FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Palaniappan v Westpac Banking Corporation [2017] FCAFC 121
Appeal from: Palaniappan v Westpac Banking Corporation [2016] FCA 1494 File number(s): WAD 592 of 2016 Judge(s): GILMOUR, MCKERRACHER & CHARLESWORTH JJ Date of judgment: 10 August 2017 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – counterclaim, set-off or cross-demand – whether the debtor could not have set up in proceeding in which judgment obtained –Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 40(1)(g) Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 40(1)(g), 43(1)(a), 52(1)(a)
Cases cited: Nath v Clipway Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 625
Palaniappan v Westpac Banking Corporation [2016] FCA 1494
Palaniappan v Westpac Banking Corporation [2016] WASCA 72
Re Brink; Ex parte Commercial Banking Co of Sydney (1980) 30 ALR 433
Re James; Ex parte Carter Holt Harvey Roofing (Aust) Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 183
Re Ling; Ex parte Ling v Commonwealth (1995) 58 FCR 129
Re Stokvis (1934) 7 ABC 53
Re Vicini; Ex parte E. A. Sealey & Co (1982) 64 FLR 323
Walton v National Mutual Life Association of Australia Limited (1994) 49 FCR 406
Westpac Banking Corporation v Palaniappan (No 2) [2015] WASC 227
Date of hearing: 23 May 2017 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 66 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S Penglis Solicitor for the Appellant: Bennett + Co Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S K Dharmananda and Mr A Papamatheos Solicitor for the Respondent: Lavan ORDERS
WAD 592 of 2016 BETWEEN: KASI PALANIAPPAN
Appellant
AND: WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION
Respondent
JUDGES:
GILMOUR, MCKERRACHER & CHARLESWORTH JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
10 AUGUST 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GILMOUR J:
This is an appeal from the dismissal of an application made by the appellant under s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act) to set aside a bankruptcy notice served on the appellant by the respondent (Bankruptcy Notice). In pursuing his application, the appellant had sought to satisfy the court that he had a cross-demand equal to, or greater than, the quantum of the judgment upon which the Bankruptcy Notice is predicated but which he could not have set up in the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained.
The appeal concerns, principally, the application of established authority concerning the proper construction of s 40(1)(g) of the Act to the facts of this case.
The Notice of Appeal contains two grounds which were, in summary, that the primary Judge erred in:
(a)finding that the appellant could have set up his counterclaim or cross-demand in the action in which judgment was obtained (Ground 1); and
(b)failing to find that the counterclaim or cross-demand was equal to or exceeded the amount payable by the appellant to the respondent under the judgment…
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- Case
- [2017] FCAFC 121
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was whether the provision in the guarantee that prevented Palaniappan from claiming a set-off or counterclaim while the guaranteed debt remained unpaid constituted a "positive inhibition" that could exempt Palaniappan from the operation of s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). This section bars a debtor from being declared bankrupt if they could not have set up a set-off or counterclaim against the creditor in the proceedings that led to the judgment debt. The court had to determine if such a prohibition constituted an inability to set up a counterclaim as contemplated by s 40(1)(g).
The Federal Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that Palaniappan’s ability to set up his counterclaim was not legally inhibited by the terms of the guarantee. The court held that the guarantee clause merely postponed Palaniappan’s right to claim a set-off or counterclaim until he fulfilled his primary obligation to pay the guaranteed debt. Therefore, Palaniappan could have prosecuted his counterclaim if he had paid the guaranteed monies to Westpac. The court concluded that the inhibition to bringing the counterclaim was not a legal prohibition but a conditional one, tied to Palaniappan’s failure to make payment. Consequently, the Federal Court held that the clause did not exempt Palaniappan from s 40(1)(g), and his appeal was dismissed. Palaniappan was ordered to pay Westpac’s costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant acknowledges that the authorities are to the effect that if there is something that a party who wishes to prosecute a counterclaim can do in order for the counterclaim to be prosecuted in the action brought against that party, and the party does not do so, s 40(1)(g) will not be satisfied. However, he contends that none of the cases go so far as to extend that principle to payment of the claim made in the proceedings in which the counterclaim is sought to be brought. He submits that such a requirement is inconsistent with the longstanding explanations as to the purpose of s 40(1)(g).Consideration The appellant did, in fact, file a defence and counterclaim. The counterclaim is still on foot. The appellant, for this reason alone does not come within the exception in s 40(1)(g): Nath v Clipway Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 625 per Hely J at [11]. If, however, ‘unable to set up’ means, in effect, unable to prosecute rather than unable to institute a counterclaim, even then the appellant, in my opinion, fails to meet the terms of the exception. The appellant could have prosecuted his counterclaim if he had complied with the terms of the Guarantee, by paying to the Bank the guaranteed monies. By cl 9(a) of the Guarantee, so long as any of the guaranteed money remains unpaid, he could not, without the Bank's consent, reduce his liability under the Guarantee by claiming that he or Murray Riverside or any other person has a right of set-off or counterclaim against the Bank. As Buss JA, in the Court of Appeal, described the effect of cl 9 at [74] in Palanappian v Westpac Banking Corporation:74A suspension provision of the kind embodied in cl 9 of the Guarantee does not oust the jurisdiction of the courts. It suspends, but does not otherwise impair, the rights of the party bound by the provision. That party is entitled to enforce the rights in question provided it conforms with its primary obligation to make payment to the other party. See GE Capital Australia v Davis [2002] NSWSC 1146; (2002) 180 FLR 250 [93] (Bryson J); Westpac Banking Corporation v Helicopters Brisbane Pty Ltd [2012] QSC 263 [24] (Martin J). (emphasis added). Contrary to the appellant’s submission, the conclusion of the Master and, in turn the Court of Appeal, was not, in effect, a finding that, as a matter of law, the appellant could not set up his set-off and counterclaim, at least not in the sense of a legal inhibition which would attract the exception provided in s 40(1)(g)(c)(ii) of the Act. The appellant submits that on its proper construction s 40(1)(g) could not sensibly mean that it does not apply where the ‘positive inhibition’ to the bringing of a cross-claim is, as in this case, the non-payment of the self-same amount claimed in the action and which resulted in the judgment debt upon which the bankruptcy notice has issued. This, he submits, is because the section proceeds on the basis of a valid bankruptcy notice which, in many cases, as in this case, is founded upon a judgment debt and that if the disputed amount had to be paid, the operation of s 40(1)(g) would become redundant as there would not have been a bankruptcy notice in the first place.