SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
No. 3759 of 2002
| COLIN WILLIAMS | Appellant |
| v. | |
| SUZANNE MARY SMITH OATAWAY | Respondent |
No. 5624 of 1999
| ONESTEP CONCRETE and PUMPING and ORS. | |
| Appellants | |
| v. | |
| HELEN CEFAI | Respondent |
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JUDGES: | BATT, BUCHANAN and VINCENT, JJ.A. | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 6 September 2004 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 31 May 2005 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2005] VSCA 137 | |
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ACCIDENT COMPENSATION and TRANSPORT ACCIDENT – Claims under Part III of Wrongs Act 1958 by dependants of worker and dependants of transport accident victim – Whether interest payable on all or some of damages awarded – Whether the damages or the “first tier” of them were excepted from prohibition of interest as being “damages referable to loss actually suffered before the date of the award” – Accident Compensation Act 1985, ss.134AB(34), (35), 135A(16), (17), 135C(5), (6); Transport Accident Act 1986, ss.93(15), (16), 175(1), (2); Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), s.50(1), (7).
STATUTES – Interpretation – Avoidance of surplusage – Effect of enactment of almost identical provisions after interpretation by County Court.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| Williams v. Oataway For the Appellant | D.F.R. Beach, SC | TAC Law Pty. Ltd. |
For the Respondent | T.J. Casey, Q.C. with C. Winneke | Frenkel Partners |
| Onestep Concrete v. Cefai For the Appellants | D.F.R. Beach, SC | TAC Law Pty. Ltd. |
For the Respondent | J.H. Keenan, Q.C. with M.R. Nightingale | Clark & Toop |
BATT, J.A.:
Introduction: the legislation
These two appeals, which were heard together, raise questions as to the interpretation of very similarly worded provisions precluding, subject to an exception, the payment of interest on damages awarded in proceedings brought under Part III of the Wrongs Act 1958 in accordance with s.93 of the Transport Accident Act 1986 (“the TAA”) and s.135C of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (“the ACA”) respectively.
Those provisions are contained in sub-s.(15) of the first-mentioned section and sub-s.(5) of the second-mentioned. Each sub-section must be read with the one that follows it. In the case of the TAA they read:
“(15)A court must not, in relation to an award of damages in accordance with this section, order the payment of interest, and no interest shall be payable, on an amount of damages, other than damages referable to loss actually suffered before the date of the award, in respect of the period from the date of the death of or injury to the person in respect of whom the award is made to the[1] date of the award.
(16)Except as provided in sub-section (15), nothing in that sub-section affects any other law relating to the payment of interest on an amount of damages, other than special damages.”
[1]This word was inserted by s.14(b) of the Transport Accident Amendment Act 1998. It has been in s.135C(5) of the ACA from its commencement, but is not in the similar s.134AB(34) or s.135A(16) of that Act.
Sub-section (5) of s.135C of the ACA is in the same terms as sub-s.(15) set out…
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- Williams v Oataway [2005] VSCA 137
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- [2005] VSCA 137
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues centred on the interpretation of sections within the Accident Compensation Act 1985, the Transport Accident Act 1986, and the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth). The court needed to clarify whether certain damages were excepted from interest payments, as per the provisions of these statutes. Furthermore, the court had to consider the principle of avoiding surplusage in statutory interpretation, particularly in light of previous interpretations made by the County Court.
The court's reasoning was grounded in statutory interpretation, focusing on the legislative intent behind the statutes. It found that the earlier interpretation by the County Court had overlooked the principle of avoiding surplusage, leading to an over-inclusion of damages in the exemption from interest. By revisiting the statutory language and the context of the legislative framework, the Supreme Court concluded that only a specific "first tier" of damages, those directly attributable to pre-award losses, were exempt from interest. The court's decision was pivotal in ensuring that statutory provisions were not redundant and that the legislative intent was properly applied.
The final orders of the court affirmed that interest was payable on damages beyond the "first tier," aligning with the legislative intent and avoiding surplusage. This decision provided clarity for future claims under the Accident Compensation Act 1985 and the Transport Accident Act 1986, ensuring that interest was only exempted for damages directly linked to losses suffered before the award date.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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