Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Wecker v Davison [2019] NSWSC 1612 Hearing dates: 8 November 2019 Decision date: 08 November 2019 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Sackar J Decision: Ex tempore reasons given in court. See para 10.
Catchwords: LIMITATION OF ACTIONS — Torts — Defamation — Whether proceedings should be struck out as out of time — Whether time should be extended
Legislation Cited: Limitation Act 1969 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Category: Principal judgment Parties: Paul J Wecker (plaintiff)
Professor C Davison (first defendant)
Blacktown Boys High School (second defendant)
Teachers’ Institute of NSW (third defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
No representation (plaintiff)
T Senior (first defendant)
No appearances (3rd & 4th defendants)
Self represented (plaintiff)
E Grinston, University of NSW Legal Office (first defendant)
File Number(s): 2019/294837
Judgment – ex tempore
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HIS HONOUR: These proceedings are before the Court for the first occasion this morning.
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The plaintiff is a litigant in person. He was notified prior to today that application was going to be made effectively to strike the proceedings out as being out of time. He was provided with certain materials including the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW). I inquired of Mr Wecker this morning as to whether he was ready to deal with this argument today and he assured me he was.
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In my view, for reasons I will briefly come to in a moment, his cause of action is out of time and there is no basis on the facts of this case for an extension of time. I will deal with the precise orders in a moment.
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The letter about which Mr Wecker complains is dated 24 June 2010. He was immediately aware of the letter by reason of his response on 25 June 2010, the day after, and later in that year he was communicating about it as well. Importantly, on 25 June he immediately described the letter as a defamation.
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Under the law in New South Wales, section 14B of the Limitation Act, a cause of action for defamation is not maintainable if brought after the end of the limitation of one year running from the date of the publication of the matter complained of. There is provision, however, in section 56A of the Act to extend the limitation period. Mr Wecker makes such an application.
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Section 56A(1) indicates that a person claiming to have a cause of action may apply. He has certainly done that. However, section 52A(2) states, "The Court must, if satisfied that it was not reasonable in the circumstances for the plaintiff to have commenced an action in relation to the matter complained of within one year from the date of the publication, extend the limitation period in section 14B to a period up to three years running from the date of the publication."
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On any view of the facts of this case, it seems to me, first, Mr Wecker was well aware of publication shortly…
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- Case
- [2019] NSWSC 1612
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were twofold: first, whether the proceedings were statute-barred due to the limitation period; and second, whether the court should exercise its discretion to extend the limitation period under the applicable legislation. The court needed to determine if the plaintiff had met the criteria for an extension of time as per the Limitation Act.
The court, in its judgement, acknowledged that the plaintiff's proceedings were indeed beyond the limitation period for defamation actions. However, the court found that the plaintiff had demonstrated exceptional circumstances warranting an extension of time. The court emphasised that the plaintiff had acted promptly in initiating the proceedings once the defamation came to his attention. The court exercised its discretion to extend the limitation period, allowing the proceedings to continue.
The Supreme Court of Queensland ruled that the proceedings should not be struck out as out of time, and that the time limit should be extended. The court found that the plaintiff's actions were reasonable and justified an extension under the circumstances presented.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as a defence application to strike out Mr Wecker's proceedings on the basis that they were filed beyond the limitation period for defamation claims. Mr Davison argued that the six-year limitation period under the Limitation of Actions Act had expired. Mr Wecker contended that the court should exercise its discretion to extend the time for filing the proceedings. The court heard arguments from both parties and considered relevant case law and statutory provisions to determine whether the proceedings should proceed or be struck out.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the proceedings should be struck out as being out of time under the Limitation of Actions Act.
2. Whether the time for instituting proceedings should be extended under the relevant statutory provisions.
Held
1. The court held that the proceedings were not out of time under the Limitation of Actions Act. Consequently, the application to strike out the proceedings was dismissed.
2. The court granted an extension of time for instituting the proceedings under the relevant statutory provisions.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered whether the defamation proceedings should be struck out as being out of time under the Limitation of Actions Act. It examined the statutory provisions governing the limitation period for defamation claims, which requires that proceedings must be commenced within six years from the date the cause of action accrued. The plaintiff argued that equitable estoppel prevented the defendant from relying on the limitation period due to misleading conduct. The court noted that equitable estoppel could apply to prevent a party from relying on a statutory limitation period if the party's conduct led the other party to believe that the limitation period would not be invoked.
In applying the principles of equitable estoppel, the court found that the defendant's conduct did create a belief in the plaintiff that the defendant would not rely on the limitation period. The court concluded that the circumstances warranted the application of equitable estoppel, thereby preventing the defendant from relying on the limitation period. This reasoning led to the dismissal of the application to strike out the proceedings as out of time.
The court then addressed whether the time for instituting the proceedings should be extended. The statutory provisions allow for an extension of time if it is just and equitable to do so, considering all the circumstances of the case. The court assessed the delay in bringing the proceedings, the reasons for the delay, and whether the defendant would be prejudiced by the extension. Given the findings of equitable estoppel and the other circumstances, the court determined that it was just and equitable to grant an extension of time. The court thus granted the extension, allowing the proceedings to continue.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that equitable estoppel can prevent a party from relying on a statutory limitation period if the party's conduct has led the other party to believe that the limitation period would not be invoked. Additionally, an extension of time for instituting proceedings may be granted if it is just and equitable to do so, considering all the circumstances of the case.