CITATION: RE HER HONOUR JUDGE SCHOOMBEE; EX PARTE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2011] WASCA 129
CORAM: BUSS JA
MURPHY JA HALL J
HEARD: 15 FEBRUARY 2011
DELIVERED : 10 JUNE 2011
FILE NO/S: CACV 8 of 2010
MATTER :Application for a Writ of Certiorari and a Writ of Prohibition against HER HONOUR JUDGE SCHOOMBEE of the District Court of Western Australia
EX PARTE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA Applicant
AND
HER HONOUR JUDGE SCHOOMBEE First Respondent
RANDALL GRAHAME DEVOS Second Respondent
Catchwords:
Criminal injuries compensation - Proper construction of s 37(3)(a) and s 37(3)(b) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA) - Proper construction of the phrase 'the vehicle was used for the purpose of committing the offence' within s 37(3)(a) - Proper construction of the phrase 'the offence is a crime' within s 37(3)(b) - Offender convicted of the offence of dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm to the second respondent, contrary to s 59(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) - Whether it was necessary for the second respondent to prove under s 37(3)(a) that the offender's subjective state of mind was deliberately to use his vehicle for the purpose of driving dangerously and causing grievous bodily harm - Whether the offender's summary conviction in the Magistrates Court of the offence of dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm was a conviction for an offence that is a 'crime' within s 37(3)(b)
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Re Her Honour Judge Schoombee [2011] WASCA 129
Case
[2011] WASCA 129
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case involved an application for criminal injuries compensation by the second respondent, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by the offender. The offender had been convicted of dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm, contrary to section 59(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA). The dispute was before the Supreme Court of Western Australia, which was required to interpret certain provisions of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA). The court had to decide whether the phrase 'the vehicle was used for the purpose of committing the offence' in section 37(3)(a) required the second respondent to prove that the offender had the subjective state of mind to deliberately use his vehicle to commit the offence. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the offender's conviction for dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm was a conviction for an offence that is a 'crime' under section 37(3)(b).
The court held that the phrase 'the vehicle was used for the purpose of committing the offence' in section 37(3)(a) did not require the second respondent to prove that the offender had a subjective state of mind to deliberately use his vehicle to commit the offence. Rather, it was sufficient for the second respondent to prove that the offender used his vehicle in a way that resulted in the commission of the offence. The court also held that the offender's conviction for dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm was a conviction for an offence that is a 'crime' under section 37(3)(b). The court found that the phrase 'the offence is a crime' was not limited to indictable offences but also included summary offences that are considered serious in nature.
The court's interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA) meant that the second respondent was entitled to criminal injuries compensation. The offender's conviction for dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm satisfied the requirements of both section 37(3)(a) and section 37(3)(b) of the Act. Therefore, the second respondent was entitled to compensation for the injuries she suffered as a result of the offender's actions. The court ordered that the offender pay the second respondent a specified amount of compensation.