Wickramasinghe v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wickramasinghe v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 30

DINITHIE WICKRAMASINGHE  -v-  MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

N 797 of 2002

and

DILANKA WICKRAMASINGHE  -v-  MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

N 798 of 2002

GRAY, RYAN and GYLES JJ

7 MARCH 2003
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 797 of 2002

On appeal from a Judge of the Federal Court of Australia

BETWEEN:

DINITHIE WICKRAMASINGHE
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGES:

GRAY, RYAN and GYLES JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

7 MARCH 2003

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 798 of 2002

On appeal from a Judge of the Federal Court of Australia

BETWEEN:

DILANKA WICKRAMASINGHE
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGES:

GRAY, RYAN and GYLES JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

7 MARCH 2003

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 797 of 2002

On appeal from a Judge of the Federal Court of Australia

BETWEEN:

DINITHIE WICKRAMASINGHE
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
Respondent

AND

N 798 of 2002

On appeal from a Judge of the Federal Court of Australia

BETWEEN:

DILANKA WICKRAMASINGHE
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGES:

GRAY, RYAN and GYLES JJ

DATE:

7 MARCH 2003

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. These are two related appeals from orders made by Branson J on 16 July 2002.  Her Honour dismissed applications for judicial review of decisions of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) affirming decisions by the delegate of the respondent Minister to refuse Family (Residence) (Class AO) visas to the applicants, their respective spouses and children:  Wickramasinghe v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 916 and Wickramasinghe v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 917. Ms Diluka Wijayakoon (“the nominator”) had nominated each applicant for a Family (Residence) (Class AO) visa on the basis that each was a “special need relative”. Ms Dinithie Wickramasinghe is the older sister of the nominator, while Mr Dilanka Wickramasinghe is her twin brother.

  2. The applicants each contended before the Tribunal that their sister’s psychological and emotional needs constituted each of them her “special need relative”.  The relevant elements of the definition of “special need relative” were contained in Migration Regulation 1.03 which provided that a “special need relative” is one who is “

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Details
Case
[2003] FCAFC 30
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Wickramasinghe v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the applicant, Ms Dinithie Wickramasinghe, sought to appeal a decision made by the Tribunal which had rejected her application for a visa on the basis that the nominator did not suffer from a serious psychological dependence. The Federal Court was tasked with reviewing the Tribunal’s decision to ensure that it was legally sound and based on proper evidence.

The central legal issue in this case was whether the Tribunal erred in concluding that there was no evidence of the nominator's serious psychological dependence. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the Tribunal's assertion that there was "no evidence" should be understood in a strict sense or whether it meant that there was no evidence that the Tribunal was willing to accept as genuinely probative. Additionally, the court had to consider if the Tribunal's decision on the nominator’s capacity to look after herself was correct.

The court examined the Tribunal's reasons and found that while the Tribunal had referred to the nominator’s statutory declaration, it did not appear to have overlooked it. Instead, the court interpreted the Tribunal's statement as reflecting a judgment on the weight and probative value of the evidence rather than a strict finding of "no evidence." Given this interpretation, the court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was not flawed and thus, the appeal was dismissed.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The learned primary Judge saw the application to the Court by Ms Dinithie Wickramasinghe as turning on a proper understanding of the following passage from [37] of the Tribunal’s reasons:“… … the Tribunal is not satisfied that the nominator suffered from a level of psychological dependence, which could be described as serious. The fact that she was close to her sister, the visa applicant, and that she missed her cannot be seen, even in the context of some isolation in a new country, as a serious circumstance. There is no evidence that the nominator was unable or found it difficult to look after herself. The Tribunal is not able to accept the opinion in Mr Kleynhans’ report that the nominator had an abnormal psychological dependence on the visa applicant, noting that the indicators for that conclusion are in the most part normal and fundamental human needs.” (emphasis added by her Honour)Her Honour then continued:“If the Tribunal is properly to be understood as asserting that there was literally no evidence that the nominator found it difficult to look after herself it would have to be concluded that the Tribunal overlooked the nominator’s own statutory declaration dated 13 March 2002 in which she states that:‘From the year of 1997 I found it difficult to cope with day to day work such as cooking, housekeeping, washing, shopping and even taking care of myself.’The book of relevant documents filed in the related matter N462 of 2002 reveals that the nominator’s husband gave evidence to the same effect.In considering how the critical passage from the Tribunal’s reasons for decision is properly to be understood, two matters require consideration. First, the Tribunal in its reasons for decision refers explicitly to the nominator’s statutory declaration dated 13 March 2002 and accurately, if succinctly, describes the nature of its contents. It therefore seems unlikely that the Tribunal overlooked the content of the statutory declaration.However, the learned primary Judge declined to regard the Tribunal’s conclusion as based on a finding of “no evidence” in the strict sense. Rather, her Honour concluded:“Secondly, a reading of the whole of the passage from the reasons for decision of the Tribunal set out above illustrates that the Presiding Member of the Tribunal has a tendency to state as a fact a matter that in reality reflects an exercise of judgment. The Tribunal states that it is ‘not able to accept the opinion in Mr Kleynhans’ report’. It seems clear enough, however, that the Tribunal recognised that it was, as a matter of law, able to accept the opinion of Mr Kleynhans it decided, having considered the material advanced in support of the opinion, to exercise its judgment not to accept the opinion. The above tendency is not uncommon and affects judicial as well as administrative decision‑makers. The legal significance which attaches to a finding of ‘no evidence’ means that it is a tendency ideally to be avoided where what is in truth meant is that there is no independent evidence on a particular issue or there is no evidence which the fact-finding tribunal is willing to accept on the issue.Having given careful attention to the whole of the reasons for decision of the Tribunal, I am satisfied that the Tribunal’s assertion that there was no evidence that the nominator found it difficult to look after herself is not to be understood in a technical sense. In my view the meaning which the Tribunal intended to convey is that there was no evidence to which the Tribunal was willing to ascribe weight. That is, no evidence which it found genuinely probative. That finding of the Tribunal is not one with which this Court may interfere. The first applicant by her counsel accepted, rightly in my view, that unless she were able to satisfy the Court that the Tribunal erred in its conclusion that there was ‘no evidence that the nominator … found it difficult to look after herself’ the present application must fail whatever may be the proper construction and effect of s 474 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).As I have concluded that properly understood the reasons for decision of the Tribunal do not disclose the error alleged by the applicant, it is not necessary for me to give consideration to whether the Tribunal erred in its approach to the issue of whether at the time of the applicant’s visa application the applicant was willing and able to provide substantial and continuing assistance to the nominator within the meaning of the definition of ‘special need relative’ contained in Migration Regulation 1.03.”