Weston v SZEPESVARY

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTON & ANOR v SZEPESVARY & ANOR [2016] FCCA 1367
Catchwords:
BANKRUPTCY – Ex parte interlocutory application – s.30 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – orders made as sought.

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966, ss.30, 153B, 154

Cases cited:

Weston & Anor v Szepesvary & Anor (No.2) [2015] FCCA 3517

Szepsevary v Weston [2016] FCA 91 (12 February 2016)

First Applicant: PAUL GERARD WESTON
Second Applicant: PETER VRSECKY
First Respondent: AARON PAUL SZEPESVARY
Second Respondent: BUKET OZDIL
File Number: MLG 1036 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Hartnett
Hearing date: 10 May 2016
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 10 May 2016

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Devanny
Solicitors for the Applicant: Smith Leonard Fahey

THE COURT ORDERS EX PARTE THAT:

  1. Pursuant to section 30 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) the bankrupts AARON PAUL SZEPESVARY and BUKET OZDIL (‘the bankrupts’) be restrained from:-

    (a)contacting the sale agent, Mr Joe Zucco of Paul McDonald Real Estate; and/or

    (b)contacting any employee or agent of Mr Joe Zucco regarding the sale of 44B Woodland Street, Strathmore in the State of Victoria; and/or

    (c)taking any other steps to interfere in any way in the sale of 44B Woodland Street, Strathmore in the State of Victoria, including attendance at the auction on 14 May 2016, together with any delayed auction that may be relisted.

  2. Service of this order be effected forthwith by email upon the bankrupts by the solicitors for the Applicants to the email address at yourwiredforsound@bigpond.com.

  3. Liberty to apply to the bankrupts on short notice.

  4. Liberty to apply generally.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 1036 of 2015

PAUL GERARD WESTON

First Applicant

PETER VRSECKY

Second Applicant

And

AARON PAUL SZEPESVARY

First Respondent

BUKET OZDIL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Edited Ex Tempore Reasons)

History

  1. Before the Court is an interlocutory application brought pursuant to s.30 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (‘the Act’) seeking orders which the Court makes this day. The application is supported by affidavit sworn by Lisa Maree McNicholas on 10 May 2016. Ms McNicholas is the solicitor for the Applicants in the interlocutory proceeding who, subject to supervision by her principal, has the conduct and control of the matter on behalf of the Applicants.

  2. On 21 December 2015, her Honour Judge Riley made orders in favour of the Applicants for vacant possession of the property known as and situate at 44B Woodland Street Strathmore in the State of Victoria (‘the property’).[1] 

  3. On 25 January 2016 the Court issued a warrant of possession in favour of the Applicants in relation to the property. 

  4. On 23 February 2016 the warrant of possession in favour of the Applicants was executed by the Sheriff’s Office of Victoria with the assistance of Victoria Police, and possession of the property was handed over to the Applicants. 

  5. On or about 25 February 2016 Mr Joe Zucco of Paul McDonald Real Estate was engaged on behalf of…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCCA 1367
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Weston v Szepesvary*, heard before Hartnett J in the Supreme Court of Victoria, the dispute concerned a claim for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff, Weston, alleged that the defendant, Szepesvary, was negligent in the operation of his vehicle, which resulted in the collision and subsequent injuries to the plaintiff. The defendant denied negligence and, in the alternative, raised the defence of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the defendant had breached his duty of care to the plaintiff by operating his vehicle negligently, and if so, whether the plaintiff had also contributed to the accident through their own negligence. The court was required to assess the evidence presented by both parties to determine causation and the apportionment of blame, if any.

Hartnett J found that the defendant had been negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout and in failing to take reasonable steps to avoid the collision. The court applied the principles of negligence as established in common law, focusing on the duty of care owed by drivers to other road users and the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver in the circumstances. While the court found the defendant primarily at fault, it also determined that the plaintiff had contributed to the accident by failing to take reasonable precautions for their own safety. Consequently, the court apportioned liability between the parties.

The court ordered that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages, but these were reduced by 20% to reflect the plaintiff's contributory negligence. The quantum of damages was to be assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established