Allwood v Sundin, Chung, Greaves

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Allwood v Sundin, Chung, Greaves & Anor [2020] QSC 188

PARTIES:

JASON SCOTT ALLWOOD
(applicant)

v
DR J SUNDIN, DR A CHUNG AND DR C GREAVES CONSTITUTING THE GENERAL MEDICAL ASSESSMENT TRIBUNAL – PSYCHIATRIC
(first respondent)
and
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(second respondent)

FILE NO:

812 of 2019

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

23 June 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

7 February 2020

JUDGE:

Ryan J

ORDERS:

1.   The application is dismissed.

2.   Unless the parties wish to make submissions to the contrary, the applicant is to pay the second respondent’s costs of the application on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE – EXTENSION OF TIME –  where, from 2008 until 21 July 2014, the applicant suffered a work related psychiatric/psychological injury (the “first injury”) and later, from 22 July 2014 until January 2015, suffered a work related aggravation of a pre-existing psychiatric/psychological injury (the “second injury”) – where the Medical Assessment Tribunal – Psychiatric assessed the applicant’s degree of permanent impairment from the first injury at four percent, which meant that he was ineligible to seek common law damages in relation to that injury – where the applicant is out of time to bring an application for judicial review – where the applicant’s explanation for the delay is that he was not initially aggrieved by the decision, but became aggrieved upon receipt of a psychiatrist’s report which made it clear that his claim for damages as a result of the second injury could not be such that would compensate him for the psychiatric injury that he suffered during his employment – whether there has been a satisfactory explanation of the applicant’s delay – whether the grant of an extension would be fair and equitable in the circumstances – whether there are merits in the applicant’s grounds of review

Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) s 7, s 20, s 24

Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 32(1), s 32(5), s 237

Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2013 (Qld) s 17

Allwood v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 088, cited

Argos Pty Ltd v CorbellMinister for the Environment and Sustainable Development (2014) 254 CLR 394, applied

Chilcott v The Medical Board of Queensland [2002] QSC 118, applied

Hoffman v The Queensland Local Government Superannuation Board [1994] 1 Qd R 369, applied

Kim Hyun Tai v Bolkus (1996) 42 ALD 249, applied

Kuku Djungan Aboriginal Corporation v Christensen [1993] 2 Qd R 663, applied

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v WuShan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, applied

Lock the Gate Alliance Ltd v Chief Executive under the Environmental Protection Act 1994 [2018] QSC 22, cited

Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar (1981) 38 ALR 363, cited

Shaw v Barker & Ors [2001] QCA 220, considered

Tooheys Ltd v Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs (1981) 54…

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Details
Case
[2020] QSC 188
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Mr Allwood, sought judicial review of a decision of the Medical Assessment Tribunal – Psychiatric (MAT), which assessed the degree of permanent impairment resulting from his work-related psychiatric injury at four percent, deeming him ineligible to seek common law damages. The applicant was out of time to bring the application for judicial review, and his explanation for the delay was that he did not initially feel aggrieved by the MAT's decision but became aggrieved upon receiving a psychiatrist's report that clarified the impossibility of his claim for damages compensating him for the psychiatric injury suffered during his employment. The court had to determine whether there had been a satisfactory explanation of the applicant's delay, whether the grant of an extension would be fair and equitable in the circumstances, and whether there were merits in the applicant's grounds of review.

The applicant argued that until he received evidence contrary to the MAT's decision, he was not aggrieved by it, citing Shaw v Barker and Chilcott v The Medical Board of Queensland. The court noted that the applicant could have sought the opinion of Dr Dwyer at any time and that his reliance on Shaw v Barker was misplaced. The court found that the applicant's interests were not impacted or affected by the MAT's decision until he received evidence contrary to it, but this did not mean that the decision did not prejudice him. The court held that the applicant's delay in bringing the application for judicial review was not satisfactorily explained.

The MAT assessed Mr Allwood's degree of permanent impairment at four percent, which made him ineligible to seek common law damages. The MAT noted that Mr Allwood had developed an eating disorder and suffered an aggravation of anxiety and depression due to adverse events during his employment. The tribunal found that Mr Allwood continued to experience disturbed body image, daily panic attacks, reluctance to leave home, nightmares concerning work events, intrusive recollections of work events, and a disturbed body image. Mr Allwood was effectively housebound and had not returned to any form of employment or undertaken any voluntary activities.

