Westfield Management Ltd v Brisbane City Council & Anor

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PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT COURT
OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Westfield Management Ltd v Brisbane City Council & Anor [2003] QPEC 010

PARTIES:

WESTFIELD MANAGEMENT LTD      Applicant
v
BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL       First Respondent
&
HA BACHRACH (NOM)
PROPRIETARY LIMITED          Second Respondent

FILE NO:

4951 of 2002

PROCEEDING:

Application for declarations

HEARING DATE:

31 March, 1 and 2 April 2003

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

17 April 2003

JUDGE:

Judge Brabazon Q.C.

ORDER:

Declaration that Council’s decision is invalid and is set aside. The application is remitted to Council to be dealt with according to law.

CATCHWORDS:

LOCAL GOVERNMENT – TOWN PLANNING - declaration – compliance of proposal with local plan - interpretation of City Plan 2000 – “jurisdictional fact” – meaning of “have regard to” – review of Council’s decision, effect of town planning report

Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) s 3.5.4; s 3.5.11; s3.5.13

Reservilt Pty Ltd v. Maroochy Shire Council (2002) QCA 367

Weightman v. Gold Coast City Council (2002) QCA 234

Vynotas Pty Ltd v. Brisbane City Council [2001] 1 Qd R 108

Grosser v. Gold Coast City Council (2001) 117 LGRA 153

Eshenko v. Cummins (2000) QPELR 386

Buck v. Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Yusef (2001) 75 ALJR 1105

Dunlop v. Woollahra Municipal Council (1975) 2 NSWLR 446

R v. Brisbane City Council; ex parte Read [1986] 2 Qd R 22

Timbarra Protection Coalition Inc v. Ross Mining ML (1999) 46 NSWLR 55

Zhang v. Canterbury City Council (2001) 51 NSWLR 589

Ballymont v. Ipswich City Council (2002) QCA 233

COUNSEL:

Mr D Gore QC and Mr T Trotter for the applicant
Mr M Hinson SC for the first respondent
Mr P Lyons QC and Mr R Litster for the second respondent

SOLICITORS:

Minter Ellison for the appellant
Brisbane City Legal Practice for the first respondent
Praeger Batt for the second respondent

  1. Introduction

  1. On 22 July 2002 H A Bachrach (Nom) Pty Ltd (Bachrach) lodged a development application with the Brisbane City Council.  It contained a proposal to re-develop a large site in the Nundah shopping district so that there would be a shopping centre, offices and multi-unit dwellings in an integrated development on the land.  These are the main aspects of the proposal:

“-     total GFA 20,185sqm incorporating a 3,300sqm Woolworths supermarket, 2,100sqm specially shops along an enclosed retail mall, 2,510sqm offices, and 10,500sqm residential (approx. 92 dwelling units);

-      building height up to 10 storeys above ground, comprising a 3 storey podium (2 levels of parking, 1 level of retail and offices) and a 6-7 storey residential tower above the podium;

-       access to retail car parking via Buckland Rd and Aspinall St;

-       access to residential car parking via Aspinall St;

-       service vehicle access to retail off Buckland St;

-       491 parking spaces – 146 residential; 345 retail/commercial;

-       pedestrian connections through the site via retail mall between Sandgate Rd and Aspinall St, and via the car park between Buckland St and Aspinall St.” (from Exhibit 8)

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Details
Case
[2003] QPEC 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Westfield Management Ltd v Brisbane City Council & Anor, the primary dispute involved the interpretation of the City Plan 2000 and the compliance of a development proposal with the local planning scheme. The court was tasked with determining whether the Brisbane City Council's decision to approve the development application was legally sound and whether the Council correctly applied the relevant provisions of the Integrated Planning Act (IPA). Specifically, the court needed to assess whether the Council's decision-making process complied with the statutory requirement to consider applications solely against the applicable codes and common material, and whether the Council properly exercised its discretion under section 3.5.13 of the IPA.

The central legal issues revolved around the concept of a "jurisdictional fact" and the interpretation of the phrase "have regard to" in the context of the Council's approval process. Westfield argued that a jurisdictional fact existed, necessitating the Council's satisfaction about compliance with the code before it could approve the application. Conversely, Bachrach contended that no jurisdictional fact was required, and that the Council's discretion arose only if it was satisfied that compliance could not be achieved with or without conditions. The court found merit in Bachrach's argument, concluding that the IPA does not mandate the establishment of a jurisdictional fact before the Council exercises its discretion. Instead, the court held that the Council must consider compliance with the code as part of its decision-making process.

The court further held that the Council's decision-making process was flawed because it improperly considered factors outside the statutory framework. The Council had referenced recent planning intentions and private views of its officers, which were not accessible to the public and thus not permissible in the code assessment process. The court emphasised that the statutory requirement for local authorities to consider applications strictly against the provisions of the codes and common material must be adhered to, ensuring the expectations of those relying on the planning schemes are not subverted. Consequently, the court declared the Council's decision invalid and set it aside, remitting the application to the Council for reconsideration in accordance with the law.

