Weston and ANOR v SZEPESVARY and ANOR (No.2)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTON & ANOR v SZEPESVARY & ANOR (No.2) [2015] FCCA 3517
Catchwords:
BANKRUPTCY – Trustees seeking vacant possession of property formerly vested in bankrupts – oral claim property acquired partly with protected monies – s.116(4) of Bankruptcy Act 1966 applies.
Legislation:
Bankruptcy Act 1966 ss.58, 115(1), 116(1), 116(2)(d)(iii)(A), 116(2)(iv), 116(2)(n), 116(3), 116(4)
Judiciary Act 1903 s.79(1)
Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) s.234D
First Applicant: PAUL GERARD WESTON
Second Applicant: PETR VRSECKY
First Respondent: AARON SZEPESVARY
Second Respondent: BUKET OZDIL
File number: MLG 1036 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Riley
Hearing date: 21 December 2015
Date of last submission: 21 December 2015
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 21 December 2015

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the applicants: Brenton P. Devanny
Solicitors for the applicants: Smith Leonard Fahey Lawyers
Counsel for the first respondent: The first respondent appeared in person
Solicitors for the first respondent: The first respondent was not represented
Counsel for the second respondent: The second respondent appeared in person
Solicitors for the second  respondent: The second respondent was not represented

DECLARATION

  1. The land described as Lot 2 on Plan of Subdivision 324371G being the whole of the land in Certificate of Title Volume 10101 Folio 392 (“the Land”) being the land known as 44B Woodland Street, Strathmore, in the State of Victoria vests in the applicants pursuant to ss.58, 115(1) and 116(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) as tenants in common in equal shares.

ORDERS

  1. The respondents deliver up to the applicants vacant possession of the Land within 14 days of this order.

  2. Pursuant to s.234D of the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) as applied by s.79(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903, the land and buildings comprising the property be sold by the applicants.

  3. The applicants have the sole conduct and control of the sale of the Land, and are authorised to make all decisions with regard to the sale including appointing a real estate agent, appointing solicitors to undertake the necessary conveyance, choosing the method of sale and setting the reserve price (if any) for the sale.

  4. In the event that the respondents fail to deliver up vacant possession of the Land in accordance with the order 2 above, a warrant of possession shall issue forthwith in favour of the applicants.

  5. The respondents at their own cost and expense must remove from the Land all vehicles, chattels and personal possessions on the Land and any rubbish on the Land which has not vested in the applicants (the personal property) within 14 days of the date of this order.

  6. In the event that the respondents fail to comply with order 6 above, the applicants are empowered to remove and dispose of the personal property as they see fit after 14 days have passed from the making of this order.

  7. The respondents have liberty to bid at any auction sale of the Land on the condition that they have demonstrated, prior to any auction, the financial means to purchase the Land.

  8. The proceeds of the…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCCA 3517
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the District Court of New South Wales, Judge Riley considered a dispute between the plaintiffs, Weston and another, and the defendants, Szepesvary and another. The proceedings concerned an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants from proceeding with a sale of property.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiffs had established a serious question to be tried regarding their claim that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duties and acted in contravention of the *Real Property Act 1900* (NSW) by proceeding with the sale of a property. The court was required to assess whether the balance of convenience favoured granting an interlocutory injunction to preserve the status quo pending a final determination of the substantive proceedings.

Judge Riley's reasoning focused on the plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate a strong arguable case that the defendants had acted in breach of their fiduciary obligations or statutory duties. The court found that the evidence did not establish that the defendants had acted improperly in their dealings concerning the property sale. Consequently, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the threshold requirement of establishing a serious question to be tried, and therefore, the balance of convenience did not favour the grant of an interlocutory injunction.

The court ordered that the application for an interlocutory injunction be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established