Wickramasinghe v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wickramasinghe v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 916

DINITHIE WICKRAMASINGHE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

N 413 OF 2002

BRANSON J
16 JULY 2002
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 413 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

DINITHIE WICKRAMASINGHE
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 JULY 2002

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.There be no order for costs.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 413 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

DINITHIE WICKRAMASINGHE
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE:

16 JULY 2002

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) whereby the Tribunal affirmed a decision made by a delegate of the respondent to refuse to grant to the applicant, her husband and child a Family (Residence) (Class AO) visa.

  2. The first applicant claimed, and continues to claim, that she is a special need relative in respect of her younger sister and nominator, Ms Diluka Wijayakoon (“Ms Wijayakoon”) who is a permanent resident of Australia.  I stress, although I assume that it is unnecessary in this case where the applicant has legal representation for me to do so, that the merits of the applicant’s application is not a matter with which this Court is entitled to concern itself.

  3. Crucially, for present purposes, the applicant was entitled to be granted the visa which she sought only if she was at the time of her application a special need relative of her sister.   Migration Regulation 1.03 relevantly defines a “special need relative” as:

    “… a relative who is willing and able to give substantial and continuing assistance to the citizen or resident where:

    (a)the citizen or resident has a permanent or long‑term need for assistance because of death, disability, prolonged illness or other serious circumstances affecting the citizen or resident personally …”

  4. The Tribunal, therefore, was required to determine whether it was satisfied that the applicant’s younger sister, at the time of the applicant’s application for the visa, had a permanent or long‑term need for assistance because of death, disability, prolonged illness or other serious circumstance affecting her personally.  The applicant asserted that her younger sister at the relevant time had a strong psychological and emotional need for the applicant’s help and support because of the younger sister’s depression, extreme anxiety and vulnerability to stress.

  5. This application, in my view, turns on the proper understanding of the following passage from the written reasons for decision of the Tribunal:

    “… the Tribunal is not satisfied that the nominator suffered from a level of psychological dependence, which could be described as serious.  The fact that she was close to her sister, the visa applicant, and that she missed her cannot be seen,…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 916
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Wickramasinghe v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs involved the applicant challenging a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) which found that the applicant’s sister did not suffer from a serious psychological dependence on the applicant. The applicant argued that the RRT had overlooked evidence of the sister's difficulties in managing daily tasks, which was critical to their claim for a protection visa. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, which was tasked with reviewing the RRT's decision for errors of law or material error.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the RRT had properly considered and given appropriate weight to the evidence of the sister's psychological condition. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the RRT's statement that there was "no evidence" the sister found it difficult to look after herself should be interpreted literally or whether it reflected a judgment about the probative value of the evidence. The court was also required to consider whether the RRT's approach to weighing evidence was flawed, potentially constituting an error of law.

In its judgment, the court carefully examined the RRT’s written reasons, noting that the Tribunal had indeed referred to the sister's statutory declaration but interpreted its finding as reflecting a judgment about the weight of the evidence rather than a literal finding of no evidence. The court held that the RRT was entitled to decide not to accept the expert opinion provided by Mr. Kleynhans, and its reasons showed a clear exercise of judgment rather than an oversight. The court concluded that the RRT's finding that there was no evidence of serious psychological dependence was based on its assessment of the probative value of the evidence, which was within the Tribunal's discretion and not subject to judicial interference.

The court dismissed the application, finding no basis to interfere with the RRT's decision. No order for costs was made.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. There be no order for costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves a challenge to a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) in relation to a visa application. The nominator, who is closely related to the visa applicant, claimed to suffer from psychological dependence, which the Tribunal did not accept as serious. The Tribunal's decision was based on the lack of evidence that the nominator found it difficult to look after herself, despite the nominator's own statutory declaration and testimony from her husband indicating otherwise. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the Tribunal's reasons for decision, particularly regarding whether the Tribunal overlooked the evidence or simply decided not to accept it.