Orders

Orders of the court

Declaration that Council’s decision is invalid and is set aside. The application is remitted to Council to be dealt with according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

Jurisdictional Facts It was submitted on behalf of Westfield that s.3.5.13(4) meant that the Council could only deal with the application if a “jurisdictional fact” existed – that is, the existence of its satisfaction about compliance with the code. To understand the submission, and its possible impact, it is necessary to understand the essential features of the concept of jurisdictional fact: It was submitted on behalf of Bachrach that no jurisdictional fact arose here. It was said that non-compliance with the Code, with or without the imposition of conditions, was a fact to be objectively established before the Council’s discretion arose under s.3.5.13(4). The reference to “satisfaction” was significant. Satisfaction, or the absence of it, was to be reached as part of the usual decision making process entrusted to the council, and was not some matter which is preliminary or ancillary to the Council’s assessment of the application. It was further submitted that the idea of a jurisdictional fact in this case would undermine the distinction between appeals on the merits and reviews involving questions about how the Council proceeded. Likewise, it was submitted that s.3.5.13(2) did not raise a question of jurisdictional fact, as its operation only arises if council is satisfied that development does not comply with the Code, even with conditions. In my opinion, the submission for Bachrach should be accepted. Section 3.5.13 does not contain a need for a jurisdictional fact to be established. Rather, it refers to a fact which has to be considered by the council in the course of its decision making process. It should also be noted, that approval will be the usual course, unless Council is satisfied that compliance cannot be achieved. (The above statements of principle about jurisdictional facts are based on the comprehensive judgment of the Chief Justice of NSW in Timbarra Protection Coalition Inc v. Ross Mining ML (1999) 46 NSWLR 55.) The Validity of the Decision The Planner’s references to the Council’s recent planning intentions may be factually accurate, but they were impermissible to the extent that compliance within the code was being considered. Counsel at the hearing did not attempt to support them. The reason is clear. The provisions of City Plan, and its codes, are binding on the Council itself as much as on members of the public. The statutory provisions say that the application will be considered only against the applicable code, and common material. It is true that in some cases a planning authority (and this court) can look at planning intentions in addition to those in the planning scheme. For example, a proposed amendment to the planning scheme, which has been made public, might be taken into account. That is the well known Coty principle. Here, the matters taken into account seem to include some private views of the Council, or of its officers, or of the planner herself. There is nothing to indicate that such views were accessible in any way to anyone outside Council. In the case of code assessment, where there is no appeal, it is important that the statutory requirement on local authorities, to consider applications against the provisions of the codes, be strictly observed. If not, the expectations of all those who rely on the provisions of IPA and planning schemes will be subverted in ways which they may well know nothing about.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Council’s Decision Officers of the Council understood that they should act according to those powers. The minutes of the decision arrived at by the Urban Management Committee on 18 December 2002 (Ex 10) include a recital of the matters put before it, including the recommendation of the Development Assessment Committee. Page 1 of the approval package records that the assessment of the application had been undertaken by a project team of three Council officers. In addition to an engineering officer and an urban designer, the team included a Miss Paula Moretti, described as “Assessment Manager – Development Assessment Team North.” The decision of the Urban Management Committee contained some preliminary recitals, to this effect:“(a) The Town Planner, Development Assessment Team North, reports that an application has been submitted by Bachrach (describing this application).(b) The Town Planner adds that the application was code assessable with no formal public notification required under IPA. Section 3.5.4 of IPA provides that for code assessable applications the Assessment Manager must assess the application only against the applicable codes and the common material.(c) The Town Planner advises that the Development Assessment Committee considered the application on 12 December 2002, and it was recommended that the Council approve the application as requested, subject to reasonable and relevant conditions.(d) The Town Planner therefore recommended that the application be approved subject to reasonable and relevant conditions, and the Committee agreed.(e) The application was code assessable and required no formal public notification.(f) Pursuant to s 3.5.4 of IPA, it has been assessed against the applicable codes and the common material.(g) The Council is required by s 3.5.11(1) of IPA to approve the application subject to reasonable and relevant conditions.” (emphasis added)The Council – No doubt the error in para (g), saying the Council is required to approve the application subject to reasonable and relevant conditions, can be overlooked as a slip – no submission was made about it. The approval can be easily recognised as one made under the above paraphrase of s 3.5.13(4)(a) and (b) - compliance with the code has been achieved by the imposition of conditions. There is some documentary evidence showing how Council reached its decision. No witness was called by any party, on that issue. It is necessary to pay close attention to the documents. It is easier to draw inferences from the documents because no other evidence was given about the decision-making process. The recommendation of the Development Assessment Committee is in precisely the same form as the following decision of Council – apart from the fact that the former refers to a recommendation, while the latter refers to a decision. The recommendation was signed by Miss Moretti, described as “Town Planner, Development Assessment Team West” and also by another officer. A “Report and Recommendation on Development Application” by the town planner is in evidence. It is dated 17 December 2002 (the day before the Council’s decision). The bottom of its first page also bears the date 12 December 2002. Bearing in mind the recitals of the recommendation and the decision, the inference is that the Town Planner’s report was before each committee. It also bears a stamp which appears to contain a handwritten file number, which is unexplained. The stamp says “Council’s Delegate” - which was the role of the Urban Management Committee.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established