The application was dismissed, and unless the parties wished to make submissions to the contrary, the applicant was to pay the second respondent's costs of the application on the standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. Unless the parties wish to make submissions to the contrary, the applicant is to pay the second respondent’s costs of the application on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Counsel submitted that had Mr Allwood made an application “before the reports of Dr Chalk or Dr Dwyer became available to him … it would simply have been based on his subjective belief that the Medical Assessment Tribunal was wrong … had he made an application at that time, it would have been open to the respondent to bring an application to strike out [his] application because he didn’t have standing”.[41] She argued that “the evidence did not exist to say that he would be aggrieved by the decision” (my emphasis).[42] She argued that there was no prejudice which flowed from the MAT’s decision “until Dr Dwyer agreed with Dr Chalk”.[43] [41]T6/38 – 41.[42]T13/6 – 7. [43]T3/18-21. I note here that whilst the timing of the receipt of Dr Chalk’s report may not have been a matter for the applicant, the notion that he had to wait until the report of Dr Dwyer became available before appreciating his position ignores the fact that Dr Dwyer’s opinion (about the MAT assessment) was available to the applicant and his lawyers whenever they chose to seek it. In support of the argument that the applicant was not aggrieved by the decision of the MAT until he received evidence contrary to it, counsel referred me to Shaw v Barker & Ors [2001] QCA 220 and Chilcott v The Medical Board of Queensland [2002] QSC 118 (Cullinane J). Shaw v Barker concerned an application for leave to appeal from a decision summarily dismissing an application for judicial review of a Minister’s decision on the basis that the applicant was not a person aggrieved by the decision. Each member of the Court of Appeal expressed the view that the applicant’s interests were not impacted or affected by the Minister’s decision and leave was refused. As I understand her arguments, counsel for the present applicant relied particularly upon Byrne J’s reasons in indirect support for the argument that the MAT’s decision did not prejudice the applicant (and thereby cause him to become a person aggrieved) until evidence contrary to it was received by him. The relevant decision in Shaw v Barker was the Minister’s decision to approve the assignment of an interest in a mining lease from “Pelsoil” to “RAG” (companies). Byrne J’s discussion is necessarily fact specific. My attention was drawn to the parts of it which appear in bold below – [18] All these concerns are founded on the notion that the mining in which RAG has engaged, or might yet carry out, may impact adversely on the applicant’s interests; and as much may be assumed. But that does not mean that the impugned decision – to approve the assignment of Pelsoil’s interest to RAG – involved the prospect of some adverse consequence for the applicant or his interests. [19] Neither approval of the assignment, nor the assignment itself, could have prejudiced the applicant’s rights under the compensation agreement. There is no suggestion that Portman had ceased to be bound by that agreement; and … the mining lease was subject to a condition that the holder comply with all the terms of any such agreement. In these circumstances, as the Judge held, the assignment would permit the applicant to enforce the obligation to maintain the homestead against Portman, RAG, and, if Pelsoil had covenanted to do so, against Pelsoil.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The MAT expressed its decision as follows –[29][29]Court document 12, page 1398.DecisionFollowing consideration of all medical and other evidence presented, interview and clinical examination of the worker and with reference to the Guidelines for Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 2nd edition, the tribunal determined that:Section 505(2) (a) the worker has sustained a degree of permanent impairment;(b)the degree of permanent impairment resulting from the injury is four (4) percent. In its decision on claim #627, the MAT noted that WorkCover had accepted, as relevant injuries, “Exacerbation of Eating Disorder and aggravation of Anxiety and Depression”. Under the heading “Medical details of injury”, the MAT said –[30]Mr Allwood was an IT service manager … who suffered a number of adverse events during the course of his employment. These adverse events are the subject of a separate claim ([#043]) which was accepted by WorkCover Queensland.Mr Allwood lodged a further claim for compensation ([#627]) and after a process of review, WorkCover Queensland accepted that, in addition to other psychiatric diagnoses, Mr Allwood had developed an Eating Disorder and suffered an aggravation of Anxiety and Depression, over the period of time from 22 July 2014 to January 2015. The other matters are detailed in a separate report on claim [#043] which was also assessed by the tribunal today.The tribunal is concerned with respect to the accepted claim [#627] pertaining to the Eating Disorder and Anxiety and Depression.[30]Court document 12, page 1402. Under the heading “Relevant clinical history”, the MAT noted that, as a consequence of “the anxiety he was experiencing in the workplace”, Mr Allwood “developed a pattern of excessive exercising bingeing and purging on weekends in an effort to alleviate the anxiety he felt about any return to work” – particularly on Sunday afternoons to manage the distress he felt about returning to work on Mondays. [31] [31]Court document 12, page 1402. The MAT also noted that Mr Allwood – ·started using exercise as a form of stress management in 2008;·experienced a 35 kg weight loss over several months in 2008; and·experienced an aggravation of his anxiety and body image disturbance by his colleagues repeatedly showing his “fat photos” in 2008/2009, despite his requests that they stop. The MAT continued (my emphasis) – Mr Allwood continued to struggle with body image disturbance, panic attacks and reluctance to leave home. His current treating Psychiatrist, Dr J Robertson, considered that the eating disorder behaviour and anxiety was at its worst in late 2014, at which time Mr Allwood’s weight had dropped to 66 kg. With treatment, his weight rose to 75kg by September 2018, but he was continuing to experience disturbed body image, daily panic attacks, reluctance to leave home, nightmares concerning work events, intrusive recollections of work events, and a disturbed body image.…At interview with the tribunal, Mr Allwood reported that he continues to count calories and restricts himself to one meal per day … He has a disturbed body image and despite being only 75 kg, he sees himself as being grossly overweight. He is fearful of resuming exercise, believing that should he start to exercise again he would not be able to stop.Mr Allwood continues to experience depressed and anxious mood. His energy, motivation and volition are all low. His sleep is disturbed by initial insomnia and nightmares regularly. He continues to experience an exaggerated startle reflex, is alert to dangers for himself and his wife, avoids triggers and reminders of the previous work-related events and has a general sense of detachment from others.He is effectively housebound. He will only leave the house to attend appointments with his psychiatrist, or if supported and accompanied by his wife. They recently took a holiday to Cambodia for two weeks, but he felt anxious and uncomfortable throughout this time. He has not returned to any form of employment and has not undertaken any voluntary activities. He is undergoing in vivo desensitisation to address his agoraphobic cognitions.…Mr Allwood’s presentation was consistent with the reports provided by the vast majority of assessing psychiatrists.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.