FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Westwood v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission
[2004] FCA 153
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW – application for extension of time to seek review made 12 years after decision – applicant litigant in person – claims of denial of procedural fairness – application refused – applicable principles
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5 and 11(1)
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 52(4)Reid v Sheiban (1988) HREOCA 5 (28 July 1988)
Kim Hyun Tai v Bolkus (1996) 42 ALD 249
Hunter Valley Development Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Brisbane South Regional health Authority v Taylor (1996-1997) 186 CLR 541
R v Lawrence [1982] AC 510
Vel v Human Rights an Equal Opportunity Commission (1997) 47 ALD 219PAMELA WESTWOOD v HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AND MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE SCOTS COLLEGE & ANOR
N 321 OF 2003
CONTI J
27 FEBRUARY 2004
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 321 OF 2003
BETWEEN:
PAMELA WESTWOOD
APPLICANTAND:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
FIRST RESPONDENTMEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE SCOTS COLLEGE
SECOND RESPONDENTS(NAME SUPPRESSED)
THIRD RESPONDENTJUDGE:
CONTI J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 FEBRUARY 2004
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. Application dismissed.
2. The applicant to pay the costs of the second and third respondents of the application.
3.The order of the Court made on 24 July 2003 in the following terms, as corrected, be continued to hereafter read as follows:
‘Pursuant to s 50 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (as amended), the name of the third respondent, and any published material that might enable the identification of the third respondent to be made, and of any other person referred to in the evidence tendered in the application for leave herein to extend the time for filing legal process, not be published.’
4. There be liberty to apply in relation to Order 3.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 321 OF 2003
BETWEEN:
PAMELA WESTWOOD
APPLICANTAND:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
FIRST RESPONDENTMEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE SCOTS COLLEGE
SECOND RESPONDENTS(NAME SUPPRESSED)
THIRD RESPONDENTJUDGE:
CONTI J
DATE:
27 FEBRUARY 2004
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The context to the proceedings in summary
On 17 March 2003 the applicant filed in this Court an application for an order for review, the sole respondent then named being Irene Moss. Ms Moss was then a Hearing Commissioner of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (hereafter abbreviated as HREOC). I shall refer to Ms Moss hereafter as the ‘Commissioner’. By s 11(1) of the AdministrativeDecisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘Judicial Review Act’), application to review an administrative decision must be made within twenty-eight days of the decision, or within such further time as the Court…
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- Case
- [2004] FCA 153
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In addressing these issues, Branson J highlighted the significant delay in filing the application, noting that the applicant had been made aware of her right to seek judicial review in 1991 but did not do so until 2003. The judge emphasised the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay, and pointed out the substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth if the decision of HREOC was to be set aside after such a long period. Branson J concluded that the justice of the situation did not compel the exercise of discretion in favour of the applicant, particularly given the potential distress and inconvenience to many parties involved in re-litigating the case after such a long time. The court also stressed the importance of maintaining the integrity of the judicial review process and the potential for significant prejudice to the Commonwealth.
The court dismissed the application for leave to extend the time for judicial review. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the second and third respondents. Additionally, an order was made to prevent the publication of the name of the third respondent and any other person referred to in the evidence. The court also granted liberty to apply in relation to the confidentiality order.
The final orders of the court included dismissing the application, directing the applicant to pay the costs of the second and third respondents, and continuing the confidentiality order regarding the respondents' names and details. This decision underscored the importance of timely judicial review and the potential for significant prejudice if such processes are unduly delayed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Application dismissed.
2. The applicant to pay the costs of the second and third respondents of the application.
3. The order of the Court made on 24 July 2003 in the following terms, as corrected, be continued to hereafter read as follows:
‘Pursuant to s 50 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (as amended), the name of the third respondent, and any published material that might enable the identification of the third respondent to be made, and of any other person referred to in the evidence tendered in the application for leave herein to extend the time for filing legal process, not be published.’
4. There be liberty to apply in relation to Order 3.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: CONTI J
Moreover as Branson J observed in Vel v Human Rights an Equal Opportunity Commission (1997) 47 ALD 219, it is possible that the justice of a particular situation may require an extension of time within which to seek administrative review, even when the applicant fails to give an explanation for the delay. That observation was in the context of an applicant’s limited command of the English language and his limited understanding of the workings of the Australian legal system. Her Honour found herself compelled nevertheless to conclude that the discriminatory conduct, having occurred more than ten years earlier, did not justify the exercise of a discretion in favour of an applicant for administrative review, given the prejudice to the Commonwealth if the decision of the Commissioner there involved was to be set aside. The operation of the above principles upon the circumstances of the present application The applicant has provided no satisfactory explanation for the very long period of time which elapsed since the decision of HREOC (Commissioner Moss) was made on 31 January 1991 adversely to the applicant. The length of time involved between that date and the filing of the present application on 17 March 2003 may well be without precedent in relation to judicial review of administrative decisions. The termination of the applicant’s employment by the College had earlier taken place effectively from 1 July 1988. The applicant had been aware of the legal process of judicial review of decisions made by HREOC at least since the Legal Aid Commission wrote to her on 7 November 1991 (see [17] above). Moreover the Office of Legal Aid Services wrote to her subsequently on 27 May 1992 (see [18] above), and the Attorney General’s Department wrote to her on 3 June 1992 (see [19] above), on each occasion in relation to the subject of judicial review of the HREOC decision. It may have been the case that the applicant had no financial means to undertake judicial review with the assistance of legal representation, but the applicant has not adduced any evidence, or at least sufficient satisfactory evidence, in that regard. In any event, she has made the present application without apparent legal assistance. It may be observed for completeness that the applicant did have the benefit of legal assistance in her workers compensation proceedings, which were dismissed on 29 May 1992 (see [27] above). I would infer that the circumstances said by the applicant to give rise to her present application are highly controversial, and likely to be the subject of protracted and costly proceedings in this Court, if the present application for leave is granted. To have those circumstances reinvestigated and litigated, after the lapse of so many years, would doubtless occasion substantial distress and inconvenience to the many people who would be likely to be involved, or potentially so, directly and indirectly. The memories of likely or prospective witnesses would obviously have faded significantly after the lapse of time that has occurred since the events of which the applicant has complained.