JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION -v- PALANIAPPAN [No 2] [2015] WASC 227
CORAM: MASTER SANDERSON
HEARD: 15 MAY 2015
DELIVERED : 23 JUNE 2015
PUBLISHED : 24 JUNE 2015
FILE NO/S: CIV 1307 of 2014
BETWEEN: WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION
Plaintiff
AND
KASI PALANIAPPAN
Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Application to amend statement of claim after summary judgment granted - Judgment for part of claim only - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)
Result:
Leave to amend statement of claim and judgment granted to plaintiff
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr S K Dharmananda SC
Defendant: Mr S M Davies SC
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Lavan Legal
Defendant: Cullen Babington Macleod
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
MASTER SANDERSON: This was the return of two applications. The first in time was the defendant's application by letter dated 4 May 2015 seeking to strike out the plaintiff's amended statement of claim. The plaintiff then applied for leave to amend its summons seeking summary judgment and 'further and alternatively' amendment of the order of 18 December 2014 granting summary judgment. The reasons why these two applications were brought requires some background facts.
By chamber summons filed 20 June 2014 the plaintiff sought summary judgment against the defendant. On 16 December 2014 I published reasons for granting the summary judgment application: Westpac Banking Corporation v Palaniappan [2014] WASC 475. The summary judgment application sought judgment for the plaintiff's entire claim. The defendant had guaranteed certain loans and the plaintiff was suing on the guarantee. The amount of the claim was specified in the chamber summons but as interest was payable the amount of the claim when judgment was entered was greater than the amount specified in the chamber summons. But there was no suggestion in the chamber summons itself that judgment was sought only for part of the plaintiff's claim.
The statement of claim referred to a 'Facility Agreement'. This agreement which was constituted by a number of documents was entered into around 1 July 2011 and was varied on 26 October 2011. The borrower under the facility agreement was Murray Riverside Pty Ltd and the defendant guaranteed those borrowings. The plaintiff pleaded the borrower was liable to repay the 'total amount owing' as defined in cl 72 of the general conditions.
The plaintiff pleaded the terms of the securities which touched upon the borrower's obligations under the facility agreement and referred to certain specific terms. It then pleaded the 'Guarantee'. This Guarantee was said to be dated 9 July 2008 (so it predated the Facility Agreement), but it was said pursuant to its terms the defendant guaranteed the borrower's obligations. The plaintiff pleaded the defendant agreed to guarantee the 'Guaranteed Money' which was the equivalent of the total amount owing by the borrower to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff then pleaded certain defaults…
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- Case
- [2015] WASC 227
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the entire claim or only part of it. The court had to consider the specific terms of the guarantee and the claims made by the plaintiff, including whether the plaintiff had sought judgment for the entire amount or only part of it. The plaintiff's chamber summons did not explicitly state that judgment was sought only for part of the claim, but the amount specified in the summons was less than the total amount claimed when interest was included.
The court reasoned that the amount of the claim was not clearly specified in the summons and that the plaintiff had not sought judgment for the entire claim. The court found that the judgment should be for part of the claim only, as the amount specified in the summons did not cover the full amount owed, including interest. The court concluded that the application for summary judgment should only be granted for the part of the claim that was explicitly stated and quantified in the summons.
The court ordered that summary judgment be granted for part of the claim as specified in the summons, and not for the entire amount claimed by the plaintiff. This decision hinged on the precise language of the summons and the specific terms of the guarantee, ensuring that the judgment reflected the exact claims made by the plaintiff.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
By chamber summons filed 20 June 2014 the plaintiff sought summary judgment against the defendant. On 16 December 2014 I published reasons for granting the summary judgment application: Westpac Banking Corporation v Palaniappan [2014] WASC 475. The summary judgment application sought judgment for the plaintiff's entire claim. The defendant had guaranteed certain loans and the plaintiff was suing on the guarantee. The amount of the claim was specified in the chamber summons but as interest was payable the amount of the claim when judgment was entered was greater than the amount specified in the chamber summons. But there was no suggestion in the chamber summons itself that judgment was sought only for part of the plaintiff's claim. The statement of claim referred to a 'Facility Agreement'. This agreement which was constituted by a number of documents was entered into around 1 July 2011 and was varied on 26 October 2011. The borrower under the facility agreement was Murray Riverside Pty Ltd and the defendant guaranteed those borrowings. The plaintiff pleaded the borrower was liable to repay the 'total amount owing' as defined in cl 72 of the general conditions. The plaintiff pleaded the terms of the securities which touched upon the borrower's obligations under the facility agreement and referred to certain specific terms. It then pleaded the 'Guarantee'. This Guarantee was said to be dated 9 July 2008 (so it predated the Facility Agreement), but it was said pursuant to its terms the defendant guaranteed the borrower's obligations. The plaintiff pleaded the defendant agreed to guarantee the 'Guaranteed Money' which was the equivalent of the total amount owing by the borrower to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then pleaded certain defaults and notices of demand and the fact receivers and managers were appointed over the borrower's property. The sale of the secured property was pleaded and the plaintiff pleaded the proceeds from the sale of the property were not sufficient to pay the total amount owing. The plaintiff pleaded a second notice of demand in an amount of $14,683,764.37 being the Guaranteed Money owing as at 22 January 2014. In the prayer for relief the plaintiff claimed payment of $14,966,604.82 a sum which was greater than the amount demanded because it included interest from the date of the demand to the date of issue of proceedings. There was a further demand for interest on the outstanding balance at different interest rates. The application was supported by two affidavits of Terry Neil Lovelock, the first sworn 20 June 2014 and the second sworn 17 September 2014. By reference to these affidavits and the statement of claim it is not possible to ascertain precisely what amount is included in the overall claim for the costs and expenses of the receiver. In fact in par 31 of the defendant's submissions in opposition to the summary judgment application counsel appears to acknowledge precise quantification is not possible. It was not on that basis the application for judgment was opposed. But what is common ground between the parties is the amount claimed in the statement of claim and in a summons for judgment included receiver's costs and a penalty interest component.