WILLIAMS v The State of Western Australia
[2010] WASCA 102
•31 MAY 2010
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: WILLIAMS -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2010] WASCA 102
CORAM: McLURE P
OWEN JA
JENKINS J
HEARD: 25 MARCH 2010
DELIVERED : 31 MAY 2010
FILE NO/S: CACR 130 of 2009
BETWEEN: ROBERT IAN WILLIAMS
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :KEEN DCJ
File No :IND 674 of 2009
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Sentencing - Multiple offences on indictment and s 32 notice - Totality principle - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Extension of time granted
Leave to appeal granted on the sole ground of appeal
Appeal allowed
Appellant resentenced
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr S B Watters
Respondent: Mr J McGrath
Solicitors:
Appellant: Thames Legal
Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) v Ottewell [1970] AC 642
Dunks v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 82
Mullane v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 247
Otway v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 165
R v Nichols (1991) 57 A Crim R 391
Roffey v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 246
Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465
McLure P: I have read the reasons for judgment of Owen JA. I differ from him on the weight that should be given to the appellant's youth and the conclusion that the total sentence offends the totality principle.
The facts and circumstances giving rise to the appeal are set out in the reasons of Owen JA and need not be repeated. The appellant was aged 21 at the time he committed the 13 offences for which he was sentenced in August 2009 to a total effective sentence of 6 years and 6 months. There is no challenge to the individual sentences imposed for each offence nor could there be.
The appellant committed the 13 offences whilst he was on parole for a string of 16 offences, including three aggravated burglaries, committed between October 2006 and the date of his conviction for those offences on 12 November 2007. The appellant has been a regular offender since the age of 15.
The appellant's offending is linked with entrenched substance abuse which commenced at the age of 13. When questioned by the author of the pre‑sentence report about his future goals in relation to his drug use, the appellant was ambivalent and indicated that he would possibly attempt controlled use of amphetamines. With that attitude to the dominant cause of his offending, the risk of future offending is significant.
A review of the sentences imposed for the appellant's offending between January 2002 and November 2007 reveal that because of the appellant's youth the focus was, as it should be, on the rehabilitative rather than the deterrent aspects of the sentencing principles. Ordinarily the youth of an offender is a mitigating factor and a valid ground for extending leniency. If imprisonment is inevitable because of the seriousness of the offence, youthfulness will justify a lower sentence than would otherwise be indicated.
However, there comes a time when the significance of age as a mitigating factor is diminished. As noted in R v Nichols (1991) 57 A Crim R 391:
[W]hen young people have already been before the courts and have shown no inclination of reform, they cannot expect their youth to continue to be a barrier against the imposition of sentences appropriate to the gravity of the crime, without too much regard for their youth (396).
The appellant had in my view reached that stage when he came to be sentenced for the offences in August 2009. Thus, there will of necessity
be a significant disparity between the total sentence imposed in November 2007 and that imposed in August 2009.
Against that background, I come to consider the ground of appeal which is that the total effective sentence offended the totality principle.
This court is not entitled to intervene merely because it would have exercised the sentencing discretion in a manner different than the sentencing judge. It can only intervene if the sentencing judge made an express or implied material error of fact or law. The totality principle comprises two limbs. The first is that the total effective sentence must bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all the offences, viewed in their entirety and having regard to the circumstances of the case, including those referable to the offender personally. The second is that the court should not impose a 'crushing' sentence. The word crushing in this context connotes the destruction of any reasonable expectation of a useful life after release: Roffey v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 246 [23] ‑ [25].
The individual sentences and the total effective sentence in this case should reflect the need for both specific and general deterrence and the protection of the public with reduced weight being accorded to the appellant's youth. Approaching the matter within that framework, I accept that the total sentence of 6 years and 6 months is high even when regard is had to the fact that the crime spree for which he was being sentenced occurred whilst the appellant was on parole for an earlier crime spree. However I am not satisfied that it offends either limb of the totality principle. I would dismiss the appeal.
OWEN JA: The appellant committed a number of offences, most significantly burglary and stealing, on four occasions in a period of about three weeks. He pleaded guilty to the offences and was sentenced to immediate imprisonment for a total of 6 years and 6 months. He now appeals against the sentence.
