Westmite Pty Ltd v the Law Society of SA No. Scgrg-98-853 Judgment No. S75

Case [1999] SASC 75


WESTMITE PTY LTD v THE LAW SOCIETY OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

[1999] SASC 75

Civil

Debelle J  (ex tempore)

  1. On 30 July 1997, Westmite Pty Ltd made a claim against the Legal Practitioners Guarantee Fund pursuant to s60 of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981. On 8 April 1998 the Law Society rejected the claim pursuant to s63 of the Act. Section 63(4) of the Act provides a right of appeal to this court by a claimant who is aggrieved by the decision of the Law Society. Section 63(4) reads:

    “A claimant who is aggrieved by a determination of the Society under this section may appeal to the Supreme Court against the determination.”

As a person aggrieved by the Law Society's determination to reject its claim, Westmite Pty Ltd has appealed to this court. 

  1. The Law Society has applied for a preliminary determination of the nature of the appeal.  The determination of that question will have an important bearing upon the manner in which the appeal will be conducted.  It will affect such matters as whether pleadings are required, whether either party may lead evidence, and whether the parties may obtain discovery of documents.  It is plainly desirable that the question be determined at an early stage. 

  2. The word “appeal” is a word of flexible meaning.  It is capable of describing at least three kinds of procedures and, although each is a review of a prior decision, each differs in the manner in which it is conducted.  The nature of the three kinds of appeal was helpfully reviewed by Cox J in Wigg v Architects Board South Australia (1984) 36 SASR 111. I respectfully adopt His Honour's reasoning. It is also important to note His Honour's caveat (at p114) as to the possibility of a hybrid kind of appeal.

  3. Which of these three kinds of appeal is designated in any statutory provision will depend upon the legislative intention as disclosed on examination of the legislation as a whole:  Builders Licensing Board v Sperway Constructions (Syd) Pty Ltd (1976) 135 CLR 616 at 621, Wigg v Architects Board of SA (supra) at 113 to 114, and reColdham; ex parte Brideson (No 2) (1990) 170 CLR 267 at 273 to 274. While the search must always be to glean the legislative intention, it is nevertheless well settled that, when the legislature gives a court the power to review or hear an appeal against the decision of an administrative body, a presumption arises that the court is to exercise original jurisdiction and to determine the matter on the evidence and law applicable as at the date of the curial proceedings: ex parte Australian Sporting Club Ltd (1947) 47 SR(NSW) 283 approved in Re Coldham; ex Parte Brideson (No 2) (supra) at 273. 

  4. There are several factors which point to the conclusion that the intention is that s63(4) provides an appeal de novo.  First, the claimant against the Guarantee Fund has no right to be heard before the Law Society.  The claimant's only right of audience is before the court on appeal.  Next, there is no record of what takes place in the Law Society and there is no statutory obligation upon the Society to give reasons for its decision.  I do not stay with the question whether the Society is obliged at common law to give reasons. All that is known is the Society's decision. Thirdly, s63(7) is expressed in terms which are wide enough to indicate that the evidence, the subject of that  provision, may be adduced on an appeal.  To summarise, an appeal to this court is the only opportunity for a claimant to be able to adduce evidence to be heard and to have his claim properly ventilated. 

  5. For these reasons, the right of the claimant to appeal to this court pursuant to s63(4) is an appeal de novo.  I note that a similar right of appeal in New South Wales has been treated as an appeal de novo, although the matter was not argued and the Law Society conceded the point in van Houten v Law Society of New South Wales (unreported, 11 December 1991, Abadee J) and Harrison v Law Society of New South Wales (unreported, 1 September 1993, Smart J).  Those decisions were noted without question but were not examined in Vassiliadis v Law Society of New South Wales (1997) 41 NSW LR 383 at 386 to 387. 

  6. The parties have already filed points of claim and points of defence.  They are sufficient for elucidating the issues of fact and law. The appeal should hereafter proceed in a manner similar to the conduct of an action with the parties at liberty to seek discovery of documents, give notice to admit and the like.  

  7. There will be an order that this appeal proceed in a manner similar to that for the conduct of an action.

Details
AGLC
Westmite Pty Ltd v the Law Society of SA No. Scgrg-98-853 Judgment No. S75 [1999] SASC 75
Case
[1999] SASC 75
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of South Australia, Westmite Pty Ltd has brought an appeal against the Law Society of South Australia following the rejection of a claim made under s60 of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981. The Law Society rejected the claim pursuant to s63 of the Act, and Westmite, being aggrieved by the decision, has appealed to the Supreme Court under the same section. The primary issue before the court was to determine the nature of the appeal process provided by s63(4) of the Act. Specifically, it needed to be clarified whether the appeal was de novo, meaning a fresh and complete examination of the case by the court, or if it was another form of review such as certiorari or prohibition. The court found that the appeal provided by s63(4) is indeed de novo. This conclusion was based on several factors, including the claimant's lack of a prior right to be heard by the Law Society, the absence of a statutory obligation for the Society to provide reasons for its decision, and the broad terms of s63(7) which allow for the introduction of new evidence on appeal. The court further noted that similar appeals in New South Wales have been treated as de novo appeals. Given this determination, the appeal will proceed in a manner similar to the conduct of an ordinary action, with the parties having the opportunity to seek discovery of documents and other procedural steps. The court ordered that the appeal should proceed as an ordinary action, allowing for full discovery and other procedural opportunities for both parties.

Orders

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Background

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Evidence

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