This matter came before the court as an application to review the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The applicant, Wickramasinghe, sought to challenge the Tribunal's conclusion that there was no serious psychological dependence on the part of the nominator. The court examined the Tribunal's written reasons for decision and the evidence presented, including the nominator's statutory declaration and the husband's testimony. The applicant argued that the Tribunal misunderstood or overlooked the evidence regarding the nominator's difficulties in self-care. The court's role was to interpret the Tribunal's decision and determine whether the applicant's arguments had merit.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

This application, in my view, turns on the proper understanding of the following passage from the written reasons for decision of the Tribunal:“… the Tribunal is not satisfied that the nominator suffered from a level of psychological dependence, which could be described as serious. The fact that she was close to her sister, the visa applicant, and that she missed her cannot be seen, even in the context of some isolation in a new country, as a serious circumstance. There is no evidence that the nominator was unable or found it difficult to look after herself. The Tribunal is not able to except the opinion in Mr Kleynhans’ report that the nominator had an abnormal psychological dependence on the visa applicant, noting that the indicators for that conclusion are in the most part normal and fundamental human needs.” (emphasis added) If the Tribunal is properly to be understood as asserting that there was literally no evidence that the nominator found it difficult to look after herself it would have to be concluded that the Tribunal overlooked the nominator’s own statutory declaration dated 13 March 2002 in which she states that:“From the year of 1997 I found it difficult to cope with day to day work such as cooking, housekeeping, washing, shopping and even taking care of myself.”The book of relevant documents filed in the related matter N462 of 2002 reveals that the nominator’s husband gave evidence to the same effect. In considering how the critical passage from the Tribunal’s reasons for decision is properly to be understood, two matters require consideration. First, the Tribunal in its reasons for decision refers explicitly to the nominator’s statutory declaration dated 13 March 2002 and accurately, if succinctly, describes the nature of its contents. It therefore seems unlikely that the Tribunal overlooked the content of the statutory declaration. Secondly, a reading of the whole of the passage from the reasons for decision of the Tribunal set out above illustrates that the Presiding Member of the Tribunal has a tendency to state as a fact a matter that in reality reflects an exercise of judgment. The Tribunal states that it is “not able to accept the opinion in Mr Kleynhans’ report”. It seems clear enough, however, that the Tribunal recognised that it was, as a matter of law, able to accept the opinion of Mr Kleynhans it decided, having considered the material advanced in support of the opinion, to exercise its judgment not to accept the opinion. The above tendency is not uncommon and affects judicial as well as administrative decision‑makers. The legal significance which attaches to a finding of “no evidence” means that it is a tendency ideally to be avoided where what is in truth meant is that there is no independent evidence on a particular issue or there is no evidence which the fact-finding tribunal is willing to accept on the issue. Having given careful attention to the whole of the reasons for decision of the Tribunal, I am satisfied that the Tribunal’s assertion that there was no evidence that the nominator found it difficult to look after herself is not to be understood in a technical sense. In my view the meaning which the Tribunal intended to convey is that there was no evidence to which the Tribunal was willing to ascribe weight. That is, no evidence which it found genuinely probative. That finding of the Tribunal is not one with which this Court may interfere.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BRANSON J
Issues
1. Whether the Tribunal properly considered and understood the evidence of the nominator's difficulties in self-care as presented in her statutory declaration and her husband's testimony.
2. How the phrase "no evidence" in the Tribunal's reasons for decision should be interpreted, particularly in the context of the nominator's claim of psychological dependence.

Held
1. The Tribunal properly considered and understood the evidence of the nominator's difficulties in self-care as presented in her statutory declaration and her husband's testimony. The court concluded that the Tribunal's assertion that there was no evidence was not to be understood in a technical sense, but rather meant that the Tribunal was not willing to ascribe weight to the evidence presented.
2. The phrase "no evidence" in the Tribunal's reasons for decision should be interpreted as meaning that the Tribunal found no evidence genuinely probative on the issue of the nominator's difficulty in self-care. This interpretation was upheld by the court, and the court found no basis to interfere with the Tribunal's decision.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BRANSON J

The court examined the Tribunal's written reasons for decision and the evidence presented, particularly focusing on the nominator's statutory declaration and her husband's testimony. The court found that the Tribunal accurately described the contents of the statutory declaration and it was unlikely that the Tribunal overlooked the nominator's difficulties in self-care. The court noted that the Tribunal had a tendency to state as a fact a matter that in reality reflected an exercise of judgment. The court emphasised the importance of avoiding the use of the phrase "no evidence" when what is meant is that there is no independent evidence on a particular issue or no evidence the fact-finding tribunal is willing to accept on the issue. The court held that the Tribunal's finding that there was no evidence the nominator found it difficult to look after herself was not one with which the court may interfere, as it was a finding of no evidence genuinely probative. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that when a tribunal states that there is "no evidence" on an issue, it should be interpreted as meaning that the tribunal found no evidence genuinely probative, rather than literally no evidence at all. This interpretation aligns with the court's finding that the Tribunal's decision was not one with which the court may interfere.