The notice of appeal was filed out of time. These reasons cover the application for an extension of time, the application for leave to appeal and the substantive appeal.
Background
The appellant was 21 years of age in December 2008. He was a young man with a serious drug problem and an extensive criminal history. In November 2007 the appellant had been sent to prison for 2 years and
6 months for a series of offences including aggravated burglary and stealing motor vehicles. He had been released on parole on 11 May 2008, with his parole period due to expire in August 2009. On four occasions in the period between 10 December 2008 and 4 January 2009 the appellant committed 13 separate offences for which he was eventually charged on an indictment and in a notice under s 32 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA). Details of the 13 charges, and the sentences that were imposed on each of them, are set out in the Schedule to these reasons. The offences are not dealt with in the indictment and the s 32 notice in chronological order but it will be convenient to describe the offending conduct by reference to the four occasions.
10 December 2008
At about 1.00 pm on 10 December 2008 the appellant stole a set of keys and a wallet from the change rooms at a leisure centre. The keys were used to steal a Holden Calais motor vehicle valued at approximately $58,990 (s 32 ‑ charge 10370).
The vehicle was abandoned in a service station car park. The vehicle had been extensively damaged and the wheel rims and tyres were removed. The rims and tyres were valued at about $900 each (s 32 ‑ charge 10373).
The vehicle was located on 18 December 2008. A forensic examination uncovered the appellant's fingerprints on parts of the car. The appellant was spoken to about the vehicle and stolen rims and tyres on 13 January 2009. He said he had bought the car (the transcript, I think incorrectly, says he bought the tyre) from someone he knew for $500; he used the car and knew it was stolen; and he stripped the vehicle removing the rims and tyres and sold them.
12 December 2008
At about 8.00 am on 12 December 2008 the appellant drove the stolen Holden Calais to a house in Trigg. The house was being renovated by the complainant while living there. The appellant parked the vehicle in the driveway facing the street and left the engine running. He entered the house, rummaged through the study and removed a number of items, including two camera boxes. The appellant was confronted by a worker near the study and told him he was the gardener who had come to do landscaping. He was asked to wait outside, but when the worker left, he re‑entered the house.
The appellant was seen by the complainant leaving the study with the complainant's briefcase. When confronted by the complainant, the appellant became aggressive and left the house through the front door. The complainant and the worker managed to catch up with the appellant and retrieve the briefcase before the appellant fled with a pair of sunglasses and a portable music device (Indictment count 1).
1 January 2009
At about 10.00 am on 1 January 2009 the appellant entered a house in Greenwood while the complainant was at home. While inside, the appellant took keys belonging to a Toyota Camry motor vehicle, a mobile telephone and a handbag (s 32 ‑ charge 6399). The appellant left the complainant's house and stole the Toyota Camry from the driveway (s 32 ‑ charge 6400).
4 January 2009
At about 1.00 pm on 4 January 2009 the appellant stole a set of keys from the change rooms at a bowling club in Tuart Hill. The keys were used to steal a white Nissan Navara utility, valued at $18,000, from the car park of the bowling club. When spoken to regarding the matter on 13 January 2009, the appellant said he had bought the car from someone he knew for $100 and had used the car knowing it was stolen (s 32 ‑ charge 10372).
A couple of hours later (around 3.15 pm on 4 January 2009) the appellant drove to a house in Cottesloe. The appellant knocked on the door. The complainant was in the shower and did not answer the door. The appellant tried the door and entered on finding it unlocked. He searched the house for items of value, and then wrapped a laptop computer, a mobile telephone, a wallet, an Australian passport, a musical device docking station, a digital camera and a set of car keys in bed clothes removed from the complainant's bedroom. He left the premises with the stolen items (Indictment count 2).
After the events the subject of count 2, the appellant drove to a nearby service station where he received a telephone call from the complainant on the complainant's (stolen) mobile telephone. The appellant made a number of demands for $800 cash in exchange for the return of the complainant's property. A number of telephone calls were made and during one of them the appellant told the complainant's friend that if they contacted police and reported him, he knew where they lived and 'knew bad people'. The complainant then contacted the police (Indictment count 3).
