Wiegand v Comcare Australia

Case [2006] FCA 1620


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wiegand v Comcare Australia [2006] FCA 1620 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal pursuant to s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – claim for compensation under Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) – proper construction of s 4 of the SRC Act – Tribunal held that two of the relevant events that materially contributed to the applicant’s disease were excluded under the Act – applicant not entitled to compensation – whether no evidence to support Tribunal’s findings in respect of excluded events

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (“the SRC Act”) s 4(1)

Hart v Comcare [2005] FCAFC 16 applied
Treloar v The Australian Telecommunications Commission (1990) 26 FCR 316 applied
Schmid v Comcare [2003] FCA 1057 cited
Roads Corporation v Dacakis (1995) 2 VR 508 referred to

JOACHIM WIEGAND v COMCARE AUSTRALIA

No SAD 215 of 2005

FINN J
27 NOVEMBER 2006
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 215 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

JOACHIM WIEGAND
Applicant

AND:

COMCARE AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 NOVEMBER 2006

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 215 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

JOACHIM WIEGAND
Applicant

AND:

COMCARE AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE:

27 NOVEMBER 2006

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is the second occasion upon which this matter has been before the Court by way of an appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dismissing a claim for compensation under the provisions of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (“the SRC Act”). If the Tribunal in this matter had been able to deal with the applicant’s claim on the basis of what was understood to be the true construction of s 4 of the SRC Act at the time of Mr Wiegand’s first appeal to the Tribunal, he would have been awarded the compensation he claimed. As the law is now to be understood in light of the decision of the Full Court in Hart v Comcare [2005] FCAFC 16, the Tribunal acknowledged it had no option but to dismiss the application to it given its findings.

  2. At the hearing of this application before me I permitted Mr Wiegand, with the concurrence of Comcare, to raise a new question of law.  That new question impugned two critical findings of the Tribunal on the basis that there was no evidence to support either of them.  To anticipate what I have to say, I am not satisfied that the Tribunal erred in the way suggested.  In these circumstances, as Mr Wiegand reluctantly conceded, I would be obliged to apply Hart and…

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Details
AGLC
Wiegand v Comcare Australia [2006] FCA 1620
Case
[2006] FCA 1620
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Wiegand v Comcare Australia, the applicant sought to challenge certain findings made by the Tribunal regarding his claim for compensation for major depression, which he attributed to his employment with the Australian Taxation Office. The applicant contested the Tribunal's findings on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to support them, particularly regarding the contribution of his employment to his condition. The court had to determine whether the Tribunal erred in its findings and whether the applicant's appeal should be dismissed.

The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation of the definition of "injury" under the relevant legislation, specifically section 4 of the SRC Act, and whether the Tribunal had correctly applied this definition to the facts of the case. The court had to assess whether the Tribunal's findings were supported by evidence and whether they correctly concluded that the applicant's depression was materially contributed to by his employment.

The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its findings. The evidence presented before the Tribunal, including the testimony of the applicant's psychiatrist, Dr Coyte, supported the conclusion that a combination of employment-related events and situations had a compounding effect on the applicant's mental health, leading to his major depression. The court noted that the Tribunal had carefully considered the evidence and provided detailed reasons for its findings, which were consistent with the statutory definition of "injury." Consequently, the court dismissed the applicant's appeal and ordered him to pay the respondent's costs of the application.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

At the hearing of this application before me I permitted Mr Wiegand, with the concurrence of Comcare, to raise a new question of law. That new question impugned two critical findings of the Tribunal on the basis that there was no evidence to support either of them. To anticipate what I have to say, I am not satisfied that the Tribunal erred in the way suggested. In these circumstances, as Mr Wiegand reluctantly conceded, I would be obliged to apply Hart and dismiss the application. BACKGROUND Mr Wiegand was employed in the Australian Taxation Office from May 1986 until January 1998. In May of 1998 he made his claim for compensation attaching a medical certificate from a psychiatrist which contained a diagnosis of major depression with the stated date of injury as approximately January 1998. The Tribunal indicated in its reasons that the causes of this condition were a large number of “situations and events” which occurred during Mr Wiegand’s employment by the ATO:“Whilst his evidence suggests that some particular events had a more significant effect on him than others, I find that the combination of a large number of employment related situations and events (including those to which I have referred in paragraphs 13 and 15 above), or Mr Wiegand’s perception of them, led to his developing major depression. I further find that he was suffering from this condition, or an aggravation of this condition, as at 2 January 1998, when he failed to return to work at the ATO, and that this condition was materially contributed to by his employment”: Reasons par 48. I would note in passing that par 13 refers to eleven “situations and events” and par 15 to 21 “other situations and events”. Only one of these was not employment related. Later in its reasons the Tribunal observed (at par 51) that a large number of the asserted stressors took place prior to October 1995; that Dr Coyte’s opinion – Dr Coyte was Mr Wiegand’s treating psychiatrist – was that they had an increasing and compounding effect; and that the pre October 1995 stressors materially contributed to the subsequent development of Mr Wiegand’s depression. Having reached this conclusion, the Tribunal was confronted with the proviso to the definition of injury in s 4 of the SRC Act. Section 4(1) provides:“injury means: (a) a disease suffered by an employee; or (b)an injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee, being a physical or mental injury arising out of, or in the course of, the employee's employment; or (c)an aggravation of a physical or mental injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee (whether or not that injury arose out of, or in the course of, the employee's employment), being an aggravation that arose out of, or in the course of, that employment; but does not include any such disease, injury or aggravation suffered by an employee as a result of reasonable disciplinary action taken against the employee or failure by the employee to obtain a promotion, transfer or benefit in connection with his or her employment.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FINN J
I should add for the sake of completeness that I have reached a like view on the compassionate leave question. The evidence of its contributing effect might be considered slight but there nonetheless was evidence of such a contribution before the Tribunal.CONCLUSION I dismiss the appeal and order the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FINN J

Full text does not contain this section.