Palaniappan v Westpac Banking Corporation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Palaniappan v Westpac Banking Corporation [2017] FCAFC 121

Appeal from: Palaniappan v Westpac Banking Corporation [2016] FCA 1494
File number(s): WAD 592 of 2016
Judge(s): GILMOUR, MCKERRACHER & CHARLESWORTH JJ
Date of judgment: 10 August 2017
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – counterclaim, set-off or cross-demand – whether the debtor could not have set up in proceeding in which judgment obtained –Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 40(1)(g)
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 40(1)(g), 43(1)(a), 52(1)(a)

Cases cited:

Nath v Clipway Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 625

Palaniappan v Westpac Banking Corporation [2016] FCA 1494

Palaniappan v Westpac Banking Corporation [2016] WASCA 72

Re Brink; Ex parte Commercial Banking Co of Sydney (1980) 30 ALR 433

Re James; Ex parte Carter Holt Harvey Roofing (Aust) Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 183

Re Ling; Ex parte Ling v Commonwealth (1995) 58 FCR 129

Re Stokvis (1934) 7 ABC 53

Re Vicini; Ex parte E. A. Sealey & Co (1982) 64 FLR 323

Walton v National Mutual Life Association of Australia Limited (1994) 49 FCR 406

Westpac Banking Corporation v Palaniappan (No 2) [2015] WASC 227

Date of hearing: 23 May 2017
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S Penglis
Solicitor for the Appellant: Bennett + Co
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S K Dharmananda and Mr A Papamatheos
Solicitor for the Respondent: Lavan

ORDERS

WAD 592 of 2016
BETWEEN:

KASI PALANIAPPAN

Appellant

AND:

WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION

Respondent

JUDGES:

GILMOUR, MCKERRACHER & CHARLESWORTH JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

10 AUGUST 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GILMOUR J:

  1. This is an appeal from the dismissal of an application made by the appellant under s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act) to set aside a bankruptcy notice served on the appellant by the respondent (Bankruptcy Notice). In pursuing his application, the appellant had sought to satisfy the court that he had a cross-demand equal to, or greater than, the quantum of the judgment upon which the Bankruptcy Notice is predicated but which he could not have set up in the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained.

  2. The appeal concerns, principally, the application of established authority concerning the proper construction of s 40(1)(g) of the Act to the facts of this case.

  3. The Notice of Appeal contains two grounds which were, in summary, that the primary Judge erred in:

    (a)finding that the appellant could have set up his counterclaim or cross-demand in the action in which judgment was obtained (Ground 1); and

    (b)failing to find that the counterclaim or cross-demand was equal to or exceeded the amount payable by the appellant to the respondent under the judgment…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 121
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Palaniappan, filed an appeal against Westpac Banking Corporation in the Federal Court of Australia regarding a bankruptcy notice served on him. The dispute arose from a property development loan that Palaniappan’s company, Murray Riverside Pty Ltd, took from Westpac in 2011. Palaniappan executed a guarantee and indemnity in 2008 to secure the loan. After the loan defaulted, Westpac appointed receivers to sell the property in 2013. Westpac then initiated proceedings against Palaniappan in the Supreme Court of Western Australia in 2014 to recover the debt under the guarantee. Palaniappan filed a defence and counterclaim, asserting that the receivers sold the property at an undervalue. However, the guarantee contained a clause preventing Palaniappan from setting off or counterclaiming against Westpac while the guaranteed money remained unpaid without Westpac’s consent.

The central legal issue was whether the provision in the guarantee that prevented Palaniappan from claiming a set-off or counterclaim while the guaranteed debt remained unpaid constituted a "positive inhibition" that could exempt Palaniappan from the operation of s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). This section bars a debtor from being declared bankrupt if they could not have set up a set-off or counterclaim against the creditor in the proceedings that led to the judgment debt. The court had to determine if such a prohibition constituted an inability to set up a counterclaim as contemplated by s 40(1)(g).

The Federal Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that Palaniappan’s ability to set up his counterclaim was not legally inhibited by the terms of the guarantee. The court held that the guarantee clause merely postponed Palaniappan’s right to claim a set-off or counterclaim until he fulfilled his primary obligation to pay the guaranteed debt. Therefore, Palaniappan could have prosecuted his counterclaim if he had paid the guaranteed monies to Westpac. The court concluded that the inhibition to bringing the counterclaim was not a legal prohibition but a conditional one, tied to Palaniappan’s failure to make payment. Consequently, the Federal Court held that the clause did not exempt Palaniappan from s 40(1)(g), and his appeal was dismissed. Palaniappan was ordered to pay Westpac’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