At about 6.30 pm police arrived at the service station and located the appellant sitting in the stolen Nissan Navara utility in the car park. They identified themselves to the appellant as he walked towards the entrance of the service station. The appellant stopped and walked towards the rear of the police vehicle where he was spoken to. While being spoken to, the appellant ran from police but was apprehended a short distance away.
He responded violently and kept trying to move his hand toward his waist area during the struggle. He refused to comply with police requests to stop resisting. This resulted in one police officer's jeans and another police officer's shoes being torn. He was eventually placed in handcuffs and escorted to the rear of the police vehicle where he was searched (s 32 ‑ charge 7594).
This search uncovered a hammer with a large square head tucked into the appellant's shorts, which the appellant claimed he carried for self defence (s 32 ‑ charge 7595). During questioning the appellant provided a false name, date of birth and address to police (s 32 ‑ charge 7596). After an extensive search on the police database the appellant was identified.
While at the service station, police searched the stolen vehicle and uncovered a number of stolen items. They located a bag holding a GPS device valued at about $300. No explanation was provided by the appellant as to how he came to be in possession of the device. Inquiries revealed that the GPS had been stolen from a vehicle parked on the verge of a street in Subiaco some time during the previous evening or that morning. When spoken to regarding the matter on 13 January 2009, the appellant said he had bought the bag from 'a junkie'. This is the subject of s 32 ‑ charge 10374.
Police also recovered from the stolen vehicle a black case containing a portable DVD player valued at $300. Again, the appellant provided no explanation as to how he came to be in possession of the item. When spoken to regarding the matter on 13 January 2009, the appellant initially said he had bought the DVD player at a swap meet but later stated it was already in the car when he took it. This is the subject of s 32 ‑ charge 10375.
The appellant later participated in a video record of interview during the course of which he made admissions. He was eventually charged with (and pleaded guilty to) the offences that are listed in the Schedule.
The sentencing remarks and the sentence
The appellant does not contend that the sentencing judge made an express error, such as a mistake of law or a mistake of fact or of failing to take into account a relevant consideration. Accordingly, it will be convenient to describe the facts material to this appeal by reference to what the sentencing judge said in his remarks.
Factors taken into account
The sentencing judge began by summarising the appellant's convictions and describing them as 'a crime spree'. He noted that other than to admit the offences, the appellant had little to say about them and appeared to be 'somewhat adept at this sort of offending'.
The appellant had been on parole from 11 May 2008. He had been abiding by the terms of his parole, had been employed and (apparently) drug free. However, from about September or October 2008, he encountered problems in the relationship with his then partner, he lost his job and began to socialise with old associates. He returned to some substance abuse and 'went downhill from there'. At the time of the offences the appellant was significantly under the influence of drugs.
In canvassing the appellant's personal history, his Honour noted that he was 22 years of age, having been born on 21 January 1987. He came from a good and stable family and was brought up in a strict environment with no remarkable trauma, but became rebellious at an early age. He suffered a football injury at 14 years of age, which ended an otherwise promising career. This event 'emotionally crushed' the appellant and, according to him, led to his drug abuse.
The appellant was diagnosed with ADHD at the age of eight and was prescribed medication. The appellant was educated to Year 9 and completed Year 10 at Banksia Detention Centre. He then often gained employment, usually as a labourer. His mother said he was good at school and put his offending down to his football injury and to the problems with his partner.
The appellant contracted hepatitis C as a result of substance abuse. He began using cannabis at 13 years of age and his drug abuse escalated to amphetamines. By 14 years of age he was using on weekends, and by the age of 15, was using on a daily basis. Incarceration has been his only break from drug abuse. He became intoxicated on benzodiazepines as a child and commenced heroin use at the age of 15 up to the age of 19. His Honour noted that the appellant did not seem to have control of his drug use and the pre‑sentence report indicated that 'he would possibly attempt controlled use of amphetamine' in the future.
The sentencing judge noted counsel's submission that the appellant now had a real insight into his offending and the detrimental influence of his peers in Western Australia. It was the appellant's intention, when released from prison, to move to the east to distance himself from his peers and start a new life.
