has been filed under s 156A of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
6.A copy of these orders is to be provided to the Official Receiver in Sydney within two business days.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
The applicant (Bank) applies for a sequestration order against the estate of the respondent, Mr Williamson.
The act of bankruptcy on which the Bank relies is Mr Williamson’s failure to comply with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice. Mr Williamson does not deny he failed to comply with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice; and he does not dispute that the preconditions for the making of a sequestration order, as prescribed by s 52 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Act) and the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Rules), have been satisfied. Mr Williamson submits he is not indebted to the Bank because the Bank has not established that any money was lent to him.
BACKGROUND
The starting point is a proceeding (Proceeding) the Bank commenced in 2010 in the Supreme Court of Victoria against Mr…
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- Case
- [2021] FCCA 1987
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether Mr Williamson had demonstrated "other sufficient cause" to prevent the making of a sequestration order. This required the Court to determine if Mr Williamson's arguments regarding the underlying transaction, specifically the alleged absence of a loan or payment, were relevant to the validity of the judgment debt upon which the bankruptcy notice was founded.
Manousaridis J reasoned that Mr Williamson's submissions and evidence focused on the initial loan transaction, which was irrelevant to the current proceedings. The judgment debt arose not from the original loan, but from a subsequent Settlement Agreement, by which Mr Williamson agreed to pay the Bank $400,000 in full and final settlement of prior proceedings. His Honour found that Mr Williamson had failed to comply with this agreement by the stipulated deadline. The Court held that the Settlement Agreement rendered irrelevant any disputes about the original loan, including whether funds were disbursed or used as intended. Mr Williamson had not challenged the binding nature of the Settlement Agreement or his liability under it. Consequently, his arguments did not raise any question about the existence of a true debt behind the judgment.
His Honour concluded that the matters relied upon by Mr Williamson did not constitute "other sufficient cause" to prevent the sequestration order. Accordingly, the Court answered the question in the negative.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At the hearing of the creditor’s petition Mr Williamson repeated the submissions he made in his written submissions that no money had been paid to him, and no loan was made to him.SUFFICIENT CAUSE WHY SEQUESTRATION ORDER OUGHT NOT BE MADE? The question is whether the evidence and other materials on which Mr Williamson relies, and the submissions he makes, support a finding there is some “other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not be made”. Mr Williamson’s evidence and submissions ignore the source of the judgment debt on the basis of which the bankruptcy notice was issued against him. The source is not the loan the Bank alleged in the Proceeding GSF lent to Mr Williamson, the benefit of which was assigned to the Bank. The source of the judgment is the Settlement Agreement. By that agreement Mr Williamson agreed to pay the Bank $400,000, and the Bank agreed to accept payment of that amount, by the time provided for in the Settlement Agreement. The Bank and Mr Williamson so agreed “in full and final settlement of the proceeding”. While in force, the Settlement Agreement renders irrelevant the amount the Bank had claimed in the Proceeding, and the grounds on which it claimed that amount; the Settlement Agreement also renders irrelevant the grounds on which Mr Williamson relied or intended to rely in the Proceeding for denying liability to pay the amount the Bank claimed in the Proceeding. In particular, it renders irrelevant whether GSF transferred or paid any money to Mr Williamson, or whether any money that was supposed to have been paid to him was used for the purposes for which the money was supposed to be used. What is relevant are the obligations the parties assumed by entering into the Settlement Agreement. In the case of Mr Williamson, his principal obligation was to pay the Bank $400,000 by no later than 30 September 2018. He failed to do so; and the Bank, as it was entitled to do under the Settlement Agreement, applied for and recovered judgment against Mr Williamson in the amount of $400,000. Although Mr Williamson had filed two proceedings in which he claimed the Settlement Agreement was not binding, he did not proceed with those claims; and he has not submitted in the proceeding before me that the Settlement Agreement is not binding or, if binding, it is liable to be set aside. Nor has Mr Williamson submitted he did not become liable under the Settlement Agreement to pay $400,000 when he failed to pay that amount to the Bank by 30 September 2018, or that the Bank was not entitled to apply to the SCNSW for judgment in the amount of $400,000 when Mr Williamson failed to pay to the Bank all or any of the $400,000 by 30 September 2018. None of the matters on which Mr Williamson relies, therefore, raises any question about whether behind the judgment the Bank obtained pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, and on the basis of which the bankruptcy notice was issued, there lies a true debt. The evidence and submissions on which Mr Williamson relies, therefore, do not reveal some “other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not be made”. The question, therefore, whether there is some other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not be made against the estate of Mr Williamson must be answered in the negative.DISPOSITION