I would, for the reasons which follow, resolve Ground 1 against the appellant which, accordingly, is sufficient for the appeal to be dismissed.Background In 2011, the Bank advanced moneys under facilities to the appellant’s company, Murray Riverside Pty Ltd, for a property development and the Bank relied on the appellant’s guarantee and indemnity executed in 2008 (the Guarantee). In March 2012, demands were made by the Bank pursuant to the Guarantee. From mid-2012 receivers appointed by the Bank (Receivers) attempted to sell Murray Riverside's property and ultimately did so in December 2013.The Supreme Court proceedings In March 2014, the Bank commenced proceedings against the appellant in the Supreme Court of Western Australia for recovery of a sum due under the Guarantee. In those proceedings, the appellant filed a defence and counterclaim in October 2014 prior to the hearing of the Bank's summary judgment application. The defence was by way of an alleged set-off of the damages claimed in the appellant’s counterclaim which asserted that the Receivers and managers appointed by the Bank sold the property at an undervalue and that, on the facts, in doing so they were acting as agents for the Bank. However, cl 9(a) of the Guarantee provided:As long as any of the guaranteed money remains unpaid, you may not, without our consent:(a) Reduce your liability under this guarantee and indemnity by claiming that you or the customer or any other person has a right of set-off or counterclaim against us. At the time of it filing the defence and counterclaim, the appellant had not paid the guaranteed money. Whether this was the result of an inability to do so or for any other reason was not revealed. Nor had the appellant obtained the relevant consent. Before Master Sanderson, on the Bank’s application for summary judgment, the Bank contended successfully that the appellant was precluded from prosecuting his set-off and counterclaim by reason of the terms of cl 9(a) of the Guarantee. Master Sanderson held that the effect of cl 9(a) was to postpone the appellant’s rights to claim a set-off (being the amount of his counterclaim): Westpac Banking Corporation v Palaniappan [2014] WASC 475 at [17]–[18]. Master Sanderson awarded partial summary judgment in December 2014 and amended that judgment in May 2015 (the Judgment): Westpac Banking Corporation v Palaniappan (No 2) [2015] WASC 227; Palaniappan v Westpac Banking Corporation [2016] WASC 72 at [4]. The appellant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on 29 April 2016: Palaniappan v Westpac Banking Corporation [2016] WASCA 72. A special leave application to the High Court of Australia was withdrawn in June 2016.The Bankruptcy Notice The Bankruptcy Notice (number BN 177877) was issued on 16 January 2015 and served by the Bank on the appellant in Malaysia on 27 February 2015. The appellant made an application in this Court to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice on 9 March 2015, which application was adjourned and programmed accordingly pending the appeal from the Judgment. Thereafter the primary judge made various programming orders towards a hearing which was ultimately held on 2 December 2016.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant acknowledges that the authorities are to the effect that if there is something that a party who wishes to prosecute a counterclaim can do in order for the counterclaim to be prosecuted in the action brought against that party, and the party does not do so, s 40(1)(g) will not be satisfied. However, he contends that none of the cases go so far as to extend that principle to payment of the claim made in the proceedings in which the counterclaim is sought to be brought. He submits that such a requirement is inconsistent with the longstanding explanations as to the purpose of s 40(1)(g).Consideration The appellant did, in fact, file a defence and counterclaim. The counterclaim is still on foot. The appellant, for this reason alone does not come within the exception in s 40(1)(g): Nath v Clipway Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 625 per Hely J at [11]. If, however, ‘unable to set up’ means, in effect, unable to prosecute rather than unable to institute a counterclaim, even then the appellant, in my opinion, fails to meet the terms of the exception. The appellant could have prosecuted his counterclaim if he had complied with the terms of the Guarantee, by paying to the Bank the guaranteed monies. By cl 9(a) of the Guarantee, so long as any of the guaranteed money remains unpaid, he could not, without the Bank's consent, reduce his liability under the Guarantee by claiming that he or Murray Riverside or any other person has a right of set-off or counterclaim against the Bank. As Buss JA, in the Court of Appeal, described the effect of cl 9 at [74] in Palanappian v Westpac Banking Corporation:74A suspension provision of the kind embodied in cl 9 of the Guarantee does not oust the jurisdiction of the courts. It suspends, but does not otherwise impair, the rights of the party bound by the provision. That party is entitled to enforce the rights in question provided it conforms with its primary obligation to make payment to the other party. See GE Capital Australia v Davis [2002] NSWSC 1146; (2002) 180 FLR 250 [93] (Bryson J); Westpac Banking Corporation v Helicopters Brisbane Pty Ltd [2012] QSC 263 [24] (Martin J). (emphasis added). Contrary to the appellant’s submission, the conclusion of the Master and, in turn the Court of Appeal, was not, in effect, a finding that, as a matter of law, the appellant could not set up his set-off and counterclaim, at least not in the sense of a legal inhibition which would attract the exception provided in s 40(1)(g)(c)(ii) of the Act. The appellant submits that on its proper construction s 40(1)(g) could not sensibly mean that it does not apply where the ‘positive inhibition’ to the bringing of a cross-claim is, as in this case, the non-payment of the self-same amount claimed in the action and which resulted in the judgment debt upon which the bankruptcy notice has issued. This, he submits, is because the section proceeds on the basis of a valid bankruptcy notice which, in many cases, as in this case, is founded upon a judgment debt and that if the disputed amount had to be paid, the operation of s 40(1)(g) would become redundant as there would not have been a bankruptcy notice in the first place.