The sentencing judge then turned to the appellant's prior criminal record, both as a juvenile and an adult. His juvenile record included serious offences such as burglary, possessing prohibited weapons and stealing. As an adult, the appellant had committed a range of offences, including stealing, fraud, possessing prohibited drugs, motoring offences, stealing motor vehicles, assault, and aggravated burglary, and received a range of penalties - from community based orders and fines to imprisonment.
By way of mitigation, the sentencing judge noted that the appellant had pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity and had expressed remorse.
The sentencing judge noted that the appellant had been on parole at the time of the offending conduct. Each of the complainants was vulnerable (I presume this is a reference to the householders in the Trigg and Cottesloe residences). His Honour also noted that the appellant had sought to profit from his conduct and to extort money from the victims with threats of harm, which added insult to injury. The sentencing judge also noted 'the manner in which [the appellant] acted on that day'. I presume this is a reference to his attempt to escape from police and his initial lack of cooperation at the service station on the evening of 4 January 2009.
His Honour noted that the appellant's record showed a complete disregard for the law and the property of others. He commented on the need for both general and personal deterrence, on the community's entitlement to feel safe, the appellant's failure to learn from his previous involvement with the courts and his escalating offending.
On the other hand, the appellant had made steps toward rehabilitation during his time in prison on remand. The appellant was still a young man and had time to turn his life around once released from prison. The sentencing judge noted counsel's submission that the appellant now had some insight into his problems and behaviour.
The sentence
In his initial calculations the sentencing judge had arrived at a total sentence of 10 years and 6 months' imprisonment. However, he made express reference to the totality principle and structured the sentence in the way set out in the Schedule so as to arrive at a total sentence of 6 years and 6 months' imprisonment. The sentence was backdated to commence on 5 January 2009.
Parole
At the sentencing hearing counsel tendered a letter from the appellant in which he requested a finite term and that he not be made eligible for parole. Counsel told the sentencing judge that she had informed the appellant that he could seek a transfer of parole interstate but that the appellant had 'heard a lot of horror stories in custody recently, particularly with the change of responses to parole applications' and had instructed her to make the submission. The letter reads, relevantly:
I'm asking if the court could take into account my request for a finite sentence. When I'm due for release, whenever that may be, I have full intentions of heading over east to try and begin a new life. I personally feel that with the circle of people that I have in my life around me on the outside, I have no chance of completing my parole period.
Counsel added that the appellant would not be going interstate 'solo'. He was doing so at the request of a family member with the support of his family and would be living on a country property out of Sydney. It would give him an opportunity to obtain employment and move away from his peers.
The sentencing judge noted that the State would have opposed parole given the appellant's entrenched offending and the fact that the offences were committed while on parole. His Honour acceded to the appellant's request and did not make a parole eligibility order.
Disposition of the appeal
The sole ground of appeal is that the sentencing judge erred in imposing a total sentence that infringed the totality principle, having regard to the overall criminality of the appellant's conduct when viewed in the context of all of the circumstances, including those personal to the appellant.
In the written submissions, reference is made to both limbs of the totality principle. It is necessary, therefore, to look at whether the aggregate sentence was disproportionate to the overall criminality of the appellant's conduct as well as the question whether the sentence was crushing in the relevant sense.
Totality relies on implied error: that the result is unreasonable to such an extent that the court must conclude that a substantial wrong has occurred. It is largely a matter of impression. The circumstances of the offending were undoubtedly serious. There was a persistence in the conduct, the value of the property stolen was not inconsiderable, the conduct involved home invasions and was perpetrated at times when an intruder might well expect the occupiers to be present (as was the case), thus putting individuals at risk. In addition, the offences had been committed while the appellant was on parole. On the other hand, the appellant was only 21 years of age at the time the offences were committed and 22 years of age when sentenced. He had pleaded guilty.
There are signs that in the period between his arrest and sentencing he had begun to develop an insight into his offending and had taken steps towards rehabilitation. While in custody awaiting sentence he had undertaken a voluntary drug and alcohol programme and had progressed to the extent that he was a support worker conducting induction courses for other offenders wishing to enter the programme. He had also undertaken a Certificate III course in youth work and was studying mathematics at Year 11 and 12 level. With the support and assistance of his family, a plan (relocation to another state) had been identified that would assist him to start a new life when eventually released.
In the written submissions the appellant referred to a large number of cases in support of the proposition that the sentence imposed on the appellant is outside the range of sentences commonly imposed for offences of this nature. This is a very difficult argument to mount because the circumstances of the offending are peculiar. Nonetheless, sentences imposed in cases such as Mullane v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 247, Otway v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 165 and Dunks v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 82, lend some support to the appellant's contention that the sentence imposed on him was high. In each of those cases the offending conduct was attended by circumstances that could be regarded as more serious than those applying in the appellant's case. The sentences imposed in those cases (and the age of the offender) were: Mullane, 4 years and 6 months (39 years of age); Otway, 5 years and 6 months (19 years of age); and Dunks, 8 years (28 years of age). Dunks involved 64 separate offences in the course of which property to the value of about $500,000 was stolen or destroyed. I repeat that not too much can be made of these comparisons because of the disparate nature of the circumstances. However, they do provide some support for the appellant's contention.
In my view, were it not for the appellant's prior record, it would be very difficult to justify the length of the sentence. It is therefore necessary to look closely at the appellant's criminal record and the part it may have played in the sentencing process. The appellant has an extensive and disturbing criminal history. He has been offending since the age of 15 years. During 2006 and the early part of 2007 (he was in custody from February 2007) the appellant had convictions for traffic offences, fraud, stealing and possession of amphetamines. On 12 November 2007 he was sentenced for a series of offences including aggravated burglary, stealing motor vehicles, common assault and serious traffic matters. This series of offences has features in common with the present offending. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years and 6 months. He had been released on parole on 11 May 2008, with the parole order due to expire in August 2009.
The part that criminal history plays in the exercise of the sentencing discretion was authoritatively described by the High Court in Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465, 477. The relevant passage from the judgment is well known and I will not repeat it. However, the circumstances of this case render it advisable to restate the principles.
1.An offender's prior record is relevant but it must not lead to the imposition of a sentence that is disproportionate to the gravity of the offences for which the offender is before the court and which is, in effect, a second punishment for prior conduct.
2.The prior record is relevant to show whether the offences for which he or she is before the court are 'an uncharacteristic aberration or whether the offender has manifested in [the] commission of the instant offence a continuing attitude of disobedience of the law'.
3.The prior record may also reflect on the moral culpability of the offender and it may indicate the need for condign punishment by way of specific deterrence aimed at the offender and general deterrence directed to others who may be tempted to engage in similar conduct.
In Veen [No 2] the High Court referred with apparent approval to a passage from Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) v Ottewell [1970] AC 642, 650:
[J]udges have always (and I think rightly) felt themselves entitled to deal with a persistent offender by increasing the sentence they would have passed if he were not. This is not to punish the offender again for his past crimes. Nor is it always primarily for the protection of the public. It may simply be because in the judge's view the sentences passed for previous offences have proved to be an insufficient deterrent and that the effect of a longer sentence must be tried, perhaps in the offender's own interests. Or, it may be that repetition has itself increased the gravity of the offence. Eventually, in some cases, a stage is reached where it becomes clear that progressively increasing sentences are not a deterrent; and the protection of the public against a persistent offender then comes to the forefront of the considerations which the judge must take into account.
The sentencing judge noted the appellant's prior criminal history, both as a juvenile and an adult. His Honour stated that his 'serious record as a juvenile' would not be taken into account for the purposes of sentencing. However, he noted that the appellant appeared 'from [his] record to have a complete disregard for law and order and other people's property'. His Honour also referenced the appellant's 'appalling record'. It is difficult to do anything other than agree with those comments. Nonetheless, the ultimate question remains whether the weight accorded was such as to lead to the imposition of a penalty which was disproportionate to the gravity of the offences.
A sentence of 6 years and 6 months' imprisonment is a substantial one to impose on a 22 year old and, in my view, it is very high. It is particularly substantial when it is noted that in November 2007, at the age of 20 years, the appellant was sentenced to a term of 2 years and 6 months' imprisonment for various (similar) offences. To adapt the words used in Ottewell, a progressive increase in the term of imprisonment was called for as a deterrent. But an (approximately) two and a half‑fold increase over the 2007 sentence goes beyond such a measure and has, in my view, resulted in an overall term that is disproportionate.
It is also, again in my view, relevantly crushing. Before pronouncing sentence, his Honour stated that 'despite [the appellant's] appalling record [he] ought to be given some hope for the future'. In my view that is correct. The progress apparently made by the appellant towards rehabilitation could well be jeopardised if he were to have no chance of release until July 2015, when he would be well into his 29th year.
I want to make it clear that nothing I have said is meant to suggest that there was an express error in relation to the treatment of the appellant's past record. But it does reflect on the overall result and in reaching the impressionistic judgment that a challenge based on implied error involves. Nor should the reference to the appellant having no chance of release until July 2015 be taken as a back door mechanism for revisiting the parole eligibility question. It is a statement of fact about the effect of the head sentence actually imposed.
In my view the overall sentence infringed the totality principle and the ground of appeal has been made out.
Resentencing the appellant
It follows that the appeal must succeed and the sentences imposed by the sentencing judge must be set aside. It falls to this court to resentence the appellant.
I have come to the view that the appellant ought to serve an overall term of immediate imprisonment of 5 years. I would structure the sentence by imposing terms of immediate imprisonment as follows:
1.Count 1 on the indictment: 2 years.
2.Count 2 on the indictment: 3 years, cumulative on count 1.
3.Count 3 on the indictment: 18 months, concurrent with all other sentences.
4.All charges in the s 32 notice: the same sentence as imposed by the sentencing judge, all to be served concurrently with all other sentences.
The order for concurrency reflects totality considerations rather than any application of the one transaction principle.
The court was not invited to revisit the denial of parole eligibility should it come to resentence the appellant. That position holds. The commencement of the sentence will be backdated to 5 January 2009.
Conclusion
The notice of appeal was lodged about three weeks out of time. The explanation was that the appellant's solicitor was absent for about two weeks for personal reasons and there was a delay in obtaining the sentencing transcript. It was stated that 'reasonable steps were taken to
advance the matter after that time'. The delay was not inordinate. In the circumstances of this case, refusal of an extension would result in a miscarriage of justice. I would grant an extension of time within which to appeal.
I would grant leave to appeal, allow the appeal, set aside the total sentence of 6 years and 6 months' imprisonment imposed by the sentencing judge and resentence the appellant to a total sentence of 5 years' imprisonment structured as set out above and to be backdated to 5 January 2009. The appellant will remain ineligible for release on parole.
JENKINS J: I agree with Owen JA.
THE SCHEDULE
CHARGES ON THE INDICTMENT
| Count (Charge) | Date of offence | Offence description | Term | Concurrent or cumulative |
| Count 1 | 12 December 2008 | Aggravated burglary | 2 years | |
| Count 2 | 4 January 2009 | Aggravated burglary | 3 years | Cumulative |
| Count 3 | 4 January 2009 | Intent to extort or gain | 18 months | Concurrent |
CHARGES ON THE SECTION 32 NOTICE
| 7594 | 4 January 2009 | Obstructing public officers | 6 months | Concurrent |
| 7595 | 4 January 2009 | Possessing an article with intent to injure | 6 months | Concurrent |
| 7596 | 4 January 2009 | Giving false personal details | 6 months | Concurrent |
| 10370 | 10 December 2008 | Stealing a motor vehicle | 18 months | Concurrent |
| 10372 | 4 January 2009 | Stealing a motor vehicle | 18 months | Concurrent |
| 10373 | 10 December 2008 | Stealing | 18 months | Concurrent |
| 10374 | 4 January 2009 | Possessing stolen or unlawfully obtained property | 6 months | Concurrent |
| 10375 | 4 January 2009 | Possessing stolen or unlawfully obtained property | 6 months | Concurrent |
| 6399 | 1 January 2009 | Stealing | 9 months | Concurrent |
| 6400 | 1 January 2009 | Stealing a motor vehicle | 18 months | Cumulative |
2
6
1